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PREFACE 
This issue of Acta Linguistica contains a selection of the papers presented at 
the conference on Metapragmatic Terms held in Budapest , July 3 through 
5,1990, and jointly organized by the Research Institute for Linguistic of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the International Pragmatics Association 
(IPrA), Antwerp. Metapragmatics is an empirical-conceptual approach to lin-
guistic action. It is an a t tempt to come to grips with the varying ways in which 
linguistic behavior is conceptualized by those engaged in it , by way of scruti-
nizing empirically observable linguistic reflections of those conceptualizations 
(such as linguistic action verbials, i.e. the verbs and verb-like expressions used, 
in natural language, to talk about the conceptualized behavior in question). 
This metapragmatic approach to verbal communication is motivated by the 
assumption that the meaning of social practices can only be fully understood 
by gaining insight into the worlds of ideas with which the participants associate 
them, and in terms of which they interpret them. It ul t imate goal, which can 
only be achieved after further scrutinizing the complex interactions between 
concepts and actual practices, is to shed light on cross-linguistic and cross-
cultural communication problems which may result, in par t , from differences 
in the mental communicative frames in terms of which interacting members 
of different linguistic, cultural or subcultural background, operate. 
A useful s tar t ing point for the study of differences in the lexicalization and 
conceptualization of linguistic interaction, and of their behavioral correlates, 
may be the description of metapragmatic terms, i.e. linguistic entities which 
reflect directly the conceptualization of linguistic interaction. The present vol-
ume is devoted to this problem. 
Fall 1992 
Ferenc Kiefer Jef Verschueren 
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METAPRAGMATICS IN LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT: 
EVIDENCE FROM SPEECH AND GESTURE* 
JUSTINE CASSEL 
I. Introduction 
In this paper, language acquisition data will be brought to bear on the ques-
tion of what constitutes a metapragmatic term, and what relationship exists 
between metapragmatic terms and metanarrative discourse (a concept that 
I'll explain further below). In using the s tudy of development to answer ques-
tions asked by linguists working on adult language I am assuming t h a t data 
from acquisition is not just an earlier stage in or detour from studying adult 
speakers. One might ask: "Why kids? Aren' t they just the ones who do it 
wrong?" But as Ochs-Schieffelin (1979) point out "Nowhere is the importance 
of an i tem more noticeable than in its absence. Child language is valuable to 
a study of pragmatics in par t because it demonstrates gaps in competence". 
The na ture of metapragmatics can here be elucidated by an examination of 
its absence. 
First , however, a number of primary distinctions need to be drawn. Fol-
lowing Morris (1938) we distinguish between "relations which a given sign 
sustains and the signs used in talking about such relations" (1938, 7). The 
sign participates in three dyadic relations, broadly speaking, and these are 
syntax:, semantics, and pragmatics, and each of these relations is subject to 
talk at a 'higher level of semiosis', that is to metalinguistic discourse. It is the 
last relation, pragmatics, defined by Morris as the relationship between a sign 
and its "interpreter" (here we may gloss that as 'user ') , and its corresponding 
metalanguage that concerns us here. 
Current discussions of pragmatics tend to fall into one of two camps: a) 
descriptions of pragmatic meanings in terms of propositional-like rules with 
structures that should parallel those of syntactic or semantic descriptions— 
pragmatics as a part of 'reference-and-predication' (Silverstein, 1987); or 
* Prepara t ion of this manuscript was suppor ted by a 1989-90 dissertation research grant 
from the National Science Foundation, by a 1989-90 dissertat ion grant from the Spencer 
Foundation, and by a 1990 dissertation grant f rom NIMH. 
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b) descriptions privileging the distinctions set forth by Peirce (1932) who took 
into account not only the sign and the user, but also the context of use (the 
respect or capacity in "something stands to somebody for something in some 
respect or capacity"1) . Into this latter camp falls, for example, Bates (1976) 
who, following Silverstein, defines pragmatics as the s tudy of linguistic in-
dices, which cannot, be described without reference to the context of their use 
(1976,3). This latter approach, often found under the rubric 'ethnography 
of speaking', allows an examination of the function of particular pragmatic 
forms—not only their socially understood purposive funct ion, but also their 
function as indices at a higher level of the context of speaking in which they 
are uttered (Silverstein 1987). 
It is the la t ter kind of pragmatics which allows, too, a metapragmatics, 
where this might be defined as kinds of implicit contextualization cues, or signs 
indexing the use of signs in context by users. Metalinguistic discourse, at least 
in the psycholinguistic l i terature, has often been conceived of in terms of ex-
plicit comments that indicate t h a t the speaker is reflecting on language in some 
way. That is, metalinguistic awareness is commonly thought to be evidenced by 
self-corrections or repairs, questions about proper usage, comments about the 
speech of others, language play, judgements of linguistic structure and func-
t ion, comments about languages and about language in general (Clark 1978). 
Metapragmatics can be both a subbranch of metalinguistics (note that some of 
t h e mentioned topics are actually metasemantic), and a special privileged do-
ma in in which to study it. If indexicals of various sorts comprise the object of 
s tudy of pragmatics, then pragmatic usage contains metapragmatic usage, in 
some sense, since all indexicals, by definition, index their own use in context.2 
Seen in this way, metapragmatics can be the study of te rms that index the 
speaker 's knowledge of and purposive functions for communicative situations, 
as well as indexing an entire cultural construction of the kind of interaction 
being engaged in ( 'metapragmatic function vs. metapragmatic discourse' Sil-
verstein 1985, 1990). 
1
 Cf.: Logic as semiotic: the teory of signs [from ms. c. 1897]. In: Buchler, J. (ed.) 1955. 
Philosophical Writ ings of Peirce, 99. 
2 
P u t otherwise, every metapragmat ics has a pragmat ics at a higher functional order. 
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II. Metapragmatics in narrative 
(1) Adults 
A. Speech 
One domain where the use of metapragmatic terms to denote bo th the com-
municative functions of the speech situation, and the speaker's construction 
of the speech event, is particularly clear is narrative. When narra t ing a story 
adults often make clear where this narration fits into the interactive text— 
tha t is, into the larger speech event currently taking place (Polanyi 1989),3  
who the narration is aimed towards (Goodwin 1986), and what the speaker's 
relationship may be to the segment of events just then being narrated. This 
last feature can be captured by a set of distinctions grouped under the heading 
of narrative, metanarrative, and paranarrative kinds of events. 
The narrator of the stories that I study (stories told to a friend about 
a cartoon or movie just seen) does not fill the role of narra tor throughout 
the storytelling process. The 'narrator ' is at first a viewer, face-to-face with 
a television screen on which is displayed a 'visual text '—the representation 
in images of a particular story about Tweetie Bird and Sylvester, (or a mur-
derer loose in London). After serving as the (somewhat) passive recipient of 
a narration, the roles are reversed and the recipient then becomes provider of 
a narration, telling the story to someone who has never seen the cartoon or 
movie. Each role entails a situational frame, or participation framework which 
organizes spatial and temporal configurations of speakers and hearers, and 
experienceable durations understandable in terms of events. The sequence of 
events that comprises the story proper is only one of a number of sequences of 
events tha t comprise the narrative. The sort of storytelling t ha t concerns us 
is composed of five 'event-lines', or 'stretches of time', that make up the three 
narrative levels. The speaker's reference to each of these event lines, then, is 
metapragmatic in that it denotes an aspect of the construction of the current 
speech event. 
The five event lines that speakers have access to are (1) the event sequence 
of the story ( the emplotment of characters across situations of [interactions); 
(2) the organization in the cartoon, or event of the visual text; (3) the duration 
or events of the viewing; (4) the representation of events that the fu ture 
О
 t 
Actually, speakers more often make clear where the narration fits in to the denotat ional 
t ex t—tha t is the record of what is to be talked about : the topic—and less often do they 
explicitly fit the narration into the interactional text: into the network of social practices 
evoked by the speech event (Silverstein 1990, personal communication) 
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speaker has formed; and (5) the events of the interpersonal narrative, or event 
of the telling.4 These are listed in Figure (I). 
Paranarrative Metanarrative Narrative 
Figure (I) EVENT LINES IN NARRATIVE 
These distinct event lines are important because all of them may equally 
well form the topic of the narrative that the listener hears. That is, not only 
the events of Sylvester chasing Tweetie Bird and then not catching him can 
be conveyed in a narrative, but also the event of watching the cartoon and 
then describing it may be described to the interlocutor. A distinction is drawn 
here between the happening of the events from their ordering in some narra-
tion. The event sequence of the story (1) comprises the narrative level of the 
discourse. The visual text (2), viewing (3), and representation (4) form the 
metanarrative level of the discourse: the part of the narrative that is about 
narrating. The interpersonal narrative (5) is what we are referring to as the 
4
 I owe this conception of the structure of events in narra t ive to Michael Silverstein 
(personal communication). 
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paranarrative level of the discourse: the part of the story where the narra-
tor steps out and changes footing (Goffman 1981), and speaks in his/her own 
voice to the listener. An example of each of these narrative levels is provided 
in Figure (II)—the example is taken from the beginning of a story told by an 
adult on the basis of a cartoon she had just seen. 
B. Gesture 
Adults make reference to all three levels, and all 5 event lines during a typ-
ical story. Their metanarrative speech functions metapragmatically to index 
the structure of the speech being produced. Adults also demonstrate a typical 
pat tern of gesturing correlated with reference to these different kinds of events 
(McNeill-Levy 1982). Iconic gestures, that depict some feature of the action 
or event being described, occur most often with narrative speech. Metaphoric 
gestures, where the concept being depicted has no physical form, and deictic 
gestures accompany metanarrative speech. Paranarrative speech is character-
ized by few gestures other than occasional deictics indicating the listener. The 
move between narrat ive levels is also characterized by a pat tern of gesture 
use. Specifically, clauses that effect a move from narrative to metanarrat ive, or 
metanarrative to paranarrative, are accompanied by a fourth kind of gesture, 
the beat. This association of gestures to narrative level is shown in Figure (III). 
Beat gestures are small baton like movements that do not change in form 
with the content of the accompanying speech. An example is given below: 
[Right], [okay this one] [actually wasn't] a B.B. cartoon 
beat beat beat 
(open right hand away from body sweeps out three times) 
In this example the beats are indexing the co-construction of a shared 
narrative event: they are signs of the interactional text in progress. The semi-
otic value of a beat lies in the fact that it indexes the word or phrase it 
accompanies as being significant not purely for its semantic content but also 
for its discourse-pragmatic content. The beat is particularly sensitive to the 
momentary indexing of the larger discourse structure or narrative situation as 
a whole. Thus gesture can serve a metapragmatic function in conjunction with 
particular functions of the speech that accompanies it, and it can also serve 
the function of revealing metapragmatic work in progress. In Figure (IV) is 
the story beginning given earlier, but with the gestures noted as well. Figure 
(IV) also gives the beginning of a story narrat ion in French, to illustrate that 
the phenomenon is not limited to English speakers. 
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1. urn have you seen any of the uh Bugs 
Bunny cartoons? [PARA] 
(yeah like} 
2. right, ok this one actually wasn't a 
Bugs Bunny cartoon [META] 
3. it was one of the- the series [META] 
(oh, ok} 
4. and it had Tweetie Bird and Sylvester [META] 
(alright (laugh)} 
5. so so so you know [PARA] 
(the cat right?} 
6. right uh huh 
{ok} 
7. and uh the first scene you see is uh [META] 
8. this this window with birdwatcher's society underneath it 
9. and there's Sylvester peeking around 
the window [NARR] 
Figure (II) NARRATIVE LEVELS 
(2) Children 
The issue that concerns us here is the development of metanarrative speech. 
It has been noted tha t , in a number of respects, young children's storytelling 
often resembles a series of barely connected sentences. Children do not, until 
as late as age 10, introduce reference and maintain reference to discourse enti-
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M E T A P R A G M A T I C S IN L A N G U A G E D E V E L O P M E N T 9 
Speech Gesture 
Narrative Iconic 
Metanarrative Metaphoric / Deictic 
Paranarrative (few gestures) 
Metapragmatic Beat 
Figure (III) TYPES OF GESTURES 
ties in the denotational text (in the story proper) an adult-like, cohesive way 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1985; Hickmann 1980). They use pronouns exophorically, as 
if the listener shares a common knowledge of the protagonists of the story. 
Likewise, there is evidence that in some contexts children do not use the 
metapragmatic markers of reported speech in an adult-like way until age ten 
or eleven (Hickmann 1985). Until tha t age they may not represent dialogue as 
speech; that is, they do not set it off by way of quotation frames or equivalents, 
consisting of verbs of saying. Finally, in thematic terms, young children may 
juxtapose a series of utterances t ha t do describe the events of a story, but lack 
the organizational property of a single narrative unit (KarmilofF-Smith 1983) 
( that is, they nar ra te solely at the story or narrative level). Many of these pro-
cesses show a U-shaped behavioral pattern. Tha t is, young children produce 
linguistic output which is closer to the adult model than is their output later 
in development. Karmiloff-Smith (1985) argues that this temporary behavioral 
regression is indicative of progression at the underlying representational level, 
where children are re-evaluating the nature of the procedure being acquired, 
and constraining local production for reasons of more global concerns. 
It will be argued here tha t the development of metanarrative skills too 
shows a U-shaped behavioral pa t te rn which also indicates radical underlying 
restructuring of the representation of the act of narration, and commenting 
on narration. 
In Figure (V) you see an excerpt from a child's narration, with gestures. 
The remainder of this paper will focus on the causes of the obvious differences 
between this transcript and the previous ones. 
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A. ENGLISH 
2. [right], [ok this one] [actually wasn't] a Bugs Bunny cartoon 
beat beat beat 
[META] 
3. [it was one of the- the series] 
metaphoric 
[META] 
(oh, ok} 
4. and it had [Tweetie Bird and Sylvester] 
beat 
[META] 
7. and uh [the first scene you see is uh] 
metaphoric 
[META] 
8. [this this window] [with birdwatcher's society underneath it] 
iconic iconic 
В. FRENCH 
1. Okay, [alors] il s'agit de [plusieurs] [episodes] d'une même 
beats 
bande [dessinée] avec les [mêmes] [personnages], 
beats 
[META] 
2. Tu as le [chat] le chat 
beats 
3. ce qu'on appelle le chat noir et blanc, 
et le petit oiseau jaune canary [très] [très] [mignon] 
beats 
[META] 
4. et ils se font la guerre depuis depuis très très longtemps 
beats 
[META] 
5. on les connaît bien [META] 
Figure (IV) GESTURE & NARRATIVE LEVEL 
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You know what? [PARA?] 
The cat [tried to go up] 
iconic 
[NARR] 
[he climbed up] [the tube] 
iconic + descriptor 
[NARR] 
'n he went 
iconic 
[NARR] 
['n then urn] [got the bird] 
beat + iconic 
[NARR] 
['n then] [Granny came] 
beat + prep for next gesture 
[NARR] 
[smacked him down] 
iconic 
[NARR] 
Figure (V) CHILD GESTURE & NARRATIVE LEVEL (AGE 5 YEARS) 
A. Speech 
Our initial question, then, was whether children differ from adults in any 
obvious way in their production of metanarrative speech. Do they talk as 
much about the act of narrating or the structure of the narrative? Does the 
metapragmatic function of narrative speech have any place in their stories? 
The data reported here come from an examination of the stories told by 
two adults, and two children at each of three age groups. In order to have some 
consistency in the stories a 'natural-enough' narrative paradigm was used. 
Children and adults watched a Sylvester and Tweetie Bird cartoon and were 
asked to tell the story to a same-age listener who had not seen the cartoon. 
For children, the cartoon was split into three episodes so as not to overtax 
their memory. The resulting stories were transcribed and divided into clauses 
using the presence of a finite verb as a guide. 
The first measure to be reported is a comparison in production of meta-
narrat ive statements over development. The measure of production was the 
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percentage of the total number of clauses produced in a story tha t were meta-
narrative in nature. The results are listed in Figure (VI). 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
5 8 11 25 
Age n=3 
Figure (VI) METANARRATIVE CLAUSES 
The trend is for a steady increase with age in the number of metanarra-
tive clauses produced. At age 5 19% of a story is comprised of metanarrative 
clauses. This increases to close to 30% for adults. 
B. Gesture 
These results show that for the younger children there is little metanarrative 
speech produced. Why is this? It is hard to do further analyses on da ta that 
are not there. In this case, however, we may use gesture as a clue to the 
function of accompanying speech. Is the absence of metanarrative statements 
indicative of an inability to structure narrative at any global level? Are children 
simply stringing sentences together? In adults there is a clear link between 
the function of a clause and the kind of gesture that it cooccurs with. We can 
therefore ask about the pattern of gesture use in children, and use this pattern 
as a clue to the function of their non- metanarrative speech. 
Acta Linguistica Hurtgarica 38, 1988 
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Given that so few metanarrative clauses are produced, one would expect 
little or no production of beats, those gestures that in adult narrative accom-
pany metanarrat ive commentary. 
The second question addressed, then, was do young children produce 
metanarrat ive gestures—that is, beats? The measure of production was the 
percentage of total clauses in the story that contained one or more beat ges-
tures. 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
5 8 11 25 
Age n = 3 
Figure (VH) BEAT GESTURES 
Figure (VII) shows the percentage of total clauses accompanied by beats 
for each of the four age groups. 
The production of beats shows a U-shaped curve of development. That 
is, 25% to 32% clauses of the total clauses produced by 5-year-olds and adults 
are accompanied by beats . Only 11% of the total clauses produced by 8-year 
olds and 11-year olds are accompanied by beats. It is striking tha t 5-year 
olds produce so many beats since Figure (VI) demonstrates tha t they do not 
produce the metanarrative speech tha t usually accompanies beat gestures. 
The U-shaped pat tern of production of beats leads us to question the 
function that beats serve at each level. It is unlikely that the function of 
beats undergo a radical shift from childhood to adulthood. This sort of radical 
Percentage of Total Clauses 
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discontinuity between child and adul t language is rarely found. More likely is 
t ha t the function is similar or identical, pointing us to look a t whether indeed 
something that might be metanarra t ive in n a t u r e is produced in the verbal 
channel. We thus examine the co-occurence of bea t s with metanarra t ive , and 
bea ts with other kinds of linguistic devices. 
T h e third question asked, t hen , concerned t h e kind of speech accompany-
ing the beat gestures produced by five year old children. We might hypothesize, 
on the basis of the development of other narra t ive subsystems, tha t children 
would acquire local marking of discourse before global. A local strategy to 
mark the structure of narrative might consist of temporal conjunctions to link 
clauses, as opposed to metanarra t ive speech l inking talk a b o u t events. T h a t 
is, perhaps children do not distinguish between event levels in the way t h a t 
adul ts do. If this is t he case, they may use local conjunctions t o join levels of 
events. This then served as the th i rd measure: 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
5 8 11 25 
Age n=3 
• Time Words ED Metanarrative 
Figure (VIII) WHERE BEATS OCCUR 
Percentage of Beats 
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Figure (VIII) shows the percentage of beats that accompany metanar-
rative statements versus the percentage of beats that accompany temporal 
adverbial phrases and conjunctions for each of the four age groups. 
At age 5 the majority of beats are produced in conjunction with t ime 
words. This phenomenon tapers off and is replaced by the adult strategy of 
producing beats in conjunction with metanarrative statements. The temporal 
conjunctions "then" and "and then" accounted for the major i ty of tempo-
ral phrases in the narrations produced by 5-year old children. Older children 
produced a wider variety of temporal terms. 
I pointed out earlier that the beat is particularly sensitive to the mo-
mentary indexing of the larger discourse structure or narrative situation as a 
whole, and can therefore serve to reveal the metapragmatic function of the 
speech that accompanies it. If we consider the function of bea t s to remain 
constant over development, insofar as they index a reference to the discourse 
structure of the story, then we have evidence that temporal conjunctions have 
metanarrat ive function for children. 
Why should we assume that beats remain constant in function over devel-
opment? One might ask whether beats simply mark temporality in young chil-
dren and metanarrativity in adults? Evidence against this hypothesis comes 
from the other kinds of speech with which beats cooccur. We said earlier t ha t 
beats accompany different kinds of metapragmatic devices. In adults beats 
occur with metanarrative phrases, but also with word searches, verba dicendi 
and repairs. While beats produced by young children clearly do not accom-
pany metanarrative phrases, it turns out that they do accompany repairs, and 
tha t this function remains constant over development. At age 5 one quarter of 
the total number of beats produced accompany repair clauses, and for adults 
this figure is not significantly different (27% of the total number of beats ac-
company repairs). Thus, the more general function of beat gestures, that is to 
signal some sort of metapragmatic device, does remain constant over develop-
ment . This fact supports the use of beat gestures as a clue to how speech is 
functioning metanarratively. 
We are claiming, then, that while adults speak of the act of narrating 
by making overt reference to the structure of the story being told, or to the 
structure of the narrating event, children speak of narrating in a less overt way. 
For adults temporal conjunctions are used to conjoin descriptions of events 
("He went up the pipe and then Tweetie dropped a bowling ball down"). For 
children the act of conjoining events is not self-evident. They are not able 
to represent the events of level one in level five. They conjoin descriptions 
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of events with temporal conjunctions and then index this performance as a 
example of reference t o the structure of the story by their use of beats. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these results. First of all, 
5-year-old children do appear to produce metanarrat ive speech, although of a 
different form than t h a t produced by adults. 
Secondly, although metanarrative speech does appear at age five, it is 
at a lower level of narra t ive structure than adult metanarrative speech. That 
is, ra ther than commenting on the structure of the story as a whole, or the 
narrating event as a whole ("This is a Bugs Bunny cartoon" or "It has three 
parts") children simply comment on the relationships of sequenciality that ex-
ist between events ( "As if they were saying" and "First one thing happens, 
and then another does") . This earlier kind of metanarrative speech must un-
dergo a rather important transformation before it looks adult-like, where the 
transformation concerns the size of the unit that is appropriate to comment on 
at a metanarrative level. Thus we are led to argue, with Karmiloff-Smith, that 
the temporary behavioral regression in the production of beats, is indicative 
of progression at the underlying representational level, where children are re-
evaluating the nature of the procedure being acquired, and constraining local 
production for reasons of more global concerns. T h a t is, as children begin to 
represent the story as a whole more important than the sum of its par ts , they 
must re-evaluate where beats are to occur; it is during this process, I argue, 
that beat production diminishes. 
Finally, to return to the issue of metapragmatics. We said that metaprag-
matics (in the sense of the discipline of metapragmatics) was the study of 
terms t h a t index the speaker 's knowledge of and purposive functions for com-
municative situations, as well as indexing an entire cultural construction of the 
kind of interaction being engaged in. For adults metanarrat ive and paranar-
rative statements have the metapragmatic function of indexing tha t language 
has a storytelling function, and indexing how that function is conceived. For 
children, we can now say, the semantic domain of temporal adverbial phrases 
(and especially temporal conjunctions) has this function. Thus, for children, 
temporal adverbials and conjunctions are metapragmatic markers. 
This paper, then, has the dual function of determining, first, whether and 
how children speak of t he culturally constructed act of narrating, but also of 
enlarging our vision of wha t might be metanarrative, and giving us a new view 
of the function of temporal adverbials and conjunctions in narrative speech. 
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TYPES OF ENGLISH DISCOURSE MARKERS 
B R U C E FRASER 
Introduction 
Levinson (1983) was one of the first to suggest in print that discourse markers 
might be considered as a group worth study:1 
" . . . t h e r e are many words and phrases in English, and no doubt most 
languages, that indicate the relationship between an utterance and the prior 
discourse. Examples are utterance-initial usages of but, therefore, in conclu-
sion, to the contrary, still, however, anyway, well, besides, actually, all in all, 
so, after all, and so on. It is generally conceded t h a t such words have at least 
a component of meaning that resists truth-conditional t r ea tmen t . . . what they 
seem to do is indicate, often in very complex ways, just how the utterance 
that contains them is a response to, or a continuation of, some portion of the 
prior discourse" (87-8). 
He did not pursue discourse markers beyond these brief comments. Since then , 
several researchers have considered discourse markers in more detail. The first 
of these research efforts is reported in Schourup (1985), who uses the t e rm 
"discourse particles" in focusing primarily on like, well, and y'know as they 
function in various sorts of written text and conversational da ta . He concludes 
that each particle signals previously undisclosed thinking on the part of t he 
speaker and indicates that this thinking is now occurring or has just now 
occurred but that the particle does not completely specify i ts content.2 
The second, and the most detailed effort, is reported in Schiffrin (1987). 
Based upon her analysis of and, because, but, I mean, now, oh, or, so, then, 
1
 An earlier version of this paper was given at the Symposium on Metapragmat ic Te rms , 
Budapes t , Hungary, J u l y 1990. 
о 
I will use the t e rm signal in speaking of p r a g m a t i c markers (in contrast to mean 
in speaking of content material) to mean that the very presence of the form (lexical or 
s turc tura l ) commits the speaker to a specific communicat ive intention. Jus t as the presence 
of a lighted green traffic signal signals authorization for the motorist to proceed, and the 
presence of the bailiff signals the immedia te arrival of the judge, so the presence of please 
before an imperat ive form signals the speaker commi tmen t to making a request. 
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well, and y'know as they occur in unstructured interview conversations, she 
proposes tha t these markers typically serve three functions: i) they work as 
contextual coordinates for utterances by locating them on one or more planes 
of discourse; ii) they index adjacent utterances to the speaker, t he hearer, or 
both; iii) they index the utterance to prior and/or subsequent discourse. She 
sees discourse markers as serving an integrative function in discourse, thus 
contributing to discourse coherence: they serve as a kind of discourse glue. 
The third is that found in Blakemore (1987), who discusses and, after 
all, you see, but, moreover, furthermore and so under the label of "discourse 
connectives." Working from the relevance framework proposed by Sperber-
Wilson (1986), she proposes that these expressions are used to indicate how 
the relevance of one discourse segment is dependent on another: they are ex-
pressions which "impose constraints on relevance in virtue of the inferential 
connections they express" (141). 
The fourth effort is tha t found in Fraser (1990), where I present an analysis 
of discourse markers as members of a pragmatic category. In this analysis, 
each marker has certain privileges of occurrence, similar to the elements in a 
syntactic category and each has a core meaning, signaling generally how the 
speaker intends the ut terance of which it is a part is to relate to the prior 
discourse. The relationships signalled by discourse markers include a speaker 
commitment to topic change ( incidently) , parallelism (similarly), reorienting 
(anyway), dissonance (well), and consequence (so). 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine the class of English dis-
course markers, looking specifically at what subclasses are motivated by the 
nature of the discourse relationship they signal. In the first section, I charac-
terize the class of discourse markers, b o t h indicating what they are, and how 
they are to be distinguished from close contenders for membership. In the sec-
ond section, I propose a three-way class distinction and , within each of these, 
several sub-classes. In the final section, I suggest some areas in which further 
research might prove frui tful . 
Characterizing discourse markers 
Following Fraser (1987, 1990, 1991a) I assume that sentence meaning is ana-
lyzable into two distinct types of encoded information: content meaning and 
pragmatic meaning. 
Content meaning captures that s ta te of affairs about which the speaker is 
talking. Sometimes referred to as the "propositional content" of the sentence, 
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it is conveyed by lexical meaning in conjunction with the syntactic structures 
present, and serves as the basis for the message content when the sentence is 
used in direct, literal communication. 
In contrast, pragmatic meaning provides signals of what messages the 
speaker intends to directly convey by way of the u t ter ing of this particular 
linguistic expression. Pragmatic meaning is conveyed through s t ructural prag-
matic markers (e.g., the declarative structure, which signals speaker belief in 
the sentence content); lexical pragmatic markers (e.g., please, which signals 
a request that the hearer bring about the action described in the sentence 
content); and phonological pragmatic markers (e.g., the so-called "sarcastic 
intonation").3 
Pragmatic markers fall into three major types: basic, which signal the 
speaker's basic communicative intention—the force of the sentence when used 
in direct literal communication; commentary, which signal an entire separate 
message consisting of a speaker comment on the basic message; and parallel, 
which signal a message separate from but concomitant with the basic mes-
sage. In a sentence such as "Frankly, Sir, we are lost ," the content consists of 
"we are lost," and there are several pragmatic markers: a basic marker, the 
declarative syntactic structure, signalling speaker belief in this s t a te of affairs; 
a commentary marker, "frankly," signalling a comment to the effect that the 
speaker does not expect the hearer to welcome the sentence content; and a 
parallel marker, "Sir," signalling tha t the speaker intends to show deference 
to the hearer. 
The relationship between these aspects of sentence meaning is shown in 
the following figure: 
/ Content Meaning 
Sentence Meaning y Basic Pgm Markers 
\ Pragmatic Meaning - Commentary P g m Markers 
\ Parallel Pgm Markers 
Within this framework, discourse markers are one type of commentary 
pragmatic marker. They are distinguished from other commentary markers 
in virtue of the fact tha t they, alone, signal a comment specifying the type 
of sequential discourse relationship tha t holds between the current utterance 
о 
I leave unaddressed the issue of whether various phonological signals such as sarcas-
tic intonat ion, emphatic stress, and the like are aspects of sentence meaning or utterance 
interpreta t ion. 
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-—the utterance of which the discourse marker is a par t—and the prior dis-
course.4 
Consider, for example, the following interchange: 
(1) Attorney: Wha t happened then? 
Witness: Well, we got i n to an argument, I sort of lost my cool, 
and called him a jerk. You know how sometimes you 
jus t can't keep your temper . . . haven't you had that 
happen to you? I 'm sorry about that , but it jus t 
happened. 
Attorney: Anyway, so you called him a jerk. And then what did 
you do? 
The re are four discourse markers (in bold italics) in the above interchange, 
each of which signals a speaker comment on the current ut terance. 
The first marker , well, signals some degree of reluctance on the part of 
the witness to recount the story.5 The second, anyway, signals a reorientation 
of the discourse focus (here, back to the witness' story), while the so signals 
t h a t the following assertion is grounded on the foregoing (indeed, the witness 
asserted it). The and beginning the final u t terance signals t h a t what follows 
is t o be heard as parallel to some part of the foregoing discourse (here, the 
initial question.)6 
Like other commentary markers, discourse markers are lexical adjuncts to 
and are independent of an already well-formed sentence. Hence, the absence 
of t he discourse marker does not render a sentence ungrammatical and/or 
unintelligible. It does, however, remove a powerful clue about what commit-
ment the speaker makes regarding the relationship between the current ut-
4
 O the r commentary pragmatic m a r k e r s signal other types of speaker comments on the 
cur ren t message, as i l lustrated in the following examples. 
a) Frankly, we are lost [message has negative impor t ] 
b) Repeatedly, we are lost [basis for speaker belief] 
c) Apparently, we are lost [degree of confidence in belief] 
d ) Regrettably, we are lost [a t t i tude towards belief] 
e) Mark my words, we are lost [ a t t i t ude towards s i tuat ion] 
These issues are examined in detail in Fraser , 1991a. 
5
 For the sake of exposition, I am assigning an in terpreta t ion to the discourse markers 
here and below. The p o i n t s to be made should survive whe the r or not readers have slightly 
different readings. 
6
 In some cases the discourse to which the marker signals a relationship may be in the 
d i s tan t past . For example ,a student in i t i a ted a conversation with me not long ago with "So, 
when are you going to I ta ly?" The so in her utterance referenced our conversat ion of some 
two weeks earlier. For a detailed examinat ion of so see Fraser 1991b. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
T Y P E S OF ENGLISH DISCOURSE M A R K E R S 23 
terance and the prior discourse. This "privilege of absence" also distinguishes 
discourse markers from other commentary pragmatic markers, which do in-
deed contribute to utterance meaning. For example, the presence of frankly 
in 11 Frankly, you didn' t do very well in the exam" signals a speaker comment, 
which cannot be inferred when frankly is not present. 
At the general level the concept of discourse marker as a lexical marker 
signaling the relationship between parts of the discourse is relatively straight-
forward. However, there is unacceptable vagueness when one looks deeper. 
Firs t , because the notion of discourse marker is one which arose from 
examining how certain lexical formatives function on a discourse level, a com-
plete understanding of what is meant by a "sequential discourse relationship," 
is not an a priori notion, and must evolve as researchers look more closely at 
the concept. For the moment, it must be left at a rather intuitive and unsatis-
factory level: how the speaker intends the current basic message to be related 
to the discourse, either its structure or prior messages. 
And second, although researchers generally agree (although not all ex-
plicitly state this), t ha t there is some "core" meaning associated with each 
marker, what constitutes this "core" remains elusive. Consider the following 
examples. 
(2) (a) Susan is married. So, she is no longer single. Damn! 
(b) John was tired. So he left early. 
(c) Attorney: And how long were you part of the crew? 
Witness: Five years. 
Attorney: So you were employed by G for roughly 5 years? 
(d) Son: My clothes are still wet. 
Mother: So put the drier on for 30 minutes more. 
(e) Teenage son: The Celtics have an important game today. 
Disinterested parent: So? 
(f) [Grandmother to granddaughter] So tell me about this 
wonderful young man you're seeing. 
These examples show that so as a discourse marker permits a wide range 
of interpretations, all of which arguably emerge from a core sense. Starting with 
this core meaning, the specific interpretation of the consequential relationship 
in a given instance is the result of enriching this general signal in light of the 
details of the particular discourse context. How this process proceeds, however, 
remains to be specified.' 
7 I see this process to be analogous to what occurs when one interprets good in "a good 
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Although not essential to their definition, there are several properties of 
discourse markers that are worth noting. First, discourse markers are drawn 
from a wide range of traditional grammatical categories: from verbs (look, lis-
ten); adverbs (now, then)-, literal phrases (to repeat, as a result); idioms (by 
and large, still and all); interjections (well); coordinate conjunctions (and, 
or); subordinate conjunctions (however, so); and OK, which falls into no tra-
ditional category. 
In this regard, the core meaning of discourse markers, while always gen-
eral, vary in the extent to which they are related to the meaning of the ho-
mophonous form when it functions in a traditional syntactic role. For example, 
the meaning of continuing, as a discourse marker (as in "Continuing, it would 
be futile for him to try"), is closely connected to its use as a present partici-
ple. On the other hand, the meaning of well in " Well, where were we?" is only 
distantly related, at best, to its meaning as a water source or the adverbial 
form of good. 
Finally, although all discourse markers can occur in utterance-initial po-
sition, and are found there most often, only some are found in medial position, 
and even fewer are found in utterance-final position. The examples in (3) il-
lust ra te this, the "?" indicating an utterance of questionable acceptability.8 
(3) (a) I am for it. However, the Dean won't agree 
I am for it. The Dean, however, won't agree 
I am for it. The Dean won't agree, however 
(b) In other words, you are refusing to do it 
You are, in other words, refusing to do it 
?You are refusing to do it, in other words 
(c) Anyway, I want to get back to our initial topic 
?I, anyway, want to get back to our initial topic 
?I want to get back to our initial topic, anyway 
meal" versus "a good movie" versus "a good boy," or when one in terpre ts just in "just now" 
versus "just behind the barn" versus "just right." 
8 
Aside f rom the obvious explanat ion tha t rests on the non-discourse marker grammatical 
s t a tu s of the form (e.g., that and is a coordinate conjunction which occurs primarily in 
sentence-initial position), one potent ia l explanation for the absence of discourse markers in 
sentence-medial /f inal position is the difficulty in distinguishing their funct ion from the same 
format ive functioning as a part of the sentence content . For example, whereas the potential 
ambigui ty of "Now where were we?" can be reduced, if not resolved, by the presence a 
c o m m a intonation, this is not possible for the al ternative "Where were we now?", although 
the difference may be signalled by the utterance-final intonation. I am unaware of research 
which provides an account of these restrictions. 
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I now wish to turn to what discourse markers are not. Firs t , in spite of 
their independence f rom the sentence proper, discourse markers are not single 
word sentences, even though some can be found standing alone to serve as a 
complete utterance. Two examples will illustrate: 
(b) Faculty Member 1: I heard that there are to be more cutbacks 
next year 
Faculty Member 2: Sol 
In (4a), the non-falling intonation on the Child's ut terance made it clear that 
she was not finished.9 In (4b) the question intonation had the effect of imposing 
an interrogative gloss on the core meaning of "Wha t follows i s . . . " , thereby 
creating the interpretation "What follows?" 
In contrast, consider (5), which contains interjections: lexical formatives 
which s tand alone and represent an entire message, usually reflecting the 
speaker's emotional s ta te . 
(5) (a) Son: The Celtics lost tonight 
Father: Oh? Wow! 
(b) Ouch! 
(c) Teenager 1: I just talked to Madonna 
Teenager 2: Far out 
In (5a) there are two interjections. T h e first, oh, has the basic interpretation 
of "Wha t I understand you to be saying is new information to me." Of course 
this interjection, like others, has imposed upon it a marked intonation which, 
in itself, provides an additional parallel message. In this instance, it was a 
utterance-final rising intonation which signals surprise. Wow, also, stands for 
an entire message, "I am pleased a t this information," ouch conveys "That 
hurts," and far out conveys "I'm pleased." Interjections differ significantly 
from discourse markers: they do not signal a comment on the current utterance. 
Indeed, they are not even pragmatic markers but are pragmatic idioms which 
may always stand alone. 
Vocatives, nominals used to refer to the addressee (e.g., Colonel, Waiter, 
Doctor, Everyone, Ahem, Sweetie), must be distinguished f rom discourse 
markers. Like interjections, they encode an entire message, to the effect: "I 
9 
T h e reader is referred to (Barton 1990) on the issue of elliptical sentences. 
(4) (a) Mother: 
Child: 
Mother: 
There is no way you're going to watch TV. 
But... 
Sorry, tha t ' s the way it is. 
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am addressing my remarks to . . . ." They seldom stand alone but are associ-
ated with an utterance and, as such, are one type of parallel pragmatic marker. 
Because, also, must be excluded as a discourse marker. Consider the ex-
amples in (6). 
(6) (a) Wife: Why do you want to go there? 
Husband: Because I like the ice cream 
(b) John must be at home, because his car is there 
In (6a), because is functioning as a subordinate conjunction, albeit in an ut-
terance in which the main clause of the sentence has been elided (I want to 
go because I like the ice cream). In (6b), because is functioning as a commen-
tary pragmatic marker, but not as a discourse marker—it does not relate two 
messages, the one in the current utterance to some prior part of the discourse. 
Rather, like inasmuch as, in view of the fact that, since, according to what I 
hear, and based on my observations it signals the basis for which the speaker 
is expressing belief in the basic sentence proposition.10 
Excluded also from the class of discourse markers is Y'know, a member 
of a class of parallel markers. Consider (7): 
(7) (a) Y'know, I really like eating raw pickles 
(b) John is, y'know, more of a friend than a lover 
In (7), Y'know, not to be confused with its putat ive source you know, does 
not signal a comment on how the current utterance is related to the foregoing 
context. Rathei , it signals a message requesting tha t the hearer appreciate 
and /or be in sympathy with the speaker's point of view. The expression I 
mean is also excluded from discourse marker membership for similar reasons. 
Finally, excluded are pause markers, illustrated in (8).11 
(8) (a) Coach: How many can you take in your car? 
Parent: Well. .. at least 6 if they squeeze 
(b) There were . .oh . . . maybe half a dozen left when I arrived 
(c) Ah... J o h n . . . uh... could you come over here for a moment? 
1 0
 There is also the u t te rance "Because!" in response to "Why aren't you cleaning up 
your room?" which appears to have become a fixed form, pe rhaps shortened f rom "beacuse 
I don ' t want to." In any event, it is not a discourse marker. 
1 1
 Some of these pause markers appear to function as a kind of "s tar t -up" form, signalling 
t h a t the speaker is taking t ime to think about the answer or at least not responding too 
quickly, perhaps out of deference to the hearer. 
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While in some cases these pause markers are homophonous with discourse 
markers or other pragmatic markers, their interpretation in such examples 
makes it clear that they are not signalling a sequential discourse relationship. 
Rather, they signal a message that the speaker wishes to keep the "conversa-
tional floor," perhaps because of the need to think before answering. As such, 
these pause markers are member of yet another class of parallel pragmatic 
markers. 
To summarize, discourse markers are lexical expressions which are syn-
tacticly independent of the basic sentence structure, and which have a general 
core meaning which signals the relationship of the current utterance to the 
prior discourse. I now wish to examine the distinctions within this category. 
Types of discourse markers 
At the most general level, the class of discourse markers divides neatly into 
three primary subclasses: markers which signal aspects of topic change; mark-
ers which signal the current discourse activity (e.g., explaining or clarifying), 
and markers which signal how the current message relates to an earlier part of 
the discourse (e.g., that it is parallel to, or contrasts with). I will t rea t them 
in turn.1 2 
Group 1: Topic markers 
The first subclass contains two groups of markers: those which signal some 
sort of topic shift; and those which signal a refocusing on the current topic. 
The notion of "topic" is, at best, problematic. Some researchers write of 
sentence topic, others of utterance topic, while still others explore the notion 
of discourse topic. (Some researchers wisely avoid the topic altogether.) For my 
purposes, I will consider only discourse topic—what the discourse participants 
are "talking about" at any given time, including various subtopics as they 
arise. 
Although one might expect to find a discourse marker whose function is 
to signal an initial discourse topic, I have found none. When an initial topic 
is conveyed explicitly—and this isn't always the case—it appears to be as the 
result of an explicit suggestion (e.g., "I would like to talk to you today about 
your recent performance, Mr. Johnson"; "Let's begin with a discussion about 
12 
On a larger scale, we might expect to find markers to signal how the speaker intends to 
frame the ent i re discourse segment, for example, "Did you hear the one about . . . " signalling 
that a joke is to following. 
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your recent performance"). There is, however, a sizeable group of markers 
which signal t ha t the speaker wishes to change the topic, (if only temporarily), 
to continue with a present topic, or to return to a former topic. I have listed 
some of the topic change markers in (9):13 
(9) back to my original point, before I forget, by the way, continuing, in any 
case, in case you don't recall, incidently, just to update you, moving right along, 
on a different note, parenthetically, speaking of, that reminds me, to continue, 
to return to my original point, turning now to, while I think of it, while I have 
you, with regards to 
There is, in addition, a second group which signals a refocusing on a par t 
of the topic at hand. These are listed in (10): 
(10) again, alright, but, here, hey, indeed, in fact, listen, look (here), now, 
OK, say, see, well, y'see 
We find these in examples such as the following: 
(11) (a) AIright, let's get this thing organized 
(b) Indeed, he is a good-looking guy 
(c) Y'see, we really don' t have enough money at this time 
Group 2: Discourse activity markers 
The second subclass consists of discourse markers which signal the current 
discourse activity relative to some part of the foregoing discourse. These ac-
tivities refer to types of discourse work such as explaining or summarizing, 
and not to the type of message (i.e., the type of illocutionary act) the speaker 
conveys through the utterance. I have identified 7 such activity types—surely 
not a complete list—and presented some representative examples in (12), with 
each type labeled by a term suggesting the discourse work being done. 
(12) (a) Clarifying: by way of clarification, to clarify 
(b) Conceding: admittedly, after all, all in all, all the 
same, anyhow, anyway, at any rate, besides, for all that, 
in any case/event, of course, still and al 
(c) Explaining: by way of explanation, if I may explain, to 
explain 
13 
The lists of discourse markers in the following discussion are intended to be il lustra-
tions, not exhaustions. 
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(d) Interrupting: if I may interrupt, to interrupt, not to 
interrupt 
(e) Repeating: at the risk of repeating myself, once again, 
to repeat 
(f) Sequencing: finally, first, in the first place, lastly, 
next, on the one/other hand, second, to begin, to conclude, 
to continue, to start with 
(g) Summarizing: in general, in summary, overall, so far, 
summarizing, summing up, thus far, to sum up, at this point 
Group 3: Message relationship markers 
The third subclass of discourse markers are those which signal the relation-
ship of the basic message being conveyed by the current utterance to some 
prior message. There are four groups: Parallel; Contrasting; Elaborative; and 
Inferential. 
Parallel markers are the most general of these and signal tha t t he current 
basic message is, in some way, parallel to some aspect of the prior discourse. 
I have list examples in (14). 
(13) Parallel discourse markers: also, alternatively, analogously, and, by the 
same token, correspondingly, equally, likewise, or, otherwise, similarly, too 
To see how these function, consider the examples in (15): 
(14) (a) Oil and water don't mix 
(b) Student 1: How was the party? 
Student 2: Fantastic. Harold came. And who do you think 
he brought? 
(c) A: John is sleeping in the den and I 'm in the kitchen 
B: And where am I sleeping? 
In (14a), and functions as a coordinate conjunction and conjoins two nominals. 
In (14b), however, and, functioning as a discourse marker, signals that the 
second message is parallel to but separate from the first. The speaker has 
signalled tha t she is conveying two messages: the first, a claim tha t Harold 
came; and the second, a (rhetorical) question involving Harold's companion. 
Similarly, in (14c), the discourse marker and, u t tered by the second speaker, 
signals a message parallel to the first two, in the sense here that th is latter bit 
of information is needed. 
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Each of the o ther parallel discourse markers signals some qualification on 
nature of the parallel relationship. I can tentatively identify two subgroups. 
The first contains alternatively, or and otherwise, which signal an alternate 
to an earlier message. The second subgroup contains also, analogously, by the 
same token, correspondingly, equally, likewise, similarly, and loo, which signal a 
message similar along some unspecified dimension, with also and too signaling 
an identity of a par t of the current message to one preceding. 
Contrastive markers, listed in (15), populate the second group.1 4 
(15) Contrastive discourse markers: all the same, but, contrariwise, con-
versely, despite, however, I may be wrong but, in spite of, in comparison, in 
contrast, instead, never/nonetheless, notwithstanding, on the one/other hand, 
on the contrary, rather, regardless, still, that said, though, well, yet 
Similar to the parallel markers, there seems to be a single, more basic 
contrastive marker: but. Just as and signals t h a t there is some sort of par-
allelism at hand, but signals a sense of "dissonance." The examples in (14b) 
reflect some of the contexts in which the discourse marker but is found. 
(16) (a) Son (whining): I can ' t do it 
Father: But I know that you CAN do it 
(b) Job Interviewer: The position has been filled. But do come in 
anyway and talk for a minute. 
(c) Witness: I d idn ' t think I should talk about it 
Attorney: But what did you actually say? 
There are several subgroups which specify a more detailed sense of con-
trast . Markers such as contrariwise, conversely, in comparison, in contrast, on 
the contrary and on the one/other hand signal explicitly that it is the content 
of the two messages t h a t is in sharp contrast. Another subgroup contains the 
markers all the same, despite, however, in spite of, instead, irrespective, never-
theless, nonetheless, notwithstanding, rather, regardless, still, though, and yet 
which signal a contrast sharp but one generally unexpected. A third subgroup 
within this subclass of contrastive markers contains I may be wrong but and 
that said, which signal a contrast between a previous claim or like message 
(by either the speaker or another discourse part icipant) and the claim in the 
1 4
 T h e expression on the one hand is t he one exception I ahve found of a discourse marker 
which signals that the cur ren t message is related not to a prior one but one forthcoming. 
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current message. Finally, well appears to be the sole member of a four th sub-
group, signalling that the current message is contrary to tha t which the hearer 
is presumed to expect. 
Elaborative markers populate the th i rd group. These markers signal that 
the current utterance constitutes an elaboration of an earlier one. Included in 
this group are the following: 
(17) Elaborative discourse markers: above all, also, besides, better, for ex-
ample, for instance, further (more), in addition, in fact, in other words, in 
particular, indeed, more accurately, more importantly, more precisely, more 
specifically, more to the point, moreover, namely, on top of it all, to cap it all 
o f f , what is more 
Of these, the markers above all, indeed, in fact, on top of it all, and to top it 
all off signal a more general sense of elaboration, (e.g., "He was fairly scared. 
Indeed, he was scared silly"), while a second subgroup containing better, in 
particular, more accurately, more importantly, more precisely, more specifi-
cally, more to the point has just the opposi te effect, namely, to signal a more 
refined characterization of the sense of the foregoing. A third subgroup con-
taining also, besides, further (more), in addition, moreover, what is more serves 
to signal one additional aspect to the current topic (e.g., "I don't think we 
should go due to the danger. Besides, I don' t want to go.") A final subgroup 
signals the speaker's intention to have the current message serve as an illus-
tration of an earlier point. Such markers include for example, for instance, in 
other words, namely. 
The four th and final group is Inferential markers, which signal tha t the 
current ut terance conveys a message which is, in some sense, consequential to 
some aspect of the foregoing. Examples are presented in (18): 
(18) Inferential discourse markers: accordingly, as a consequence, as a result, 
consequently, hence, in this/that case, of course, so, then, therefore, thus 
Contrary to the other three groups, there is no obvious subgrouping, although 
there are subtle difference of use, for example: 
(19) (a) John is remaining. So (?tn that case) I am leaving, 
(b) I don't want to talk with you. But I will. Thus (las a 
result) sit down 
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Final remarks 
The foregoing is intended to be a preliminary examination into distinctions 
within the class of English discourse marker. Based on my analysis, there 
appear to be some definite types: topic markers; discourse activity markers; 
and message relationship markers. Within these, there are various, more spe-
cific subdivisions, some clearly more problematic than others. Indeed, we may 
ultimately conclude that such an attempt at typing is not a useful way to un-
derstand discourse. Until then, however, I think it is an area worth pursuing. 
I have, in addition, touched upon several areas where immediate f u t u r e 
research is required. The notion of sequential discourse relationship requires 
clarification as do the details of the core meaning for individual discourse mark-
ers. One might consider whether or not discourse markers should be viewed 
as a pragmatic category, albeit a part of the grammar of a language, as I have 
proposed, or as part of a larger group of interactive markers, markers such as 
"Then there was the one a b o u t . . . " which introduces a joke, or "Let us pray," 
which introduces a moment of prayer. 
Remaining, also, is an adequate account of the interrelationship between 
performative sentences and the presence of discourse markers. For example, we 
find "More to the point, I should have done i t" conveying a speaker admission 
while "More to the point, I admit that I should have done i t " and "I admi t 
tha t more to the point, I should have done i t " are highly questionable. Not 
unrelated to this problem is that of the sequencing of discourse markers—which 
can co-occur and in what order. For example, we find sentences such as "And 
so you agree" but not "So and you agree." And finally, there is the question 
of the occurrence of various discourse markers with syntactic structures. We 
do not find, for example, "By way of explanation, who are you?" I leave these 
problems for another time. 
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VERBA SENTIENDI AS METAPRAGMATIC TERMS* 
T H O R S T E I N F R E T H E I M 
1. Introduction 
The focus of my interest is a certain type of verb whose function is to con-
vey the subject referent's at t i tude to the event or situation described in the 
sentential complement of that verb. If, on a given occasion, I were to say (1), 
(1) John is sure (or convinced) that your signature is needed, 
then I would have expressed my opinion that John is committed to the belief 
tha t the proposition of the that-clause is true. I have attr ibuted a propositional 
a t t i tude to John. Since we do not have access to the workings of other people's 
minds, it is likely that it is John himself who has explicitly informed me of 
his conviction, though I may also have formed my belief about John without 
his having told me of his propositional at t i tude. And even if my evidence for 
saying (1) does stem from something tha t John has said, I am not thereby 
referring to any specific illocutionary act on the par t of John. 
On the other hand, if I were to use the past tense form was instead of 
present tense is, as in (2), 
(2) John was sure/convinced that your signature is needed, 
then I will be understood to refer to—to report on—one particular speech act 
performed by John. The predicate of propositional at t i tude is then seen to 
subst i tute for a verb of saying in an event of indirect speech. 
Any verb of saying appearing in a report is indirectly a verb of propo-
sitional at t i tude. This is true because, normally, for someone to state that 
something is the case means she/he believes it to be the case. 
An example like (2) shows that it is possible to refer to already performed 
linguistic actions without the help of an English verb of saying. You can instead 
* This paper was read at the Conference on Metapragmat ic Terms in Budapest , 2 - 4 
July 1990. I would like to thank the audience at the conference, and I am grateful to Jan 
Ter je Faarlund and Lars Sigfred Evensen for comments on an early draft , and to Randi Alice 
Nilsen for discussions at various stages. 
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use a main clause verb referring to what the reporting person assumes to 
have been the reported speaker's at t i tude to the proposition expressed in the 
complement clause. There are special predicates tha t are available to that end, 
namely the predicates of propositional attitude, or verba sentiendi (henceforth 
abbreviated VS), which in English include, among others, believe, think, feel, 
assume, wish, hope, prefer, find (as in Beth found that the frozen berries were 
just as good as the fresh ones), etc. 
The reporting speaker's use of a particular VS may reflect the fact tha t 
that very verb was used in the speech act reported on. In such situations, the 
audience will normally assume tha t the reporter purports to provide a faithful 
rendition of what was said by the reported speaker (henceforth also referred 
to as the original speaker). We understand that the same VS would have been 
part of a direct- speech quotation of the original speech act. 
In other situations, the reported speaker may have employed no VS at 
all, and yet the report ing speaker has for some reason chosen to avail herself1 
of a VS in her report . What happens in the la t ter type of situation is tha t 
the speaker is giving some extra information over and above what would be 
communicated if she had used direct speech and a verb of saying. By means of 
a VS, a reporting speaker can impart to her addressee what she considers to be 
certain accessible inferences based on her own interpretation of the reported 
speech act. 
It is possible to combine a verb of saying and a VS in such a way tha t 
the la t ter appears in the complement of the former (He said that he thought 
that... ), but this type of construction implicates t ha t the VS in question was 
also employed by the original speaker. 
Consider the following pairs of reported and reporting acts, where only 
the former report could have been felicitously replaced by He said he believed 
that hot chilis are good for me. 
(3) Reported act: I believe that hot chilis are good for you. 
Report: He believed/believes that hot chilis are good for me. 
(4) Reported act: Hot chilis are good for you. 
Report: He believed/believes that hot chilis are good for me. 
Believe is a verb that can be placed on an epistemic scale ranging from total 
ignorance to absolute certainty, and it may receive either a one-sided (unilat-
eral) or a two-sided (bilateral) scalar interpretation in a given communicative 
1
 T h e reporting speaker ( the reporter) will henceforth be referred to as "she", the re-
ported speaker (the original speaker) as "he" . 
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event (see Horn 1989). Under the one-sided understanding of believe in sen-
tences starting with I believe that.. ./He believed that..., the verb is not felt 
to contrast with or be inconsistent with the epistemically stronger verb know. 
If you know tha t something is the case, then obviously you believe it to be the 
case. Conversely, you may well know that something is t rue without necessar-
ily stating explicitly that you hold the kind of strong belief associated with 
the notion of knowing. For example, I may characterize the reported act of 
(4), which contains no epistemic verb of propositional a t t i tude, by saying tha t 
the speaker knows. I would probably do so if my experience with the speaker 
is such that I consider him to be someone who can be trusted and who usually 
knows what he is talking about . 
We do have a tendency, however, to give a two-sided scalar interpretation 
to believe in statements such as the formally identical reports of (3) and (4) 
above. By using the weaker epistemic verb, the reporting speaker conversa-
tionally implicates (Q-implicates in the sense of Horn, ibid., where the 'Q ' 
relates to Grice's Maxim of Quantity, as expounded in Grice 1975) that the 
reporter assumes that the reported speaker just believes, and does not know 
for sure. Tha t implicature is based on a two-sided understanding of believe 
as a scalar predicate. According to the reporter , the original speaker at most 
believes that hot chilis are beneficial. 
It seems to be relatively speaking harder to avoid reading this Q-
implicature into declarative sentences where the verb believe is in the past 
tense, and it is definitely easier to suppress this 'upper bound ' implicature 
when the subject of the main clause is a 1st person pronoun and the VS is in 
the present tense, as in the reported act of (3). The speaker of that ut terance 
may not have intended the recipient to infer tha t he holds a reduced degree of 
belief about the good effects of hot chilis, in other words, t ha t he is not fully 
committed to the truth of the complement proposition. On the other hand , 
when that verb later reappears in a report on the original utterance, the Q-
implicature is susceptible of being read into the report, and there is a distinct 
possibility tha t the recipient will even read the second-order implicature of "I 
believe otherwise" into the statement He believed that hot chilis are good for 
me. (Nonverbal cues can either strengthen or weaken tha t assumption.) As 
there is (supposed to be) no linguistic difference between the report of (3) and 
the report of (4), there is clearly also no difference between those two reports 
with regard to the implicatures they induce. 
It is quite possible that the particular VS selected by the reporter adds 
information about the reporter 's own interpretation of the reported event and 
its context, whether or not tha t interpretation is consistent with the original 
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speaker's intentions. When the main clause predicate is a verb tha t purport-
edly refers to the original speaker's mental state at the time of ut terance, the 
reporter may succeed in building a richer, or more detailed context around the 
communicative act reported on than would be the case if direct speech had 
been used. Even a fanciful manner-of-speaking verb (like giggle, stutter, etc.) 
in an act of direct quoting (see Lehrer, this volume) cannot possibly convey as 
much in the way of extra assumptions (cf. Sperber-Wilson 1986) as a carefully 
selected VS. 
A number of things can go wrong in a report on a past speech act. There 
is a risk t ha t the reporter will present her audience with a highly inaccurate 
report. For instance, the report may be inaccurate because it misrepresents the 
illocutionary force (Austin 1962) that the original speaker intended the inter-
locutor to associate with his act, or because it adds one or more conversational 
implicata for which the original speaker is clearly not responsible. 
To give you an example of the former type of situation, consider the 
following pair of reported and reporting acts. 
(5) Reported speech act: The deadline was yesterday, wasn't it? 
Report : #He asked if the deadline was yesterday. 
This is not an accurate repor t , as it fails to convey the fact that the verbal act 
reported on was not an open question but an epistemically biased tag question 
construction whose first, declarative par t reveals the speaker's own presump-
tion, and whose second, interrogative par t is a request for confirmation. The 
report in (5) captures the question dimension of the original speech act but 
fails to convey that the original speaker has at least weakly committed himself 
to the belief that the proposition of the declarative is t rue. 
An example of a report that fails for a double reason is the one in (6). 
(6) Reported speech act: The deadline was yesterday, wasn't it? 
Report : #He believed/thought that the deadline was yesterday. 
What is wrong with this report is tha t it both ignores the original speaker's 
request for confirmation and adds an unwarranted implicatum of the type 
discussed in connection with (3) and (4) above. 
Occasionally you will fail to report adequately precisely because the words 
and the syntactic structure of the reported act are being copied slavishly in 
the reporting act. (7) provides a good English example of what I have in mind. 
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(7) Reported speech act: I think we can all agree that the enterprise 
has been a failure. 
Report : #He thought they could all agree that the enterprise had 
been a failure. 
My English informants tell me that the syntactic string He thought they could 
all agree that the enterprise had been a failure would scarcely make sense in 
any conceivable context. A faithful indirect speech report on the s tatement 
I think we can all agree that the enterprise has been a failure would have 
to depart f rom the actual structure of tha t modally modified declarative. He 
felt very strongly that the enterprise had been a failure would be a reasonable 
candidate. 
A linguistic action verb used in a report on some previously performed act 
of speaking is one type of metapragmatic verb. The present paper is about the 
analoguous metapragmatic function of a different category of verbs: the VS. 
My principal language of investigation has been Norwegian. I will not a t tempt 
to delimit exactly the class of VS in Norwegian that can be argued to assume 
the role of a verb of saying in reports on previous speech acts. I am mainly 
interested in the use of four central Norwegian verbs of propositional a t t i tude 
in reporting and reported acts, every one of which can be translated by the 
single multi-functional, or polysemous English verb think. 
2. The think category of Norwegian verba sentiendi 
The four Norwegian verbs referred to at the end of the introductory section are: 
1) tro, meaning ' to think' in the sense of ' to believe' (including the religious 
faith context as well as a parenthetical hedging function); 2) synes, meaning 
'to think' , or ' to feel', with reference to strictly subjective evaluations based on 
personal tas te , etc.; 3) mene, meaning ' to have an opinion (about something)'; 
4) tenke, meaning 'to assume', or ' to suppose', in addition to its intransitive 
use as a predicate denoting the activity of thinking, or pondering. 
We will first make a comparison between tro and synes, a lexical pair 
that is admirably suited to demonstrate the polysemous character of English 
think. In English it is possible to use a sentence like (8) not only if you feel 
you do not have sufficient knowledge to leave the statement of the complement 
clause unmodified, but also if you intend to express your personal subjective 
evaluation. 
(8) I think she's a good guitar player. 
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The continuation of (9) implies the former reading, and that of (10) the la t te r . 
(9) I think she's a good guitar player, but I only know her as a 
percussionist. 
(10) I think she's a good guitar player, but I admit that that's simply 
my own personal taste. 
If we subst i tute believe for think in the sentence structures of (9) and (10), we 
find that this other English VS, believe, is acceptable in (9') but not in (10') . 
(9') I believe she's a good guitar player, but I only know her as a 
percussionist. 
(10') I believe she's a good guitar player, #but I admit that that's 
simply my own personal taste. 
Norwegian tro (present tense tror) would be required in a translation of (9), 
while synes (present tense syns or synes) would be the right gloss for think 
in (10). 
(11) J eg tror/??syns hun er en god gitarist, men jeg kjenner henne 
bare som perkusjonist. 
(12) Jeg syns/??tror hun er en god gitarist, men jeg innrfimmer at det 
rett og slett er min egen personlige smak. 
We have found that the same generalized conversational implicatures at-
tach to the use of Norwegian tro and English think - believe. Synes, on the 
other hand, does not really belong to the same kind of epistemic scale as tro 
and its English counterparts, because it refers to a purely subjective judgement 
on the part of the subject referent. As the propositions of the complements 
of (13) are all such that you cannot form a purely subjective opinion about 
their t ruth or falsity, the synes alternative makes those sentence structures 
ungrammatical. 
(13) (a) Möns tror/*syns at han vinner i morgen. 
'Möns thinks (believes) that we will win tomorrow' 
(b) Jeg trodde/*syntes du kjente henne. 
'I thought (believed) you knew her' 
(c) Jeg tror/*syns Andersen hadde mistet lommeboka si. 
'I think (believe) Andersen had lost his wallet' 
The subjective character of synes makes the indirect speech report of 
(14) an appropriate report on the statement of I) as well as on the unqualified 
statement of II). 
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(14) Reported speech act I): Jeg syns hun er en god gitarist. 
'I think she is a good guitar player' 
Reported speech act II): Hun er en god gitarist. 
'She is a good guitar player' 
Report : Han syntes hun var en god gitarist. 
'He thought/fel t she was a good guitar player' 
The impart ial character of this report stands in striking contrast to the biased 
alternative of (15) used as a report on I) or II) in (14). 
(15) Report : #Han trodde hun var en god gitarist. 
'He thought/believed she was a good guitar player' 
Even Norwegian synes is a polysemous verb. I said that it refers to a 
different type of mental state than tro, but it does not necessarily involve 
reference to some personal evaluation, to a statement whose truth-value simply 
cannot be tested on empirical grounds. Synes is also appropriate when the 
speaker is trying to identify the na ture of some sensory stimulus as she is 
speaking. 
(16) Jeg syns du har en flekk pá frakkén din. 
'I think you have a stain on your coat' 
'It looks as if you have a stain on your coat ' , or 
'You seem to have a stain on your coat' 
(17) Jeg syns det tordner. 
'I think it thunders ' 
This particular use of synes presupposes a 1st person subject. Curiously, it 
is not think but believe that seems to have an analogous function in English, 
a verb tha t does not correspond to Norwegian synes, apart from its use in 
sentences like (18) and (19): 
(18) I believe there's a stain on your coat. 
(19) I believe there's thunder in the air. 
The English speaker's use of believe in ( 18)—( 19) could conceivably represent 
a case of understatement; on the other hand, you will typically use ( 16)/(17) 
and ( 18)/(19) precisely because you have to see or hear more closely in order 
to form a definite idea. 
The verb synes, which is otherwise quite acceptable in a metapragmatic 
reference to a previous statement involving that VS, is less natural in reports 
on statements of the type illustrated in ( 16)—(17): 
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(20) ?Han syntes jeg hadde en flekk pá frakkén min. 
'He thought I had a stain on my coat ' 
(21) ?Han syntes det tordnet. 
'He thought it thundered' 
Synes can not modify statements that deal explicitly with the subject 
referent's preferences or (dis)likings. Hence (22) is well-formed, but (23) is 
not; (24) is well-formed, and (25) is not. 
(22) Jeg syns du er fantastisk. 
'I think you are marvellous' 
(23) *Jeg syns jeg liker deg veidig godt. 
'I think I like you very much' 
(24) Jeg syns beaujolais er bedre. 
'I think beaujolais is bet ter ' 
(25) *Jeg syns jeg foretrekker beaujolais. 
'I think I prefer beaujolais' 
The constraint on complement and main clause verb relations that blocks 
Norwegian structures like (23) and (25) explains the absence of "reports" like 
(26) and (27). 
(26) *Han syntes han likte meg. 
'He thought he liked me' 
(27) *Han syntes han foretrakk beaujolais. 
'He thought he preferred beaujolais' 
Notice that (25) would actually be quite acceptable if tror were substi-
tu ted for syns (cf. the grammaticality of the English sentence I think I prefer 
beaujolais). It would simply weaken the speaker's commitment to the propo-
sition of the complement clause. 
Let us now turn to the Norwegian VS mene. This verb has two distinct 
meanings. I am not sure whether there are actually two homonyms, or one pol-
ysemous lexeme. Certain criteria seem to point in the direction of homonymy, 
others do not (see the discussion in Fretheim 1990). One of the senses of mene 
is ' to have an opinion about something', the other sense is a purely metalin-
guistic one concerning the potential discrepancy and even opposition between 
what is being said and what is meant, or between how a speech act was in-
terpreted the first time around and how it was intended to be interpreted by 
the sender. The sender may have to make another t ry with some sort of para-
phrase of the first utterance. A sentence like Jeg mener at jeg venter til det 
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blir mfirkt ('I mean that I'm waiting until i t ' s dark ' ) can only have the l a t t e r , 
metalinguistic meaning, i.e. "Wha t I really mean to say is t ha t I'm wait ing 
until it 's dark." In saying this I am definitely not expressing my opinion. As 
it is only the opinion sense that is interesting for the topic of this paper, mene 
is henceforth to be understood as the verb expressing the subject referent 's 
opinion, and never as the formally identical verb used in self- or other-repair. 
What are the lexical differences between tro and mene, and between synes 
and mene? First of all, mene resembles synes, in that it never induces a 
Q-implicature of the scalar epistemic sort. Consider the following two ta lk 
exchanges between A and B, where B's declaratives serve as metapragmatic 
acts of referring to something tha t the person named Astrid has said: 
(28) A: Var Astrid fornfiyd med utstillingen? 
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?' 
В: Ja. Hun mente at det var den beste hun noensinne hadde sett. 
'Yes. She thought (— was of the opinion) that it was the best 
she had ever seen' 
(29) A: Var Astrid fornfiyd med utstillingen? 
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?' 
B: Ja. (?)Hun trodde at det var den beste hun noensinne hadde 
sett. 
'Yes. She believed tha t it was the best she had ever seen' 
In spite of past tense trodde and a 3rd person subject , B's answer in 
(29) does not generate a Q-implicature. In ac tual fact, some native speakers 
report that they feel the sentence structure is no longer entirely well-formed 
when you subst i tute trodde for the quite unproblematic VS mente of (28). T h e 
complement clause of B's answer contains a reported subjective evaluation on 
Astrid's part. It would indeed be presumptuous for someone to implicate t h a t 
some other person's subjective evaluation has been based on an erroneous 
belief, so the Q-implicature generally does not go through in cases of th is 
sort. However, one would not expect the VS tro to be at all appropriate when 
the reported speech act is a subjective evaluation, and in contradistinction 
to B's sentence in (29)—which is just very mildly deviant—the answer of 
(30), though structurally well-formed in isolation, actually turns out t o be 
considerably worse, in the context of A's question, than the answer of (29). 
(30) A: Var Astrid fornfiyd med utstillingen ? 
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?' 
B: Ja. #Hun trodde at den var fin. 
'Yes. # S h e believed that it was good ' 
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There is a significant difference between B's repor ts in (29) and (30). 
You will not need to qualify your s ta tement with a main clause VS like tro 
if you wish to express t ha t some experience has had a positive effect on you. 
Using the hyperbolic expression that something is the best thing t h a t ever 
happened t o you, or the greatest piece of music you ever heard, is a very 
different ma t t e r . Even if we allow for the fact that Astr id 's statement reported 
by person В in (29) may represent a s tandard type of hyperbole familiar from 
a large number of languages, it is understandable t h a t a Norwegian speaker 
might prefer to qualify her use of a superlative like the one in (29) by adding 
the modal preamble of Jeg tror at... and placing the propositional content 
of her u t terance in the ai-complement. It is very likely that Astrid's original 
statement was something like this: 
(31) Astrid: Jeg tror at den utstillingen er den beste jeg noensinne 
har sett. 
'I believe tha t that exhibition is the best I have ever seen' 
The report of (29) is then seen to render Astrid's own statement in a struc-
turally most accurate way. 
As for the report of (30), Astrid is not likely to have made the judgement 
of (32) about the exhibition unless she never saw it herself but had only been 
informed about it by someone who liked it: 
(32) Astrid: Jeg tror at den utstillingen er fin. 
'I believe tha t that exhibition is good' 
While Jeg tror at... in (31) relates to the superlative den beste and noth-
ing else, the same qualification in (32) relates to the ai-complement predi-
cation. Both the statement of (32) and the report of (30) conversationally 
implicate t h a t Astrid was personally unable to judge the quality of the ex-
hibition. (English is apparently not much different f rom Norwegian on this 
point.) 
Observe tha t even (33), which is identical to (30) except for the speaker's 
having selected mene instead of tro, would sound a little bit less na tu ra l than 
the flawless alternative of (34), where it is synes that occupies the VS position. 
(33) A: Var Astrid fornfiyd med utstillingen? 
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?' 
B: Ja. (#)Hun mente at den var fin. 
'Yes. She regarded it as good' 
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(34) A: Var Astrid fornfiyd med utstillingen? 
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?' 
B: Ja. Нитг syntes at den var fin. 
'Yes. She thought that it was good' 
The VS mene, as it is being used by В in (33), pictures a situation where the 
experiencer has based her judgement on solid arguments more than on any 
impressions or spontaneous reactions that the exhibition might have caused 
in her. Synes, on the other hand, accomodates her spontaneous feelings about 
it. 
Synes and mene have more conspicuously different functions in t h e re-
ports of (35) and (36). 
(35) Han syntes det var godt â vœre г Lorvika. 
'He thought/fel t it was good to be in Lorvika' 
(36) Han mente det var godt à vœre i Lorvika. 
'He was of the opinion that it was good to be in Lorvika' 
Although both reports refer to personal judgements, (35) presupposes t h a t the 
original speaker has been in Lorvika and really knows the place personally, and 
(36) does not. You can eliminate this condition pertaining to Han syntes at... 
of (35) by adding a subjunctive modal auxiliary in the complement clause, as 
shown in (37) where syntes and mente turn out to be interchangeable because 
the speaker of (37) does not relate her own experience. 
(37) Han syntes/mente det màtte vœre godt à vœre i Lorvika. 
'He thought it must be good to be in Lorvika' 
We have seen that Jeg mener... and Jeg syns... can be prefixed to sub-
jective judgements. Tha t , I have said, is not t rue of Jeg tror... 'I be l ieve . . . '. 
Nor is it true of Jeg tenker... 'I t h ink /a s sume . . . ' . Whereas an unmodified 
statement like (38) expresses a personal evaluation, (39) is a hedged s ta tement 
of belief tha t can not be based on the speaker's own impressions. The speaker 
of (39) has not herself seen the necklace she is referring to, or she has a t least 
not seen it in its present state, at the time of utterance. 
(38) Halsbändet ser elegant ut. 
'The necklace looks elegant' 
(39) Jeg tenker at halsbändet ser elegant ut. 
'I assume that the necklace looks elegant ' 
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Even if Norwegian tenke and English think are cognates, think would be a 
misleading gloss in (39). We have to resort to some such English VS as 'as-
sume' . 
In fiction you may find a past tense statement like (40) referring to the 
subject referent 's thoughts a t the sight of t he necklace. (40) conveys the same 
as the direct speech (or ra ther "direct thought" ) construction of (41), or the 
mixed "free indirect speech" construction of (42). 'Assume' would not be the 
right gloss in any of these. 
(40) Han tenkte at halsbändet sá elegant ut. 
'He thought that the necklace looked elegant' 
(41) Han tenkte: "Halsbändet ser elegant ut." 
'He thought , "The necklace looks e legant" ' 
(42) Halsbändet sä elegant ut, tenkte han. 
'The necklace looked elegant, he though t ' 
T h e communicative equivalence of (40) on the one hand and (41)/(42) on the 
o ther suggests t h a t the VS tenke has a descriptive, and not a metapragmatic 
function in (40). It describes a thought process, not some linguistic action 
resulting from, t he kind of cerebral activity associated with the Norwegian 
verb tenke. 
However, utterances like (41) or (42) are not restricted to that type of 
fiction where t h e narrator is omniscient and has the ability to "quote" other 
people's thoughts . (44) can be a report on (43), for example. 
(43) Jeg tenkte: "Dette er slutten." 
'I thought, "This is the end . ' " 
(44) Han tenkte: "Dette er slutten." 
'He thought , "This is t he end. '" 
Though the u t te rance of (44) really looks as if it reports the thoughts of some 
person who is not the speaker of (44), t ha t utterance is really a report on a 
communicative act , see (43), and not the result of a mind-reader's probings. 
T h e problem—if there is one—does not relate to (44), because (44) simply 
renders (43) in t h e straightest possible way; it is rather (43)—the original act— 
t h a t presents us with a problem: are one's thoughts really translatable into a 
coherent linguistic form? I am not going to pursue that philosophical question. 
T h e point is t h a t (43) is common usage. The re is nothing bizarre about that 
Norwegian u t te rance or its English translation. We all know that people are 
constantly ta lking about their thought processes as i f i t were possible to quote 
thoughts. 
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Cresswell (1985, 41) notes that the direct speech report of (45) is t rue iff 
Lyell has uttered a token of the sentence Robins are red. 
(45) Lyell says 'Robins are red'. 
Hence a token of (45) cannot be used to report on a performed ut terance of 
the sentence of (46), for example. 
(46) Lyell says that robins are red. 
On the other hand, the indirect speech construction of (46) would be an ap-
propriate report, Cresswell reminds us, even if the original speaker had ut tered 
a token of the English sentence (47), or, say, a token of the German sentence 
(48). 
(47) The robin is a red bird. 
(48) Rotkehlchen sind rot. 
Indirect speech, as in (46), gives a speaker a certain lati tude as to how the 
complement of the verb of saying may be structured. And the use of a VS in 
place of a verbum dicendi further increases this latitude. No one expects you 
to replicate the original speaker's wordings when you use a VS in a report . 
Conversely, you will not normally use a verbum sentiendi with a direct quo-
tation. This, as we have seen, does not mean that indirect speech is the only 
possibility with such verbs. There is the free indirect style of (42), and there 
are constructions like (44). There are furthermore syntactic constructions with 
propositional a t t i tude verbs in the postposed parenthetical clause position. 
The Norwegian "direct thought" construction of (44) is confined to the 
use of one particular VS, namely tenke\ in English it is confined to the verb 
think. I must confess that I have no idea why the parenthetical of (49) is 
perfect, while (50) is ungrammatical. 
(49) "Nâ bedrer det seg, " trodde han. 
' "Now things are improving," he thought/believed. ' 
(50) *Han trodde: "Nâ bedrer det seg." 
'He thought/believed, "Now things are improving."' 
The Norwegian VS tenke assumes a somewhat different character when 
it has the metapragmatic role of substi tute for a verb of saying in a report 
of a speech act dealing with some future event, more precisely, a report of a 
statement about the subject referent's intention to act in a specific manner 
in the future. The talk exchange of (51) is perfectly acceptable. В is here 
reporting on Ola's verbal reaction to the fact that he had missed the t rain: 
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(51) A: Hva sa Ola da han fikk hfire at toget hans hadde gâtt? 
' W h a t did Ola say when he got to know that his train had left? ' 
B: Han tenkte han ville ta det neste toget isteden. 
'He thought he would take the next train instead' 
Ola 's actual u t terance reported by В may or may not have included the VS 
tenke. That u t terance could have been (52) for example, or (53). 
(52) Da tar jeg det neste toget. 
'Then I'll take the next t ra in ' 
(53) Da tenker jeg jeg tar det neste toget. 
'Then I th ink I'll take the next train ' 
The transit ive VS tenke means 'to assume' or ' to suppose' when its object 
complement refers to an existing situation but it appears to have a different 
meaning when the complement refers to some future event, as in (53) and 
B's report in (51). There is actually some evidence that the transitive predi-
ca te tenke is ambiguous between an 'assume/suppose' reading and an ' intend' 
reading. A sentence like (54) can be interpreted in two different ways, either 
as a hedged s ta tement of belief, or as an expression of what the speaker has 
planned tc do. T h e present tense form finner ( 'find') refers to the future under 
either interpretation. 
(54) Jeg tenker jeg finner et billig hoteil her i byen. 
(lit.: I th ink I find a cheap hotel here in town) 
a. 'I suppose I'll find a cheap hotel in this town' 
b. 'I intend to find a cheap hotel in this town' 
Now, if someone were to report on my having uttered (54), then the 
'assume' reading and the ' intend' reading would have to be differentiated syn-
tactically. (55) and (56) are both possible reports on my original utterance, but 
on closer inspection (55) can only mean tha t I assumed I could find a suitable 
hotel , and in (56)—due to the added modal auxiliary skulle (lit.: should)— 
t h e reporter mus t have understood my ut terance to be an expression of my 
intentions: 
(55) Han tenkte han fant et billig hoteil. 
(lit.: He thought he found a cheap hotel) 
'He assumed he would find a cheap hotel ' 
(56) Han tenkte han skulle finne et billig hoteil. 
(lit. : He thought he should find a cheap hotel) 
'He intended to find a cheap hotel' 
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Why is ambiguity permitted in (54) but not in the reports of (55)-(56)? 
The following answer is the best I can do. When you report , you will ide-
ally recreate at least part of the context of the reported speech act in order 
to reduce the addressee's processing efforts. The reporter's greater need to 
contextualize by means of her choice of linguistic form may account for the 
conventional use of distinct syntactic constructions for the 'assume' version of 
(55) and the 'intend' version of (56). In the original speech act of (54), the pre-
vious discourse itself would presumably give the addressee sufficient evidence 
to add the correct assumptions abou t what the speaker intended to convey. 
The indirect speech/thought use of a modal auxiliary is not limited to the 
expression of an intention requiring coindexed main and complement clause 
subjects, but when intention is not involved, a different modal expression, like 
the one appearing in (58), replaces skulle: 
(57) Reported act: Jeg tenker du firmer et billig hoteil, Gerda. 
'I suppose you'll find a cheap hotel, Gerda ' 
(58) Report : Han tenkte hun kom til á finne et billig hotell. 
'He thought she would (lit.: came to) find a cheap hotel' 
Some Norwegian speakers claim to find an ambiguity similar to the one 
displayed in (54) even when they substitute tror for tenker; others do not 
perceive it so clearly with the VS tro. Personally I judge (59) to be subject 
to the same conditions of usage as (54), and I would like to add that you can 
eliminate the epistemically weakened alternative of 'I suppose I'll find a cheap 
hotel in this town' by keeping tror and using the reflexive verb finne seg ( ' t o 
find oneself (something)') plus a right-dislocated copy of the subject pronoun. 
(60) is a disambiguated alternative to (59).2 
(59) Jeg tror jeg finner et billig hotell her i byen. 
' l it . : I believe I find a cheap hotel here in town' 
a. 'I suppose I'll find a cheap hotel in this town' 
b. 'I intend to find a cheap hotel in this town' 
(60) Jeg tror jeg finner meg et billig hotell her i byen, jeg. 
(lit.: I believe I find myself a cheap hotel here in town, I) 
'I intend to find myself a cheap hotel in this town' 
In reports, there is a clear difference between tenke and tro. While the 
choice between (55) and (56) as legitimate reports on (54) depends on the 
о 
T h i s observation is due to Randi Alice Nilsen. 
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reporter's conception of the meaning of (54), the repor t of (61)—unlike (56)— 
does not accomodate the intention reading that may be at t r ibuted to (59) in 
the right context: 
(61) Han trodde han skulle finne et billig hotell. 
(lit. : He believed he should find a cheap hotel) 
'He thought he would find a cheap hotel' 
In other words, (61) can not mean t h a t the subject referent had made up his 
mind to find an inexpensive hotel. In addition we observe that t he VS tro of 
(61) induces a scalar Q-implicature, as we would expect , while the VS tenke 
of (56) does not. 
It now remains to contrast tenke and mene. A good example of differ-
ences in the contextualizing effects—or the relevance, if you like—of those two 
Norwegian verbs is provided by the following minimally different reports: 
(62) Da hun ikke kunne finne nfiklene sine, tenkte hun at hun hadde 
glemt dem hjemme. 
'When she couldn't find her keys, she thought ( = inferred, 
guessed, assumed) tha t she had left them at home ' 
(63) Da hun ikke kunne finne nfiklene sine, mente hun at hun hadde 
glemt dem hjemme. 
'When she couldn't find her keys, she expressed the opinion tha t 
she had left them at home' 
These two reports do not give the recipient the same ideas of what the 
subject referent had said. (62) sounds like a report on a hedged s ta tement . The 
reported speech act could have been something like Jeg har sannsynligvis glemt 
nfiklene hjemme ('I have presumably left my keys at home'). T h e speaker's 
degree of commitment to the expressed proposition is probably fairly low here. 
It was no disaster that she did not have those keys, and therefore not terribly 
important for her, at the time, to be absolutely sure t ha t she had left them at 
home. 
In contradistinction to (62), the other report, (63), suggests t h a t the sub-
ject referent had maintained, with a high degree of commitment, that the 
keys had been left at home. She may have performed a modally unqualified 
statement like Jeg har glemt dem hjemme ('I've left them at home') . 
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3. Matching reported and reporting acts 
The observations of the preceding section, on four central Norwegian verba 
sentiendi whose lexical content may be said to correspond to various aspects 
of the meaning of English think, were mainly based on native speaker intro-
spection. I have in addition carried out a test in which Norwegian informants 
were asked to match a written set of reported acts and a written set of report-
ing acts containing one of those four VS. 
Embedded under the VS in the reporting acts were certain modal modifi-
cations in the form of modal auxiliaries that the informants were asked to pay 
attention to. Those auxiliaries were assumed by the investigator to restrict the 
set of VS available in the main clause. 
The reported acts were chosen so as to present the informants with nine 
syntactically and lexically distinct ways of expressing various modal qualifica-
tions of the same propositional content. The combination of modality markers 
(auxiliaries and modal particles) and embedded infinitival clause or t/ied-clause 
found in most of the versions reveals that the original speaker is referring to 
something unfulfilled, some event or state to be completed, or terminated in 
the future. (64) presents the full set of reported acts used in the test. (The 
suggested English translations reflect my own views of what would be the con-
textually least marked meanings of my nine sentences. There are conceivably 
contexts requiring a different translation than the ones offered here. In a single 
case, no. 6, I found it necessary to be explicit about an ambiguity.) 
(64) 1. Det er nok best at jeg venter til det blir m/rkt. 
' I t 's probably best for me to wait until i t ' s dark' 
2. Jeg venter til det blir m/rkt. 
Ti l wait until it 's dark' 
3. Jeg skal vente til det blir m/rkt. 
' I 'm going to wait until i t 's dark' 
4. Jeg skal visst vente til det blir m/rkt. 
' I 'm supposed to wait until it 's dark, apparent ly ' 
5. Jeg tror jeg venter til det blir m/rkt. 
'I think I'll wait until i t ' s dark' 
6. Jeg tror jeg skal vente til det blir rri/rkt. 
'I think I 'm supposed to wait until i t ' s dark ' , or 
'I think I'll wait until i t 's dark' (cf. no. 5) 
7. Jeg vil vente til det er rri/rkt. 
' I 'm waiting until it 's dark ' 
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8. Jeg har besternt meg for a vente til det blir mfirkt. 
'I 've decided to wait until i t 's dark' 
9. Det er meningen at jeg skal vente til det blir mfirkt. 
'The idea is for me to wait until it 's dark ' 
The declaratives tha t were designed to serve as possible candidates for 
acceptable reports on the above set of acts 1-9 were divided into three sub-
groups, I, II, and III, tha t were structured differently in their main-clause 
direct object complements. There is a systematic difference in the choice of 
modal markers in the complement of the VS appearing in the main clause of 
the reporting utterances. Group I has a complement with the past- tense modal 
auxiliary skulle 'should' plus an infinitive, which shows that the subject ref-
erent is reported to have said that he would act in accordance with a certain 
plan or intention (possibly someone else's); group II contains the volitional 
modal auxiliary ville 'would' instead of skulle; group III contains the modal 
auxiliary fikk (lit.: got) plus an infinitive, and this is an auxiliary with a mildly 
deontic character, conveying the idea that the subject referent considered it 
appropriate to behave in the way reported by the speaker (in the present case, 
to wait until it gets dark). 
These three modal auxiliaries seem to me to be very frequent in reports 
of speech acts whose performer is referring to some future nonverbal event. 
Ville and fikk definitely have a more subjective flavour than skulle. They can 
be relatively easily associated with the intentions, plans, or preferences of the 
subject referent of the VS, i.e. the speaker of the reported act . Unlike ville 
with its primary volition sense, both skulle and fikk suggest an element of 
obligation, but with skulle it is often an obligation that is outwardly imposed 
on the subject referent and with fikk it is an "inner" obligation, a feeling of 
having a duty to act in a specific manner , which does not arise f rom pressure 
from without but rather from a personally felt need to behave in the way 
described. Thus the sentence Jeg skal vente her (lit.: I shall wait here) means 
either 'I 've made up my mind to wait here', or ' I 'm supposed to wait here', 
whereas Jeg far vente her (lit.: I get wait here) means 'I'd bet ter wait here', 
and never ' I 'm supposed to (or 'expected to') wait here'. 
(65) lists the set of reporting acts that my informants were requested to 
confront each one of the nine original acts of (64) with. (The glosses are strictly 
literal this time. Notice the e)-versions added for control. They do not contain 
a VS but instead the most neutral Norwegian verb of saying, si ' t o say'): 
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I (a 
(b 
(c 
(d 
(e 
II (a 
(b 
(c 
(d 
(e 
III (a 
(b 
(c 
(d 
(e 
Han tenkte han skulle vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He thought he should wait till it became da rk ' 
Han syntes han skulle vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He thought/fel t he should wait till it became dark' 
Han trodde han skulle vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He believed he should wait till it became da rk ' 
Han mente han skulle vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He meant he should wait till it became da rk ' 
Han sa han skulle vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He said he should wait till it became dark ' 
Han tenkte han ville vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He thought he would wait till it became da rk ' 
Han syntes han ville vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He thought/fel t he would wait till it became dark' 
Han trodde han ville vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He believed he would wait till it became dark ' 
Han mente han ville vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He meant he would wait till it became dark ' 
Han sa han ville vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He said he would wait till it became dark ' 
Han tenkte han fikk vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He thought he got [=had better] wait till it became dark ' 
Han syntes han fikk vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He thought/fel t he got wait till it became dark ' 
Han trodde han fikk vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He believed he got wait till it became dark ' 
Han mente han fikk vente til det ble mfirkt. 
'He meant he got wait till it became dark ' 
Han sa han fikk vente til det ble mflrkt. 
'He said he got wait till it became dark' 
The informants ' task was to start with the reported speech act of (64 /1) 
and run through the whole set of (65) I, II, III, checking on a form designed 
for the purpose which of those fifteen declaratives were acceptable reports 
on (64/1), and which ones were not. Then they would s t a r t all over again 
with (64/2), and so on, until the list was exhausted and a total of 15 X 9 
pairs of reporting and reported acts had been evaluated. They were also asked 
whether they felt that main clause han and complement clause han referred to 
the same person. The number of Norwegian informants participating in this 
test was ten, which is quite modest. It was truly hard to recruit willing people, 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
54 THORSTEIN F R E T H E I M 
though, as their job was extremely time-consuming and exacting, and quite 
tiresome af ter a while. 
Both the three modal auxiliaries and the four nonauxiliary verbs of prepo-
sitional a t t i t ude can be placed on a subjectivity—objectivity scale, with tro, 
the verb of all the c)-versions of the reporting acts, being definitely the most 
objective, and synes, the verb of the b)-versions, being definitely the most 
subjective VS in the set. Among the original speech acts of 1-9 there are four 
tha t have a typically subjective ring to them, namely nos. 2, 5, 7, and 8. 
It may surprise some readers to learn tha t no. 5—Jeg tror jeg venter til det 
blir mfirkt—belongs in t ha t group, because tro, as I said, is the least subjective 
of the four VS. However, present tense tror after a 1st person subject can have 
a lexically bleached meaning; it can function like a hedge, or softener. 'I guess' 
would probably be the most suitable English gloss under such circumstances: 
'I guess I'll wait until it gets dark' (cf. the data of (59)—(60) in the preceding 
section). The hedging funct ion disappears once you replace the present tense 
and/or the 1st person subject with something else. Pas t tense trodde retains 
the full lexical meaning as a verb of propositional a t t i tude . It is always a 
genuine VS when it is used as a metapragmatic subst i tute for a verb of saying 
in an act of referring to some speech act. And in a sentence like Han trodde han 
ventet til det ble mfirkt you cannot help interpreting han in the main clause 
and han in t he complement as non-coreferential terms, due to the objective 
character of the non-hedge use of the past tense form trodde. 
Sentence no. 6—Jeg tror jeg skal vente til det blir mfirkt—is ambiguous 
between a hedging and a non-hedging reading of the main clause verb. Why is 
the full lexical verb reading of tro so much more acceptable in sentence no. 6 
than in sentence no. 5? T h e answer is presumably tha t Norwegian jeg skal ('I 
shall') opens for a. situation where someone else—a person or an institution 
with authority—has decided that the speaker is to wait until it is dark. The 
ambiguity of no. 6 is a funct ion of the lexical ambiguities of the verb forms 
tror and skal. 
It turned out that the test subjects' opinions about what would be a good 
report on no. 5 and no. 6, respectively, were as a whole not very different, but 
there are at least a couple of striking differences between the data I got on 5 
and on 6 t h a t I find interesting. I have said that skulle is probably the least 
subjective of the three modal auxiliaries and that tro is the least subjective 
VS. The combination of those two items is what we find in the reporting act 
I (c): Han trodde han skulle vente til det ble mfirkt. All ten informants found 
that this was an acceptable report on speech act no. 6, and that result was 
contrary to my expectations. Either they did not recognize the Q-implicature 
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and 'false belief' implicature tha t I have attr ibuted to report structures start-
ing with Han trodde... ('He bel ieved. . . ' ) , or they simply did not feel tha t 
those implicata interfered with their ideas of an acceptable report . In their 
unanimous acceptance of the pair of 6/1 (c), the informants also disregarded 
the possible interpretation of 6 as a statement about the speaker 's decision to 
wait, a pragmatic meaning that presupposes tha t you assign a hedge function 
ra ther than a VS function to jeg tror... . 
It also turned out that all ten informants considered II (b )—Han syntes 
han ville vente til det ble mfirkt—to be a good report on no. 6, and the se-
mant ic differences between I (c) and II (b) are actually such tha t those two 
sentences simply cannot be used to report on the same s ta tement . In version 
I (c) the reporter is talking about expectations and obligations, but in II (b) 
she is talking about a decision to act in the manner described. The former 
report implies tha t tror in no. 6 is being understood to be the VS meaning ' to 
believe', and the latter report implies an understanding of tror as a hedge, or 
parenthetical verb. 
The fact tha t both pairs, 6 /1 (c) and 6 / I I (b), were assessed in the same 
way shows that the test subjects must have recognized the ambuigity of 6, 
but in their respective evaluations of 6/1 (c) on the one hand and 6/H (b) on 
the other, they have evidently perceived one content at a time* All informants 
assigned the interpretation of 'I believe I'm supposed to wait until it 's dark ' 
to sentence no. 6 in the situation where it is matched with I (c), while they 
all assigned the interpretation of 'I guess I'll wait until i t 's da rk ' to the same 
sentence matched with the report of II (b). 
The noted highly positive score for the pair of 6/1 (c) was the same as 
for 4 / 1 (c). Reported sentence no. 4—Jeg skal visst vente til det blir mfirkt— 
contains a modal particle visst, which is hard to translate properly, but which 
is the least subjective of the most common Norwegian downtoner particles 
(Fretheim 1991); it often implies that the speaker is offering second-hand 
knowledge. No. 4 is a s tatement about the speaker's feeling of uncertainty 
about how he is expected to behave. 
There were just two people out of ten who felt that I (c) could be used 
as a report on sentence no. 5 (Jeg tror jeg venter...). This means that the 
major i ty judged no. 5 to be a statement about the speaker's own decision to 
wai t . 
Most of the reporting versions with the modal auxiliary fikk in the comple-
ment (group III) showed high positive scores for no. 5 and no. 6 alike, though 
III (c)—Han trodde han fikk vente til det ble mfirkt—was not considered a 
good report on sentence no. 5 by more than six people, against nine people 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
56 T H O R S T E I N FRETHEIM 
out of ten for the pair of 6 / I I I (c). Tha t discrepancy must be a t t r ibuted to two 
factors, namely the non-subjective character of the verb tro when it cooccurs 
with the unequivocally deontic modal auxiliary / a , and the fact that no. 5 can 
only be interpreted as a statement about the speaker's decision, while no. 6 
can also function as as statement of belief. 
None of the (a)-reports were ever associated with an obligation due to a 
decision made by someone other than the original speaker. All three combi-
nations tenkte... skulle, tenkte... ville, and tenkte... fikk evoke a picture of a 
subject referent who has made up his mind to wait unti l it gets dark, though 
in my opinion the tenkte... skulle combination of I (a) does permit an inter-
pretation of skulle as a deontic modal as well, just like III (a). 
There is a striking difference between the informants ' reactions to I (a) 
and their reactions to I (c), and a no less convincing difference between their re-
actions to II (a) and II (c). The responses suggest tha t everyone has considered 
han... han to be «preferential both in I (a) and in III (a) , and that eight out 
of ten considered han... han to be «^referential in II (a) . In contrast to those 
da ta , nobody considered the two occurrences of han in II (c)—involving the 
collocation of trodde... ville—to refer to the same individual. Jeg tror jeg vil... 
is an acceptable sequence due to the fact that the cooccurrence of a 1st person 
subject and the present tense of tro admits a parenthetical, or hedge interpre-
tat ion, but the past tense form trodde of Han trodde han ville... in II (c) is 
not a hedge, it is a weak epistemic VS. Due to the noted scalar implicature 
attached to past tense trodde, the appearance of tha t form in II (c) means it 
is only with great difficulty that you construe the VS of II (c) as a verb mod-
ifying a statement containing the modal auxiliary ville of the volition type. 
Therefore the main clause han and the complement clause han of II (c) tend 
to be processed as non-coindexed pronouns. 
Among the d)-reports starting with Han mente..., the mente... ville ver-
sion of II (d) is apparently fraught with much the same 'problem' as II (c). 
When you have decided tha t you wish to act in a certain way, you will hardly 
describe your state of mind by saying that you 'have an opinion about ' what 
you want to do, but tha t is exactly what a Norwegian speaker would do if 
she/he were to use (66) as a report. 
(66) ??Jeg mener jeg vil vente til det blir mfirkt. 
' l a m of the opinion tha t I wish to wait till it is da rk ' 
The deviance of (66) is consistent with the preponderance of assignments of 
non-coreference to han... han in II (d). 
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To the extent that (66) can be assigned a meaning, its meaning is signif-
icantly different from t h a t of Jeg tror jeg vil vente til det blir mfirkt. In such 
syntactic environments as these, the prefix Jeg tror.. . will automatically be 
understood to serve as a hedge, but t he VS mene is never a hedge. 
One might have believed that the (e)-versions, which contained no propo-
sitional a t t i tude verb but instead the most neutral of all Norwegian verbs of 
saying would be acceptable throughout, but that was not the case. For ex-
ample, III (e)—Han sa han fikk vente til det ble mfirkt—got the best possible 
score as a report on sentence no. 1 and an almost equally good score with 
respect to nos. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, bu t it got the very lousy score of two YES, 
eight NO as a report on sentence no. 4. The culprit here is the modal auxiliary 
fikk, not the verb form sa 'said'). Fikk suggests, as I said previously, some 
kind of personally felt obligation, whereas sentence no. 4 containing the modal 
particle visst may be said to minimize the importance of the speaker 's own 
will or intention, and to describe the speaker as someone who is in this case 
simply acting upon some other person's presumably rather diffusely expressed 
request. 
All in all, sentence no. 4 with i ts sequence skal visst proved to be the odd 
man out in the set of nine speech acts in (64). The report of I ( c )—Han trodde 
han skulle vente...—got ten positive votes out of ten as a report on no. 4, but 
many of the other report ing acts shows very low scores with regard to sentence 
no. 4, including the other two sentences featuring tro, i.e. II ( c )—Han trodde 
han ville vente... —and III (с)—Han trodde han fikk vente  
Judging from the informant responses, what generally happens in sub-
group III of the report ing sentences is that the lexical differences between the 
four VS verbs of tenke, synes, tro and mene are somewhat blurred when the 
auxiliary fikk appears in the complement clause. As a rule the informant's 
reactions to the respective (a), (b) , (c), and (d) versions of subgroups I and 
II differed systematically, but most informants discriminated to a much lesser 
extent between (a), (b) , (c) and (d) in subgroup III. That is not surprising, 
since the modal auxiliary fâ suggests that the decision to act is t he speaker's 
own. One consequence o f t h a t is t h a t the presence of fikk in III (c) counteracts 
the Q-implicature normally adhering to past tense trodde with a 3rd person 
subject pronoun. Fikk favours a coreference understanding of han... han. With 
the exception of noncoreference judgements of han... han in III d) ( Han mente 
han fikk... ) from two informants, and from one informant in the case of III e) 
(Han sa han fikk... ), the two pronominal subjects were uniformly considered 
to be coindexed in subgroup III of (65). 
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4. Conclusion 
Assertives is the name that Searle (1979) gave to one of his five main categories 
of illocutionary acts. The assertives form quite a heterogeneous class, though 
Searle offers no explicit subcategorization. One th ing common to all assertives, 
as Searle defines them, is the 'psychological s t a t e ' that the performer of an 
assertive must be in, or its 'sincerity condition', to use his earlier terminology 
(Searle 1969). 
The psychological state belonging to assertives is 'belief'; t h a t is, a speaker 
who states, explains, claims, presumes or intimates that p is t rue is committed 
(in varying degrees) to the belief tha t p is true. 
Bach-Harnish postulate four main categories of communicative illocu-
tionary acts, which they label Constatives, Directives, Commissives, and Ac-
knowledgements, respectively (Bach-Harnish 1979, 39f.). They propose very 
fine-grained subclassifications. Their Constatives, for example, are divided into 
fifteen classes, one of which is called Assertives. They claim t h a t a feature 
common to all Constatives is " the expression of a belief, together with the 
expression of an intention that hearer form (or continue to hold) a like belief' 
(op.cit., 42). 
With the proviso tha t the mentioned state of belief is given a definition 
wide enough to include judgements made on the basis of the speaker 's personal 
taste (cf. Norwegian synes), 'belief ' can indeed be postulated as the psycho-
logical s tate pertaining to the felicitous performance of Norwegian assertives. 
However, I very much doubt that those Norwegian declaratives t h a t begin with 
Jeg syns (at)..., or the ones you can report on by saying NN syntes (at)..., 
would generally fit Bach and Harnish' description of Constatives as expressing 
the speaker's intention that the hearer form, or continue to hold, the speaker's 
belief. For synes it seems sufficient that the speaker informs the hearer about 
his own belief. If the speaker wishes to impose his belief on the hearer, he 
might have more success with a different VS than synes. 
I have not undertaken a cross-linguistic examination that might tell us 
something about how wide-spread the metapragmatic use of VS is, and I do 
believe we should eschew any a priori assumptions as to the universality of this 
manner of reporting on past illocutionary acts. T h e conventionalized reference 
to the psychological s ta te of belief observed in reports on assertives in the 
present paper might be culture-independent, but I am inclined to believe that 
it is culture-specific. 
English is one language that makes extensive use of VS in reports on 
assertive, or constative communicative acts, and closely-related Norwegian is 
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another. One of my goals has been to contrast four central Norwegian VS in 
the lexical ' think'- 'believe' area with their English counterparts. 
Nothing has been said about non-assertive illocutionary acts , but our use 
of VS as metapragmatic devices is clearly not restricted to reports on declar-
ative sentences used as assertives. Lyons (1977) contended t h a t the state of 
mind of anyone asking or posing a question is lack of knowledge, puzzlement, 
or wonder about something, and that the most general function of questions 
is simply to give expression to one's state of wonder or uncertainty. He de-
scribed interrogatives as sentences in which the s ta te of doubt is "grammati-
calized" (op.cit., 754). Be that as it may, it seems fairly accurate to say t h a t 
the state of mind that one would normally a t t r ibute to a person performing an 
information-seeking question is a s ta te of wondering (whether p is true). Both 
English and Norwegian have lexical verbs referring to this s ta te of mind appro-
priate for anyone asking an information-seeking question. You can subst i tute 
English NN wondered... for NN asked..., and the equivalent Norwegian VS 
lure pâ 'wonder' of NN lurte pâ... for the verb spfirre 'ask' of NN spurte... 
'NN asked . . . ' . Even this type of prepositional a t t i tude verb may have prag-
matic implications beyond what would the case if a regular verb of asking were 
used instead. I have a particular type of situation in mind. Suppose the ad-
dressee of some reported question can be expected to know the correct answer 
to the original speaker's question. I imagine tha t in this sort of situation, the 
report of (67) can have a richer set of contextual implications than the report 
of (68). 
(67) Linda wondered whether you're related to Gregory Berry. 
(68) Linda asked (me) whether you're related to Gregory Berry. 
If it is mutually known by speaker and addressee that the addressee of 
(67)/(68) does not know the answer, then the addressee would presumably 
interpret (67) as an indirectly conveyed question, more readily than (68). Us-
ing an explicit verb of asking is apparently one way of emphasizing t ha t in 
uttering (68), the speaker is doing no more than reporting on Linda's original 
question. If you choose to be less explicit, in the manner of (67), you thereby 
also give a hint that you would not mind being enlightened yourself. 
In my mind there is something to be gained from fur ther exploratory 
studies of the sort presented in this paper. Cross-linguistic typological investi-
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gâtions of the use of verba sentiendi as metapragmatic terms might be a useful 
complement to Verschueren's ongoing large-scale work on (Basic) Linguistic 
Action Verbs (Verschueren 1989, and this volume). 
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MU>, MOUTH(E), MOUTH 
DENOTING LINGUISTIC ACTION: 
ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF A RADIAL CATEGORY 
LOUIS GOOSSENS 
1. Introduction 
A number of years ago, on the occasion of a BBC interview, John Searle was 
asked what he regarded as the essence of language. "Well, Searle replied af-
ter a moment 's reflection, you open your mouth, and all tha t racket comes 
out". W h a t Searle did, of course, besides leaving the sophisticated reporter 
speechless for a few seconds, was build on the knowledge tha t our mouths are 
crucially involved in the production of speech sounds and hence of linguistic 
action. Tha t this is quite general knowledge about human language, is (also) 
reflected in the use of the lexical i tem mouth in Present-day English as it is 
recorded in a general usage dictionary like the Longman Dictionary of Con-
temporary English. Indeed, in a da t a base collecting the figurative expressions 
for linguistic action from the LDCE (on which see Vanparys (in press)), it 
appears that with respect to the body parts which can be used to denote lin-
guistic action (henceforth L.A.), mouth is the one that scores highest: 16 items 
in all, with tongue as a close second (14 items) and lip in third position with 
seven. 
For me, this observation about the fequency of the items mouth, tongue 
and lip in the denotation of L.A. in Present-day English usage triggered the 
question whether for the corresponding items in Old English a comparable 
situation obtained as well. My findings are reported in a paper presented at 
the Ninth International Historical Linguistics Conference (New Brunswick, NJ, 
August 1989) (Goossens (forthcoming)) and are briefly summarized in section 
2 of this contribution. 
As a kind of follow-up I will t ry here to give a glimpse of the (diachronic) 
development in English of this use of the item mouth to denote L.A., working 
with three successive samplings, one for Old English, one for Middle English, 
and one for Early Modern English. As it happens, an analysis of these samples 
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reveals a development with some interesting pat terns, which I would like to 
report on here. The reason why in the title of this paper I speak of 'aspects 
of the development of a radial category', is that I want to think about it in a 
Cognitive Grammar vein (in line, for example, with Lakoff (1987)). The idea 
is that the meanings of the lexical item mouth and its ancestors are organized 
around a prototypical centre ( ' the opening on the face through which an animal 
or human being may take food into the body, and by which sounds are made', 
LDCE mouth, n. 1), which radiates out to other senses by métonymie and 
metaphorical mapping. Following Cognitive Grammar, I define metonymy as 
involving a mapping from one element onto another within the same domain, 
metaphor as involving a mapping between two different domains. Obviously, in 
this context we are concerned with just a part of the development of the radial 
category, viz. the métonymie and metaphorical mappings of тир, mouth(e), 
mouth onto L.A. 
As pointed out above, section 2 is concerned with the way in which the 
counterparts of Present-day English mouth, tongue and lip in Old English were 
used to denote L.A.; more particularly, with the way in which this meaning 
extension appears to have arisen. Section 3 briefly presents the da ta bases on 
which the main body of this paper is based. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present my 
analyses of the Old English, the Middle English and the Early Modern English 
samples successively. A brief confrontation with the LDCE data follows in 
Section 7, after which we round off with our final conclusions. 
2. The rise of a new conceptualization pattern in Old English 
In Goossens (forthcoming) I provide an account of the distribution of тир , 
tunge and weler/lippe denoting L.A. in Old English texts (note tha t weler is 
t he current i tem for lip in OE and that lippe is still somewhat marginal). 
In outline, I found that for all these items the uses tha t denote L.A. occur 
with few exceptions in religious texts, and that within the religious corpus 
those L.A. uses predominantly come from the Psalms. In other words, there 
is ample evidence that the use of тир, tunge and weler/lippe to denote L.A. 
is of biblical origin. 
Among those items the most numerous one is again т и р , and, more im-
portantly, it appears that for т и р (but not for the other items) we see the 
beginnings of an independent (i.e. independent of biblical sources) use in the 
denotation of L.A. In other words, the conceptualization of linguistic action in 
te rms of the lexical item т и р is established in (late) Old English to the point 
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that it no longer requires direct biblical models. Obviously, from tha t point of 
view as well, mouth presents itself as the most promising item for the kind of 
diachronic investigation tha t I want to present here. 
3. A data base for MU)>/MOUTH(E)/MOUTH 
Although a lot can be learned from dictionaries, a study of the entries for 
тир, mouth (e) and mouth in the Old English, Middle English and Oxford 
English Dictionaries will not do for our purposes, for a number of reasons. 
First, because for the Toronto Dictionary of Old English the entry т и р is not 
yet available. Secondly, because the material on which both the MED and 
the OED are based is extremely heterogeneous, and because neither of them 
gives an idea of the proportion in which a particular use comes. Moreover, the 
contextualizations in those dictionaries are (for obvious reasons) too restricted 
in a number of cases for independent interpretation. 
Therefore, I decided to work with three comparatively homogeneous sam-
ples which present us with successive synchronic cuts. One for Late Old English 
around the millennium, for which I collected all the occurrences with т и р 
TElfric's writings from the Toronto Concordance (Di Paolo Healey-Venezky 
(1980)), one for Middle English (second half of the fourteenth century) with all 
the uses of mouth(e) f rom Chaucer (where I made use of the Chaucer Concor-
dance by Tatlock-Kennedy (1927) and Robinson's Chaucer edition (Robinson 
(1957)), and one for Early Modern English around the turn of the sixteenth 
to the seventeenth century with the uses of mouth in Shakespeare (based 
on Bart let t ' s Shakespeare Concordance (1962) and the Signet Classic edition 
(Barnet (1972)). In actual fact, there were about 170 instances in iElfric, 160 in 
Shakespeare and only 70 items in Chaucer; so I decided to work with 100 ran-
dom instances for /Elfirc and Shakespeare, whereas I took the complete sample 
for Chaucer. Under (1) I summarize this point about our data base, together 
with the distribution, in percentages, of the L.A. uses (both literal and non-
literal ones) versus the contexts where no L.A. is denoted. Note that for the 
Chaucer sample 39% corresponds to 27 instances; for /Elfric and Shakespeare 
the percentage, of course, corresponds to the actual number of instantiations. 
(1) TElfric (N: 100) Chaucer (N: 70) Shakespeare (N: 100) 
L.A. 59% 39% 61% 
Non-L.A. 41% 61% 39% 
In what follows we concentrate on the L.A. uses only. 
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4. Patterns in the jElfric data 
In the analysis of the three samples the three main L.A. uses to be distin-
guished are the literal, the métonymie and the metaphorical ones. 
The ./Elfric data contain four L.A. instances where т и р can be interpreted 
in its prototypical or literal sense, as exemplified by (2) (the reference is tha t 
of the Toronto Concordance). 
(2) (TEGram 4.9) 
Se mu)) drifö ut \>a. clipunge and seo lyft byô geslagen 
the mouth drives out the sound and the air is struck 
mid ))aere clypunge and gewyrő to stemne 
with tha t sound and becomes to voice 
All the other instances are figurative. There are none, however, which 
are purely metaphorical, i.e. where т и р fits into a pattern t ha t as a whole 
evokes a domain other than linguistic action and which in the context has to 
be mapped onto L.A. This means tha t as many as 55 (out of 59) have т и р in 
a métonymie sense. In other words, there is as a rule a mapping of the body 
part mouth onto some aspect of L.A., but this mapping occurs within the same 
domain, for which we can assume the presence of what LakofF would call an 
Idealized Cognitive Model in which the mouth is conceived as instrumental in 
L.A. As it happens, we even have proof that TElfric had an explicit awareness 
of the human mouth's instrumentality in linguistic action, given the (literal) 
instance f rom his 'Grammar ' quoted under (2). Under (3) we give an example 
where тире stands for what is said (words, speech). 
(3) (TECHom II, 39 1 294, 231) 
and cwae)) to őam leasan mid gelaernedum mujie 
and said to the wicked one with learned mouth 
Our next step is to differentiate this category of métonymie uses. In (4) 
we give a survey of the subcategories adopted ((i)-(v)) together with the 
number of occurrences for each in our sample. We complete this survey with 
the figures for the literal and the metaphorical uses (which we have already 
given above). In addition, we have added under the métonymie cases an extra 
specification métonymie in a metaphorical context. What this indicates is that 
among the métonymie uses, there are some that fit into a metaphorical context, 
as metonymies. These are spread across subcategories (i)-(v); they therefore 
do not add up to the total . 
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(4) (Late Old English; jElfric - 59 L.A. items) 
A. Literal 4 
55 B. Metonymie 
(i) ппф = what is said/words/speech 
(ii) X's п п ф = X's words = X as a speaker 
(iii) ппф = speaker 
(iv) mu}> = speech faculty 
(v) métonymie expressions with ппф 
(métonymie in a metaphorical context) ( 1 6 ) 
11 
•24 
3 
6 
11 
C. Metaphorical 0 
Let us next further illustrate and, if necessary, clarify, the distinctions made 
under the category métonymie. 
(i) In (5) and (6) we give two more instances where тир = what is 
said/words/speech. In (5) we can paraphrase mid anum тире as with the 
same words, in (6) of his тире means something like with what he said. 
and he him from his mouth in a heavenly way lore gave 
heora sawle to bigleofan 
their soul to nourishment 
Note also that (6) is an instance of metonymy within metaphor. There is an 
overall context in which the domain of feeding is mapped onto tha t of L.A., 
but the métonymie interpretation of his тире is still relevant. (For a fuller dis-
cussion of this intertwining of metaphor and metonymy see Goossens(1990)). 
(ii) As indicated by the paraphrase in (4), our second subcategory is very much 
like the first, in that т и р permits the same paraphrase as in (i). But there is 
the additional possibility that we can equate the combination of the genitive 
and its headword т и р with the person(s) referred to by the genitive conceived 
as speaker(s). We have included this as a separate subcategory because of its 
frequency. Indeed, it is more frequent than any of the other metonymies tha t 
we distinguish here. (7)—( 10) provide examples. 
(5) (TECHom II, 2 17, 207) 
ne magon we mid anum mu)>e bletsian and wyrian 
not can we with one mouth bless and curse 
(6) (TECHorn II, 2 11, 93 42) 
and he him of his ппфе heofenlice lare forgeaf 
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(7) (TECHom I, 10 152.3) 
godspelle )>e we nu gehierdon of Jjaes diacones mu]>e 
gospel which we now heard from the deacon's mou th 
(8) (jELS (Vincent) 80) 
seo ylce naeddre spaec nu I>urh }>ises arleasan muj) 
the same adder spoke now through this wicked one's mouth 
(9) (TELS (Ash W.) 241.) 
foröan ]?e se leasa ппф ofslihö })aes mannes sawle 
because the wicked mouth destroys the man ' s soul 
(10) (TECHom 1,4 74.32) 
öu settest on minum ппфе J>inre sodfaestnysse word 
you put on my mouth of-your-truthfulness words 
(9) and (10) are again instances of metonymies within metaphor. 
(iii) There are also a few cases where there is a direct mapping of т и р onto 
speaker. In (11), for example, we get no genitive qualifying тир and we cannot 
paraphrase it as what is said/words/speech. 
(11) (TECHom 1,10 160.8) 
gewite seo sawul ut: ne maeig se ппф clypian 
come the soul out not can the mouth cry out 
(iv) As illustrated in (12) тир can also be used to denote the speech faculty. 
(12) (TECHom II 42 310.14) 
ic sodlice sylle eow mu}j and wisdom 
I truly (will)give you mouth and wisdom 
Tha t the boundary lines are not always fully clear also for this category 
appears, for example, from (13), where т и р can be taken to refer to both the 
speaker and to his speech faculty. 
(13) (TECHom I, 33 494.15) 
he sprecd donne he mid godes herungum his mu]) gebysgaö 
he speaks when he with God's praises his mouth occupies 
(v) Finally, there are several instances where т и р is part of a larger expression 
which includes a verb and which is métonymie in i ts entirety. We illustrate this 
with (14)-(16). 
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(14) (TECHom I, 36 548.13) 
he undyde his muj) and hi laerde ))us cweőende 
he opened his mouth and them taught thus saying 
(15) (TELS (Sebastian) 94) 
geopenige donne se aelmihtiga haelend dises wifes muj) 
(may)open then the almighty saviour this woman's mouth 
})aet heo maege sprecan 
that she may speak 
(16) (TECHom II, 25 352.4) 
da mid dam gewrite weard his пиф geopenod: and his 
then with that writing became his mouth opened and his 
tunge unbunden to rihtre spraece 
tongue loosened to correct speech 
With respect to (14), opening one's mouth is a necessary par t of speaking and 
is therefore like a part-whole metonymy. Mutat is mutandis the same holds for 
(15) and (16). 
Summing up this analysis, we find that in the TElfric sample, there are only 
a few instances where L.A. is denoted literally, but a great many where there 
is métonymie mapping. The mapping is from тир onto what is said, the speech 
faculty or the speaker, or from a complex NP (where тир is the head and where 
there is a prehead genitive whose referent is the speaker) onto the speaker. 
There are also cases where the mapping is from a verbal combination (where 
т и р is an argument) onto L.A. as a whole. Purely metaphorical expressions 
in which т и р figures were absent, but among the metonymies quite a few 
were part of a broader metaphorical context, where, however, the metonymy 
remains interpretable as such. 
5. Analysis of the Chaucer sample 
The (sub)categories set up in analysing the Late Old English data are also 
relevant to the Chaucer sample, be it with some differences in the distribution 
(some of the categories, for example, are represented only sparingly). Mutat is 
mutandis, however, this presentation will be little more than a variation on 
the same theme. We first give a survey. 
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(17) (Middle English; Chaucer - 27 L.A. items) 
A. Literal 1? 
B. Metonymie 26 
(i) mouth = words, speech 14 
(ii) mouth of X = X's words = X as a speaker 8 
(iii) mouth = speaker 2 
(iv) mouth = language faculty 1? 
(v) métonymie expressions with mouth 1? 
(métonymie in a metaphorical context) (6) 
C. Metaphorical 0 
As can be observed, the predominance of the métonymie uses is even more 
overwhelming than in the Aîlfric sample: again there are no purely metaphor-
ical items (except perhaps for the instance which is now listed under sub-
category (v)) , and the single literal i tem (quoted here as (18)) is somewhat 
doubtful as regards its denotation of L.A.—The references are to Robinson's 
edition. 
(18) (Canterbury Tales, Wife of Bath's T . , 973) 
She leyde hir mouth un to the water doun 
she laid her mouth onto the water below 
" . . . " quod she " . . . " 
" . . . " said she " . . . " 
T h e context in (18) is clearly one of L.A., bu t the first line in this quotation 
can also be interpreted without taking tha t context into account. 
We now proceed to exemplification and clarification of the métonymie 
uses, in the same way as we did for the Late Old English sample. 
(i) This is by far the best represented category, The emphasis here is on spoken 
words/speech, as appears f rom instances (19)-(21). 
(19) (C.T., Parson , 1020 ff.) 
Thou mos t eek shewe thy synne by thyn owene propre mouth 
you mus t also reveal your sin by your own mouth 
but thow be woxe downb and not by le t t re 
but you (should)be become dumb and not (too)detailed 
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(20) (C.T. , Parson, 480 if.) 
Also the humilitee of mouth is in foure thynges: in 
also the humility of mouth is in four things in 
a t tempree speeche, and in humblenesse of speeche, . . . 
modera te speech and in humility of speech 
(21) (C.T. , Parson, 950 if.) 
Now for as muche as the seconde partie of Penitence stant 
now in so far as the second part of penance consists 
in Confession of mouth 
in confession by mouth 
In (19) by thyn owene propre mouth can be paraphrased as in oral confession, 
in (21) Confession of mouth means oral confession-, humilitee of mouth in (20) 
can be equated with humility in speaking. Generally, there is a focus on either 
oral or public speech production. 
(ii) The second type of metonymy, where we get mouth as the head noun of 
a complex noun phrase qualified by a genitive or an o/-phrase which refers to 
the speaker, and in which mouth remains paraphrasable as words, whereas the 
complex NP as a whole refers to X ( the person referred to in the o/-phrase or 
genitive) as speaker, decreases in frequency as compared with the Old English 
sample, but is still well represented (eight instances in all). Illustrations are 
offered in (22)-(25). 
(22) (C.T. , Parson, 235-240) 
Seith God by the mouth of Ezechiel 
says God by the mouth of Ezechiel 
(23) (House of Fame II, 758) 
Loo, this sentence ys knowen kouth 
look this saying is known 
Of every philosophes mouth 
f rom every philosopher's mouth 
As Aristotle and daun P la to 
such as Aristotle and Sir P la to 
(24) (C.T. , Prol., 1744) 
This is a short conclusion 
this is a brief decision 
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Your oweiie mouth, by youre confessioun 
your own mouth by your confession 
Hath dampned yow 
has damned you 
(25) (C.T., Melibee, 2690-2695) 
Jhesu Crist . . . for he dide nevere synne, ne nevere cam 
Jesus Christ for he did never sin nor never came 
ther a vileyns word out of his mouth 
there a villainous word out of his mouth 
Note that in (25) the metonymy fits into the context of the Conduit metaphor 
(cf. Reddy (1979)). 
(iii) The two instances where mouth stands for speaker are quoted as (26) 
and (27). 
(26) (C.T., Parson, 625-630) 
but after the abundance of the herte speketh the mouth 
but according to the abundance of the heart speaks the mouth 
ful ofte 
quite often 
(27) (House of Fame III, 2076-2078) 
Thus north and south 
thus north and south 
wente every tydyng fro mouth to mouth 
went every news from mouth to mouth 
and tha t encresing ever mo 
and tha t encreasing ever more 
(iv) The single instance where mouth can be taken to stand for the language 
faculty, (28), is somewhat doubtful again, to the extent that here mouth could 
also be mapped onto Homer's literary work, as Chaucer's own paraphrase 
suggests. In the second interpretation a further complexity arises, because 
Homer's work can be thought of as writings (even if we know that it was 
composed in an oral tradition); this would involve a double metonymy: from 
mouth onto words/speech (subcategory (i)), and then onto the written form. 
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(28) (Boece V, met rum 2,1) 
Homer with the hony mouth( tha t is t o seyn, Homer with the 
Homer with the honey mouth that is t o say Homer with the 
swete ditees) 
sweet compositions 
(v) The expression with mouth, reproduced here as (29), is open to several 
interpretations. To begin with, we might take it to be a full metaphor in 
which mouth is reinterpreted as an animal (for example a horse) which has to 
be controlled. But the métonymie reading, whereby the speaker stops speaking 
while literally holding his mouth , should certainly not be ruled out ei ther. 
Alternatively, we could say tha t we have a metaphor here from the earlier 
metonymy, in other words, what I have called a metaphor from metonymy in 
Goossens (1990). 
(29) Now holde your mouth, par charitee 
now hold your mouth for charity's sake 
Summarizing here, we can say that overall pattern does not differ strik-
ingly from the Old English one, except perhaps for the fact t ha t the emphasis 
is more often on oral or public speech production in category (i). Note also 
that we have at least one instance, (29), which we might also have listed as a 
'pure ' metaphor. 
6. The Shakespeare sample 
Turning to the d a t a from Shakespeare, we find that there is a striking shif t 
in the general distribution. Not because we do not find any representatives 
of the category literal any more, for instantiations there were also rare in t he 
Old English and in the Middle English sample, but because all of a sudden 
the pure metaphors have become frequent. T h e details are registered in (30). 
(30) (Early Modern English; Shakespeare - 61 L.A. items) 
A. Literal 0 
B. Metonymie 37 
(i) mouth = words, speech 14 
(ii) X's mouth = X's words = X as a speaker 8 
(iii) mouth = speaker 5 
(iv) mouth = language faculty 3 
(v) métonymie expressions with mouth 7 
(métonymie in a metaphorical context) (20?) 
C. Pure metaphors (occ. with demetonymization) 24 
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In our exemplification for the métonymie cases the great major i ty of our 
instances will have a metaphorical context . This reflects the fact mos t of the 
metonymies in Shakespeare are indeed of the metonymy-within-metaphor 
type. As t he question mark in the tab le reveals, however, there are a num-
ber of instances where the difference between (frozen) metaphor and literal is 
not easy to make. The references are t o the Signet Classic Shakespeare. 
(i) The first subcategory, where mouth can be mapped onto words or what 
is said is again the most frequent type of metonymy. (31) illustrates a literal 
instance, (32) one which I think can be regarded as having a metaphorical 
context. 
(31) (K. John iii 1 306) 
О husband hear me! Ay alack how new is husband in my mouth 
(32) (Richard II v 6 37) 
From your own mou th , my lord, did I this deed 
In (32) what you said can contextually be equated with your order. T h e reason 
for characterizing it as metaphorical hangs together with the fact t ha t we 
are forced to conceive the speaker's (pas t ) doing of the deed concerned as 
proceeding from this order; from, in o ther words, suggests movement f rom one 
location to another, which here is mapped onto a s t a t e of affairs in which a 
particular action ( this deed) occurred as a result of somebody else's linguistic 
action. On the other hand , the métonymie mapping is still relevant; and the 
salience of the metaphor is, of course, restricted, since its only expression is 
the preposition from. 
(ii) The second subcategory is exemplified in (33) and (34). Again it occurs 
with considerable frequency. 
(33) (K. John i 1 21) 
Then take my king's defiance from my mouth 
The far thes t limit of my embassy 
(34) (Measure f. M. v 1 304) 
The duke 's unjust 
Thus t o retort your manifest appeal 
And put your trial in the villain's mou th 
Which here you come to accuse 
From my mouth in (33) can be paraphrased both as from what Fm saying and 
as from me (as speaker); put your trial in the villain's mouth in (34) amoun t s to 
entrust your trial to what the villain is going to say or entrust your trial to the 
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villain (as speaker). These metonymies occur both in a metaphorical context : 
defiance and trial have to be conceived as objects that can be manipulated in 
space (to be taken or put somewhere). 
(iii) As can be inferred from the analysis of (33) and (34), the distinction 
between the first three subcategories in a metaphorical context is not always 
easy to make. (35) and (36), however, are best interpreted as requiring a direct 
mapping of mouth(s) onto speaker(s). 
(35) (Henry V iv 7 41) 
It is not well done, mark you now, to take the tales out of my mouth, ere 
it is made and finished 
(36) (Henry VIII i 2 61) 
This makes bold mouths. 
Tongues spit their duties out , and . . . 
(35) illustrates another point about the blurring of distinctions in metaphorical 
contexts. It might also be assigned to the fully metaphorical group, if we take 
the context to suggest a scene of a bakery, where the loaves are taken out of 
the oven before they are fully baked. Under t ha t interpretation mouth is the 
mouth of the oven, which has to be mapped onto the speaker's mouth. 
(iv) In (36) we get the métonymie mapping of Gargantua's mouth onto his 
language faculty. The pat tern is (again) comparatively rare. 
(36) (As you Like it iii 2 226) 
You must borrow me Gargantua's mouth first; 'tis a word too great for 
any mouth of this age's size. 
(v) Finally, we give a couple of instances where the expression as a whole has 
to be processed metonymically. A current pa t t e rn in the Shakespeare d a t a is 
one in which kissing is viewed as a means to stop a person's speaking; (37) is 
an example in point. 
(37) (Much Ado ii 1 299) 
Speak, cousin; or (if you cannot) stop his mouth with a kiss and let him 
not speak either. 
In (38) we can take it tha t , at the point where we get the dash in the t ex t , 
there is some gesture on part of the character addressed such that it literally 
stops the speaker's mouth. In the context a kiss is not very likely; perhaps 
the addressee puts his finger on the other 's mouth, which would give us the 
métonymie interpretation. 
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(38) (Two Gentleman of Verona ii 3 41) 
P. Tut, m a n , I mean thou ' l t lose the flood, and, in losing the flood, lose 
thy voyage, and, in losing thy voyage, lose thy master , and in losing thy 
master, lose thy service, and, in losing the service—Why dost thou stop 
my mouth? 
L. For fear thou shouldst lose thy tongue. 
As we have already pointed out, the most current pat tern in Shakespeare 
is that of the full metaphors, i.e. instances where there is a mapping from a 
distinct domain onto that of linguistic act ion and where a métonymie mapping 
for mouth is no longer relevant. We illustrate this in (39) and (40). 
(39) (Richard II v 3 29) 
For ever may my knees grow to the ear th 
(Kneels) 
My tongue cleave to my roof within my mouth 
Unless a pardon ere I rise or speak 
(40) (Richard II i 3 166) 
Within my mouth you have enjailed my tongue, 
Doubly portcullised with my teeth and lips, 
And dull unfeeling barren ignorance 
Is made my jailer to a t tend me. 
In (39) the addition of roof can be taken to reinterpret the mouth as a building 
within which its inhabitant (the tongue) is immobilised. In (40) the metaphor 
is more explicit: here the tongue is viewed as emprisoned in a jail which is like 
a fortified castle (here the mouth). 
Note t h a t we can generalize over (39) and (40) as conceptualizing the 
mouth in terms of some sort of building. Another, even more frequent pat tern 
has eating and drinking as a donor. We exemplify it in (41) and (42). 
(41) (K. John iv 2 195) 
I saw a smith stand with his hammer, thus, 
The whilst his iron did on the anvil cool 
With open mouth swallowing a tailor 's news, 
Who . . . 
Told of a many thousand warlike French, 
(42) (As you Like it iii 2 203) 
I prithee take the cork out of thy mou th , that I may drink thy tidings. 
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In (41) the mouth is instrumentally involved in eating, more particularly in 
swallowing food, which is mapped on listening to and processing somebody's 
linguistic actions. In (42) the donor scene is more specific; removing a cork is 
a preliminary to pouring out whatever is contained in t he drinking vessel; the 
whole is mapped onto beginning to speak/communicate in a situation where 
the addressee is keen on hearing what the other one has to say (as is expressed 
in the added clause that I may drink thy tidings). 
Among these metaphorical instances we also get a few which involve what 
can be referred to as demetonymization inside a metaphor (see Goossens 1990, 
335). We illustrate this by (43) and (44). 
(43) (Measure for M. ii 4 4) 
When I would pray and think, I think and pray 
To several subjects; heaven hath my empty words, 
Whilst my invention, hearing not my tongue, 
Anchors on Isabel; heaven in my mouth , 
As if I did but only chew his name, 
And in my heart the strong and swelling evil 
Of my conception. 
(44) (Tempest v 1 131) 
For you, most wicked sir, whom to call brother 
Would even infect my mouth, I do forgive 
Thy rankest fault—all of them; . . . 
In (43) heaven in my mouth at first sight seems to contain a metonymy: we 
can map my mouth onto what I'm saying. The continuation (as if I did but 
only chew his name) forces us to reinterpret it in terms of the donor scene of 
chewing food in which the mouth has i ts own instrumentality. The whole is 
to be mapped, of course, onto 'empty' speaking in which the speaker does not 
mean what he says. In (44) the potential metonym mouth/speaker has to be 
reinterpreted in terms of a scene where bad food infects the mouth, which then 
as a whole has to be mapped onto L.A. t ha t has a negative (or even sickening) 
effect on the speaker. 
As we have already observed at the beginning of this section, the most 
striking point about the Shakespeare d a t a is the high degree of metaphoriza-
tion, which results in a considerable number of pure metaphors, including in-
stances where potential metonyms are 'demetonymized', as well as in a larger 
proportion of metonymies within a metaphorical context . It is unavoidable 
that this should occasionally blur the distinction between the (sub)categories 
adopted. 
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7. The LDCE data in the light of the diachronic development 
Before moving on to our general conclusions, I would first like to consider 
the Present-day English sample of figurative expressions wi th mouth from the 
L D C E (referred to in section 1) in the light of t he foregoing analyses. In spite of 
i ts restricted size (16 uses in all) this sample can be taken to be representative 
of everyday contemporary usage, especially in British English. 
Making use of the classification adopted above, we find (a) that there 
are no literal uses among them (for obvious reasons, because the sample only 
contains figurative expressions), (b) that there are only five metonymies among 
them, and (c) t h a t , therefore, the pure metaphors predominate (as many as 
11 out of 16). To facilitate t he discussion, we list this material under the 
(sub)categories adopted earlier; the paraphrases and the labels (derog(atory), 
sl(ang), etc.) are from the LDCE. 
Metonymie uses 
(i) (45) by word of mouth 'by speaking and not by writ ing' 
(iii) (46) blabbermouth derog si 'a person who tells secrets by 
talking too much' 
(47) loudmouth 'a person who talks too much and in an 
offensive manner' 
(v) (48) keep one's mouth shut infml ' to avoid saying or speaking 
about something, esp. something secret; keep silent ' 
(49) shut one's mouth infml. a. usu. imper. ' to s top talking; be 
silent' b. Well, shut my mouth! Southern AmE (an expression 
of surprise) 
Although this is not a complete inventory of métonymie expressions with 
mouth denoting L.A., the sample, as pointed out before, can be regarded as 
sufficiently representative to conclude that mouth has become decidedly less 
popular in the métonymie uses where it was most frequent in older stages of 
the language. The single instance where mouth is mapped onto speech, (45), 
has the emphasis on speaking aloud, a usage type that was quite frequent in 
the Chaucer sample; but otherwise a mapping of mouth on to what is said ap-
pears to have gone out of use. The use of mouth for speaker, on the other 
hand, is still current , especially when mouth receives an additional, pejorative 
qualification as in both (46) and (47). Subcategory (v) is probably preserved 
best , because one can think of other expressions, whose meaning is perhaps too 
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obvious to be listed in dictionaries (for example, open one's mouth for begin 
to speak), in addition to the ones included in the LDCE. Note also tha t the 
expression keep one's mouth shut (48) can be used in contexts where it is not 
métonymie: in the paraphrase 'avoid saying or speaking about something, esp. 
something secret' there is no idea that the speaker actually keeps his mouth 
shut, but rather that while talking, he does not give away a specific bit of in-
formation. In other words, we have in that use a metaphor from metonymy (cf. 
the discussion of instance (29) in the Chaucer sample). Similarly, the southern 
AmE use Well, shut my mouth! (49b), which is to be interpreted as involving 
an implicature, is best explained as building this implicature on a metaphor 
from metonymy. 
Metaphorical uses 
(50) put the mouth on someone BrE & AustrE si ' to (seem to) make someone's 
actions or a t tempts unsuccessful by saying that he is doing very well' 
(51) stop somebody's mouth fml ' to make someone keep silent' 
(52) Don't look a gift horse in mouth 'don't complain about a gift ' 
(53) put words into somebody's mouth a. ' to tell someone what to say' b. derog 
' to suggest or claim, falsely, that someone has said a particular th ing ' 
(54) to take the words out of someone's mouth ' to say something that someone 
else was going to say, before he has had time or a chance to speak' 
(55) shoot one's mouth off infml ' to talk foolishly about what one does not 
know about or should not talk about ' 
(56) straight from the horse's mouth infml '(of something) told to one directly, 
f rom the person concerned' 
(57) mouthful infml, usu. humor 'a big long word that one finds difficulty in 
saying or pronouncing'; infml, often humor or derog 'a statement t ha t is 
important , or tha t is long and tries to sound impor tan t ' 
(58) mouthpiece often derog 'a person, newspaper, etc. tha t expresses the 
opinion of others ' 
(59) foul-mouthed derog 'containing or having the habit of using foul language' 
(60) mealy-mouthed 'of a type of person who tends to express things not 
freely or directly, using words which are not plain in meaning, esp. when 
something unpleasant must be said' 
A first observation here is that some of these metaphorical expressions are 
derivable from métonymie ones. (50) reminds us of instances like (37) in the 
Shakespeare data; putting one's mouth on somebody else's is one way to stop 
him or her talking. Probably the expression is no longer transparent to most 
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speakers of Contemporary English, but this does not invalidate its métonymie 
origin. A similar point can be made for (51), which is comparable to (38); 
but , of course, in its Present-day English use there is no necessity any more to 
postulate an explicit gesture which has the effect of silencing another speaker. 
(52) can also be taken to have originated in a context where somebody made 
critical remarks about a horse that he received as a present. Moreove, we had 
already noted the possible shift from metonymy to metaphor in instances like 
(48) and (49b). In other words, métonymie expressions are not infrequent as 
a source for (these) everyday metaphors for aspects of L.A. 
A second point is about donor domains. There is a variety of them, as 
is to be expected. But there is one that appears to be more important than 
the others, viz. that of eating and drinking, which can account for (53), (54), 
(57) and (59). A similar observation, it will be remembered, was made for the 
Shakespeare corpus. Obviously this hangs together with our general conception 
of linguistic communication in terms of the Conduit metaphor: the mouth is 
conceived as a container for (reified) words, which in the metaphors under 
discussion here can be taken to be fed into other people (as in (53)), or in 
some sense stolen from others (in (54)), or to be too voluminous to contain 
(57), or to have a soiling effect on it (in (59)). 
8. Some conclusions 
Having analysed three successive samples where mouth or its ancestor is used 
to denote linguistic action, and having confronted these analyses with the uses 
recorded in a contemporary corpus-based general usage dictionary, we would 
now like to highlight some pat terns that emerge. Obviously, our sampling was 
too restricted to present this as the complete story of the development; on the 
other hand, we think that our findings have a reasonable degree of represen-
tativeness, and would at least be worth the confrontation with other, similar 
investigations into the way in which métonymie and metaphorical mappings 
can develop. 
In our specific instance the mapping of т и р onto L.A. is of biblical (and 
hence non-native) origin, but it appears to have been firmly established already 
in the writings of TElfric. Disregarding the (few) instances where it is used 
literally, we find that initially the mapping is only métonymie, but as such 
multi-faceted, as it was in the biblical t radit ion from which it was borrowed. 
The functionality of the mouth in the speech event allows it to be mapped onto 
what is said, and as such the combination X's тир can denote what X says and 
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hence X as speaker. Less frequently onto the speaker directly, or onto the (more 
abstract) speech faculty. Besides, there are a number of verbials with тир 
which are as such used metonymically. Some of these metonymies are fitted 
into metaphorical contexts, but such that the metonym is maintained, in other 
words we get metonymies within metaphor. This general pat tern for metonymy 
is maintained with Chaucer, with as a special feature the added emphasis on 
oral or public production in most of the cases where mouth denotes what it 
said. This special point is not relevant for the Shakespeare sample, which, as 
far as metonymization is concerned, largely parallels the TElfric one, except 
for the decrease in the type mouth of X or X's mouth and an increase of the 
metaphorical contexts in which the metonyms occur. 
There is a striking difference between Shakespeare and the earlier samples, 
however, in tha t there are a considerable number of pure metaphors containing 
the item mouth, including some where we get demetonymization, i.e. instances 
in which a potential métonymie use of mouth loses its métonymie force because 
a literal interpretation is required with respect to the donor domain, which is 
mapped as a whole onto L.A. This sudden rise in metaphor is, of course, in line 
with the baroque, flowery character of Shakespeare's (and most Elizabethan) 
language. 
As regards our restricted general usage sample from LDCE, we found 
that the métonymie applicability of mouth has diminished considerably; the 
metonymies that appear to survive best are those where mouth, with some 
further, pejorative, specification, is mapped onto the speaker, together with 
the métonymie expressions in which mouth is an argument in a verbal expres-
sion. On the other hand, the marked increase in pure metaphors we found in 
Shakespeare is also found here, though obviously there is no room for excessive 
flowery language in a general usage da ta base like the one used by the LDCE. 
As regards these metaphors, two categories stand out (even if the absolute 
numbers in our restricted sample are low): the metaphors from metonymy 
(i.e. those where the metaphor builds on an earlier usage which could be in-
terpreted metonymically); and the metaphors where the donor domain is that 
of eating and drinking (which was already the major donor domain in the 
Shakespeare data) . 
Generalizing somewhat further, it would seem tha t the following dimen-
sions in this development are worth emphasizing. 
(i) In the métonymie mapping the complexity of L.A. makes for a multifaceted 
range of possibilities. Mouth and its forerunners are not just mapped on what 
is said, but also onto the speaker, the speech faculty, and in the case of more 
complex verbal expressions, on different aspects or stages of the linguistic 
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event. With respect to our oldest sample, however, we must stress again in 
this context t ha t we owe this métonymie network to biblical sources. 
(ii) Metonymie mappings can change over time in the sense that what used to 
be the major metonymy (here mouth onto what is said or speech) can become 
largely inoperative. 
(iii) Extensive métonymie mapping can, as it were, pave the way for extensive 
metaphorical mapping. In our case, metonymies were found in metaphori-
cal contexts f rom the s tar t , but such tha t the metonymies remained inter-
prétable as such. It was not until the Early Modern English sample that 'pure 
metaphors ' wi th mouth were fully established. It would seem that this relates 
to the general promotion of baroque and figurative language with Shakespeare 
and in the Elizabethan period in general, but this will have to be confirmed 
by additional research of the type conducted here. 
(iv) One clear instance where metonymy paves the way for metaphor is offered 
by the metaphors from metonymy, which were found in (proportionally) large 
frequency in our restricted Present-day English sample f rom the LDCE, but 
not earlier ( though there is perhaps an isolated instance in the Chaucer da ta) . 
(v) With respect to specific donor domains for L.A. within which mouth fig-
ures (from the Shakespeare sample onwards, since we are concerned here with 
pure metaphors), the one t ha t stands out is that of eating and drinking. It is 
worth pointing out that also here there is a conceptual foundation, in that our 
mouths are as it were equally instrumental, in speaking on the one hand, and 
in eating and drinking on the other, be it tha t the directionality of food and 
drink is the opposite of that of (egressive) speech production. Obviously, the 
connection through (partially) shared function is not of a diachronic nature , 
but experientially given. 
(vi) Adding up the observations in (iii)-(v), the evidence here points to the 
priority of metonymy over metaphor in figurative mappings. 
As I have already pointed out, these conclusions based on a single and 
somewhat restricted case study will have to be confronted with other investi-
gations along similar lines. 
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PERFORMATIVES ARE DEFAULT REFLEXIVE 
STANDARDIZED INDIRECT ACTS* 
R O B E R T M. HARNISH 
Introduction 
The problem of performatives 
There are sentences which have the form of declaratives, but have been claimed 
not to have the usual constative force of declaratives—the so-called 'explicit 
performative sentences' or 'performatives'1: 
(1) (a) I (hereby) order you to leave. 
(b) I (hereby) promise to pay you five dollars. 
(c) I (hereby) declare this meeting adjourned. 
Performatives are still of interest to philosophers of language and lin-
guists, because we have no consensual theory t h a t explains two putative facts 
about performatives: the fact that performative sentences seem to be compo-
sitional (the meaning of the whole sentence is a function of the meaning of its 
constituents and their grammatical relations), and the fact tha t they seem to 
be used to perform the act named by the peformative verb (or noun etc.) tha t 
they contain. 
The basic reason for the first putative fact is theoretical simplicity. A 
grammar or t ruth definition that can treat the contribution of e.g. 'order' in 
( l a ) the same as 'order ' in ( Id) 
(d) I ordered you to leave. 
will have a leg up one one which has to provide a seperate clause for each use 
of each such verb in the language. Besides being theoretically untidy, such a 
treatment makes the prediction tha t each of these words and the sentences 
they occur in is ambiguous. And the theory must explain how the word or 
* Presented at the Conference on Metapragmatic Terms , Budapest , July 2 - 4 , 1990. 
1
 I will use 'per format ive ' as short for both 'per format ive sentence' and 'performative 
u t te rance ' (of a performat ive sentence). 
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sentence looses the (normal) compositional meaning it has in ( I d ) when it 
occurs in (la).2 
The basic reason for the second putative fact is introspection—there is 
a bru te intuition tha t ( l a - c ) are used literally and directly to order, promise 
and adjourn respectively.3 
These two properties of performative sentences can, of course, clash. The 
compositional meaning of a performative sentence is always one which gener-
ates a constative illocutionary act potential, but performative sentences may 
be used to perform non-constative acts , such as questioning, ordering, or com-
manding. So it seems to be the case both that the illocutionary act potential 
of a performative sentence is restricted by semantics to constatives, and that 
we intuit them as used to perform non-constative acts. 
Conditions of adequacy 
Any adequate account of how performatives work should meet at least four 
conditions: Performatives (i) are normal declaratives from the point of view of 
compositional semantics, (ii) they have an interpretation as a non-constative 
doing,4 and (iii) they introspectively feel as if they mean just that non-
constative doing. In addition, a theory of performatives must (iv) explain how 
they work communicatively—how speakers perform the acts they do, and how 
this is communicated to hearers. An adequate account of performatives must 
satisfy these conditions (or explain them away).5 
How should we resolve this tension between semantics and pragmatics 
as well as conform to these conditions of adequacy? This is the problem of 
performatives. There is a spectrum of analyses of the communicative uses of 
performative sentences: 
2
 See Heal (1974, 108 -9 ) , Récanati (1987, Par t I). 
О 
Gale (1970) argued tha t performatives do not have a t ru th value, and Schiffer (1972, 
108-9) argued that performatives are not used to costate. See Sampson (1971) for a reply 
to Gale. We will return to Schiffer's proposal at the end of this section. 
4
 Except when the u t terance is also performatively a constat ive, as with 'I (hereby) state 
tha t p' . 
5
 Searle (1989, section 3) offers eight conditions of adequacy, many of which are not 
neutral between theories. These are discussed in Bach-Harn i sh (in press). 
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Spectrum of analyses of performatives 
1. Performatives are just used to do (illocutionary) things, (Austin 1961; 
Searle 1969). 
2. Performatives are used to say (locutionary) one thing and to do (illocu-
tionary) other things (Austin 1961). 
3. Performatives are used to declare (illocutionary) things and to do (illocu-
t ionary) other things (Récanati 1987; Searle 1988). 
4. Performatives are used to constate (illocutionary) one thing and do, by 
standardized indirection, something else (illocutionary) (Bach-Harnish 1979). 
5. Performatives are used to constate one thing (illocutionary), and indirectly 
by implicature to do (illocutionary) another. 
6. Performatives are ambiguous as between a performative and a non-
performative reading. 
7. Performatives are true or false, but are not used to constate anything 
(Schiffer 1972). 
8. Performatives are true or false, and are used to constate one thing and to 
do that thing directly (Davidson 1979). 
In this paper we will first look at Austin's introduction of the notion of a 
performative utterance and relate tha t to a notion of a performative sentence. 
We then elaborate the view in (4), and end with some comments on (2), and 
(6)-(8).6 
A. Austin: What are performative utterances? 
The thirty or so articles and books published on Austin's discussion of perfor-
matives gives testimony to the fact that his notion is not crystal clear. In par t 
I of his paper "Performative Utterances" Austin introduces and motivates the 
notion of a performative utterance; in part II he tries to find criteria for dis-
tinguishing performatives from assertions s tatements and other 'constatives'. 
He fails and charts the demise of the distinction. 
Austin (1961,220) introduced "peformative" as a "new and ugly word" 
with the following explications: 
"Now it is one such sort of use of language [non-report ive, non-descriptive] 
tha t I want to examine here. I want to discuss a kind of ut terance which 
6
 For a discussion of position 1 see Harnish (1991b). For comments on position 3 see 
Harnish (1991a, b). and Bach-Harn i sh (in press). 
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looks like a statement and grammatically, I suppose, would be classed as a 
s tatement, which is not nonsensical, and yet is not true or false . . . They 
will be perfectly straightforward utterances, with ordinary verbs in the first 
person singular present indicative active, and yet we shall see at once tha t they 
couldn't possibly be t r ue or false. Furthermore, if a person makes an utterance 
of this sort we would say that he is doing something rather than merely saying 
something . . . When I say 'I do' (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded 
wife), I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it. Now these kinds 
of ut terance are the ones that we call performative utterances" (1961, 222). 
"These performative utterances are not true or false, then. But they do 
suffer f rom certain disabilities of their own. They can fail to come off in special 
ways, and that is what I want to consider next. The various ways in which a 
performative utterance may be unsatisfactory we call, for the sake of a name, 
the infelicities.. . " (ibid, 224). 
"Furthermore, with these verbs [performative] t ha t I have used there is a 
typical asymmetry between the use of this person and tense of the verb and 
the use of the same verb in other persons and other tenses, and this asymmetry 
is rather an important clue" (ibid, 228-9). 
" . . . here is at least one other s tandard f o r m . . . where the verb is in the 
passive voice and the second or th i rd person, not the first: 'Passengers are 
warned to cross the line by the bridge only'." (ibid, 229), "You are hereby 
authorized to do so-and-so" (ibid, 229). 
"Very typical of th is kind of performative—especially liable to occur in 
written documents of course—is tha t the little word 'hereby' either actually 
occurs or might naturally be inserted" (ibid, 229-30). 
" . . . any utterance which is performative could be reduced or expanded or 
analyzed into one of these two standard beginning 'I . . . ' so and so or begining 
'You (or he) hereby . . . ' so and so" (ibid, 30). 
From these quotations we can extract the following properties of prototypical 
performatives: 
1. They are statements, grammatically;7 
2. they are in the first person singular present indicative active; 
3. they are not reports or descriptions; 
4. they cannot be t rue or false; 
•j 
Aust in probably m e a n t tha t they are declaratives or indicatives, since s t a t ements are 
not kinds of sentences, bu t ra ther speech acts . 
Acta Linguistica LIungarica 38, 1988 
P E R F O R M A T I V E S ARE D E F A U L T R E F L E X I V E S T A N D A R D I Z E D I N D I R E C T ACTS 87 
5. they are doings, not merely sayings; 
6. they are subject to infelicities;8 
7. they are asymmetrical between first person, present tense and other per-
sons and tenses; 
8. they natural ly take 'hereby'; 
9. they take passive voice, and second and third person. 
Non-prototypical performatives can take other forms, but are equivalent to 
prototypical performatives: 
10. those in 9 can be reduced or expanded into the s tandard format of 2. 
Defining performatives 
Can we turn these into a more precise characterization of prototypical perfor-
matives? If we allow ourselves the notion of an illocutionary act , then we can 
say, as a first approximation: 
(P-Perf) e is a prototypical performative iff 
1. e is of the form: I (hereby) VP, or NP2/3rd are (hereby) 
VP-ed (VP is present tense or progressive aspect); 
2. VP denotes an illocutionary act;9 
3. If S utters e in the appropriate circumstances, then S VP-s. 
(Perf) e is a performative iff e is equivalent (on a reading) 
to a prototypical performative.1 0 
Lets try these out on some examples. First , (Perf) admits such non-
prototypical examples as: 
(2) (a) I will be there, and that is a promise 
(b) I am promising to be there 
But it rules out 'hedged performatives' such as, 
(3) (a) I must order you to leave 
(b) I would like to suggest a Merlot 
This is because sentences such as (3a, b) are not equivalent to P-performatives, 
as can be seen by, 
g 
Austin (1961, 226ff) notes t ha t the list of infelicities is neither complete nor exhaust ive. 
9
 Austin (1961) of course propounded the notion of a performative before and inde-
pendently of the notion of an illocutionary act, bu t he never succeeded in characterizing 
performatives to this satisfaction. 
1 0
 By 'equivalent ' we mean tha t they have the same illocutionary act potential . 
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(c) I must order you to leave, but you won't 
(d) *I order you to leave, but you won't 
Second, (P-Perf ) rules out such examples as: 
(4) (a) Come in [clause 1] 
(b) I (hereby) move molecules [clause 2] 
(c) I (hereby) u t te r an English sentence [clause 2] 
(d) I promise to be there on Wednesdays (habitual) [clause 3] 
Such performatives were contrasted with constatives, which are, prototypically, 
true or false, need not be first person singular present indicative active, don' t 
naturally take 'hereby' etc. Notice that if we distinguish clearly performatives 
as sentences from performatives as utterances (actions), then some criteria go 
more naturally with the linguistic aspect, others go more naturally with the 
action. Qua sentence type, 1, 2, 7-10 are natural predicates of performatives, 
but qua action type 3 -5 are more natural .1 1 Both come together in the pro-
duction of the sentence token (utterance) under certain circumstances and 
hence the title: Peformative Utterances. The production of the sentence token 
(utterance token) can be categorized according to properties of the sentence 
type tokened, or properties of the act of tokening it.12 
In part II of the paper Austin argues that the distinction between con-
statives and performatives begins to break down at two important points: 
1. Statements too can be felicitious or infeliciteous (1961,235). 
2. Performatives can be assessed along dimensions of "correspondence with 
fact" (1961,237). 
Austin concludes that , 
"We need to go very much farther back, to consider all the ways and 
senses in which saying anything at all is doing this or that—because of course 
it is always doing a good many different things. And one thing that emerges 
when we do this is that , besides the question that has been very much studied 
in the past as to what a certain utterance means, there is a further question 
distinct from this as to what was the force, as we may call it, of the ut terance 
. . . What we need besides the old doctrine about meanings is a new doctrine 
1 1
 Austin seems to have countenanced s ta tements as actions which can be t rue or false; 
see Austin (1950), especially 8 6 - 8 . 
11 Notice, by the way, t h a t so far Austin has not mentioned what many regard as the 
most salient proper ty of explicit performatives—they contain as main verb a description of 
the act being performed in their utterance. 
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about all the possible forces of utterances, towards the discovery of which 
our proposed list of explicit performative verbs would be a very great help" 
(1961,238). 
Thus, the old performative/constative distinction must give way to a doctrine 
of the forces of utterances, and in Austin's posthumously published lectures 
(1962) this new doctr ine is worked out in some detail . 
Récanati: saving Austin from Austin 
Was Austin correct in rejecting t he performative/constative distinction? Ac-
cording to Récanati (1987, 70ff), Austin was right to highlight the pragmatic 
dimensions of constati ves, but he may have lost sight of the original idea behind 
the introduction of performatives. Although constatives, such as statements, 
may be infelicitous, they are still expected to conform to an independent reality 
the speaker aims to describe. A performative ut terance, however, "represents 
itself as intended to bring about t he state of affairs it represents" (ibid, 71-2). 
They have a world-to-act direction of fit (ibid, 155). For example, a serious 
ut terance of "The ear th is flat" constitutes a s ta tement that the earth is flat, 
but what the sentence represents is the state of affairs of the ea r th being flat. 
An utterance of "The meeting is adjourned" on the other hand, presents itself 
as adjourning the meeting and is intended to bring about the s ta te of affairs 
it represents. Does the distinction between direction of fit coincide with the 
performative/constative distinction? Not on two counts. First , performatives 
such as, 
(5) I (hereby) s t a te that Arizona is hot and dry 
would, on Récanati 's theory, have only a word to world direction of fit. 
Second, Récanati also considers utterances of non-declaratives such as 
"Come here"? as performative because "My ut terance represents your coming 
here, and it presents itself as, in a certain manner , 'causing' or intended to 
cause, this state of affairs to come to pass" (ibid, 71).13 There is an important 
difference between these two examples that Récanati 's reconstruction of Austin 
does not account for: an utterance of "The meeting is adjourned" successfully 
adjourns the meeting and makes true the content of the utterance, but an 
ut terance of "Come here!" successfully directs the hearer t o come here, and 
13 
It is important to note that it is u t t e r a n c e s , not sentences, that a re supposed to have 
this property. The sentence itself, of course, can be used w i t h t h e s a m e m e a n i n g not only 
to order , but to request or beseech. 
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does not make true the content of the utterance—only compliance by the 
hearer would do tha t . 
Adequacy 
How does Austin's account fare with respect to our conditions of adequacy? 
Keeping in mind that we do not really have a theory here it is unclear whether 
performative utterances as characterized by Austin satisfy our first , second 
and fourth criteria of adequacy (see the section on Conditions of adequacy). 
As for (iv), Austin never proposed a theory of linguistic communication. As 
for (i) and (ii) the trick is dealing with property 5. If 'saying' here means 
just 'u t te red ' or 'produced something linguistic', then it would not satisfy 
the demands of compositionality. If, on the other hand , it means something 
stronger, such as the locutionary acts of his later lectures (Austin 1962), then 
they might. The picture would then be that what is said in a performative 
utterance is determined compositionally, but what is done is not. T h e mystery 
here is saying how what is done gets done in saying what is said (under the 
circumstances). If, on the other hand, 'say' is construed only as an utterance, 
then special conventions of use could at tach to it such that their sincere and 
literal ut terance counts as the performance of the indicated act.14 In this case 
he would satisfy condition (ii), but not condition (i). Austin never worked out 
these ideas. 
B. Bach and Harnish: performatives as 
default reflexive standardized indirect acts 
Performatives as constatives 
Bach and Harnish (1979, Chapter 10.1) agree with Aust in 's characterization of 
performatives except, notably, for his controversial theoretical doctrine about 
their t ru th valuability. As Bach and Harnish note, Aust in does not really give 
any argument that performatives are not truth valuable. He intuits it and 
thinks it is obvious: 
"None of the utterances cited is ei ther true or false: I assert this as obvious 
and do not argue for it" (1962, 6). 
Austin apparantly thought it enough to point out t ha t we wouldn't normally 
say that a performative utterance was t rue or false. But as we point ou t , there 
1 4
 See Récanati (1987, part I) for an excellent detailed critical examination of this idea. 
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can be semantically irrelevant reasons for why we 'wouldn't say ' something. For 
instance, we 'wouldn't say' some things because they are obscene or otherwise 
offensive. The only reason that is relevant in this discussion is t h a t we wouldn't 
say it because it isn't true. But Austin did not show that it is false that we are 
not saying something or asserting something in uttering performatives. There 
is also some evidence that performative are t rue or false. For instance, we can 
say, 
(1) S: I promise to be there. 
H: Is that true? Do you?1 5 
S: Yes, it is true; I promise that I'll be there. 
(2) It is t rue that if I promise I will be there, then it will be true that I 
promised to be there. 
(3) S: I gladly promise to be there. 
H: Tha t ' s false; you're not glad. 
This last interchange is evidence because of the following (inductively arrived 
at) principle: if a sentence with "gladly" (or any other such adverb) modifying 
the main verb is true/false, then the sentence without "gladly" (or any o the r 
such adverb) is true/false.1 6 
There are other arguments as well. Stampe (1975, section 36 if) compares 
performatives to other oratio obliqua constructions; see also Davidson (1979). 
Harnish (1976, section B) argues that performatives, if not t rue or false, would 
fail general principles of substitutivity of identity, and hence compositionality. 
Harnish (1979), Davidson (1979), and Ginet (1979,246) extend this to tense. 
Szabolcsi (1982, section 2) develops the idea t ha t performatives are semanti-
cally declaratives (and so true or false) within a model theoretic semantics. 
Heal (1974, section III) presents an argument based on modification. She does 
not set the argument out explicitly, and she formulates it in terms of 'neust ics ' 
and 'phrastics '—a terminology I would like to avoid. Here is a reconstruction: 
1. Consider sentences such as: 
(4) (a) I promise with all my heart tha t . . . 
(b) I, being of sound mind and body, do bequeath . . . 
1 5
 It might be objected that H's contribution ques t ions the content of the promise—being 
there—not the promise, but this does not seem t o be so; to question tha t one should say 
"Is that true? W i l l you (be there)?" 
1 6
 This e laborates an example from Heal (1974, 114). We still need an explanation, how-
ever, for why it is awkward to say of the unmodified sentence tha t it is true or false. 
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2. both (4a , b) are performatives; 
3. 'promise ' is modified by the adverbial in (4a), so it is a consti tuent used 
normally to predicate promising of the subject; 
4. 'I ' is modified by the adjectival in (4b) , so it is a constituent used normally 
to refer t o the speaker; 
5. so 'I ' and 'promise' are playing their normal roles in these performative 
sentences; 
6. so performatives are t r ue or false jus t as normal declaratives are. 
Although steps 3, 4, and 5 need independent argument , it seems tha t the 
burden of proof is on the other side to give reason to suppose these sentences 
are not t rue or false in this case. However, our primary purpose here is not to 
argue tha t performatives are true or false, but assuming they are, t o say how 
they work. 
Illocutionary taxonomy 
Bach and Harnish (1979, chapters 3, 6) proposed t h a t what Austin (1962) 
called illocutionary acts covers two subclasses of acts: communicative and 
institutional (we called t h e m 'conventional' acts). Communicative acts are 
successfully performed jus t in case their reflexive communicative intention is 
expressed and then recognized. For instance, 
(REQ) S requests t ha t H do A if S, in uttering e, expresses: 
(a ) the intention/desire t ha t H do A, 
(b ) the intention that H intend to do A (at least 
partly) because of S's intention/desire. 
We analyse expressing attitudes in te rms of reflexively intending tha t H 
take the u t terance as reason to think S has those at t i tudes.1 7 For us, com-
municative intentions are reflexive intentions—they refer to themselves in the 
way that Searle (1983) and Harman (1986) have argued all intentions refer to 
themselves. But unlike most intentions, communicative intentions are fulfilled 
when they are recognized. For example, intending to convince you may, as 
these authors have argued, involve intending that this very intention be effi-
cacious in convinving you, bu t your recognizing my intention to convince you 
17 
The general form of communicat ive intentions is given by ( E X P ) : 
( E X P ) S reflexively intends t h a t H take the u t t e r a n c e of e as reason to think: 
(a) S A-s that p, 
(b) S in tends H to A ' t h a t p. 
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does not consti tute my convincing you. Telling you that p, on the other hand, 
succeeds when you recognize my intention to tell you.18 
Most so called 'communicative acts ' can of course be performed even 
though the intention to perform them is not (intended to be) recognized. So the 
terminology may be a bit misleading. However, such occasions are peripheral 
to the theory of speech acts and language use, and it may even be that they 
are in some sense parasitic on the communicative occasions. 
Institutional acts, on the other hand, depend on nonlinguistic institutions 
(systems of mutual expectation) for their existence and are performed when 
the ut terance satisfies the conditions of the institution.19 'Locution-specific' 
institutional acts require that certain forms of words be uttered inorder for 
the performance of the act .2 0 There are two broad classes of institutional acts: 
Effectives, which cause changes in the institutional status of persons or things 
(for instance, a baby is baptized, a ship is christened, a meeting is adjourned), 
and Verdictives, which are judgments which by convention have official binding 
import in the context. For instance, a jury might find a defendent guilty or 
an umpire might call a runner out. Of course one can perform an institutional 
act without intending to communicate this fact. However, implementing the 
change in institutional s tatus usually requires communicating this result to 
interested or affected parties. 
The communicative role of the performative verb (or noun) in both types 
of act is to indicate what one is doing in uttering it by constating what one is 
doing. Thus we have options such as: 
(5) Judge: 
(a) The defendent will spend . . . 
(b) I (hereby) sentence the defendent to spend . . . 
(6) Chairman: 
(a) This meeting is adjourned. 
(b) I (hereby) declare this meeting adjourned. 
18 
Recently the idea that communicative intentions are reflexive has come under crit icism 
by Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Récanati (1987). Récanati rightly challenges Sperber and 
Wilson, then proposes his own modified criticism. T h a t argument is challenged in Harnish 
(1991a, b). 19 
These are conventions, on one use of the term; see Lewis (1969), Schiffer (1972), B a c h -
Harnish (1979). 20 
See Bach -Harn i sh (1979, 110). One candidate example: saying the words "Harei at 
mekvdeshet li lefi dat moshe veisrael" while put t ing a ring on the bridge's finger in the 
presence of two appropriate witnesses const i tutes marrying in some Israeli cultures. 
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Indirection 
In some cases we communicate 'indirectly' in that one communicative inten-
tion (the one associated with the indirect act) is recognized (and expected 
to be recognized) by means of another communicative intention (the one as-
socatiated wi th the direct act) . The two acts are performed simultaneously, 
though the hearer typically will reason (and will be expected to reason) from 
the constative (direct) act to the other (usually nonconstative) indirect act. 
Thus, if I say 
(7) "My car has a flat t i re" 
at a gas s tat ion I can expect to be taken as requesting a repair, whereas if said 
in an intersection to a policeman it will more likely be taken as an excuse. In 
both cases I am using the sentence to literally and directly assert that my car 
has a flat t i re . Likewise, we can be communicating indirectly in performing 
an institutional act. As a constituent of communicative acts, (non locution-
specific) institutional acts are also indirect in that the speaker is performing 
two illocutionary acts, and expects that the indirect act will be recognized by 
means of the direct act. 
How performatives work 
Applied to performatives, "I (hereby) order you to leave" is directly constative 
and indirectly an (standardized) order. According to Bach-Harnish (1979, 208) 
a hearer might reason (and be expected to reason) as follows: 
1. S is saying "I (hereby) order you to leave." 
2. S is s tat ing that S is ordering me to leave, [mood and context] 
3. If S's s tatement is t rue , then S must be ordering me to leave. 
4. If S is ordering me to leave, it must be S's ut terance that constitutes the 
order (what else could it be?) . 
5. Presumably, he is speaking the t ru th , [conversational presumption] 
6. Therefore, in stating t h a t S is ordering me to leave S is ordering me to 
leave. 
On this account there is nothing semantically special about performatives.21 
In particular, it is not a pa r t of the semantics of performatives that they refer 
to their own utterance. The speaker may be e.g. ordering by performing some 
21 
Other t h a n that the performat ive verb denotes an act performable, in the circum-
stances, by u t t e r ing that very sentence. But why call this a ' semant ic ' property of the verb? 
See Ginet (1979) for further discussion. 
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collateral act such as signing a paper (see s tep 4). In this sense performative 
utterances could be described as default reflexive in that they 'refer' to them-
selves (and are therefore reflexive) by defaul t , when no collateral act could 
plausibly be being referred to as the vehicle of the performance of the order . 2 2 
'Hereby' makes explicit the fact that the ut terance has t h e (indirect) force it 
has in virtue of what the speaker is now doing. It means something like, 
Hereby = by this very act 
where the act at issue could be, but need not be, the u t te rance itself. Notice 
tha t the vehicle of the performance of the indirect act is no t a part of the com-
municative intention. Consider the following case.23 I have authority to order 
you to face immanent death only in writing ( to minimize misunderstandings). 
You do not know this, so when I say (while signing) "I order you to go" I 
intend the signing to be the vehicle of the order , but you understand the ut-
terance to be the vehicle. There has been an infelicity, but communication has 
still been successful because for communication to occur, t h e hearer need only 
recognize my communicative intention to order—the hearer need not identify 
the intended vehicle, but only believe there is one. Hence step 4. would be 
typical, but not necessary. The generalized pa t te rn of inference is: 
1. S is saying tha t S F-s tha t P ("I (hereby) order you to leave."). 
2. S is stating t ha t S is F-ing tha t P (ordering me to leave). 
3. If S's statement is true, then S must be F-ing that P (ordering me to leave). 
4. Presumably, S is speaking the truth, [conversational presumption] 
5. Therefore, S is F-ing that P (ordering me to leave).24 
Furthermore, some forms of words, such as (8a) vs. (8b), become standardized 
for their indireci force in that H need not figure out what t he indirect force of 
the utterance is, given that H knows the u t terance has an indirect force.25 
2 2 
Not to be confused with Récanat i ' s notion wi th the same n a m e (1987, 201). Scare 
quotes arround ' refer ' and 'reflexive' indicate tha t the re is nothing in the sentence t h a t 
denotes , designates or refers to t h a t ut terance itself. T h e speaker i n t e n d s it to be ( taken to 
be) the vehicle. 
23 
See also Sampson 's (1971) Rur i t an i a example. 
2 4
 See Ginet (1979) for a discussion of the extens ion of per format ive verbs tha t helps 
legi t imate steps 2 and 4. 
25 
Bach-Harn i sh (1979, 195) characterize this not ion eis follows: 
I l l o c u t i o n a r y S t a n d a r d i z a t i o n (IS): expression T is s tandard ly used to F in g r o u p 
G if and only if: 
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(8) (a) Сап/could/would you VP? 
(b) Do you have the ability to V P ? 
The above inferences are a reconstruction of reasoning before standardization. 
After standardization the performative practice short-circuits the s teps of this 
inference pat tern , both as carried through by the hearer and as expected by 
the speaker: 
1. S has ut tered "I (hereby) order you to leave", 
2. "I (hereby) order you . . . " is s tandardly used to order , 
3. It would be contextually inappropriate for S just t o be contating t h a t S is 
ordering, 
4. So, S is ordering me t o leave. 
Compare this with ambiguity: 
1. S has ut tered "I will meet you at the bank", 
2. "bank" means both 'river or lakeside' and 'finance house', 
3. It would be contextually inappropriate for us to meet at some river or 
lakeside, 
4. so S is saying that he will meet me a t a certain f inance house. 
The interpretation of the utterance is thus introspectively indistinguishable 
from disambiguation, and so feels to t he communicants like a ' reading' of the 
sentence. 
Adequacy 
It is easy to see that this theory satisfies the four conditions on performatives: 
(i) performative sentences are semantically ordinary declaratives, (ii) they have 
an interpretation that is non-Constative ( the indirect ac t ) , and (iii) performa-
tive sentences feel as if they mean jus t the 'other' doing because this use 
has become standardized, and so introspectively approximates being a second 
'reading' of the sentences. Finally (iv) our account of performatives is embed-
ded in a general theory of speech acts and linguistic communication and thus 
we have an account of how a speaker can peform the ac t described in uttering 
that sentence, and how this can be communicated to a hearer. 
(i) It is mutually believed in G that generally when a m e m b e r of G u t t e r s T , his 
illocutionary in tent is to F, and 
(ii) General ly when a m e m b e r of G u t t e r s T in a context in which it would violate 
the conversational presumptions to utter T wi th (merely) its l i tera l ly determined force, his 
illocutionary in tent is to F. 
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Open questions 
The theory, as it stands, still faces prima facie difficulties and open questions. 
1. One is the s tatus of the general inference before standardization; did peo-
ple really figure out performatives as they figure out paradigmatic cases of 
indirection? 
2. And how did standardization come about—by precedent, by convention? 
Perhaps there was a natural evolution from collateral acts to utterance acts 
as the vehicle of the performance due both to the fact that natural languages 
contain the resources to talk about themselves, and that the utterance act is 
always available as the vehicle of the performance—freeing the speaker f rom 
having to perform the collateral act.26 
3. Also notice that some forms have become standardized for indirect requests, 
but some have not. Performatives, on the other hand, all seem standardized— 
why? 
(9) (a) I promise to VP 
(b) I am promising to VP 2 7 
(c) I VP, and that ' s a promise28 
(d) I VP, I promise29 
4. Fourth, there is the lack of introspective evidence that we really are con-
stating in communicating with explicit performatives. Perhaps one reason we 
2 6
 See J. Burgess "Notes on Performatives", Monash University xerox, 1990. 
27 
Why do performatives resist the present progressive if they are used to say what we 
are now doing? Notice that some forms are more na tura l than others, bu t most are no good 
with "hereby": 
a) I am begging you . . . *I am hereby begging you . . . 
b) I am asking you . . . ?? I am hereby asking you . . . 
c) ??I am baptising . . . *I am hereby baptizing you . . . 
Perhaps this has to do with the t ime s t ructure of these various verbs and the fact t ha t we 
are reporting on an act which aspect marks as 'in progress' , but is actual ly performed at a 
point in time. 
28 
Notice t ha t "and that ' s a promise" cannot always be appended to an utterance used 
to make a promise. 
SI: Do you promise to come? 
S2: Yes, I will (come), and t ha t ' s a promise 
S3: *Is the Pope Catholic, and tha t ' s a promise 
S4: *I promise, and tha t ' s a promise 29 
Direct quota t ion works differently, compare: 
a) "I'll be there" he promised 
b) *He promised "I'll be there" 
c) "I'll be there" he said 
d) He said "I'll be there" 
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do not normally introspect a constative force is not tha t it is not there, but 
because it usually is. I.e. since performatives are usually true, their t ru th is not 
their usual point and we don ' t notice what we take for granted. This explana-
tion makes the prediction tha t when a performative is false, then its constative 
force should be (more) evident. However this does not seem to be so; if I say 
"You are fired", I clearly haven't done so, as conditions are not appropriate. 
Do we intuit this ut terance as (more) clearly constative? It would seem not. 
5. A corollary of this problem is why, if performatives are constatives, is it 
often so unnatural to say tha t they are t rue or false? 
6. A sixth worry regards the function of performatives. Notice that some acts 
require performatives and some prohibit them. 
Performative Required 
(10) Priest: 
(a) I (hereby) pronounce you man and wife. 
(b) *You are man and wife.30 
(c) I (hereby) bapt ize you Samuel, in the name of . . . 
(d) *You are (named) Samuel, in the name of . . . 
Performative Prohibited 
(11) Umpire: 
(a) You're out! 
(b) *I (hereby) call you out. 
(12) Boss: 
(a) You're fired. 
(b) *I (hereby) fire you. 
(13) (a) I'll get you for that! ( threat) 3 1 
(b) *I (hereby) threa ten that I will get you for that! 3 2 
If the point of performatives is to make explicit an illocutionary intent , why 
don't we always have this option? 
7. Why is (14a) a suggestion, but (14b) is not an adjournment? 
30 
Notice t h a t the following seems ok: "You are now man and wife". 
3 1
 We also have forms such as: "I don't wan t to threaten you, but . . . ", and "I don ' t 
want this to sound like a t h r ea t , but . . . " . 
32 
Included in this list are also "insinuate", "imply", "suggest" etc. and perhaps "brag' , 
"boast" etc. See Strawson (1964), Vendler (1972) and Ginet (1979) for further discussion. 
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(14) (a) May I suggest a Merlot? 
(b) May I adjourn this meeting?3 3 
8. Finally, are performatives ambiguous? Suppose sentence SI can be construed 
as C l , C2, and sentence S2 as Cl and C2. Then we will say that two construals 
of a conjunction 'SI and S2' are uncrossed if the only possible construals are: 
( U C ) S l ( C l ) and S2(C1) 
S1(C2) and S2(C2) 
And we will call construals crossed if they include any others. Implicit in our 
earlier discussion was appeal to a principle such as: 
(P) Since 'do so' proverbalizes under a meaning, if the first conjunct is con-
strued as being used with a given meaning, then the second conjunct must be 
construed as having tha t same meaning. 
In other words: 
(CR1) The possibility of crossed construals (in conjunction reduction) is 
evidence for the indeterminacy of the unreduced clause. 
(CR2) The impossibility of crossed construals (in conjunction reduction) is 
evidence for the ambiguity of the unreduced clause. 
Consider the example:34 
(15) (a) I saw her duck and so did he. 
(b) I saw her fowl and so did he (fowl, *bow). 
(c) I saw her bow down, and so did he (bow down, *fowl). 
(d) I saw her (qua blond) duck and so did he (qua redhead). 
(e) I saw her (qua redhead) duck and so hid he (qua blond). 
The test correctly predicts that (15a) is ambiguous with respect to 'duck' , but 
only indeterminate as between blonds and redheads. 
Consider now the sentences: 
(16) (a) I promise to come on Wednesdays and so does John. 
(b) John promises to come on Wednesdays and so do I. 
(c) I hereby promise to come on Wednesdays and so does John. 
(d) John promises to come on Wednesdays and hereby so do I. 
33 
See Fraser (1975), and Bach-Harn ish (1979, chapter 10.2) for further discussion. 
3 4
 See Zwicky-Sadock (1975), who also note problems with such tests. 
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These have the construals: 
(17) (a) performative, report 
report , report 
*performative, performative 
(b) report , report 
report , performative 
*performative, performative 
(c) performative, report 
*performative, performative 
*reportive, reportive 
(d) report , performative 
report , report 
*performative, performative 
Wha t does this say about (CR1) and (CR2) and ambiguity? Since they all al-
low crossed readings, (CR1) predicts the unreduced clause to be unambiguous. 
Notice that we are forced to cross readings, not just allowed to, as with normal 
applications of the test. But recall (P) , the rationale for these principles. Why 
then can't we get reduction on the performative sense? The reason seems to be 
connected with the fact that most people do not get third person performative 
promises ("John promises to be there"), but those who do also get the above 
performative uncrossed readings. What does this show about the test? Is this 
an extraneous consideration—a filter on an independent test—or should it be 
constituitive of the test itself? 
Consider an analogous case involving nonliterality:35 
(18) Nerdsky is a (real) genius and so is Chomsky. 
Here it seems we must take the reduced conjunt as ironic or not, depending on 
the construal of the first conjunct. By (CR2), this is evidence for the ambiguity 
of "Nerdsky is a genius" as between a literal and an ironic reading. Surely 
something has gone wrong if we apply the test in this way.36 
Analogous points can be made for other forms of nonliterality, such as 
metaphors and proverbs: 
(19) (a) The gambler is hot right now, and so is the weather, 
(b) ?He who hesitates is lost, and so were Lewis and Clark, 
3 5
 See Zwicky-Sadock (1975, 26ff.). 
3 6
 Zwicky-Sadock (ibid) suggest a psychological set might be involved here. 
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(c) ?The early bird catches the worm, and so does the early 
fisherman, 
(d) ?No man is an island, and neither is a peninsula. 
As with irony, both clauses must be taken metaphorically or literally, no cross-
ing is possible and again, ambiguity is predicted. With proverbs the situation 
is slightly different. Because the whole sentence constitutes the proverb there 
is no coherent way to proverbalize just part of i t , and so it has no coherent 
interpretation as a whole. 
Thus it would appear that there can be external filters on the output of 
these tests. In particular, we must be careful that the 'impossibility' mentioned 
in (CR2) is not due to some extraneous constraint on the interpretation of the 
sentence. But how do we tell when such a constraint is operative? This needs 
additional work. 
Other ambiguity test yield similar results: 
Contradiction 
(20) (a) That kid (child) is not a kid (young goat) , (ambiguous) 
(b) *I promise to be there on Wednesdays and I don't . 
(univocal) 
Substitution 
(21) (a) He cooked (*baked) her goose, (ambiguous) 
(b) I promise (am promising) to be there, (univocal) 
Stylistic variation 
(22) (a) They saw her duck ( n o t = Her duck was seen by them) . 
(ambiguous) 
(b) I promise to be there on Wednesdays ( = On Wednesdays I 
promise to be there) (univocal) 
The overall upshot of these tests is that performatives are not ambiguous, 
though there are issues of interpretation regarding these test t o be settled. 
Alternatives 
1. Maybe the answer to at least some of these worries is to take the second 
Austinian alternative mentioned earlier (section A) more seriously and propose 
tha t a speaker in uttering an explicit performative is saying tha t S is F-ing, 
but is not constating it. The problem with this solution, recall, is that we have 
no explanation of the connection between what is said and the illocutionary 
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force potential, and so do not satisfy condition 2. Until this connection can 
be spelled out in a way compatible with the other conditions of adequacy we 
cannot count this opt ion as an advance on our theory. 
2. Another , more radical , solution would be to deny the common assumption 
underlying most of these problems: 
(T-C) If a sentence has a t ruth value, then it (i) has a constative illocution-
ary force potential (CIFP) , and (ii) is u t t e red with that potential. 
Perhaps performatives are sentences with a truth value, and so a compositional 
semantics, but they are not used constatively. 
The problem with this solution is saying why performatives are not used 
constatively. We need to break the connection between having a t r u th value, 
having a CIFP, and being used constatively. Schiffer (1972, 108-9) argued inge-
niously for one version of this solution. His view seems to be that performatives 
have the 'conventional force' of constatives (and so have a t ruth value), but 
they are not uttered wi th this full conventional force. Thus, he breaks the con-
nection at T-C(ii) . His argument is t ha t to make the conventional force of e.g. 
"I order you to leave" explicit one would have to u t t e r "I state that I order you 
to leave", and to make tha t force explicit one would have to utter "I s tate that 
I state t ha t I order you to leave" ad infinitum. Many writers have found prob-
lems with this argument. Heal (1974, 117-8) denies the regress is vicious. Bach 
(1975,232) denies tha t performatives make explicit the conventional force of 
an ut ternace. Heal challanges this also. Harnish (1976, section B) denies that 
the regress gets started. 
How about trying to break the connection at (i)? This would be more 
natural in that this is a break between (on some accounts) a semantic prop-
erty and a pragmatic one. Could a declarative sentence have a t ru th value 
without having CIFP? If having CIFP just means being able to constate with 
it, and constating is jus t uttering something as t rue or false, then it might 
prove difficult to drive a wedge between t ruth value and CIFP. If, however, we 
have a richer conception of CIFP involving the idea of expressing a belief or 
committment to t ruth, then it is possible for the performative to have a truth 
value, but not be used to express belief or truth committment . 
Suppose we adopt t he richer conception of CIPF for the sake of argument. 
Still we need an explanation of why they do not have such potential. And 
although this alternative would handle some of the above problems, it would 
still need to face others—such as why it is sometimes so unnatural to say that 
performatives are true or false. And what is the connection between uttering 
a t ruth valuable sentence (but not constating anything) and e.g. ordering? 
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How would we satisfy condition of adequacy (ii)? Until such questions can be 
answered we cannot count this option as an advance on our account. 
3. Probably the most radical solution to the problem of performatives is David-
son (1979). He argues tha t performatives are indicatives, and so are true or 
false on occasions of ut terance, and should fall under the purview of a t ruth 
definition. His proposal is tha t performatives (and other oblique constructions 
such as 'say tha t ' ) are analyzed as follows: 
(23) (a) I order that you go. 
(b) I order that . You go. 
Where the force of (23b) is given by: 
(c) I am issuing an order whose content is given by my next 
utterance. You go. 
By analysing performatives as paratactic constatives Davidson inherits all the 
problems of such theories.37 There are two distinctive problems with this pro-
posal. First, Davidson analyzes imperatives and interrogatives paratactically, 
and claims as a virtue of the analysis tha t it correctly predicts they are without 
t ru th value: 
"Each of the two utterances has a t ru th value, but the combined utterance 
is not the utterance of a conjunction, and so does not have a t ru th value" 
(1979,20). 
The question then arises; why do performatives have a t ruth value, but 
nonindicative analyzed the same way do not? Furthermore, often a pair of 
sentences is equivalent to a conjunction, logically,38 and each declarative sen-
tence in the analyzing pair support a variety of inferences which the analyzed 
imperative and interrogative do not. Another distinctive problem with this 
proposal is the connection between performative sentences such as (23a) and 
their analysans (23b-c). How does the t ruth definition (semantics) t reat these 
three sentences; are all three covered by its clauses, or only (23b)? What re-
lates (23a) to (23b)? Davidson says the first sentence of (23b) "represents a 
transformation", but it is not clear in what sense; no transformational gram-
mar would derive (23a) from (23b).39 Furthermore, how would this proposal 
extend to such sentences as the following? 
3 7
 See, for instance, Haack (1971), McFetridge (1975/6), A r n a u d (1976), and Segal -Speas 
(1986). 
38 
Think of ^ - I n t r o d u c t i o n , &-E l imina t i on rules. 3Q 
See Bach-Harn ish (1983, 389-492) for further critical discussion. 
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(24) (a) I order you to leave, 
(b) ?I order you. To leave. 
(25) (a) There is a phone call I promise to make. 
(b) ?I promise to make t h a t . There is a phone call. 
None of this shows that Davidson's proposal is wrong, just t h a t it needs more 
elaboration than Davidson has so far given to make it plausible. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we presented the problem of performatives as the problem of 
explaining how performative sentences can both have a (constative) composi-
tional semantics and be used to perform a non-constative illocutionary act, and 
how a speaker can use performatives to communicate to a hearer . Further, we 
insisted that a theory of this be consistent with four conditions of adequacy. We 
saw tha t there is a spectrum of analyses of performatives in the literature, and 
before exploring our own theory we looked briefly at Austin's original charac-
terization of performatives, his abandonement of the performative-constative 
distinction, and Récanati 's resuscitation. We then turned to our own proposal 
t ha t performative utterances are default reflexive standardized indirect speech 
acts, and we argued that this theory meets our four conditions of adequacy— 
though it faces a number of open questions. However, the alternatives seemed 
to face worse problems and we concluded that our theory is t he best available 
theory of performatives.40 
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MODAL PARTICLES 
AS DISCOURSE MARKERS IN QUESTIONS* 
F E R E N C KIEFER 
1. The essence of modality consists in the relativization of the validity of sen-
tence meanings to a set of possible worlds. In less technical terms one may 
characterize modality as 'envisaging several possible courses of events ' or as 
'considering the possibility of things being otherwise' (Kiefer 1987; 1992). The 
possibilities envisaged by yes-no questions are defined by the two alternatives: 
p and not-p. Tha t is, the two possible courses of events considered in the case 
of the question "Is Bill at home?" are "Bill is at home" and "Bill is not at 
home". Roughly speaking, "p or not-p" is the prepositional content of a yes-no 
question. In the case of wh-questions the prepositional content has to be de-
fined differently. To take the simplest example where the answer is categorially 
determined by the question word, the propositional content of the wh-question 
can be circumscribed in the following manner. The alternatives considered are 
defined by a set of propositions obtained by replacing the question word by cat-
egorially appropriate terms which are restricted by the universe of discourse. 
For example, the propositional content of the question "Who wants another 
piece of cake?" may be "Bill wants another piece of cake or Mary wants an-
other piece of cake or John wants another piece of cake or Eve wants another 
piece of-cake" where Bill, Mary, John and Eve are the only persons to whom 
the question may be put in the given universe of discourse. The presupposition 
tha t "Someone wants another piece of cake" may, but need not, be par t of the 
propositional content. By asking a question the speaker wants to know which 
one(s) of the possible alternatives envisaged is (are) true. This is the basic 
modal value of interrogativity. 
Modal particles in questions are used to modify the basic modal value of 
interrogativity. One characteristic feature of the basic modal value of interrog-
ativity is that there is no preferred alternative, all alternatives considered are 
equally possible. By using a modal particle the speaker may wish to indicate 
tha t he has some evidence to believe that one of the alternatives is more likely 
to occur than the other one(s). Or a modal particle may be used to introduce a 
* An earlier version of this paper was published in Kiefer 1992a under the t i t le "Att i tu-
dinal markers in quest ions". As to the notion of discourse marker cf. Fraser this volume. 
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presupposition where no presupposition was present. Since in Hungarian most 
modifications of the basic modal value of interrogativity are brought about by 
means of modal particles, for our present purpose (in want of a more general 
definition) we may use this property as the defining property of modal parti-
cles in interrogative sentences: A linguistic expression is a modal particle in a 
question if it modifies the basic modal value of interrogativity. 
Though not all discourse markers affect modality, all modal particles seem 
to have discourse functions. In the case of questions modal particles may have 
two main discourse functions: (i) they connect the question to the previous 
discourse, (ii) they signal the preferred or expected answer. This will become 
clear from the discussion which follows. The 'connective funct ion ' of modal 
particles cannot always be made explicit. On the other hand, the expected 
answer is, in general, derivable f rom the modal meaning of the particle.1 
2. In Hungarian the following modal particles are used in questions: csak 
'surely' , csakugyan 'really', egyáltalán 'at all', hát 'so (after all)', is 'really', 
még 'still', szóval 'so', talán 'perhaps ' , tehát 'so' , ugyan ' can/could ' , tényleg 
' really', valóban 'really'.2 
2.1. Csak 'surely'3 
Compare the following sentences: 
( l ) ( a ) Jár neked, valamilyen újság? 
'Do you subscribe to a newspaper?' 
(b) Csak jár neked valamilyen újság? 
'But you surely subscribe to some newspaper?' 
1
 From the vast l i te ra ture on particles I refer here to Thurma i r 1989 which is perhaps the 
most systematic account of particles in German. It also deals quite extensively with the role 
of particles in questions. For further references cf. the bibliography in T h u r m a i r 1989. As to 
part icles in Hungarian, the l i terature is rather scarce. Cf., however, Molnár 1968, Kocsány 
1986, Fábricz 1987 and, in particular, Bende 1989. 
2 T h e list is perhaps complete. Recall tha t only particles which modify the basic modal 
value of interrogativity count as modal . It should also be made clear tha t the English 
equivalents are very approximate. As known, particles are notoriously difficult to translate. 
Fur thermore the formulat ions of the speaker 's a t t i tudes proposed in the present paper are 
i l lustrat ions rather then serious semantic descriptions. For more precise formulat ions much 
fu r the r research is needed. 
In view of the scarcity of really reliable material the discussion of the particles here 
is by necessity very sketchy. A fu l l - f l edged account would have to cover modal particles in 
other sentence types as well. In part icular , in a more complete description the behavior of 
modal particles in quest ions would have to be compared with their behavior in declaratives. 
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Question ( l a ) is indifferent with respect to the two alternatives, ( lb) , on the 
other hand, makes it clear—by means of the particle csak—that the speaker 
has some reason to believe that one of the alternatives—namely p—should be 
the case. At the same time, however, he is not quite sure whether p is really the 
case, where p = ' the addressee subscribes to a newspaper'. T h e same difference 
can also be observed between (2a) and (2b): 
(2)(a) Felkel Jancsi dél előtt? 
'Does Johnny get up before noon?' 
(b) Jancsi csak felkel dél előtt? 
' Johnny will surely get up before noon, (won't he)? ' 
(2a) is an uncommitted information question, (2b), on the other hand, makes 
the speaker's beliefs explicit who thinks tha t Johnny should get up before 
noon. The particle csak may be accompanied by the tag пет?, as in (3), but 
this need not be so. 
(3) Jancsi csak felkel dél előtt, nem? 
Csak seems to have a fixed position: it always occurs in the position immedi-
ately preceding the (prefixed) verb. This is one of the major differences between 
csak as a modal particle and csak as a logical operator meaning 'only'. On the 
latter interpretation csak occurs normally in front of a noun phrase. 
In more general terms the speaker's a t t i tude expressed by csak can be 
formulated in the following fashion: The speaker thinks that p should be the 
case, but he has got some evidence which makes him believe that p may not 
be the case after all. 
Notice that the modal particle csak cannot occur in wh-questions for at 
least two reasons. First, csak expresses a strong belief toward one of t he al-
ternatives, which automatically excludes it from wh-questions. Second, the 
syntactic position of csak is taken by the question word in wh-questions, con-
sequently there is no place for it in such questions. 
As to the discourse function of csak, this can be derived from its modal 
meaning. Since the speaker indicates his preference, the preferred answer is the 
one which is in accordance with this preference. Therefore a positive answer 
to ( lb ) or (2b) meets the speaker's expectations whereas a negative answer 
does not. Furthermore, since very often it is not too polite t o leave the speaker 
unsatisfied, a negative answer must in general be more elaborate. 
Csak may be combined with the negative particle nem yielding csak nem: 
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(4)(a) Nem akarsz elmenni hozzá? 
'Don ' t you want to go to him?' 
(b) Csak nem akarsz elmenni hozzá? 
'You surely don't want to go to him (,do you)?' 
Question (4b) clearly indicates that the speaker thinks that p (= you go to 
him) should not be the case. In other words, the negative particle reverses the 
speaker's a t t i tude expressed by csak. Question (4a) is indifferent with respect 
t o this a t t i tude . 
2.2. Csakugyan 'really' 
In contradistinction to csak, which has several uses of which most are not 
attitudinal, csakugyan is always an at t i tudinal marker in questions. Consider: 
(5)(a) Csakugyan 6 az? 
'Is it really him'? 
(b) Csakugyan eljössz? 
'Will you really come?' 
(6)(a) Csakugyan nem ő az? 
'Is it really not h im? ' 
(b) Csakugyan nem jössz el? 
'Will you really not come?' 
In (5a-b) the speaker's a t t i t u d e expressed by csakugyan refers to a positive, 
in (6a-b), on the other hand , to a negative state-of-affairs. In other words, 
negation in (6a -b ) is part of the propositional content. T h e relevant speaker's 
at t i tude can be paraphrased as follows: The speaker is not quite sure about 
p, there is still a slight possibility for p not to be the case. 
Questions such as (5a -b ) and (6a-b) are typically asked for confirmation. 
Once again, th is discourse function can be derived from the modal meaning of 
the particle csakugyan: the belief that p is the case comes close to certainty, 
the other alternative is not seriously considered as a possibility, a negative 
answer is not expected. No wonder, it would be odd to answer the questions 
(5a) or (5b) by a plain 'no ' . 
As to wh-questions, consider: 
(7)(a) Csakugyan hol van a kutya? 
' Indeed, where is t he dog?' 
(b) Csakugyan mi van vele? 
' Indeed, what is wi th him?' 
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The particle csakugyan in the above sentences is not modal, but it has a 
clear discourse function, which can be described as follows. When people start 
talking about the dog you realize tha t the dog has disappeared. This may 
prompt you to ask the question (7a). Similarly, in the Gourse of a discourse 
mention is made of a certain person. At this moment you realize tha t you 
don't know anything about said person. In this case you may ask question 
(7b). More generally, the discourse particle csakugyan shows the speaker's 
involvement in the discourse topic as well as his ignorance with respect to the 
state-of-affairs at stake. Notice that the first part of this characterization is 
also valid for the use of csakugyan in yes-no questions and the second half of 
the characterization seems to be a general feature of wh-questions. It would 
thus be misguided to distinguish between the modal particle csakugyan and 
the discourse particle csakugyan. Since the modal meaning expresses a strong 
bias toward p (i.e. one of the alternatives), and a wh-question does not offer 
alternatives, the modal meaning is blocked in the la t ter case. This seems to 
be the case whenever a particle shows the preference of one alternative over 
the other. Recall tha t the modal particle csak behaves in a similar fashion. 
As to the discourse function, at least two things must be distinguished: (i) 
specification of the previous discourse, (ii) specification of the expected answer, 
(i) may be a common feature of yes-no and wh-questions, (ii), on the other 
hand, makes only sense in the case of yes-no questions. This seems to indicate 
that the particle csakugyan has a modal and discourse potential, the realization 
of which depends on the semantics of the question at hand. 
It should also be noted that the particle csakugyan occurs in questions 
which are associated with a presupposition. Thus, question (7a) can only be 
meaningfully asked if the dog is somewhere, and (7b) can only be meaning-
fully asked if something can be said about the person in question. It is odd, 
however, to use the particle csakugyan with questions which do not have such 
presuppositions. E.g. + Csakugyan kinek van egy cigarettája? 'Indeed, who has 
got a cigarette?' . 
2.3. Egyáltalán 'at all' 
At first glance it would seem that the particle egyáltalán, too, has two differ-
ent uses depending on whether it occurs in yes-no-questions or wh-questions. 
Consider 
(8)(a) Figyelsz egyáltalán? 
'Are you listening (at all)?' 
(b) Egyáltalán van hozzá bátorságod? 
'Do you have enough courage to do it?' 
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(9)(a) Egyáltalán mit akar ez az ember? 
'What on earth does this man want? ' 
(b) Egyáltalán hol tartod most a pénzedet? 
'As a m a t t e r of fact, where do you keep your money now?' 
T h e particle egyáltalán occurs at the beginning or at the end of the sentence. 
T h e modal funct ion of egyáltalán is quite apparent in yes-no questions. It can 
be paraphrased as follows: The speaker has serious doubts about p, in fact, 
he believes that not-p is more probable than p. As to its discourse functions, 
egyáltalán presupposes a previous discourse, of which questions such as (8a-b) 
can be a continuation. No identity of topic is required. The speaker expects an 
affirmative answer to his question, which is reinforced in the case of (8a) by 
politeness considerations. The addressee is expected to alleviate the speaker's 
misgivings. 
In wh-questions the particle egyáltalán has no modal function. Once again, 
since the modal meaning has t o do with the choice of one of the alternatives, 
it is excluded f rom wh-questions. On the other hand, egyáltalán indicates tha t 
there was a previous discourse and questions such as (9a-b) fit into this dis-
course, i.e. they can be considered as natural continuations of the discourse. 
Also the presupposition of t he question must be fulfilled. Consequently, it 
would be queer to use egyáltalán with questions where this presupposition is 
no t satisfied, e.g. -\-Kinek van egyáltalán egy cigarettája? 'As a matter of fact , 
who has got a cigarette?'. 
Since the presupposition of the question is taken for granted, it is utterly 
uncooperative to refute the question. Thus, for example, in contrast with a 
question such as Mit akar ez az ember? ' W h a t does this man want?', the 
question (9a) cannot be answered adequately by Nem akar semmit 'He doesn't 
want anything'. 
The speaker expects a satisfactory answer to his question. From the above 
discussion it should be clear t h a t the discourse function of egyáltalán in yes-
no-questions and wh-questions is not radically different. It has two main fea-
tures: (i) it presupposes a previous discourse and (ii) it shows the speaker's 
involvement (his bias in the case of yes-no questions and his acceptance of the 
presupposition of the question in the case of wh-questions). 
2.4. Hát 'so, after all, and' 
T h e particle hát raises a number of problems. Notice, first of all, that it can 
be used to introduce questions as in (lOa-b). 
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(10)(a) Hát én? 
'And me ?' / 'And what abou t me?' 
(b) Hát aztán? 
'Wha t next?' / 'And what then/next? ' 
In both cases the particle hát can be replaced by the conjunction és 'and' , 
which is also indicated by the English equivalents. There is yet another thing 
which can be gathered from the English translations. Questions (10a) and 
(10b) are not genuine yes-no questions. In spite of the fact that no question 
word appears in them, they are wh-questions of a special type often referred 
to as open-questions. T h a t is, the answer of the question is not categorially 
defined. The situation is similar with ( l l a - b ) . 
(11)(a) Hát mi újság nálatok? 
'And what is the news with you?' 
(b) Hát merre jártál? 
'And which places did you see?' 
The answer to (11a) is not categorially defined by the question word mi? 
'what? ' . Everything which counts as a new event is an appropriate answer 
to the question. At first glance, question ( l i b ) does not seem to fit into this 
picture. Wouldn't it be possible to answer this question by, say, Londonban 'in 
London'? Though such an answer would be quite satisfactory if the question 
Merre jártál? 'Where did you be?' had been asked. In the case of ( l i b ) how-
ever, a more elaborate answer is required. In fact, the speaker wants to hear a 
story, a description of the places which the addressee visited during his tourist 
trip. In other words, ( l i b ) is an open question, whereas the question Merre 
jártál? is not . 
However it would be wrong to believe that the particle hát in the function 
of és ' and ' can only occur in open questions. As testified by (12a-b), hát may 
have this function in any wh-question independently of whether the question 
is categorial or open. 
(12)(a) Hát hol a te barátod? 
'And where is your friend?' 
(b) Hát mit láttál Londonban? 
'And what did you see in London?' 
The fact that the particle hát is equivalent t o és 'and' in ( lOa-b) and 
( l l a - b ) shows clearly the discourse function of this particle: it indicates that 
the question is a continuation of the previous discourse. The particle hát with 
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this discourse function only occurs with wh-questions and it can always be 
replaced by és ' and ' . 
Consider next: 
(13)(a) Hát megjöttél? 
'So you are here?' 
(b) Hát meg akarsz teljesen őrjíteni? 
'So you want to drive me completely crazy?' 
In these questions the particle hát cannot be replaced by és 'and' . Notice 
tha t (13a-b) are rhetorical questions, rather than genuine yes-no questions. 
They need not be answered. However, the rhetoricity of these questions is 
not brought about by the particle hát, the questions without this particle are 
already rhetorical. The only contribution of hát to these questions seems to 
be emotional. 
In the following questions, however, the particle hát has a modal function. 
(14)(a) Hát megölték? 
'So he was killed after all?' 
(b) Hát találkoztatok már? 
'So you have met before?' 
(15)(a) Hát nem ölték meg? 
'So he wasn't killed after all?' 
(b) Hát még nem találkoztatok? 
'So you have not met before?' 
In these questions the particle hát modifies the propositional content. (14a) is 
not identical with Megölték? 'Was he killed?' and (14b) is not identical with 
Találkoztatok már? 'Have you met before?'. The speaker's a t t i tude indicated 
by hát can be paraphrased as follows: The speaker held the belief that not-p, 
but he got some evidence to believe that p is the case. 
The discourse function of hát can be derived from its modal function: 
the speaker believes that p is the case and he asks for confirmation. In ad-
dition, since the speaker's beliefs underwent radical changes, he expresses his 
astonishment at the state-of-affairs that caused these changes. 
Notice that the above description works equally well in the case when p 
is a negated statement, as in (15a-b) . 
In some cases modal interpretation of hát is also possible with wh-
questions. Consider: 
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(16)(a) Hát mikor ment el Jancsi? 
'When did Johnny leave?' 
(b) Hát hová tűnt el a pénzem? 
'Where did my money go?' 
On one interpretation the particle hát can be replaced by the conjunction 
és ' and ' and no modal interpretation is possible. There is, however, another 
possibility. The speaker expresses his belief—by using hát—that t he state-of-
affairs at stake should not have been taken place: Johnny should not have 
left and the money should not have disappeared. This interpretation is pretty 
much in line with the interpretation of hát in genuine yes-no-questions: the 
speaker held the belief tha t not-p is the case, but then he had to realize that 
p is the case after all. It is far from being clear, however, in which cases this 
interpretation becomes possible with wh-questions. 
2.5. Is 'really' 
The particle is functions as a modal particle if it is syntactically connected 
with the verb phrase. If it takes scope over a noun phrase, it is a logical 
operator. In this respect it shows a behavior which is paralell to t h a t of the 
particle csak. The modal use of is is exemplified by (17a-b). 
(17)(a) El is ment hozzá? 
'Did he really go to him?' 
(b) Meg is oldotta a problémát? 
'Did he really solve the problem?' 
It would correspond to the normal course of events t h a t 'he went to him' and 
'he solved the problem' hold. In a way the events expressed by the propo-
sitional contents of (17a) and (17b), respectively, are consequences of events 
which had occurred before. They would correspond to the arrangements, plans, 
activities, etc. of the persons involved. Let us denote the relevant plans, in-
tentions, arrangements by q. Under normal circumstances there is a practical 
inference, which leads from q to p. And this very inference is questioned in 
(16a-b). The speaker's attitude can thus be circumscribed in the following 
fashion: The speaker admits that p should normally be the case, but he has 
got some reasons to believe that p may not be the case after all. 
As to the discourse function of is, it must first be noted tha t the speaker 
wants the addressee to dissipate his doubts, consequently the expected an-
swer to (17a) and (17b) must be affirmative. In addit ion the particle is has a 
connective function: it must be possible to infer p f rom the previous discourse. 
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The particle is contributes in a different way to the meaning of wh-
questions. Consider: 
(18)(a) Hoi is nyaraltál? 
'Where did you spend your summer holidays?' (I should know it .) 
(b) Mit is mondott? 
'What did he say?' (I should know i t . ) 
The meaning of is is almost untranslatable. But the difference between the 
questions in (18a-b) and the corresponding questions without the particle is is 
this. By uttering the question (18b) the speaker indicates that he is quite aware 
of the fact that he should know what the person referred to by the pronoun 
he said, but he simply cannot remember it . The relevant information was 
either mentioned earlier in the conversation or it may have come from other 
sources. By ut ter ing questions such as (18a-b) the speaker wants to refresh 
his memory. Such questions necessarily induce a presupposition: it is taken 
for granted that the addressee spent his summer holidays somewhere and tha t 
the person referred to by the pronoun he said something. The corresponding 
questions without the particle is a re just plain wh-questions: the speaker need 
not presuppose t h a t the addressee had summer holidays or t ha t the person 
referred to by the pronoun he said something. Moreover, in that case the 
speaker has no idea about the possible answers to his questions. In sum, then, 
questions such as (18a-b) exhibit t he following speaker's a t t i tudes . The speaker 
admits that he knew the answer, but he cannot recall it. 
Questions such as (18a-b) m a y occur in various contexts. They need not 
presuppose a previous discourse, as already pointed out. Since, however, they 
refer to an earlier 'mental state' , they do have a connective function. In addi-
tion, the particle is contains a politeness factor. Admitting one's forgetfulness 
is more polite than asking the same question twice. 
The two modal uses of is do not seem to have anything in common. 
Therefore we will assume that we have to do with two particles which will be 
referred to as isi and is?, respectively. 
2.6. Még 'still' 
The particle még is not necessarily modal though it is normally mentioned 
among the modal particles. Compare: 
(19)(a) Te még beszélsz? 
'Are you still talking? 
(b) Még te beszélsz? 
'And you complain?' 
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Még functions as a temporal adverbial in (19a), in (19b), on the other hand, we 
have to do with a rhetorical question. The question without the particle még 
may, but need not, be interpreted as being rhetorical. This means that még 
contributes to the rhetoricity of the question, it disambiguates the question. 
The prepositional content of (19b) depicts a state-of-affairs which is at variance 
with what the speaker would expect. The same holds true for (20): 
(20) Még van kedved tréfálni? 
'And you are still in the humour to joke?' 
In (19b) it is taken for granted tha t the addressee is complaining and in (20) 
tha t he is joking. No answer is expected. The speaker doesn't ask a question but 
expresses his indignation about the respective states-of-affairs . The particle 
még has a similar function in wh-questions as well. 
(21)(a) Hoi van még ilyen nyugalom? 
'Where can one find such a quiet?' 
(b) Kivel lehet még így játszani? 
'With whom can one play in such a way?' 
Once again, the questions without the particle még, too, can be interpreted 
rhetorically, the only contribution of még seems to be to reinforce rhetoricity. 
This means tha t még is not changing the propositional content of the 
question: it is a rhetoricity particle rather than a modal particle. 
2.7. Szóval 'so' 
Consider: 
(22)(a 
(b 
(23)(a 
(b 
(24)(a 
(b 
Szóval elmész? 
'So you are leaving?' 
Szóval megint pihensz? 
'So you are taking a rest again?' 
Szóval ki járt itt? 
'Tell me now who was here?' 
Szóval mi történt? 
'Tell me now what happened?' 
Szóval maga a bűnös? 
'So you are the culprit?' 
Szóval maga írta ezt a levelet? 
'So you wrote this letter? ' 
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What is common in these questions is that the speaker indicates by using the 
particle szóval tha t he has some evidence to believe that p is the case for yes-
no questions and tha t he has some evidence to believe that the presupposition 
of the question is t rue for wh-questions. Notice tha t szóval can only occur at 
the beginning of the sentence. The type of evidence depends to some extent 
on the propositional content of the question. Thus, for example, in (21a-b) we 
have to do with direct (perceptual) evidence. In (24a-b), on the other hand, 
though direct evidence is not excluded, the first thing which comes to one's 
mind is linguistic (e.g. hearsay) evidence. In (23a-b) the presupposition of 
the question is taken for granted: 'someone was here', 'something happened' . 
The corresponding questions without the particle szóval need not have these 
presuppositions. It would seem tha t the evidence which the speaker has got for 
the t r u t h of these presuppositions is indirect rather than direct or linguistic. 
For yes-no questions the modal meaning of szóval can be paraphrased as 
follows: The speaker has some direct or linguistic evidence to believe that p 
is true. In the case of direct evidence no previous linguistic context is needed. 
Linguistic evidence, on the other hand , does presuppose such a context. Fur-
thermore, since the speaker is biased toward p, the question is used for con-
firmation. 
As to wh-questions, the contribution of the particle szóval to the meaning 
of the question can be formulated in the following fashion: The speaker has 
some (indirect) evidence to believe that the presupposition of the question is 
true. Such questions are not used t o introduce a conversation, however. They 
are prompted by the fact that the addressee seems to be reluctant to satisfy 
the curiosity of the speaker. Questions such as (23a-b) require a clear and 
unambigous answer. (22a) asks for identification and (23b) for specification. 
Both questions presuppose a previous linguistic context. 
2.8. Tehát 'so' 
The function of the particle tehát comes very close to that of szóval. In fact, 
in wh-questions szóval can be replaced by tehát without thereby affecting the 
meaning of the questions. That is, (25a-b) are synonymous with (24a-b). 
(25)(a) Tehát maga a bűnös? 
'So you are the culprit?' 
(b) Tehát maga írta ezt a levelet? 
'So you wrote this letter? ' 
In the case of wh-questions, however, tehát seems to be different f rom szóval. 
Consider: 
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(26)(a) Tehát ki járt itt? 
'So who was here?' 
(b) Tehát mi történt? 
'So what happened?' 
The particle tehát is in a way stronger than the particle szóval: the speaker 
insists that the addressee draw the conclusion and he wants him to speak up. 
By now the speaker does not only know tha t 'someone was here' and tha t 
'something happened ' , but he has also some hunch about who was here and 
what happened. The presuppositions of the questions are taken for granted. 
Another difference between szóval and tehát may be t ha t in the case of 
the latter the type of evidence on the basis of which the speaker draws his 
conclusions seems to be less clear. By and large, however, the two particles 
seems to have identical functions. 
2.9. Talán 'perhaps' 
The particle talán occurs in yes-no questions only and has a number of uses, 
some of which are illustrated in (27a-b) through (28a-b). 
(27)(a) Meghalt talán? 
'He is perhaps dead?' 
(b) Talán beteg volt? 
'He was perhaps ill?' 
(28)(a) Beteg talán? 
'He is not ill, is he?' 
(b) Meg vagy talán elégedve az életeddel? 
'You are not happy with your life, are you?' 
(29)(a) Talán a tudománynak éljek? 
'Should I perhaps dedicate my life to science? 
(b) Talán én vállaljam a kockázatot? 
'Should perhaps I bear the risk?' 
The analysis of sentences (27a-b) is quite straightforward. The particle talán 
expresses possibility. The speaker does not have any evidence in favor of any 
of the alternatives. The possibility of p being the case just occurred to him. 
By asking the question he puts forward a hypothesis. The speaker's a t t i tude 
can thus be formulated as follows: The speaker considers p to be possible. 
Since the speaker is not biased toward any of the alternatives, there is 
no preferred answer. Questions such as (27a-b) cannot be used to initiate a 
discourse. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
120 F E R E N C KIEFER 
The questions in (28a-b) are rhetorical. Rhetoricity is brought about by 
the particle talán together with the intonation which is characteristic of rhetor-
ical questions. The states-of-affairs at hand are not qualified by the speaker: 
he knows tha t p is not the case. He uses his questions in order to express 
indignation, surprise or annoyance. 
Questions (29a-b), too, are rhetorical. In the case, however, the questions 
without the particle talán may already be interpreted rhetorically, but they 
may also function as genuine questions. In other words, talán contributes to 
the rhetoricity of the question, and it is not a modal particle in this case. 
2.10. Ugyan 'can, could' 
The uses of the particle ugyan are exemplified in (28a-b) and (29a-b). 
(28)(a) Ugyan mi történhet? 
'Wha t can happen? ' 
(b) Ugyan ki ad nekem kölcsön pénzt? 
'Who is willing to lend me money?' 
(29)(a) Ugyan mi bosszantotta fel ennyire? 
'What did upset him so much' 
(b) Ugyan hová ment ez a gyerek? 
'Where could the kid have gone?' 
In (27a-b) the particle ugyan indicates tha t the speaker believes that 'nothing 
can happen ' and 'nobody is willing to lend him money' , respectively, are likely 
to be true statements. Nevertheless, due to the uncertainity of the underlying 
assumptions, these questions can still function as genuine questions. Notice 
that (28a-b) are not associated with presuppositions. 
The speaker's a t t i tude indicated by ugyan can be expressed in the follow-
ing way: The speaker does not believe that the presupposition of the question 
holds. The addressee may refute this assumption. Typically, questions such as 
(27a-b) are used to counter the addressee's hypothesis as to the validity of the 
presupposition. 
The questions in (29a-b) are different. Normally they are associated with 
presuppositions and the particle ugyan does not modify the propositional con-
tent of the questions. The particle is simply used to emphasize the fact that 
the speaker has no idea as to the answer to the question. This means tha t in 
this case it cannot be considered to be a modal particle. 
The particle ugyan precedes immediately the question word. It cannot be 
used in yes-no questions. 
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2.11. Valóban/tényleg 'really' 
The functions of these two particles are undistinguishable and they can be 
used interchangeably. Both occur in yes-no questions only. Consider: 
(30)(a) Valóban/tényleg beteg Eva? 
'Is Eve really ill?' 
(b) Valóban/tényleg elutazott Jancsi? 
'Has Johnny really left? ' 
(31)(a) Valóban/tényleg nem beteg Éva? 
'Is Eve really not sick?' 
(b) Valóban/tényleg nem utazott el Jancsi? 
'Has Johnny really not lef t? ' 
By asking (30a) the speaker indicates his doubt about Eve's being ill and by 
asking (30b) he expresses his doubt about Johnny 's having left . In (31a-b) 
the speaker's a t t i tude refers to the negated statements. The speaker 's a t t i tude 
indicated by valóban/tényleg can thus be formulated in the following fashion: 
The speaker expresses his doubts about p. 
Questions containing the particle valóban/tényleg are asked for confirma-
tion. Furthermore the state-of-affairs expressed by p must have been mentioned 
in the previous discourse, or at least it must be deduceable f rom it. 
2.12. Tags 
Section 2.12 concludes our discussion of the particles which occur in questions 
and which are modal. Nothing was said so far about particles which function 
as tags. The wide variety of tags in Hungarian is demonstrated by (32a-g). 
(32)(a) Elment a vonat, ugye? 
'The train has left, hasn ' t it? ' 
(b) Szerettek iskolába járni, nem? 
'You like going to school, don't you?' 
(c) Jó lenne, mi? 
'This would be fine, isn ' t it true?' 
(d) Nemsokára elutazunk, nem igaz? 
'Soon we will leaving, isn ' t it true?' 
(e) Jót mulattunk, igaz? 
'We have really enjoyed ourselves, d idn ' t we?' 
( f ) A ház mögött nagy kert is van, nemde? 
'There is also a big garden behind the house, isn't i t ? ' 
(g) Hozok neked valami ennivalót, jó? 
'I'll bring you something to eat, OK? ' 
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In these sentences we encounter the tags ugye ' isn ' t i t , hasn't i t , is it, has 
i t ' , nem 'not ' , mi 'wha t ' , nem igaz 'not true', nemde ' isn't it, hasn ' t i t ' and 
jó 'good, OK' . It is not at all clear to what extent t he analysis of these tags 
would fall under the scope of the present paper. For the time being we have 
to relegate their examination to a later study. 
3. Let's now summarize the results of our discussion. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the modal particles discussed in the present paper. The first column 
indicates whether the particle can occur in yes-no questions, the second col-
umn whether it appears in wh-questions, the third column whether it also 
shows up as a modal particle in declaratives, finally the fourth column indi-
cates whether the particle may also have other functions (whether it can also 
be an adverbial or a conjunction). Only genuine questions are considered, i.e. 
the occurrence of particles in rhetorical questions is not indicated in the table. 
Table 1 
particle yes-no qu. wh-qu. deci. other f. 
csak + - + + 
csakugyan + - + -
egyáltalán + - + -
hát + + + + 
is 1 + - + + 
is 2 - + - + 
szóval + + + -
talán + - + -
tehát + + + + 
ugyan - + + -
valóban/tényleg + - + -
From Table 1 it can be gathered t ha t the only modal particle which occurs 
in questions but not in declaratives is is2. Within questions, however, far more 
particles may occur in yes-no questions than in wh-questions. Only the former 
admit csak, csakugyan, egyáltalán, is^, talán, valóban/tényleg. Ugyan is the 
only modal particle which occurs in wh-questions but not in yes-no questions. 
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Table 2 considers t he particles f rom the point of view of their functions 
in questions, i.e. whether they are always modal or whether they can assume 
other functions as well. " + " means t ha t the particle in question is always 
modal, " - " means tha t it is never modal , "±" means that it can be both 
modal and nonmodal, and "blank" indicates that it does not occur in that 
position. 
Table 2 
particle yes-no question wh-question 
csak ± 
csakugyan + -
egyáltalán + -
hát ± ± 
ÍS\ ± 
is2 + 
szóval + + 
talán + 
tehát + + 
ugyan + 
valóban/tényleg + 
4. By way of conclusion, let 's summarize the main claims and findings of the 
present paper . 
(i) Some of the moda l particles may also have other functions. The two 
functions, however, can be kept apart by means of syntactic criteria. 
(ii) Each modal part icle has a core meaning. The difference in the modaliz-
ing effect in yes-no questions and wh-questions is a t t r ibutable to the difference 
in the semantics of the two types of questions. Only the particle is shows differ-
ent meanings in yes-no questions and in wh-questions, which are not traceable 
back to a common core meaning. Consequently, we have to assume tha t we 
have to do with two different particles, (isx and ÍS2, respectively) 
(iii) All modal particles in questions are at the same time discourse mark-
ers. Most particles—in addition to their modalizing effect—connect the ques-
tion to the previous discourse, i.e. questions containing such particles presup-
pose an appropriate linguistic context. Also, some emotional reactions may be 
predictable. For example, if the speaker held the belief that p and then new 
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evidence makes him believe tha t not-p, he tends to express his astonishment 
a t not-p. This boils down to the claim that quite a few discourse functions of 
modal particles can directly be derived from their semantics. 
(iv) The meaning of modal particles may involve various things. A particle 
may express the strength of belief, the change of beliefs brought about by new 
evidence, doubt and uncertainty, the existence of evidence and perhaps also 
the type of evidence. 
(v) In the case of yes-no questions the modal particle also seems to indi-
cate the speaker's bias toward p or toward not-p, consequently it determines 
the preferred answer. For example, strong bias toward p entails tha t the ques-
tion with the prepositional content p is asked for confirmation. In the case of 
wh-questions, on the other hand, modal particles tend to reinforce the presup-
position of the question. 
(vi) The modal meaning of a particle is, in general, not radically different 
in yes-no-questions and wh-questions. It may happen, however, t ha t the modal 
meaning is "blocked" in the case of one question type which, however, does 
not affect the discourse function of the particle. In other words, the modal 
meaning may be effective in the case of one question type only whereas the 
discourse function appears in all question types. The "blocking effect" of a 
question type should, of course, be deducible f rom the semantics of the modal 
particle and tha t of the question type. 
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SPEECH ACT TERMS 
AND MOOD INDICATORS (IN KOREAN)* 
CHUNGMIN L E E 
0. This paper is concerned with the distinction between speech act verbs and 
non-speech act verbs, special adverbial constructions with performative func-
tion, some types of illocutionary acts, and the relation between mood indica-
tors and speech act verbs, particularly in Korean. 
1. Illocutionary acts as acts are positive. First , I argue that all the illocutionary 
acts are positive, or constitute doing something (in saying something), and, 
therefore, the negation of a performative does not consti tute a performative.1 
For instance (1), below, is a performative but not (2) (cf. Lee 1973). 
(1) I promise (not) to finish my paper in t ime. 
(2) I don't promise to finish my paper in t ime. 
For most negation-implying performatives, negation is semantically associated 
with the complement of each corresponding positive performative verb, not the 
other way around, as in (3) and (4), below: 
(3)(a) I forbid you to use my car. 
(b) I order you not to use my car. 
(4)(a) I deny i t . 
(b) I declare it is not t rue. 
In (3) and (4), (a) is equivalent to (b). 
Let us now observe how the illocutionary act of forbidding is realized in 
Korean as a case in point. Typically, it is realized as negative imperative, as 
is expected cross-linguistically. Consider: 
(5) ka-ci mal -ara ! 
go Comp Neg+DO Imp 
'Don't go.' 
Presentations at the Symposium on Metapragmat ic Terms (Budapes t , 1990) sponsored 
by F. Kiefer. 
1
 Austin (1962, 79 -80 ) has such tests as 'Does he really?', 'I deliberately approved his 
act ion ' , and 'I am willing to apologize' , even though he doesn't say anything about the 
negation of a performative explicitly. 
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Korean has two forms of negation and the negative imperat ive essentially takes 
the longer form. Observe: 
(6)(a) an ka -as' - t a (without DO as in German and French) 
not go Past Dec 
'(Someone) didn't go. 
(b) ka -ci an + h -as' - t a (with DO as in English) 
go Comp not do Past Dec 
'(Someone) didn't go.' 
(6b) is the longer form just as (5) is. However, Neg+DO is obligatorily lexi-
calized as mal- in the imperative context (cf. Lee 1978), as the impossibility 
of (8) below shows. The short form negative imperative as in (7) appears only 
in some children's acquisition data but never in adults. Take a look: 
(7) an ka ! (as in "Geh nicht") (never in adults) 
not go 
'Don't go.' 
(8) *ka-ci an + h -ara ! 
goComp not do Imp 
Intended: 'Don't go.' 
The illocutionary act of order involves the addressee's volition to do some-
thing, and the negative imperative (4) can be paraphrased as: 
(9) I do the saying act of causing you not to activate your volition to go. 
Therefore, universally, a negative imperative is impossible with a non-
volitional s ta te predicate, as shown in (10), whereas it is better with a state-
change (process) predicate (when the change is assumed controllable) and it 
is perfect with action predicate. 
(10)(a) ?* changpaek-ha -ci mal -ara ! 
pale Comp Neg+DO Imp 
Intended: 'Don ' t be pale.' 
(b) (?) changpaek-hae -ci -ci mal -ara ! 
pale get Comp Neg+DO Imp 
'Don't get pale. ' 
On the other hand, mal- can be used even in a situation where the speaker's 
wish or hope of the addressee's not doing the act concerned is expressed in a 
declarative sentence, as follows: 
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(11) na -nin [ne -ka ka -ci m a l / a n + h -ki -ril] para -n - ta 
I Top you Nom go Comp N O T + D O Nomlz Acc hope P r s Dec 
'I hope you won ' t /do not go.' (-ki=Nominalizer) 
With mal, the sentence becomes more volition-sensitive increasing its forbid-
ding force. With an+h 'not+do ' , it remains more neutral or objective. The 
verb kim-ha-/kimci-ha-iforbid' of Sino-Korean origin can be used as a perfor-
mative verb as shown in (12), but its corresponding pure Korean verb malli 
'cause not to do; stop', as an action verb, cannot. Observe: 
(12) na -nin [ne -ka ka -nin kOs -il] kim -ha -n -ta 
I Top you Nom go Prs N Acc forbid Prs Dec 
'I forbid you to go. ' (kOs=to, t ha t , thing; 0 = ) 
In the embedded complement, an action verb is possible but not a s t a t e pred-
icate such as be pale, which is analogous to the negative imperative. 
2. Speech act verbs vs. non-speech act verbs. In connection wi th this, let 
us turn to the classification of verbs. The group of non-speech act verbs as 
opposed to speech act verbs can be divided into two: one is the group of 
act ion/ /motion/process verbs and the other is the group of psych-predicates. 
Action verbs are either transitive (e.g. John killed a rabbit; taking Agent and 
Theme, and other possible argument roles) or intransitive (e.g. Mary walked; 
taking Agent only). Motion/process verbs involve Theme but not Agent (e.g. 
Bill rolled down the hill unconsciously; Joe grew up) . 
The group of psych-predicates, on the other hand, can be divided into 
cognitive verbs and emotive/sensational predicates. Cognitive verbs, particu-
larly mental activity verbs, can occasionally be used as semi-performative (or 
even performative) verbs with the first person subject in present tense (e.g. 
believe, know; presume, assume, suppose; (classified by Austin as performa-
tives) conjecture, recognize, understand, don't mind, resent, am determined 
to, intend). Such a t t i tude predicates as regret, resent, strange might be called 
cognitive-emotive predicates. 
Emotive predicates again can be divided into active ones such as fear 
and its corresponding Korean verb musOwO-ha- and passive ones such as 
be surprised and its corresponding Korean intransitive verb nola- or Korean 
psych-adjective series corresponding to lonely, painful, sad, (home-)sick, have 
a (head-)ache, hatable, etc. Those psych-adjectives usually take Experiencer 
as Topic/subject and Nom(inative)-marked Theme (or Stimulus). But they 
cannot take the third or second person Experiencer in present tense. Look at 
the following: 
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(13)(a) na -nin ki yOnghwa -ka silphi - t a 
I Top the movie Nom sad Dec 
'To me, the movie is sad. ' 
(b) John -in ki yOnghwa -ka silphi -Os ' - ta 
P a s t 
'To John , the movie was sad.' 
(c) ??John -inki yOnghwa -ka silphi - t a 
'To John , the movie is sad.' 
(13c) is normally unacceptable because of a pragmatic factor; the speaker has 
no way of knowing the other's psychological s t a t e at speech t ime. The speaker 
alone knows his own psych-state at speech t ime and hence (13a). However, it 
is not an act nor a performative; it is simply a description of the speaker's own 
psych-state. In past tense, any person as Experiencer is all right; the speaker 
could already get access to informational evidence regarding someone else's 
psych-state to jus t i fy his utterance by the t ime of utterance, as in (13b). 
3. Performative disjuncts. Korean has a special adverbial ad junc t or rather a 
disjunct construction of 'V-stem + kOntae', which functions jus t like (semi-) 
performatives. 
(14)(a) phantan-ha 'judge', cimcak-ha- 'presume' , sangsang- ha- 'imagine', 
saengkak-ha- ' think', tor-a po- 'look back', hwaksin-ha- 'firmly be-
lieve', wOn-ha- 'wish', himang-ha- 'hope ' , para- 'want ' , chOng-ha-
'ask, request ' 
(b) yo(khOntae) 'summarising, in brief' 
ye(khOntae)2 'taking an example' 
It is interesting to see the above natural class of verbs take the performative-
like adverbial construction in Modern Korean, bu t in Middle Korean, far more 
types of verbs could take the same construction. The verbs of (14a) are transi-
tive verbs that take complement clauses but they can take neither any object 
complement clause nor the subject in the adverbial construction in question. 
The following S ei ther serves as an underlying object or is a consequence of 
the act of the preceding construction. The unrealized understood subject of 
the adverbial construction is necessarily the first person speaker. 
2
 Phonologically, -ha-kOntae becomes -khOntae obligatorily (vowel / а / deletes and as-
piration of / к / occurs) in these two examples. Furthermore, the verb forms yo-ha-, ye-ha- do 
not exist in Modern Korean . In (a), the phonological process of contraction (with aspiration) 
is preferable but not obligatory. 
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The disjunct formative -kOntae should be a (subordinate) conjunctive 
marker originally, even though underlyingly the construction constitutes a 
higher S of the following S, as its matr ix performative (cf. Lee 1973). It re-
sembles the present participial construction of English or other Indo-European 
but it does not always function as a performative (though it does in Frankly 
speaking, —', etc.) and typically its unrealized subject is same as t ha t of the 
following S. The disjunct may be more like the parentheticals of English such 
as I imagine, I suppose, I assume, I gather, I think, etc. or such a performative 
adverbial as presumably. Even in English, those constructions are limited to 
mental activity verbs tha t can function as (semi-)performatives. The -kOntae 
construction is followed by a normal sentence in Korean. It is used in a formal, 
grave style, as in a judge's decision document. 
Another such construction is the 'Vstem + noni' construction. This re-
quires a full performative like iri- ' tell ' , mut- 'ask ' , and myOng-ha- 'order'. 
This construction is syntactically different from the above in that it can take 
all other elements (subject, indirect object) of a performative sentence ex-
cept its complement clause. The original complement which now follows the 
disjunct construction surfaces as a main clause. Look at (15): 
(15) пае -ka nO -eke iri-noni, chOnkuk-i kak'aw-Os'-ninira 
I Nom you to tell Disj heaven Nom near Pas t Dec(grand) 
'I tell you that Heaven is at hand. ' 
This disjunct is not a subordinate but a superordinate clause in spirit. It is 
used in a grand(ious), imposing style as in the Bible. 
Differently from disjuncts, a copular construction functions like a perfor-
mative, sometimes, as in (16) below. Its null subject cataphorically refers to 
the following utterance of a sentence. 
(16)(a) myOngnyOng -i -ta. na -ka -га! 
order Сор Dec out go Imp 
'This is an order. Go out . ' 
(b) macimak chungko -i - ta . t'Ona-ci mal -ara. 
last advice Cop Dec leave Comp Neg+DO Imp 
'This is my last advice. Don ' t leave.' 
(c) tow -a eu -kes' -ta. yaksok -i - t a 
help give will Dec promise Cop Dec 
'I will help you. It is a promise. 
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In (16c), the copular construction follows the ut terance expressing intention. 
There must be correspondance between the construction of ' the name of an 
illocutionary act + Copula + Dec' and the following or preceding sentence: if 
an order, an imperative S; if a promise, an intention expression, and so on. 
As we have observed, various syntactic constructions other than a regular 
performative sentence are employed for the purpose of performative function 
in Korean. 
4. Illocutionary act types and sentential types. Let us consider now some as-
pects of the relation between different types of illocutionary acts and sentential 
types. One sentential type can serve different illocutionary acts and one type 
of illocutionary act can take different sentential types (cf. Lee 1973). As argued 
in Lee (1973), permission is not an assertion type, differently f rom Heringer's 
(1972) claim, even though it takes the declarative S form like You may leave, 
or ka-to coh-a 'It is all right even if you leave' in Korean. Heringer claims that 
it is an assertion type just as You are able to leave is. However, we can respond 
to the latter with That is true but not to the permission type, jus t as we can-
not say "yes" or "no" to the explicit performative of permission like I permit 
you to leave,3 Harnish (in the same conference) may not agree (see section 6). 
Deontically, obligation and permission are inter-related in the sense that 
the negation of one is equivalent to the other and both acts involve authority 
on the part of the Agent. So the permission-seeking modal expression can be 
used in (17a) but not in (17b) below. 
(17)(a) May I suggest that you run for the Presidency 
(b) ?? May I permit you to run for the Presidency 
(c) ?? May I order you to run for the Presidency 
The Agent of suggest does not need the pragmatic presupposition of his au-
thori ty but the Agent of permit does. In (17a), the modal expression shows 
the speaker's politeness to the hearer, giving the impression of leaving the op-
tion to the addressee and enabling the sentence to function as performative. 
In (17b, c), however, there occurs a conflict of presuppositions on authority 
in the speaker; s /he presupposes tha t s/he has the authority of the act of 
permission or order bu t , at the same time, s /he presupposes, by means of the 
modal expression, t ha t the addressee has the authori ty of giving permission 
Aust in (1962, 154) s ta tes that an excercitive such as permit is ' the giving of a decision 
in favor of or against a certain course of action, or advocasy of i t ' . He fu r the r states 'it is a 
decision tha t something is to be so, as dis t inct from a j u d g m e n t that it is so: it is advocasy 
tha t it should be so, as opposed to an es t imate that it is so. . .'. 
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for tha t (cf. Lee 1975). But authority is one-way or asymmetric in a single 
act of authority-requiring illocutionary act. Therefore, (17b) and (17c) cannot 
consti tute a permission and an order, respectively, while (17a) does constitute 
a suggestion. The modal expression of (17a) already lost its independent force 
of permission-seeking or question except its presupposition involved because 
of the force of the embedded performative. 
There are various expressions of promise in Korean and one form originat-
ing from intention (or futurity) expression came to serve as a promise marker, 
as in (18). 
(18)(a) t 'o о -1 k'O-ya 
again come will 
'(I) will come again.' 
(b) t 'o о -1-k'e 
Promise Marker 
'I promise to come again.' 
(18b) is a promise in the sense tha t it is used only in a promise context. The 
futuri ty/ intention marker is longer than the promise marker, which comes 
from the former by contraction historically. The shorter the form of futu-
rity/intention expression becomes, the more intensely does the speaker's in-
tention get expressed, so as to be bound as a promise (in (18), (b) may be 
accompanied by crossing baby-fingers as promise gesture but not (a), among 
children in Korea). It should be a reflection of iconicity in language. It is wit-
nessed in any language (see the deontic reading of (27) in English later). The 
most immediate, peremptory illocutionary act of order is expressed by a sin-
gle verb (and possibly a minimal element) in any language. Go! in English, ka 
(from ka-a, Vstem T S ending) in Korean, and Geh (Vstem) in German. 
Threatening, though involving intention, is different from promising in 
that the speaker believes that the hearer does not want, rather fears, the 
speaker's future act and that the speaker's performing a threat does not obli-
gate him to do the fu tu re act. It cannot be an act of contract. Threatening is 
not used as an explicit performative except in an embedded clause in a round-
about way of performing the act, as in I wish I wouldn't have to threaten you 
. . . Elocutionary acts adverse to the addressee are typically represented with 
the expression of inevitability of the act concerned on the part of the speaker, 
with such modal expressions as I must..., I have to..., followed by an ad-
verse performative. In Korean, a round-about implicature may be mobilized 
for a threatening act , as, for example, in wihyOp-iro til-li-l-ci morici-man... 
'This may sound like a threat , b u t . . . '. However, a straightforward expression, 
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such as one corresponding to I will kill you (completely), is frequently used. 
Threatening can constitute a perlocutionary act, on the other hand. It is not 
an institutionally well accepted formal illocutionary act and does not give a 
pleasant impression, even though it may not necessarily constitute a criminal 
act.4 It is something you want to avoid as an explicit matrix S performative 
expression, even when you are performing it. 
Typologically speaking, performatives as main clauses do not abound in 
Korean, probably not in any language, as already painted out on the first day 
of the conference. It occurs in an emphatic, bureaucratic, or fictional (as in a 
drama) situation. Instead of performatives, major mood indicators that show 
illocutionary forces regularly occur toward the end (verbal par t ) of a sentence 
in this SOV language. And even when those are reported, they regularly appear 
in the embedded complement sentences, as shown below: 
(19) Sue -nin [[Joe- ka ka-as' -ta] -ko] mal-ha -yOs' - t a 
Top Nom go Past Dec Comp say Past Dec 
'Sue said tha t Joe went.' 
(20) Sue -nin [[Joe -ka ka -as ' -ninya]- ko] mul -Os' - t a 
Top Nom go Past 0 Comp ask Past Dec 
'Sua asked whether Joe had gone.' 
(21) Sue -nin Joe -eke [[ ka -га] -ko] myOngnyOng-ha -yOs ' - ta 
Top to go Imp Comp order Past Dec 
'Sua ordered Joe to go.' 
(22) Sue -nin Joe -eke [[ ka -ca] -ko] ceeuy -ha -yOs' - t a 
Top to go Prpst Comp propose Past Dec 
'Sue suggested to Joe they go.' 
Typically, those declarative, interrogative, imperative and propositive mood 
markers show their corresponding illocutionary acts and they also appear in 
complement sentences when reported. And the reporting verbs correspond 
to the names of the illocutionary acts or performative verbs. Because the 
sentences from ( 19)-(22) are reported sentences, they are s tatements and end 
in the Dec(larative) mood marker. 
All the speech act verbs that can occur as reporting verbs can be replaced 
by the verb mal-ha 'say', and this possibility suggest that all the speech acts 
verbs can be covered by the same term mal-ha 'say' in Korean at least in re-
porting. As a mat te r of fact all the illocutionary act verbs must have originated 
4
 Mey in the conference rightly indicated tha t 'criminal ' varies from society to society. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
SPEECH A C T TERMS A N D M O O D I N D I C A T O R S (IN K O R E A N ) 1 3 5 
as reporting or quotation verbs. Because of the mood markers in embedding 
we can tell which illocutionary act is reported, even if we simply put the re-
port ing verb mal-ha 'say' in the mat r ix S. In o ther words, we can replace the 
matr ix V mul- 'ask ' by mal-ha- ' say ' in (20) above and so forth.5 This is not so 
tidy in Indo-European languages, though we can frequently tell from different 
syntactic forms (mainly complementizers). Consider: 
(23) John told Mary to go. (Imperative force) 
(24) *John said whether Mary had gone. 
Thus , in Korean, mood indicators and speech act verbs are closely inter-
related, and impor tant functional elements are placed toward the end of a 
sentence, differently from SOV languages like English. For instance, S-ending 
mood indicators together with speech-level addressee honorification show the 
speaker's illocutionary intent and different degrees of interpersonal honorifi-
cation in a straightforward way. However, in English, as in any other Indo-
European language, there is no linguistic way of independent addressee hon-
orification and tha t is why indirect speech act forms develop in Indo-European 
languages to show the speaker's a t t i tude toward the addressee. Those forms 
are interrogative forms or speaker-based modal expressions such as hypothet-
ical subjunctive mood, to take the form of giving an option or soften coercive 
or other illocutionary force involved. 
Even in Korean, change is taking place; speech levels are getting 
simplified—the pair of polite and familiar levels becoming far more predomi-
nant than the formal pair of deferential and plain levels. Then, what happened 
is t ha t the new predominant pair of levels came to develop various modality 
expressing variant forms. Thus, the basic -O(-yo) level expresses a categorical 
judgement (in Kuroda 's sense) of the speaker, and the S ender -ne , as an evi-
dential, shows the speaker's unexpected immediate finding. So ka-as'-O ' (he) 
went, is gone' can mean that the speaker found the fact earlier in the past, but 
ka-as'-ne 'I find right now that he 's gone' means tha t the fact is found imme-
diately at the t ime of speech, and the exclamatory S ender -kun(-a) usually 
shows expected or expectable finding. The quotative S endings -tae, -ninyae, 
-rae, -cae, coming f rom complex S's of embedding, express the speaker's re-
port of someone else's statement (-ta Dec), question (-ninya), order (-ra), and 
5
 However, the verb mal-ha- 'say' does not properly funct ion as per format ive even if it is 
used in the 1st person in present tense, when applied to quest ion, order, proposal , promise, 
etc., which are not s t a t emen t , because it lacks its respective illocutionary in tent , though it 
represents the part of saying in the i l locutionary act involved. 
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proposal (-ca), respectively. Cliticization occurs in each case (-tae f rom -ta -ko 
hae '(someone) says t ha t . . . Dec', and so forth). 
In English, the modal verb must is ambiguous between the deontic mean-
ing and the epistemic meaning, as in (25), but in Korean, two different con-
structions for the different meanings are employed, as in (26) below: 
(25) John must be at home. 
(26)(a) John -i thillim-Opsi cip-e is'-il-k'O-ya (epistemic) 
(b) John -in cip-e is ' -Oya(-man) ha-n -ta (deontic) 
(27) John mustn' t be at home, (deontic only) 
In (26a), the epistemic meaning is expressed by the Conjectural modal con-
struction plus an adverbial showing certainty. In (26b), the deontic meaning is 
expressed by the deontic modal construction consisting of the compositional 
meaning of 'all right only i f . . . '. The deontic modal construction wi th its bind-
ing force, is shorter than the epistemic one at least in negation in its contracted 
form as in (27). The meaning of deontic binding is more urgent to t he speaker 
and its form is shorter, reflecting iconicity as mentioned earlier. On the other 
hand, the epistemic meaning of may is translated into Korean like (24) below: 
(28) John -i о -1 -ci - to mori -n - t a 
Nom come Fut Dubitat Concessive not know Pres Dec 
' John may come.' 
The modal part of sentence (28) comes from Dubitat ive plus a main V ('not 
know') undergoing reanalysis in this case as a light predicate or an auxiliary. 
So it cannot take its own original subject , i.e., the 1st person, and it is almost 
limited to the present tense. 
5. Factivity. In English, modal inflection has developed well as modal aux-
iliaries but instead factivity distinctions in complement sentences are rather 
poor. In contrast, observe the fine factivity distinctions in Korean shown in 
(29)-(33). 
(29) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t 'Ona -n kOs] -il] kaethan-haes' - t a 
Top Nom leave Pas t Nmlzr Acc regretted Dec 
'Sue regretted t h a t Joe had lef t . ' 
(30) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t 'Ona -s ' - ta -nin kOs-il] ic -Os ' - t a 
Top Nom leave Pas t Dec Pren N Acc forgot Dec 
'Sue forgot tha t Joe had left . ' 
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(31) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t ' O n a -n kOs] -iro] al -n -ta 
Top Nom leave Past N Dir know Pres Dec 
'Sue believes Joe to have left. ' 
(32) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t ' O n a -s' -ta]] -ko saengkak -ha-n - ta 
Top Nom leave Past Dec Quot think Pres Dec' 
'Sue thinks that Joe had left. ' 
True inner factivity is marked in (29), as is the case with t h e higher cognitive-
emotive verb like regret; external factivity for publically known fact is marked 
in the complement with such cognitive verbs as forget, know, as in (30); the 
Korean V al- 'know' is ambiguous between factive and non-factive, depend-
ing on whether the embedded complement takes Acc or t he oblique case of 
direction, and (31) shows the latter non-factive case. If t h e verb al- 'know' 
is factive, it can be either of inner factivity or external factivity, depending 
on whether its complement clause takes a prenominal tense form before the 
Nominalizer kOs followed by Acc or a finite full clause fo rm + -nin- (<—ko 
ha-nin- 'say t h a t ' ) kOs followed by Acc as in (30), respectively. Thus factivity 
shows different degrees from strong to weak down to none, and all the differ-
ences are grammatically marked in Korean as shown. This feature of factivity 
presupposition is not well appreciated by the GB framework because it sticks 
to syntactic principles. 
An interesting phenomenon regarding the cognitive verbs al- 'know' and 
mori- 'not know', its negative form, is t h a t the former can be ambiguous 
between factive and non-factive as mentioned, and ambiguity can further be 
shown by the following dependent Nominal. Observe: 
(33)(a) na- nin [ai -ka t 'Ona -n cul- il] al - a s ' -ta 
I Top child Nom leave Past way Acc know Pas t Dec 
'I knew that the child had left.' 
(b) na- nin [ai -ka t ' O n a -n cul- lo] al -as ' -ta 
Dir 
'I thought that the child had left . ' 
This ambiguity is in parallel with (31), between kOs-il (Acc) and kOs-iro (Dir ) . 
However, in (31), when Acc replaces Dir and makes fact ive presupposition 
possible, even if the Acc marker is deleted, still factivity remains , and it cannot 
be taken as delation of Dir. Dir must be marked to be interpreted as non-
factive. However, in (33), if there is no marker af ter the dependent Nominal cul, 
there occurs an ambiguity between factive and non-factive. However, there is 
a disambiguating phonological cue: if there is no pause between the dependent 
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Comp N and the matrix V al- 'know' and a slight stress on the complement V, 
then the S is non-factive. On the contrary, if there is some pause between the 
dependent Comp N and the matrix V 'know' and a slight stress on the matr ix 
V, then the S is factive. In t he former, the complement V is focused, whereas 
in the latter, the matrix V 'know' is. But t he negative V form mori- 'not know' 
cannot take the non-factive creating Direction marker -(i)lo, as follows: 
(34) *Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t 'Ona -n cul/kOs] -iro] mol -as'-ta 
Top Nom leave P N Dir not know P Dec 
'Sue didn ' t believe (know) Joe to have left.' 
The V mori- 'not know ' can only take Acc in the complement as a pure 
factive verb, whereas al-ci mot-ha- ' not able to know' (V-f-Neg) can take 
Dir, gaining the sense of weak factive presupposition th is time. Because of the 
presupposition of mot-ha- 'unable to' cul/kOs-iro al-ci mot-ha comes to gain 
factive presupposition even with the Dir marker, meaning 'unable to reach the 
s ta te of knowing . . . , ( thinking some other way)'. (If t he ability Neg mot-ha-
is replaced by the neutral Neg an-ha-, the gained factivity disappears.) If Dir 
is replaced by Acc in this context, the construction comes to be purely factive, 
meaning 'unable to know t h e fact t h a t . . . ' . Factive presupposition is primarily 
due to the mat r ix verb and is marked in the complement by case (Acc), but 
the same cognitive verb can be non-factive by taking an oblique Dir case in 
the complement. The lexical negative ability cognitive verb behaves only as 
factive but the syntactic version with Dir also behaves so. 
Even in English, only non-factive predicates allow the matrix Acc plus 
infinitive construction as follows (cf. Kiparsky-Kiparsky 1971): 
(35)(a) I believe Mary t o be the one who did it. 
(b) *I resent Mary t o be the one who did it. 
In (35a), to originally mean t direction and it implies not reaching or touching 
the goal in the mind, whereas factive presupposition requires some fact 's touch-
ing the mind. That is why t h e to-infinitive cannot be used for cognitive-emotive 
factive verbs such as resent, regret, etc. (know is slightly weaker in factivity, 
allowing a to-infinitive, as in I knew him to be a fool.). We can conclude from 
the above discussion tha t surface syntactic phenomena are semantically and 
pragmatically motivated. 
6. Residual discussion. As already argued, illocutionary acts are acts and they 
are positive. Potentially negative illocutionary acts t end to have negation in 
their complements. Otherwise, negation is lexicalized and the verb can behave 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
S P E E C H A C T T E R M S A N D M O O D I N D I C A T O R S (IN K O R E A N ) 1 3 9 
like a positive action verb as a performative (e.g., disagree, so I don't disagree 
is not a performative, and neither is I don't object). These lexicalized verbs 
are not subject to negative polarity phenomenon (for instance, *I disagree 
at all but I also disagree.) differently from syntactic negative constructions 
(cf. I don't agree either.). I agree is used as a performative when the issue in 
question is specific and the response is counted as voting or something like tha t 
as an instantaneous act. Therefore, its negation I don't agree is exceptionally 
felt by many people as at least an 'implicit' performative (in Austin's sense 
when he calls an imperative S an 'implicit performative' of the illocutionary 
act of order) in tha t kind of particular context, as if it were a positive act of 
disagreement or objection.6 The reaction must be just like "yes" or "no", so 
I don't agree is felt to be the contradiction ra ther than any contrariness of 
its affirmative counterpart , as indicated also by Fretheim in the conference. 
As a matter of fact , I don't agree in the sense concerned corresponds to a 
denial of agreement, and, according to Barwise-Etchemendy (1987), a 'denial', 
differently from 'negation' , 'rejects some claim tha t has already been raised'. 
In the case of I agree or I don't agree, the issue should not be broad or general 
so as to be cumulative (like I (don't) agree on any points whatsoever), habitual 
(like I agree all the time, or futuristic, to be interpreted as a performative or 
an implicit performative,7 otherwise it becomes the (objective) description of 
the mental state of the speaker (for instance, as an answer to Do you agree 
with what the President said on television?8). Likewise I don't agree in the 
performative sense if any is equivalent to I do the instantaneous act of causing 
you to see that I have a different opinion. In that sense, illocutionary acts as 
acts can be said to be positive, in any case. 
As for the thesis proposed by Harnish in the conference tha t 'performa-
tives are also constatives', he is raising a very important and old philosophical 
issue but he is not distinguishing between performative acts as acts performed 
instantaneously, i.e., synchronously with saying the performatives or "imme-
diately" (in Récanati 's sense) on one hand and constatives as representations 
(descriptions or reports) of states of affairs independent of the utterances on 
the other. 
6
 Some non-typical performative forms are witnessed such as passive performatives like 
You are dismissed, and All passengers are requested to proceed to gate ten, or embedded 
performatives as already exemplified. 
Y 
If performativi ty is defined too broadly, as seemingly done by Pocheptsov in the con-
ference, then it can hardly be distinguished from illocution. g 
As Hadland suggested in personal communication. 
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Performative verbs are uttered in present tense, but not in the habitual 
or progressive aspects of the tense. As soon as performative verbs are inter-
preted in those aspects, they become constative verbs. So, if someone says 
"Are you really (or t ruly) promising?" he is constating a (progressive) state 
of performing a promise, exploiting the momentary performative act as if it 
had some duration. Also, when I say "I promise to be there", if the hearer 
can say "Is that t rue?" and I say "That ' s t rue", then that should refer to 
the finished promising utterance. Bach-Harnish (1979) crucially exploit the 
progressive aspect of the performative verb for their argument for applying 
' t ru th ' t o performatives, but the progressive aspect is for constatives from the 
beginning and their reasoning process makes a false start . Furthermore, as 
admit ted by everyone, performative or illocutionary acts involve social, insti-
tutional or presuppositional appropriateness conditions, not t ru th conditions. 
Those appropriateness conditions are not necessarily part of the performative 
expressions concerned, whereas Snow is white is t rue iff snow is white. If I 
order you to leave as performative and Leave! as imperative have the same 
illocutionary force, and if the former can be true as a constative because it 
is an ut terance associated with ordering, then the imperative sentence can 
also be t rue as a constative because it is an ut terance associated with the 
addressee's leaving. If this reasoning could be correct, then all the varieties 
of truth-conditional semantics and logic could have treated all the types of 
sentences such as imperative, interrogative and propositive plus performatives 
from the beginning. But we could t ry any kind of truly justifiable innovation, 
and one can be easily tempted to make generalizations between performatives 
and constatives on the basis of their common declarative sentence form and 
common verb form. 
Lastly, Verschueren (1989, also in the conference) argues tha t question 
(asking) is more basic than request cross-linguistically. It is an interesting point 
of view, but I view request as a subtype of the illocutionary act of IMPEREing 
(imposition). Its another subtype is order or command. Therefore, a request 
can be realized even in English in a polite imperative form such as Please 
come to me. And in Korean, request and order are distinguished merely by 
honorific speech level sentence ending differences (Deferential/Polite vs. Non-
deferential/Non-polite). Another dimension of difference is the pragmatic pre-
supposition of 'authority ' ; an order needs it but not a request. Furthermore, a 
request by means of an interrogative sentence type is an indirect speech act. 
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Even in acquisition, a one-word imperative (N or V) comes far earlier than an 
interrogative type. The latter is more information-related, whereas the former 
more action-related. The whole issue might turn out to be a basic mat ter of 
how to use the term 'basic'. 
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CHECKLIST FOR VERBS OF SPEAKING* 
ADRIENNE L E H R E R 
Preliminaries remarks 
My long-term goal is to compare lexical systems in na tu ra l languages, bas-
ing my hypotheses on many long-held assumptions, as well as a few recent 
ones: (1) Languages have equivalent expressive powers, bu t (2) they may lex-
icalize concepts somewhat differently. A single word in one language may be 
expressible as a phrase in another . (3) However, there are universal pa t t e rns of 
lexicalization across languages—the kinds of parameters and semantic notions 
tha t get lexicalized do not vary wildly across languages. On the last point , 
the works of Berlin and Kay on basic t e rms , Rosch on prototypes, and oth-
ers following them have been influential. Earlier work t h a t I did on cooking 
terminology applied these assumptions to a relatively small and manageable 
domain, and this paper applies these notions to a much larger and more com-
plex semantic domain. Verbs of speaking consti tute an interesting set, because 
the number of lexemes varies so enormously across languages. Whereas English 
and other Indo-European languages have hundreds of verbs, other languages, 
such as Navajo and O'odham, are reported to have only a few. However, the 
languages are probably comparable in expressive power, since the information 
which is incorporated into English lexemes can be stated syntagmatically in 
these languages. For example, the Navajo word for whisper can be t ranslated 
as 
(1) Bijeeyi'ji'dah diniish'ánii' " " bidiiniid 
his-ears-into I-put-my-head I-told-him 
t'aa hazhó'ógo 
very softly 
'Putt ing my head to his ear I told him very softly " . . . " ' 
* I wish to t h a n k Keith Lehrer, Diane Meador, Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn, Paul Saka, and 
par t ic ipants at the Conference on Metapragmatic T e r m s for their helpful comments. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
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My study is also influenced by Talmy's work on verbs of motion (1985), in 
which he compares different languages with respect to the patterns of informa-
tion that get incorporated in to lexical i tems. For example, English frequently 
incorporates manner of motion, Spanish typically incorporates paths, and At-
sugewi, an Amerindian language, incorporates themes. Talmy stresses t he fact 
tha t it is necessary to examine characteristic patterns of lexemes to arrive at 
a satisfactory typology; therefore, one must examine a large number of i tems, 
not just a few, in order to find the significant generalizations. 
The beginning of my s tudy is for English verbs, although the current 
work can be looked at more as a wishlist of things to investigate; hence, the 
results below are very preliminary. In recent years many significant studies 
have appeared, and I have drawn freely f rom these. Different investigators 
have been interested in different aspects of such verbs, and one of my goals is 
to try to pull together various threads of th is research. Some of the studies have 
been concerned mainly with syntax, and not necessarily the syntax of verba 
dicendi (hereafter, VD). W h a t I have wanted to do is collect data on various 
syntactic and semantic properties of VD and see which properties correlate 
with and predict other properties. 
One reason for looking carefully at t he syntax, even though my ul t imate 
goal is lexical meaning, is t h a t it is a good working hypothesis to suppose tha t 
syntax and semantics are correlated and t h a t syntactic f rames provide clues to 
lexical meaning. (See Wierzbicka 1988; Pinker 1989). Of course, one m u s t be 
careful to avoid circularity—of arguing t h a t the semantics must be such and 
such since the distribution is as it is. In o ther words, there must be some inde-
pendent semantic evidence in addition to syntactic evidence. Even if syntactic 
and semantic correlations can be found, the direction of influence is open to 
theoretical decision. Does syntax determine semantics? Does semantic deter-
mine syntax? Are they mutual ly influential? Are both reflections of something 
else? Do different verbs a n d / o r classes of verbs require different explanations? 
Another reason for looking carefully a t the syntax and semantics involves 
learnability considerations. Each verb involves many semantic and syntactic 
facts. For the language learner to acquire all these facts for several hundred 
verbs is a formidable task. If verbs fall into classes t ha t share clusters of se-
mantic and syntactic properties, then knowing a few things about a verb will 
enable the learner to predict the rest. Moreover, it begins to explain how 
and why speakers have judgments about novel uses. (See Pinker 1989, for an 
extensive discussion on this point.) 
My da ta base is around 400 VD in English, and it includes related items, 
such as verbs of thinking, verbs that are primarily derived from other semantic 
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domains but which are metaphorically used as VD, and a few verbs which are 
not really VD at all but which are used in direct speech, such as blush, in 
"Please don't", she blushed. 
One of the methodological problems is that t he judgments of acceptability 
are very subtle, and intuitions are not to be t rus ted. Since each word has 
multiple senses, a different sense may be involved in each person's judgment 
or in one's judgment at different times. In some cases it may be possible to use 
large corpora to supplement intuitions, a task t h a t future work will address. 
The checklist 
The checklist consists of semantic and syntactic properties of verbs of speak-
ing, and the goal is to look for those properties which are correlated with each 
other—to see which properties are predictors of other properties, and to see 
what the clusters of properties might be. What are there semantic properties 
that predict syntactic properties (or vice versa)? Included in the checklist a re 
the following: Does the verb introduce direct or indirect discourse? Is the verb 
intransitive, transitive, or ditransitive? What kinds of prepositional comple-
ments and adjuncts occur? Wha t kinds of clausal complements are possible? 
Are there the differences if the matr ix clause is negative? W h a t illocution-
ary speech act does the verb express? Are there asymmetries in the verbal 
paradigm? Is the verb factive? Is it performative? In addition, a few other 
syntactic properties have been examined that are not confined to VD, such 
as extraction from subject position. However, these verbs provide a corpus for 
testing various hypotheses that syntactic theories have made. Given the large 
number of possibilities, correlations were sought only where there was some 
reason to suspect a connection. In some cases, a correlation was hypothesized 
but not found, and these will not be discussed. 
English verbs of speaking 
Verbs that introduce direct speech1 
One of the intriguing puzzles is what semantic factors might determine whether 
a verbs can take a direct speech complement. Since most verbs allow direct 
1
 As recently as Aronoff (1985, 50) wrote, "one cons t ruc t ion . . . which has received l i t t l e 
a t tent ion from modern syntax is direct discourse. I do not know why so l i t t le attention has 
been paid to this construct ion, since it is so common. . . " . Banfield (1973) is mentioned as 
an exception. This si tuation has changed radically, as can be seen from the references. 
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speech complements, it may be more profitable to look at those verbs that do 
not appear in direct speech. Some verbs, e.g., deny and dissuade, incorporate 
a negative element which means 'say not ' , and there is therefore a semantic 
clash. For example, consider (2): 
(2) *"I a m not a crook," denied Nixon. 
Deny reverses the polarity of the proposition, not the ut terrance express-
ing it. Notice that (2) does not improve if the not is omitted, since then the 
sentence violates the requirement t ha t a direct quote reflect what was (or could 
have been) said. 
In general, verbs t h a t incorporate a negative resist direct speech comple-
ments (cancel, veto, acquit, renounce, forbid, decline, reject), but syntax may 
play a role (see below). 
Verbs that name conventional (in the sense of Bach-Harnish 1979) or 
institutional illocutionary acts do not fit well into direct speech pa t te rn : 
(3) *"You are Mary Louise," baptized (christened) the minister. 
(4) * " T h e defendant is innocent," acquitted the jury. 
(5) * " T h e meeting is over," adjourned the chairman. 
For these performatives, one can appeal to the argument structure of the verbs 
by saying they do not permit clausal direct objects, but that only pushes the 
question back further. A speculation here is that words spoken are formulaic 
or routine and therefore there is no need to present t hem in direct speech. This 
is even clearer in cases where the verb simply repeats the formula, resulting 
in redundancy. 
(6) * "Congratulations," she congratulated (him). 
(7) *"I forgive you," he forgave (her) . 
Another class of verbs that resist being used to introduce direct speech 
are those that refer t o interactional speech activities, e.g., debate, consult, 
chat, conspire, discuss, contract, negotiate, gossip, converse. These focus on 
participation in an activity rather t h a n on content. For these verbs, argument 
structure provides a more plausible explanation, since many of them are in-
transitive, and it is reasonable to t rea t the theme ( the quotation) as the direct 
object.2 If the verb is transitive but t he theme is not the direct object , direct 
speech is awkward at bes t . 
T h o u g h this view is plausible, it is not uncontroversial. See Monroe (1982). 
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(8) ?*"Ladies and Gentlemen," he addressed the audience. 
(9) ?* "You're so beautiful," he flattered (her). 
One interesting problem has to do with the verbs that are not VD at all 
but which are used, at least in literature, to mark direct speech, such as blush, 
laugh, pout, as illustrated in (10) and (11): 
(10) "You're too kind," she blushed. 
(11) "I hate you," he pouted. 
One might suppose that such verbs can be used for actions or responses tha t 
can accompany speaking, but surely this is not correct. One can speak while 
eating, reading, watching, etc., but such verbs cannot mark direct speech: 
(12) * "Look at tha t bird!" she watched. 
(13) *"I like this bread," he ate. 
Some of the allowable verbs can be treated as manner of speaking verbs, 
such as laugh and giggle; others, meaning 'speak while blushing' or 'speak 
while pouting' suggest that the response itself is communicative (although not 
necessarily intentionally so). 
Moreover, the possibility of non-VD being pushed into the category of 
VD is open and depends on finding a plausible context. Consider the following 
dialogue between a husband and wife over breakfast. 
(14) "Good morning," she says happily. 
He grunts, picks up the newspaper, and takes a bite 
from his toas t . 
"Did you sleep well?" she asks cheerfully. 
He continues chewing on his toast. 
"What 's the matter? Are you angry with me?" she 
queries. 
He remains silent and continues chewing on his toast. 
"Please say something!" she pleads. 
"Shut up!" he chews. 
In this example, chew can be viewed as a communicative act . Although some 
may find it marginal, it is possible in a literary text , since such texts frequently 
use innovative expressions. 
Bare fact correlations: 1) Manner of speaking verbs ( whisper, shout, lisp) 
all permit direct speech complements. 2) In general, verbs that permit exclam-
atory complements are found with direct speech. 
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(15) (a) He stressed what a fool John is. 
(b) "What a fool John is," he stressed. 
There are differences between sentences in which the VD precede the 
quotation and those in which it follows. This remains to be investigated. (See 
Reinhart 1975.) 
Verbs that introduce indirect speech 
Turning now to indirect speech, the first problem is to specify what to include 
(and exclude). The tradit ional narrow definition is tha t indirect speech in 
English is introduced by the complementizer that (which can sometimes be 
omitted), and furthermore, in indirect speech there are deictic shifts of person, 
tense, and time and place adverbials. Since indirect speech has been narrowly 
defined as requiring a possible that complementizer, any verb that does not fit 
into the f rame is necessarily out, for example directives, which tend to require 
different kinds of complement constructions. Traditionally, indirect speech is 
thought of as a fairly mechanical transformation (this term is not intended 
technically), where (16) might be reported by (17): 
(16) Bill says to Mary: "I like reading novels." 
(17) Mary reports to someone else: "Bill says that he likes 
reading novels." 
However, reported speech can also consist of a paraphrase, with the reporter 's 
views added as well, and if we broaden our conception of indirect speech to 
include sentences tha t take complementizers other than that, a much wider 
range of possibilities exists, as shown in (18) and (19): 
(18) (a) Bill says to Mary: "Bring me my slippers." 
(b) Mary reports to someone else: "Bill told me to bring 
him his slippers." 
(19) (a) A to B: " W h a t are you going to do?" 
(b) В reports: "A asked me what I was going to do." 
A criterion which permits any kind of paraphrase is probably too broad, since 
it allows (21) to count as an indirect speech report of (20). 
(20) Priest: "I baptize you Mary Louise." 
(21) The priest baptized the baby. 
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Sentence (20) could be ruled out as a base for indirect speech on other grounds, 
however. Indirect speech verbs require, as Banfield (1973) pointed out in her 
seminal article, tha t the message be a proposition, so t ha t (22) would be 
ungrammatical: 
(22) *He said t h a t ugh! 
Therefore, the criterion for indirect speech should be expanded to include at 
least clauses introduced by whether and probably clauses introduced by for-to 
and to as well. This characterization permits (18b) to be included. The syntax 
and semantics of indirect discourse awaits fu r the r study. However, some t rends 
concerning the correlation of complementizer types and illocutionary acts and 
the interaction of complementizers and negation are discussed below. 
Complementizers, illocutionary acts, and negation 
There is a rough correlation between the complement construction of the 
embedded clause and the kind of illocutionary act denoted by the VD 
(Searle 1976; Kiparsky-Kiparsky 1970; Wierzbicka 1988; and others.) 
In general, that clauses are associated wi th knowledge and assertions, to 
correlates with directives, and for-to constructions are found with "weak di-
rectives", like plead.3 Finally, some verbs, for example, those denoting manner 
of speaking, means of communicating, and a few others, embed several or all 
complement types. 
That clauses are indeed highly correlated with assertions, and conversely, 
most verbs of assertion allow that complements. A small class of assertives t h a t 
disallow that complements are judgmental verbs, such as denounce, acclaim, 
admonish, and credit, which presuppose a fact or event and assert a judgment . 
Another syntactic property to look at involves the distribution of comple-
mentizers in the sentences with and without negative main verbs. Traditional 
accounts of verb complements and complementizers assume tha t there should 
be no difference. In the case of verbs taking that, to, and for-to, such is the 
case. Any verb t h a t permits that in main clauses without a negative, also 
permits that when negated: 
(23) (a) I told him that I was happy. 
(b) I didn' t tell him tha t I was happy. 
Similar pairs of sentences can be constructed for to and for-to complements. 
о 
Gerundive complements will be discussed in f u t u r e work. 
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Such is not, the case with whether. Radford (1988) noticed t ha t some 
verbs allow whether to appear when the main clause verb is negated, bu t not 
otherwise, as in 
(24) (a) He didn't assert whether he would leave, 
(b) *He asserted whether he would leave. 
(25) (a) She did not admit whether she stole the money, 
(b) *She admitted whether she stole the money. 
To be t te r understand what is going on, we must look at the meaning of 
whether. Since whether introduces alternatives, the meaning of the matrix 
verb should involve some sort of choice. This explains the use of whether in 
embedded yes-no questions, as in (26): 
(26) He asked whether it would snow. 
This observation also explains the selection of whether complements wi th in-
teractional verbs like debate and discuss: 
(27) We debated whether we should buy a new car. 
(28) We disputed (about) whether we should go. 
The semantics here is fairly clear, in t ha t alternatives are being considered. 
In (27) and (28), one can intuitively see how the negative sentences provide 
alternatives. (25a) can be paraphrased as 'either she stole the money or she did 
not, but she did not say which of these alternatives is t rue . ' In (25b), however, 
only one proposition is being entertained—'that she stole the money'. It seems 
that the pr imary verbs t ha t behave this way are assertives; however, not all 
assertives allow whether when the VD are negatives, as in (29): 
(29) (a) *He didn't concede whether he lost the race, 
(b) *She didn't claim whether the argument was 
convincing. 
This topic clearly needs more work along the lines of a finely-grained semantic 
analysis. 
The syntax of to and for-to constructions interacts with control. In to 
constructions, (which are not to be interpreted as 'in order to', the implicit 
subject ( P R O in GB) is coreferential with the object of the mat r ix verb if 
there is one, with a few marked exceptions, like promise. In (30), it is Sally 
which is the understood subject of move. 
(30) Bill ordered Sally to move over. 
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If there is no direct object, the understood subject is generally coreferential 
with the matrix subject , as in (31) although cases of "arbitrary" control can 
be found, as in (32). 
(31) Norman begged to leave. (Norman is the leaver.) 
(32) Norman said to leave. (Leaver(s) unspecified.) 
In the case of for-to constructions the subject of the embedded clause is spec-
ified and is usually different from either the subject or object4 in the matrix 
clauses, possibly for pragmatic reasons. 
(33) (a) ?I nagged John for John to go. 
(b) ?I nagged (John) for me/myself to go. 
As for the correlation of illocutionary act and complement type, to cor-
relates highly with directives. This is to be expected, as Wierzbicka's analysis 
of to would predict, since to is associated with wanting—and a directive is an 
expression in which the speaker want the addressee to do something. A small 
class of directives tha t disallow to incorporate a negative: forbid, prohibit, 
dissuade, and, cancel. 
For-to constructions among the VD are rather limited, and they cluster 
around 1) requests—directives in which the speaker is in a weak position, and 
2) business deals. Examples are beg, nag, plead, intercede, appeal, apply, bid, 
negotiate, contract, and advertise. 
At least two VD classes plus assorted other individual verbs select that, 
and either to от for-to complements, (and sometimes both) . The two classes are 
manner of speaking verbs (scream, shout,) and means verbs (cable, telephone). 
Among the others are suggest, hint, advertise, plead, argue, decide, propose, 
and say. 
(34) (a) He screamed/telephoned that the house was on fire, 
(b) He screamed/telephoned for someone to help him. 
Although one could propose double or triple lexical items, it is more 
efficient to establish a single verb meaning and let the syntactic construction 
itself supply the relevant illocutionary force. (See Wierzbicka 1988; Ruhl 1989.) 
4
 Very few verbs t ha t allow or require internal dative ob jec t s are found with the for-to 
construct ion. 
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Truth properties and presuppositions 
Two items on the checklist are t r u t h properties and presuppositions. To test 
for whether the VD is one in which t ru th is relevant, a frame with the adverbs 
correctly or accurately was used.5 T h e prediction is that these adverbs should 
only be acceptable with assertions or with VD tha t can be used as statements, 
like broadcast. Syntactically, the VD that allow t ru th modifiers should also 
allow that complementizers, a correlation that holds up very well. However, 
one interesting class of exceptions emerged. Manner of speaking verbs sound 
rather bizarre with accurately, even when they are statements. 
(35) (a) ?He babbled accurately tha t the sun is very hot. 
(b) ?He lisped correctly t h a t 3 + 3 = 6. 
Apparently, the kind of information tha t manner of speaking verbs incorporate 
is somewhat incompatible with t r u t h properties. Verbs either incorporate a 
manner or an illocutionary force. It is probably not the case tha t incorporating 
both constitutes a cognitive overload or that the two semantically clash. The 
explanation may be pragmatic—that a speaker focuses on only one of these 
notions. It is analogous to the fact English syntax only allows a speaker to 
topicalize one constituent. (See Pinker 1989, 204.) 
A class of verbs, lie, fib, and their synonyms and hyponyms entail the 
falsity of the statements. 
Some of the classic work on presupposition and factivity has predicted 
that VD should not pass any of the tests for factivity; or in Kartunnen's 
terminology (1971), VD should be presuppositional plugs and not allow pre-
suppositions to remain. Although most VD behave this way, a major class of 
exceptions are verbs of judging/excuse, apologize, blame, forgive, criticize), 
which, according to Fillmore's analysis (1971), can be decomposed into two 
parts : components tha t are asserted and components that are presupposed. 
(36) I didn't apologize to him for kicking him 
presupposes that I kicked him. 
A small number of other verbs also act like factives: divulge, disclose, 
reveal, prove, verify, and attack, plus a few marginal cases like add, acknowl-
edge, remember, recollect, and emphasize. Divulge, disclose, and reveal involve 
knowledge on the speaker's par t , and like other verbs of knowledge, e.g. know, 
5
 Correctly can also be used with judgmenta l verbs, such as advise, bu t the meaning 
is t h a t the advice is good, rather than t rue. With interactional verbs, like apologize, the 
adverbs show that the act meets expected social s tandards . These uses are ignored. 
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comprehend, and prove (which are not VD), they exhibit factive properties. 
For these verbs, adding accurately or correctly sounds redundant . Remember, 
recollect, point out, notice, observe, and possibly others are not necessarily 
VD, but they are commonly used in direct and free indirect speech. Attack is 
a verb of judging and can be handled with the other such verbs as analyzed by 
Fillmore (1971). Finally, refute and inform carry a strong presumption of fac-
tivity: refute strongly implies tha t the refuted statement is false, and inform 
strongly implies tha t the information presented is correct. 
Prepositional complements and adjuncts and transitivity 
Drawing the line between complements and adjuncts is harder than one might 
suppose, as Jackendoff (1990) points out. However, for the purposes at hand, it 
may not be important , since the concern is with what can or cannot co-occur 
with the VD. The possible complements and adjuncts are intimately tied up 
with issues of transitivity. The analyst, however, has the option of deciding 
whether transitivity is a given which can be used to explain other phenomena 
or whether the transitivity of a verb is itself something to be accounted for . 
Among the VD are verbs tha t are always intransitive (consent), those 
that may be intransitive or transitive (lament), and those t ha t are optionally 
ditransitive (tell). Among the transitive and ditransitive verbs, either the goal 
(the addressee) or the theme (the message) is designated as the direct object , 
where the other the ta role is expressed as a prepositional phrase. To expresses 
the goal and about or of express the theme. (Dative alternations are discussed 
below). 
About . One might expect most VD to permit about phrases, since people 
talk about things.6 However, less than half the VD take about. Among those 
that do are intransitives and optional transitives; some of the relevant semantic 
classes so far identified are manner of speaking verbs: babble about, boast about, 
whisper about; and group interaction verbs, such as chat about, argue about, 
converse about, conspire about. One observation suggesting t ha t the semantic 
class may determine the syntax is tha t I have heard speakers use the expression 
"discuss about" , even though discuss is s tandardly transitive, but it denotes 
group interaction. 
With . Of the many meanings of with, the one I am concerned with is t h a t 
of interaction—doing something interactive with other people. This is quite a 
small class and includes chat, discuss, converse, argue, agree, conspire, debate, 
6
 The about phrase under discussion is a verb ad junc t , not a post-nominal modifier. In 
I gave the news about John to the press, the about phrase is a nominal ad junc t . 
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and a few others. Other VD can be forced to accept with by imposing a group 
interpretation on verbs t h a t normally denote individual actions: 
(37) ?He complained with me to the management. 
It is interesting to note t h a t any intransitive verb tha t permits a with phrase 
also permits an about phrase (but not necessarily the converse.) 
Charge, threaten, and possibly intercede allow another sense of with, which 
may be a reflex of an earlier meaning, 'against ' : 
(38) The court charged the defendant wi th theft. 
For. The benefactive for can occur with about half of the verbs, although 
I find my judgments here quite unreliable. Since for phrases are adjuncts , they 
should appear freely wherever their meaning is compatible with tha t of the 
verbs, as in (39) and (40). 
(39) I beseech you for the sake of my family not to reveal 
my secret. 
(40) Let me explain it again for you. 
Datives: internal datives, to, and alternations 
Dative constructions and dative alternations have been much studied (by 
Green 1974; Oehrle 1975; Wierzbicka 1986; Pinker 1989; Jackendoff 1990; and 
many others). The problem is to try to find an explanation or a set of predictors 
or at least anything be t te r than just a list that will predict the distribution. 
Some verbs permit only internal datives (convince, forbid, challenge), others 
permit only to datives (explain, assert, advertise), while other allow both con-
structions (tell, cable, convey). Wierzbicka (1986) claims that the syntactic 
distribution can be accounted for by the meanings. However, there is a prob-
lem of circularity, since it seems to be the distribution which provides the clues 
to the meaning. 
In general, when looking at internal and external datives, it seems 
necessary to divide verbs into various subclasses, a practice followed by 
Green (1974), who argues that communication verbs exhibit great syntactic 
diversity, and also Wierzbicka (1985), who in fact argues for an abstract unity 
as well. There is psycholinguistic evidence in acquisition studies for a num-
ber of subclasses in tha t children apparently do not t reat all verbs tha t take 
double objects as a uniform class but rather subdivide them into narrow se-
mantic classes (Gropen et al. 1989; Pinker 1989). Pinker 's hypothesis is that 
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syntactic alternation patterns affect narrow classes of items. Narrow classes 
can be determined by phonological, morphological, or semantic criteria or by 
an combination of these. 
Morphological constraints can be seen among the VD. In general, Latinate 
words with prefixes where the stress does not fall on the first syllable do not 
allow internal datives (Oehrle 1975; Pinker 1989).7 
(41) (a) He reported/explained the facts to me. 
(b) *He reported/explained me the facts. 
In the cases where the both the internal dative and the prepositional dative 
are permit ted, the double object carries with it the connotation of success 
(Green 1974; Oehrle 1975; Wierzbicka 1986). 
(42) (a) He cabled me the news, 
(b) He cabled the news to me. 
(43) (a) He told me the story about Joe's accident, 
(b) He told the story about Joe's accident to me. 
The (a) sentences are more likely to suggest success than the (b) sentences. 
The most apparent narrow classes among the VD are the means verbs 
(telephone, cable, radio) which permit both syntactic forms and manner of 
speaker verbs which resist internal datives, with some items being worse than 
others. 
(44) (a) He shouted/whispered/yelled the message to me. 
(b) *He shouted/whispered/yelled me the message. 
Another narrow class identified by Pinker is verbs in which a future com-
mitment is made: offer, guarantee, pledge, grant, promise among the VD as 
well as other verbs, many of which violate the morphological rule stated above: 
refer, allot, assign, advance, award, grant. 
In general, directives (requests, orders, advice, suggestions) allow or re-
quire an internal dative and do not permit io+NP, e.g. caution, direct, counsel, 
beseech, ask, etc. 
(45) (a) I cautioned (directed, entreated) him to pay me. 
(b) *I cautioned (advised) ( the warning) to him. 
There are some exceptions, however, pointed out by Dick Oehrle, such as assign. 
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Pinker's hypothesis (1989) of narrow classes is very promising and a cur-
sory study of the VD seems to be compatible with it. However, careful se-
mant ic sorting needs to be done independently of the syntactic distribution. 
Circularity is a difficult problem to avoid, and even some of very best analysts 
occasionally slip in to it. 
Asymmetries in the person paradigm 
There are three small classes of VD in which there are subtle differences be-
tween the first person and other persons in the person paradigm. One class 
consists of claim, allege, and in some cases say (especially if stressed). Com-
pare (46) and (47). 
(46) He claims tha t X's theory is the best one. 
(47) I claim tha t X's theory is the best one. 
In (46) there is an implicature tha t the speaker is withholding approval of the 
proposition, which is not the case in (47). However, the asymmetry may be 
only apparent, and Wierzbicka's account (1987) explains why. The verb claim 
puts forth some controversial issue, something tha t others might be expected 
to challenge. In the case of first person sentences, e.g., (47), the speaker admits 
t h a t the proposition is controversial; in third person sentences, the speaker is 
implying his or her own challenge. 
A second class of asymmetries include manner of speaking verbs which 
denote a negatively evaluated manner: growl, grumble, babble, chatter, etc.8 
(48) He chattered/babbled about the war. 
(49) ?I chattered/babbled about the war. 
T h e explanation in these cases is strictly pragmatic. Speakers are not likely to 
describe their speech acts negatively. The phenomena are exactly analogous 
to those of lurk, discussed in the 1960s and 1970s transformational literature 
(see Harnish 1975). 
The third class involves those VD that can serve a performatives, such as 
bet, guess, advise, declare, recommend, etc. as in (50): 
(50) I recommend that you invest in the stock market 
Q 
A few other verba dicendi t ha t carry a negative evaluation can be included here, for 
example , conspire. 
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where the sentence can count as a recommendation. Wi th a different person 
(or a different tense), (50) would simply be a statement.9 Extensive accounts 
of the syntax and semantics of such constructions can be found in Austin 
(1962), Searle (1969), and Fraser (1971). A wide variety of illocutionary act 
types can be used as performatives, including a large number tha t are involved 
in formal procedures and institutional practices: summon, authorize, certify, 
adjourn, resign, sentence, baptize, nominate, second, and many more. 
Other properties of verba dicendi 
Some of the syntactic distributions that are included in my checklist are not 
particular to VD, since they occur with other kinds of verbs as well. However, 
the VD may serve as a useful corpus for test ing the predictions made. For 
example, Erteschik-Shir-Lappin (1979) have predicted t h a t extraction f rom 
subject position is possible for verbs that are semantically 'light', or 'non-
dominant ' . Therefore, (51) is grammatical bu t (52) and (53) are not. 
(51) Who did Bill say left? 
(52) *Who did Bill whisper left? 
(53) *Who did Bill broadcast left? 
Stowell, however, argues that the explanation lies in case assigning properties 
postulated as a par t of GB theory. If that cannot be deleted, then the following 
subject cannot be extracted. Therefore, Stowell predicts t h a t extraction f rom 
subject and deletion of that should apply to exactly the same verbs. In my 
sample, there is some overlap in the two classes, but they are by no means 
co-extensive. 
Unfortunately, the judgments of acceptability are so subt le that I do not 
consider introspective reports to be reliable enough. Therefore, the property 
of that omission must await investigation until the data can be checked with 
corpora.1 0 
Erteschik-Shir-Lappin argue that the lie test also applies to 'semantically 
light ' or 'non-dominant ' verbs. Consider the following dialogues: 
(54) (a) John said that Bill stole the money, 
(b) Tha t ' s a lie! 
9
 I am grateful to Paul Meyer for this observation. 
Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English, based on a corpus of 25 million words 
of text , provides information on the acceptability of omit t ing that. 
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(55) (a) John bet that George stole the money, 
(b) Tha t ' s a lie! 
For (54) a possible interpretation is tha t Bill stole the money as well as the 
interpretation that John did not utter the complement. However, in (55) the 
only interpretation is tha t John did not bet that George stole the money. Thus 
Erteschik-Shir-Lappin predict that the same verbs should behave alike with 
respect to the extraction and lie tests. In my sample t he number of verbs for 
which the lie test yields ambiguous sentences overlaps wi th but is not exactly 
coextensive with the extract ion tests. 
Broad semantic classes and illocutionary force 
One important aspect of the study of VD, the one t h a t relates to Talmy's 
approach to lexical typology (1985), is a frequency count of the different se-
mantic classes. Since categories overlap, more than simple counting is involved. 
In general, illocutionary force constitutes the most impor tan t semantic dimen-
sion, particularly for assertives (statements) and directives. Very few verbs are 
used to ask questions: ask, inquire,query, interrogate, question. As mentioned 
above, statements and directives correlate with complement selection. 
A second set incorporates manner of speaking components. Syntactically, 
these verbs occur as intransitives, as transitives, and with almost any com-
plement; it is the complement type which determines the illocutionary force. 
Example (56a) is a s tatement and (56b) a directive. 
(56) (a) I whispered t ha t X. 
(b) I whispered ( to him) to X. 
Means verbs such as telephone, cable, etc. behave the same way. 
Another set of VD lexicalizes kinds of group activities: chat, dispute, talk, 
gossip, debate, converse. These are typically intransitive but allow further 
specification by means of with and about adjunct phrases. The meaning of 
the verb focusses on the nature of the activity—whether serious, friendly, 
argumentative, etc. 
Another small but important class includes textual verbs, that is, verbs 
used most frequently as responses to the speech of another , such as add, agree, 
reply, contradict, decline, disagree. Some of these lexicalize the speaker 's at-
titudes or intentions. Although some, like reply can involve any illocutionary 
force, others are limited to assertions. Thus we see t h a t the semantic clas-
sification of VD is different from taxonomies of illocutionary acts, although 
illocution plays a big roll in the lexical semantics. 
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Summary 
This paper has surveyed broadly the various syntactic and semantic aspects 
of verba dicendi in English. The syntax is varied, but Pinker 's hypothesis t ha t 
narrow semantic classes of verbs will predict syntactic properties is a promising 
one. Semantically, illocutionary force is an important aspect of constructing 
semantic classes, but manner of speaking, means of communicating, conversa-
tional interactional, and textual sequencing are also impor tan t semantic no-
tions are incorporated into verbs. I hope t h a t this study can serve as a basis 
for comparing the verbs of speaking in o ther languages in order to compare 
the lexicalization of concepts from a truly universal semantic domain. 
Appendix 
The morphology and syntax of indirect speech 
In comparing the grammatical properties of reported speech across languages, 
Coulmas (1985) stresses the arbitrariness and variability. Some languages, such 
as German, use a special mood for indirect speech, others, such as English and 
Italian, shift tense, others use special complementizers or adverbs or quotat ive 
particles. However, before giving up on the possibility of finding universale, it 
is necessary to investigate this matter more abstractly. Following the work of 
Victor Friedman (1980, 1981), it is necessary to look, not only at the forms 
used for reported speech but look also at the other meanings and uses of 
that form and then look at the paradigmatic contrasts in the language. For 
example, in looking at tense shifts from present to past, we need to see what 
other functions past tenses have and what they contrast with; similarly we 
need to see what other things the subjunctive mood signals in German and 
what contrasts are made with other moods. Perhaps at a more abstract level 
we can find greater similarities—perhaps not . But since labels like 'subjunctive 
mood' and 'past tense' are often applied loosely, a scholar of universale and 
typology must be wary in interpreting them without looking at how they are 
used in each language. 
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THE ITALIAN MORPHEMES NO AND NIENTE 
AS CONVERSATIONAL MARKERS 
CARMEN L I C A R I - S T E F A N I A STAME 
This paper on some pragmatic uses of the negative morphemes no (literally 
"non" in French and "no" in English) and niente (literally "rien" in French and 
"nothing"/ "not . . . anything" in English) in Italian everyday conversation, 
is par t of a broader research in progress, which was started a few years ago 
(1987) at the University of Bologna, within an interdisciplinary project (Isti-
t u to di Comunicazione, Dipartimento di Psicologia, Dipart imento di Lingue e 
Letterature Straniere Moderne). 
The main aim of our overall project is an analysis, both qualitative 
and quantitative, of the specific functioning of various conversational markers 
which characterise spoken Italian language (e.g., : ecco, allora, anzi, appunto, 
insomma, comunque, magari). Given the high frequency and the functional 
complexity of this category of linguistic items (in Italian as in other languages), 
we believe that intra- and interlinguistic micro-analysis in this field could help 
to add a few elements to the description of the overall mechanisms of the reg-
ulation of conversation. Although we will not deal here with the quantitative 
aspects, we can observe a f ragment , taken f rom a conversation over dinner 
(5 participants; Kiki is a female dog), where out of a total of 96 words, 31 
(32%) are conversational markers. The part immediately preceding this frag-
ment concerns a plan to buy and perhaps restore a country house. Given the 
circumscribed aim of the present paper, transcription conventions are limited 
to suspension points to indicate pauses, upper case to indicate raised voices, 
colon to indicate a lengthened syllable. Markers are in bold type. 
132. A: e poi met tere la luce . . . 
133. D: si no ma la luce ci sarebbe ma . . . t u t t e le pratiche . . . ma . . . il 
telefonó anche . . . 
134. A: no no si d'accordo . . . 
135. D: comunque . . . 
136. A: no capito ma ti . . . 
137. D: cioè quello che volevo dire . . . mi rendo conto . . . 
138. A: cioè se uno invece desiderava . . . 
139. B: appunto ma . . . 
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140. A: cioè comunque i tempi sono sempre . . . almeno per quello che ho 
potuto vedere 
141. D: certo . . . 
142. A: anzi aumentano sempre anche quando . . . voglio dire anche nelle . . . 
colle migliori ecco . . . pre . . . cioè condizioni diciamo . . . 
143. B: ma infatti appunto . . . alla fine ti . . . 
144. A: mhh be:ella . . . ha fame anche la Kjki vedi . . . che non mangia 
niente . . . 
145. B: eh si 
146. A: be:ella lei 
(English transposition) 
132. A: and then putt ing in the electricity 
133. D: yes well but the electricity's already been installed but . . . there 's all 
the business but . . . the telephone too . . . 
134. A: oh well yes of course . . . 
135. D: anyway . . . 
136. A: O.K. but . . . 
137. D: well . . . what I wanted to say was . . . I mean . . . 
138. A: well . . . but if you wanted . . . 
139. B: exactly but . . . 
140. A: well anyway it always takes longer . . . at any ra te from what I 've seen 
141. D: of course 
142. A: in fact it always takes longer even when . . . I mean even in the . . . 
under the best so . . . I mean . . . I mean conditions you could say . . . 
143. B: mh . . . right of course . . . in the end you . . . 
144. A: [to dog] oh sweetie . . . [to B] Kiki's hungry too . . . you see . . . she 
usually doesn't eat much . . . 
145. B: I know 
146. A: sweetie . . . 
(French transposition) 
132. A: et puis faire installer l'électricité . . . 
133. D: oui ben bon l 'électricité elle y est mais tout le reste . . . les démarches 
et puis le téléphone . . . 
134. A: ça oui oui d'accord . . . 
135. D: enfin . . . 
136. A: non tu vois mais tu . . . 
137. D: c'est que je voulais dire . . . je comprends . . . 
138. A: c'est que si au lieu on voulait . . . 
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139. B: justement mais . . . 
140. A: enfin c'est que les temps sont toujours . . . du moins pour ce que j'ai 
pu voir . . . 
141. D: bien sûr . . . 
142. A: et puis c'est toujours plus long . . . même quand . . . je crois même dans 
les . . . avec les meilleurs voilà . . . pré . . . comment dirais-je . . . conditions 
disons . . . 
143. B: mais c'est ça justement . . . et puis tu . . . 
144. A: ah que t'es belle . . . Kiki aussi a faim tu vois . . . elle qui mange rien 
145. B: eh oui . . . 
146. A: t 'es belle toi 
As for theoretical definitions of "discourse markers", found in t he many 
studies in this field, we will at least mention those of van Dijk (1979), Ducrot 
(1980), Ducrot-Anscombre (1983), Schiffrin (1987), Moeschler (1989), and 
Fraser (1990). However, these and other studies provide a range of trends 
which cannot be examined here directly. 
Besides, we have to recall that pragmatic and psycholinguistic aspects of 
denial have already been stressed in psychological studies and in psycholin-
guistics (Wason 1965; Antinucci-Volterra 1978). Although we do not intend to 
deal here with the eminently semantic problems of denial, one of the points 
we would like to make is that the pragmatic uses of the Italian morphemes 
no and niente do maintain a relation with their negative referential mean-
ings (and these meanings themselves contribute to their pragmatic functions). 
However, their communicative functions seem to go beyond their meaning con-
tent. Moreover, as Schiffrin points ou t , the communicative strength of these 
discourse markers also depends upon where they co-occur within discourse. 
We will therefore t ry to see if and how the various functional aspects 
emphasised by the l i terature on discourse markers are contained in the prag-
matic uses of no and niente. A preliminary examination of our da t a showed 
that , curiously enough, no and niente, in their pragmatic use, often do not 
seem to convey pure denial nor pure disagreement. This pragmatic use does 
not apply to question-answer pairs, where the holophrastic use is found as a 
second pai r -par t ; i.e. af ter yes-no questions, as in Hai visto Claudia? No (non 
l'ho vista) (Did you see Claudia? No, I didn't); or in question-answer pairs, 
as in Hai ricevuto posta? Niente (Did you get any mail? Nothing). 
Used as pragmatic markers, no and niente tend to convey confirmation 
and agreement, contrary to their referential content, and quite paradoxically. 
Most of the time, these conversational devices (especially when they are used in 
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the turn-opening position) reveal the coexistence of assent and dissent, in dif-
ferent ways and degrees, through a move aimed at at tenuating and minimising 
agreement a n d / o r disagreement. They then function as signals of cooperation 
and acquire a metacommunicative dimension which allows us to classify them 
as conversational markers. 
Before focusing on these and other aspects in our proposal of analysis of 
examples selected from our corpus of conversation, let us s ta r t by granting 
t h a t extra- and paralinguistic aspects are crucial in conversational analysis. 
And for no and niente, as for all conversational markers, prosodie contours 
are essential. Though prosodie components definitely helped us in identifying 
referential uses f rom pragmatic ones, we did not study them for themselves in 
our proposal of description. 
Now, since some readers may not be familiar with I tal ian, let us briefly 
step back in order to make a few considerations about some very common 
uses of no and niente. In spoken Italian, no by itself, as a negative imperative 
form linked to contextual elements, functions as a prohibition (an order not 
t o do something), e.g., to a. child: no! = don ' t ( = don't throw the spoon out 
of the window). In formal wri t ten Italian, prohibitions that are not deictically 
marked (as in no smoking, no parking) are formulated without a no form: 
vietato fumare, divieto di sosta. See also, the doctors prohibition niente fumo. 
No as a second pair-part of an adjacency pair is often difficult even for 
native speakers to understand when the first pair-part is pu t in a negative 
form, e.g., Non è stata sincera. No (She wasn ' t sincere). Does this naked 
no mean agreement with the content of the utterance or denial of the first 
speaker's evaluation? In fact, in cases like this one in Italian daily conversation, 
we often hear the first speaker asking the second one what was really meant by 
no, in order to check the correctness of the interpretation. In similar structures, 
French provides an alternative to the polarity of the yes-no answers: the French 
morpheme si has precisely the function of clearing up such ambiguities. 
The indefinite pronoun niente also has an adverbial function, as in non 
è niente/per niente/ nient'affatto piacevole (it is not at all pleasant; ce n 'est 
pas du tout agréable). 
As a conventional reply in politeness rout ine sequences, niente functions 
as a minimising device after thanks and apologies: Grazie. Niente; Scusa. (Di) 
Niente. (Not at al l / You are welcome/ Don ' t mention it; Ce n'est rien/ De 
r ien / Je vous en prie/ Pas de quoi). 
Similarly, we find some standardised combined uses of no, e.g., no follow-
ing perché (why) or come (how) in politeness replies which show some degree 
of kind attention towards the first speaker's request or appreciation of h is /her 
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proposal: come no? certainly; mais bien sûr); perché no? (= why not?; 
pourquoi pas?) 
Data 
Our study is based on a corpus of recorded and transcribed spontaneous con-
versations (2 h 26') taken from a larger corpus (a total of approximately 12 h). 
The situations of exchange concern a) dinner-table conversations (relation ori-
ented, 1 h 6'); b) discussions which are more focused on specific themes (topic 
oriented, 1 h 20'). In both cases, the exchange, which is not characterised by 
a clear disparity of roles, is rather informal. Participants (from 2 to 9 per con-
versation) are native speakers of Italian, living in Bologna, from various social 
backgrounds; ages range from 20 to 65. 
Examples 
Ellipsis, sudden changes of topic, and overlapping of different levels of discourse 
tend to make transcribed utterances of everyday conversation syntactically 
and semantically unclear. For this reason (and for economy), the examples are 
limited to five very short fragments of conversations which seem to be quite 
clear even without a more extensive conversational- context . The examples 
are followed by a proposed rough translation in French and in English. Of 
course, the question of translation "equivalence" is linked to the problem we 
are examining. 
(1) 
A: comunque pero per forza . . . ho dovuto PER FORZA: fare cosi . . . 
B: no si hai fa t to bene . . . mh::solo che magari è stato t u t t o un po' af f re t ta to 
no? 
(English transposition) 
A: anyway but I had to . . . I HAD to do it . . . 
B: O.K . . . well . . . you did right . . . er . . . except maybe it was all a bit too 
soon) 
(French transposition) 
A: mais de toute façon il fallait . . . j 'ai dû . . . je n'avais pas le choix . . . faire 
comme ça 
B: non mais tu as bien fait . . . mh . . . sauf que . . . voilà . . . il a fallu décider 
un peu t rop vite . . . tu ne crois pas?) 
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The act wi th which A expresses his position is marked by self-justification 
(comunque, ho dovuto, per forza). The no which opens B's reply does not ex-
press disagreement with the content of A's act, but metacommunicates on 
th is act precisely as regards the aspect of self-justification, with the double 
function of recognising and containing it ( = I recognise your justification, so 
there is no need for further justification). The no therefore concerns the rela-
t ional level, building solidarity or politeness, by which В relates more closely 
to A. The si which follows expresses agreement as to the content of A's act, 
an agreement which can then be reduced (solo che magari) by the relational 
move (getting closer). 
(2) 
A: . . . perché cosi non è corre t to . . . 
В: si no ma che gli dico 
(English transposition) 
A: . . . 'cause t h a t isn't really right . . . 
B: well yes . . . but what should I tell him 
(French transposition) 
A: . . . et ça c 'est pas correct . . . 
В: oui bon d'accord mais qu'est-ce que je vais lui dire 
In B's reply introduced by si по ma, В at the same time steps closer to 
and farther away from A's position. The morpheme no signals a disagreement 
which does not concern the evaluation expressed by A (on which agreement 
is assumed to have already been reached) but reinforces the distancing move 
displayed by m a , on the more restricted level of what consequent concrete 
behaviour to adopt . 
( 3 ) 
A: e poi non ti ho detto . . . quell'altra volta anche . . . che hanno avuto la 
pretesa . . . ancora . . . ma sono matti . . . proprio . . . che fosse D a . . . 
В: no no ma hai ragione 
(English transposition) 
A: and then I didn' t tell you . . . the other time too . . . when they wanted to 
. . . again . . . they must be m a d . . . really . . . that D should . . . 
В: I know I know you 're r ight 
(French transposition) 
A: et puis je ne t 'ai pas dit . . . la fois où . . . en plus . . . ils prétendaient . . . 
mais ils sont fous . . . que c 'é ta i t à D de . . . 
B: non mais tu as parfaitement raison 
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Paradoxically and in a conclusive way, the redundancy of the negative 
morpheme no here signals reinforcement of agreement with A, implicitly meta-
communicating to the hearer that he does not need to add anything in order 
to mantain his position. 
(4) 
A: be' forse è vero . . . come tut t i . . . perché comunque tu t t i siamo stanchi . . . 
piii che a l t ro ha bisogno di riposo . . . di riposarsi . . . 
B: no perché anche l ' a l t ro giorno fa . . . dice . . . non riesco neanche più a 
dormire . . . mi dispiace perché 
(English transposition) 
A: well perhaps that 's t rue . . . like everyone . . . because anyway we're all tired 
. . . above all he needs to rest up . . . to rest . . . 
B: I know because the other day too he said . . . he said I can't even sleep any 
more . . . I 'm sorry because . . . 
(French transposition) 
A: ça se peut . . . remarque . . . comme tout le monde . . . c'est qu'on est tous 
fatigués . . . il a surtout besoin de repos . . . de se reposer . . . 
B: non c'est comme quand l 'autre jour . . . quand il a dit qu'il n'arrivait plus 
à dormir . . . ça m'ennuie tu vois . . . 
Неге В's reply, introduced by no immediately followed by the explicative 
morpheme perché, does not reject the interpretation proposed by A. Rather , 
the negative morpheme signals a shift from the general (shared) level to a 
more specific one. Agreement with A's statement is made possible precisely 
thanks to the preceding change of level. 
(5) 
A: e come si fa allora . . . dillo tu 
В: niente . . . prima fai la sottrazione poi . . . se ti dà . . . come si dice . . . poi 
hai trovato l 'altro lato . . . e cosi . . . a questo punto . . . mh . . . niente . . . 
dopo fai t u t t o come nel probléma di pr ima . . . 
(English transposition) 
A: and how d'you do it then . . . you tell me 
B: look . . . first you do the subtraction then . . . if you get . . . what do you 
call it . . . then you've found the other side . . . and so . . . at that point . . . 
mh . . . O.K. . . . then you do it like the problem above . . . 
(French transposition) 
A: et comment on fait alors . . . vas-y je t 'écoute 
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B: bon écoute voilà . . . d 'abord tu fais ta soustraction puis . . . si tu trouves 
. . . comment est-ce qu'on dit . . . alors tu as trouvé l 'autre côté . . . et puis là 
. . . mh . . . ben bon voilà . . . ensuite tu continues comme pour le problème 
d ' a v a n t . . . 
Wi th in this context (explanation), the morpheme niente occurs both in 
t h e initial position and within the ut terance, with a double function: 
self/heteroregulation. In the first case, niente functions as a minimising de-
vice, mainly used to facilitate start ing and to help discourse planning. In the 
second case, the minimisation tends to signal to the hearer (metacommunica-
t ion) the speaker's willingness to adapt his own discourse to a simpler level: 
a level of shared or presupposed knowledge which would be more accessible 
to the hearer. Depending upon the case, this self-regulating aspect could take 
on different pragmatic functions ranging from polite to impolite, e.g. bridging 
distance (simplifying the issues for the hearer) or, at the opposite pole, adding 
and emphasizing distance (showing impatience). 
Remarks on quantitative aspects 
Table 1 
Co-occurrences of no as conversational marker 
to t . init. inner fin. 
no+s i 5 5 
no+mark of agreement 19 14 3 2 
no+s i+mark of agreement 4 2 2 
no+mark of agreement .+ma/peró 10 10 
n o + s i + m a / p e r ó 4 4 
no+commentary marker 22 19 2 1 
n o + perché 12 9 3 
п о / a h no 44 7 24 
s i + n o / b e ' / m h + s i + n o 16 16 
s i + n o + m a / p e r ó 4 4 
m a + n o 3 3 
come+no /oh+come+no 5 5 
148 98 32 18 
agreement markers: d'aecordo, certo, è vero, infatti, appunto. 
commentary markers: volevo dire, cioè, capito, dipende. 
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Table 1 shows occurrences and co-occurrences of no as a conversational 
marker. Semantic uses were omitted, as well as ambiguous cases (those in 
which the borderline between semantic use and conversational use did not 
seem clear enough out of context). 
The frequency of niente is very low (9 occurrences) compared to the 
frequency of no. It is of course true tha t the corpus lacks the types of exchanges 
where niente is most likely to occur (explanations, rout ine transactions, thanks 
and apologies). 
Of the 148 instances of co-occurrent no (no occurring with another 
marker), 98 (66.2%) occur in turn-ini t ia l positions, while 32 (21.6%) occur 
in internal positions and 18 (12.2%) in turn-final positions. 
Space does not allow us to explore the aspects of at least three very 
common uses of non-turn-init ial no: 
a) no in an internal position = non è vero? (you see/you know what I mean?; 
tu vois/vous voyez); 
b) no in closing position = non è vero? ( tag questions; n'est-ce pas); 
c) noo! expressing a mixture of surprise and approbation (holophrastic) = 
incredibile! (really?; how amazing!; c'est pas vrai!). 
In turn openings, no occurs mainly combined with other markers . Co-
occurrences are much less frequent when no occurs in internal a n d closing 
positions. 
Combinations with si and/or markers of agreement (e.g., d'accordo, in-
fatti, appunto) and with commentary markers (e.g., volevo dire, capito, cioè) 
are very frequent. 
As for the order of co-occurrence, in openings no precedes si or an agree-
ment marker in 35 cases, while si precedes no in 20 cases. 
These figures are interesting if compared with the use of the French non. 
Vicher and Sankoff (1989) found no use of non oui in turn-openings, while 
they found ben oui, ben non and, more seldom, non ben. 
These da ta might suggest that everyday conversation between Italians is 
strongly polemical and uncooperative. As a matter of fact, out of a total of 
994 markers occurring in turn openings, our corpus contains 214 cases of si 
and 185 of no (both conversational and semantic). This prevalence of the use 
of si can comfort us about Italians' willingness at least to cooperate, if not 
always to agree. 
The high frequency of no combined with si or with other markers of 
agreement (preceding or following no) seems significant to us since, beyond 
the surface structure of the negative device, it reflects a specific a t tent ion to 
and an awareness of the relational plane of discourse. 
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Our data are limited in space and time to t he Bologna a rea and the la te 
1980s. No and niente as conversational markers can indeed be influenced by 
regional, generational or individual peculiarities and idiosyncratic styles. For 
this and for other reasons, they are often seen as pure hesitation marks, i.e., 
as having a weak function. However, the way these markers function actually 
goes far beyond these factors. No and niente not only seem to belong fully to 
present standard spoken Italian, bu t they also t o some extent seem to reflect 
the overall mechanisms of the regulation of conversation. This is precisely what 
we t ry to underline in our conclusions. 
Conclusions 
Our data support t he following tentative conclusions regarding spoken Italian: 
- No and niente have specific conversational uses which cannot be fully as-
similated to the use of semantic denial. 
- Like many other conversational markers, they have favored locations: they 
tend to occur in turn-init ial position, but also (with different functions and 
less frequently) in internal and turn-final positions. 
- It is interesting t o note that this type of no can occur in the initial position of 
an utterance wi thout belonging to the second pa i r -par t of a yes-no question. 
Similarly, niente can occur in an initial position without being the negative 
answer to a question-answer pair . 
- Compared to the common uses of semantic denial , pragmatic uses of no and 
niente allow combinations and co-occurrences which could not occur if these 
negative morphemes were simply viewed as grammatical units. Thus, although 
the reference of no contradicts t h a t of si, in their pragmatic uses they not 
only coexist but even strongly t end to be combined. The same applies to no 
+ d'accordo d'accordo (two occurrences), or no + certo è vero. 
Some authors (Schiffrin 1987; Fraser 1990) claim that al though markers 
are syntactically detachable, removing them f r o m an ut terance would cause 
considerable loss on the functional level. Our d a t a analysis allows us to observe 
t h a t , in spite of their semantic "detachability", no and niente (like many 
o ther Italian conversational markers) tend to occur by themselves, not only in 
holophrastic uses, bu t also elliptically. 
At any rate, no and niente certainly have more than one function: 
- They can be used by a speaker to convey a personal orientation toward a 
part icular state of affairs. In t h a t sense, we can speak of bo th a relational 
and an indexicai function: the specific speaker's orientation in relation to the 
deictic center contributes to define the space of discourse which includes bo th 
participants (relation level) and utterance ( tex tua l level). 
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- By pointing out what the speaker is doing, backward or forward within 
the discourse, or both (anaphora and/or cataphora), or referring to a shared 
presupposition, no and niente have a metacommunicative function. Thus they 
are able to operate on different planes of discourse. 
- So, no and niente not only enhance coherence, marking connections which 
are inferred by producers and interpreters of the discourse (énoncé), but they 
also provide coherence linking the different components of talk at one and 
the same time: at the very level where speakers' relations with each other are 
involved in what is being said, meant and done (énonciation). 
- By contributing to coherence between utterances, no and niente as conversa-
tional markers can also be read in terms of cooperation strategies since, along 
with other linguistic items, they signal, add or even create relevance between 
turns in conversation. 
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BETWEEN RULES AND PRINCIPLES: 
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE NOTION OF 
'METAPRAGMATIC CONSTRAINT' 
JACOB L. MEY 
A pragmatic universe is not predictable in the sense t h a t a morphological or 
syntactic universe (considered abstractly) is: no strict conditions can be set up 
for a pragmatic universe, neither can any stringent hypotheses be formulated 
and tested tha t would create the illusion of a well-formed world. 
A pragmatic approach to language cannot, therefore, be captured by the 
'exact ' methods of sciences such as mathematics or physics; pragmatics views 
the world as a world of users, and tries to capture the general conditions un-
der which the users of a language have to work. Rather than speculating on 
what the user possibly could (or could want to) say, pragmatics investigates 
what the user actually can, and normally will be expected to say. In other 
words, we constrain the world of use in accordance wi th our (explicit or im-
plicit) knowledge of the users, and with the expectations tha t follow f rom that 
knowledge. 
Efforts at computer modeling of human language behavior have made us 
aware of the importance of user goals, embodied in devices such as scripts 
(cf., e.g., Schank-Abelson 1977). Scripts are, in fact, realizations of certain 
general constraints obeying which we arrive at the most general realization of 
our goal ( the 'default ' , as it is often called). If we want to deviate f rom the 
'normal ' case, we have to qualify these constraining conditions, while staying 
within the general set of expectations; alternatively, we must create a wholly 
new set of constraints, embodied in another script. Goals and expectations, 
as represented by such constraints, are essential to a pragmatic understand-
ing of human activity, and much more so than are correctness of sentence 
construction and obedience of the rules of grammar. 
As Carberry remarks, in another context, 
"[this] strategy utilizes pragmatic knowledge, such as a model of the 
information-seeker's inferred task-related plan and expected discourse goals. 
The power of this approach is its reliance on knowledge gleaned f rom the 
dialog, including discourse content and conversational goals, rather t h a n on 
precise representations of the preceding utterances alone" (1989, 76). 
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Thus, what we are looking for in metapragmatics is still, in Caffi's (1984a, 
1984b) words, those "units of act ion which are constitutive of a given interac-
t ion" (1984b, 464). However, it is not necessarily and always given that those 
act ions can be captured by rules for the use of certain distinguished, 'canoni-
cal ' speech acts— on the contrary, in order to state something, I usually avoid 
using the 'speech act verb' to s ta te , as Caffi perceptively remarks (ibid., 456). 
And indeed: the linguistic actors rely on what is implicit in t he scenario ( the 
'scr ipt ' ) , as well as on what is explicitly s t a ted (in the dialog): that is, the 
whole framework of discourse is invoked, bo th on the general level (a story, 
an argument, a report, etc.) and on the individual level of this part icular 
story, argument, report, etc., wi th the parameters indicated by the agreed-on 
conventions and limitations between, respectively of, the interactants. 
The problem with available models of discourse, as pointed out by Borut t i 
(1984), is that they tend to be "deterministic and idealistic" (1984, 445); when 
we are dealing with a script, t he common defaults are those that are least 
interesting from a pragmatic point of view. We are not really and always 
interested in people following the normal route , just as, in Nietzsche's famous 
words, an elegant error can be much more interesting than a plain t ru th ; all 
depends on our goals. 
This is not to say that viewing metapragmatics as subject to the con-
straints of (idiosyncratic) h u m a n discourse is an uncomplicated and problem-
free affair; "in order to unders tand discourse", as Borutti reminds us (ibid.), 
" t he procedures of making meaning normal and constant are very impor tan t" , 
and "[t]o obtain a correct representation of the subject's discourse, we must 
consider the linguistic strategies of the speaker, the effects he or she is plan-
ning, the anticipation of the hearer'[s] mental reactions, his or her pre-existing 
context of speaking, etc." (1984, 445). 
When looking around for a model which, at the same time, embodies 
the notion of pragmatic constraint as the expression of h u m a n potential, and 
the constance which is necessary for a consistent and metapragmatically well-
functioning mechanism of discourse, we may find it worth our while to con-
sider what goes on in the part icular , 'artificial ' (but not necessarily machine-
created) environment of the world of art, more specifically t h a t of the literary 
work. One could say that the essence of participating (mostly as a reader or 
writer) in a l i terary universe is, for both 'consumers' and 'producers' , the ac-
ceptance of a set of constraints governing the use of that world, in part icular 
those relating the universe to language and vice versa.1 
1
 Cf. the speech act vs. u t terance dichotomy, as described by Levinson (1983). 
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The ways literary universes are introduced and established vary greatly 
from period to period, f rom culture to culture. As an instance, compare the 
detailed, descriptive statements of t ime, space, geography, actors, characters, 
physiognomy, apparel, etc. that were customary in the Romantic period (good 
examples can be found in the Waverly series of novels by Walter Scot t ) to the 
extremely frugal and indirect lighting of the literary scene by modern novelists 
such as Alain Robbe-Grillet or Jorge Luis Borges. The problem of 'making up' 
a world, tha t is, of establishing a script, is akin to that of setting up conditions 
for the proper use of language, say, in a conversational environment: in both 
cases, the constraints cannot be universal, but have to respect the individual 
actors' idiosyncrasies; yet , as an author or conversationalist, I have to keep 
those constraints constant as well as consistent throughout my work (be it 
literary or conversational), on the penalty of becoming unintelligible and/or 
being rejected by my collaborators in t he literary effort , my readers or my 
interlocutors. 
It has been said that the reader, on opening a book, delivers him-/herself , 
wholesale, into the hands of the author . Evidently, th is is only par t ly true: 
the true par t being the voluntary acceptance of the author 's world and of 
the constraints that are imposed by h i m / h e r . Notice also that in order to be 
effective, the constraints are never explicitly stated: they are inferred from 
what we notice about the actors as described, comparing their behavior with 
our own, familiar, and expected way of being, and by applying the inference 
schémas tha t we use in our own daily lives. 
The main advantage of a 'constraint ' over a 'rule' approach as a metaprag-
matic explanatory device is borne out by the ease with which l i terary con-
straints are manipulated by (and vice versa, manipulate) the users, in this 
case the readers, as compared to the clumsy use of rules. Pragmatics is the 
science of the unsaid; the literary work in particular balances on the ridge 
between 'everything else being the same' and 'nothing else being the same': 
ceteris paribus, nullis paribus. 
What is the same, and what not, however, is never explicitly s ta ted ; nei-
ther is how to handle the samenesses and differences, t h a t is, how to interpret 
the constraints. Reading one of the Waverly novels, say, in 1989, is qui te a dif-
ferent cup of tea than doing the same some 150 years ago, when they first saw 
the light of day: and in to-day's literature (as an example, take recent work by 
John Fowles, e.g., A Maggot), no amount of elegant and skillful pastiching can 
obscure the fact that the author 's and the reader's work with the t e x t , and 
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hence the way t h e textual and dialogical constraints are manipulated, depend 
entirely on the contemporary conditions against which constraints are defined 
and accepted by authors and readers, respectively, and then re-defined and 
reaccepted by every new generation. 
This point of view has consequences for our handling of pragmatics in our 
daily lives and our usual surroundings as well. Much of what has been going on 
in linguistic pragmatics has been characterized by a certain 'idealism' (bo th 
in its vanilla variety and in t he strict, philosophical sense). The feeling t h a t 
we 'accept' or ' re jec t ' the constraints in a l i terary work, and in general, decide 
on our own goals and expectations by incorporating them in a script, respec-
tively extracting them from what some consider to be the dark underbrush of 
conscience, reflects also on our dealings with language on a day-to-day base. 
Jus t like the playwright 'sets the stage', in t he literal sense of the word, t h a t 
is, words the plot on the stage by manipulating dialog and stage directions 
( the 'constraints ') , so we are able to model and change the world of our lives 
using the words t ha t are at our disposal when dealing with tha t world. 
The problem has a double aspect: that of matching and that of changing. 
As to the first aspect, the extreme case, of course, is the idea that one can 
match the h u m a n speaker's native competence by means of abstract, g ram-
matical rules. In a pragmatic surrounding, t he ideal of matching comes up 
when we start t o realize t ha t a certain use of language reflects the ac tua l 
world situation rather poorly. This can be either because the words belong 
to another, earlier period (this we can normally live with: nobody thinks of 
'sailing' as an unorthodox activity, even when mentioned in connection with 
such definitely sail-less contraptions as a tomic submarines), or because they 
reflect an altered consciousness of the world; if we feel constrained by such a 
s t a te of affairs, it usually means that the constraints aren ' t right, and hence 
we have to change them: which is the other aspect of the problem. 
Consider one such constraint (or 'meta-rule ' as one could call i t ) con-
cerning the 'generic ' use of the personal pronoun third person masculine in 
English: he. T h e mismatch is that half the world's population is female; so 
how can we refer to them by the masculine?, people say. A solution ( 'change ' ) 
is to introduce t he hybrid form s/he; alternatively, one could declare the fem-
inine to be the proper generic form, and uniquely use she, also when males 
are around. 
In the l a t t e r case, the change concerns not the real s ta te of the world 
(which remains the same all the time), bu t the constraints we place on our 
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use of language in describing that s ta te . But notice t h a t what we do here is 
to change the scenario, a limited discourse, more or less like we did with the 
literary universe that I referred to above. We don't change the world (at least 
not directly) by using the generic she; at best, we may change (or 'raise' , as it 
used to be called) our consciousness about the problem. And nothing wrong 
with tha t , of course, as I have argued elsewhere (Mey 1985, 365-68). 
By contrast, a naïve belief in the 'magic' of the meta-level in pragmatics 
may lead to such absurdities as the proposed use of the 'generic' feminine in 
universes where the major i ty or even 100% of the population are masculine 
(e.g. the military or the Catholic priesthood).2 The function of a feminine form, 
under the constraints t ha t operate in our actual world, is first of all to denote a 
female being: to change t h a t , we would have to use other means than (however 
meaningful) pragmatic insights. The world in which more or less one half of the 
inhabitants are female, one half male, exists; but likewise, we are dealing with 
a world in which the societal power is not at all distributed in accordance with 
the more or less equitable division of the sexes. The metapragmatic conditions 
for language use in such a world reflect, not the actual s tate of world affairs, 
but the societal state of human meanings, as expressed in the metapragmatic 
constraints on language telling us how to use, and how not to use, the words 
that go with that world. 
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METAPRAGMATIC AWARENESS 
AS A FEATURE OF TECHNICAL DISCOURSE 
PAUL G E O R G MEYER 
This article is a spin-off from ongoing research on the structure of technical 
texts in general and abstracts in particular. For reasons of space, it concen-
trates on verbs t ha t are put to metapragmatic uses in academic texts. There 
is a large variety of such verbs, some of them metapragmatic, some not, and 
they are used in a characteristic variety of ways in academic discourse. Some of 
these uses would presumably be called metapragmatic, whereas others would 
not. To investigate the problem on a sounder empirical basis, 30 verbs were 
selected which I had found in a pilot study with a small corpus of social science 
texts. These verbs seemed to be common enough to yield interesting results 
and at the same t ime representative of certain typical metapragmatic func-
tions t h a t verbs can have in technical texts. By means of COCOA, and with 
the friendly assistance of some colleagues,1 concordances were produced of all 
their occurrences in the ' J ' section2 of the LOB corpus of English texts. I wish 
to s tar t from the assumption tha t metapragmatic terms do not only play a 
central role in the structure of technical texts, but signal one aspect of text 
s t ructure (Meyer 1987a) that is b o t h typical of and common to all technical 
discourse (Liidtke 1981; 1983) and t h a t is manifested in a wide variety of ex-
pressions (Meyer 1987b). Furthermore, it is called into question if and how a 
class of metapragmatic terms can be defined and delimited. 
To s tar t with, a few general preliminaries concerning the theoretical back-
ground of the study seem appropriate. 
1
 In part icular, I wish to express my g ra t i tude to prof. Dieter Mindt and Felicitas Tesch 
for their friendly assistance in making access to the corpus possible, and Dietrich Lange 
and Hans Peters for the many hours they spen t to provide me with their pa t i en t technical 
help in deta i ls of the handl ing of COCOA and the operating system and for their invaluable 
psychological support . Neither could have been dispensed with in the making of this paper. 
2 
This section is labelled 'Learned and scientific English'. 
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1. A theoretical point 
One question to be clarified is what exactly we mean by 'text structure' here. 
This notion is explicable in terms of two basic kinds of question which are by 
no means trivial (there has been considerable confusion about these particular 
questions in text linguistics): 
(a) What are the linguistic elements that are regarded as forming a text 
structure: are they morphemes, words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, or 
all of them? 
(b) What are the relations between the elements tha t turn the jumble of 
words, sentences etc. into a text structure: are they syntactic, semantic, 
or pragmatic? Are they syntagmatic or paradigmatic? 
For the purposes of this paper, it will be argued, with its view to iden-
tifying the role of metapragmatic expressions, it is syntagmatic functional or 
pragmatic relations between clauses and larger text chunks tha t are the rel-
evant items of analysis. It is functions or relations of this type tha t are the 
major object of metapragmatic awareness in technical discourse. 
The most recent and best known approach to text structure based on 
relations of this kind is Mann-Thompson 's (1987) 'rhetorical s t ructure theory', 
but many similar approaches have been around for at least twenty years (cf. 
Meyer 1975, and 1983 for an overview). The exact linguistic s ta tus of these 
relations is not sufficiently clear yet, but for the t ime being I will assume that 
ultimately they can be accounted for in terms of speech act theory, e.g. as 
relations between linguistic acts that form hierarchies of complex illocutionary 
acts. 
2. Uses of metapragmatic expressions 
For the purpose of devising an appropriate pragmatic theory of academic dis-
course it might be useful to take a close look a t the uses to which verbs 
commonly called metapragmatic can be put in technical texts and then to ask 
if these functions can possibly be fulfilled by other expressions as well. In this 
way, we find out how writers in the academic world decribe their own linguistic 
acts, and what linguistic acts they ascribe to others. 
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2.1. Performatives 
First of all, as Austin has shown, metapragmatic verbs can be used to per form 
linguistic acts. The ways in which this is actually done, however, differ widely 
from each other, and from the philosophical ideal of an explicit performative 
formula. We just don ' t have formulations like 
(1) *I hereby claim that metapragmatics is bunk 
or 
(2) *We hereby condemn prototype semantics as a dangerous aberration and 
heresy. 
In real academic discourse, performatives are hedged, either by modals (em-
phases mine, P.G.M.): 
(3) I would also suggest that it is a common view in Britain t h a t . . . 
or by modalized passives: 
(4) It must be admitted that Einstein's special theory of relativity is simpler 
than Robb's alternative. 
Typically, additional modifying material is used to hedge the illocutionary act: 
(5) It can be convincingly argued that this development has been influenced 
by ground-water. 
Some of these formulae, taken in their verbat im meaning, are just illocu-
tionarily self-defeating: if S utters tha t s/he 'would suggest' t h a t p, s/he has 
in fact suggested tha t p.3 So the only inference t h a t makes sense of such an 
ut terance is that S wanted to suggest and in fact has suggested tha t p. 
Other formulae of this kind usually thematize appropriateness conditions 
or similar prerequisites for academic speech acts: if 'it must be admit ted ' tha t 
p, then any rational person will in fact admit t h a t p when asked to do so, and 
if 'it can be convincingly argued' t ha t p, this may provide reason good enough 
for academic persons to argue that p. 
Wha t is more, there are performative formulae which do not use a 'performa-
tive' at all: 
This case bears a certain resemblance to real self-defeaters like I'm not going to tell 
you that p, where mentioning p in the complement clause defeats the in tent ion proclaimed 
in the matr ix clause. It is only the conventional character of such 'polite' uses of would t ha t 
makes such formulations acceptable. 
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(6) It is difficult to see how there could be desire without endeavour. 
(7) We shall suppose t h a t the two t ime constants are the same. 
Expressions like in (6) and (7) are widely used in academic tex ts . (6) is 
not a s ta tement on anybody's difficulties in seeing something nor is (7) an 
announcement of a f u tu r e mental s t a t e of the au thor . The expressions are 
simply conventionalized means of performing certain linguistic acts typical of 
academic discourse: expressing doubt and stating a working hypothesis. So 
why not analyse them as performative formulae? 
2.2. Metatextual reference 
Metapragmatic verbs can also be used to refer to one's own linguistic acts. 
This is also done by a large variety of expressions. For want of a be t te r term, let 
me call these expressions metatextual expressions. It may be worth noting that 
there is an implication relation between classical performative and metatextual 
verbal expressions. As a rule, performative expressions can also be used to 
perform metatextual reference if t ransformed into an appropriate grammatical 
person, modality, and tense. We could thus t ransform examples (3) and (4) 
into metatextual formulae 
(3)' I have also suggested that it is a common view in Britain t h a t . . . 
or 
(4)' It has been admitted above t ha t Einstein's special theory of relativity is 
simpler than Robb 's alternative. 
But this does not hold vice versa. We cannot just take a metatextual 
expression and use it in a felicitous performative formula, see examples (8) 
and (8) ' : 
(8) We shall now briefly review the various methods which have been used. 
(8)' *I hereby briefly review the various methods which have been used. 
Somebody using the verb admit in the first person singular has to be very 
careful t o avoid admi t t ing whatever is spelled out in the complement clause. 
But no one is able to review anything just by using the verb review (which 
is a pity as it would make academic life so much easier!). Example (8) can 
thus only be understood as an announcement, not as a performative formula. 
Announcements are a common device of signalling the topic organization of a 
text ((9), (10)). 
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(9) There are a host of further points to be sorted out . Let me try to list 
these. 
(10) We shall consider in a little more detail the effects of . . . 
But they are not the only way to refer metatextually. Anaphoric references to 
former linguistic acts performed in the same text are just as common. 
(11) We referred to this issue in the introduction to this chapter when we 
discussed the application of the . . . systems as redundancies. 
And again, it is not metapragmatic terms alone tha t are used in these func-
tions: 
(12) This table is analysed in detail in section В of this chapter. 
analyse most frequently occurs in a meaning where it describes a mental or 
physical activity performed by scientists. But sometimes it also functions like 
a metatextual verb. There is a number of activity verbs that are ambiguous 
between a physical, mental, and verbal reading. Among the ones studied by me 
for the present paper are hold, compare, show, concentrate, consider, examine, 
illustrate, introduce, investigate, provide, and see. 
2.3. Intertextuali ty 
So far I have drawn examples from the metatextual text layer. The intertex-
tual4 layer also provides ample material for a study of metapragmatic expres-
sions. The terms tha t are used for intertextual reference are largely identical to 
the metatextual ones, but there are some further problems of analysis. Inter-
textuality in technical discourse is neither mysterious nor can it be reduced to 
the simple question of quotations. Let us look at a typical example (emphases 
mine, P.G.M.): 
(13) The Robbins Report, whatever its many merits, did one great disser-
vice to the development of higher education in Britain. Tha t was the 
establishment of the 'Robbins principle' tha t places should be provided 
in higher education for all those qualified for and seeking them. It is this 
4
 T h e term i n t e r t e x t u a l has become a buzzword in recent years, especially in literary 
studies, and sometimes my impression has been that much of the discussion of this term has 
led to obscuring questions rather than clarifying them. The present paper is not concerned 
with the discussion among literary scholars. Neither will I a t t e m p t to give a fireproof defi-
nition of i n t e r t e x t u a l i t y . I will use the term as a convenient label covering all cases where 
one text relates or refers to another. 
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principle which has determined that much discussion of the future of 
higher education has been demography-led, especially in official publica-
tions. Thus, a peaking of the 18-year-old age group in the early 1980s, 
followed by a decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s, suggests a series 
of alternative strategies ( . . . ) . It is significant that whatever may have 
been said on the sidelines, the attraction of new client groups was not 
proposed by Government as an end in itself . . . 
If we look at the expressions t ha t are in bold type in the above text sample, 
the complexity of the task of determining and delimiting the intertextual side 
of metapragmatic awareness in technical discourse becomes apparent . Robbins 
Report is a proper name for a text , so references to it are certainly intertextual. 
merits, disservice and establishment are short characterizations of or allusions 
to perlocutionary effects of the Robbins Report . Perlocution belongs to the 
domain of pragmatics. Does this mean these expressions are metapragmatic? 
On the other hand, a term such as suggest would immediately be identified 
as metapragmatic by most linguists. In our example, however, it is not used 
metapragmatically. It rather describes a relation between a s ta te of affairs and 
certain possible actions (represented by ( . . . ) in the above text) . I will come 
back to this issue in section 2.5. 
Another difficulty is illustrated by the use of said and proposed in (13). 
They are speech act verbs, in some way referring to third party utterances 
here. But it is not made clear what texts or utterances exactly are referred to. 
The verbs are used here to allude vaguely to a general background of discussion 
on the Robbins Report .5 
To make the notion of intertextuality more suitable for a pragmatics of 
technical discourse, I would suggest to distinguish at least three types of in-
ter textual expression. Look at examples (14) to (16): 
(14) Cavagnari and Jenkins thereupon returned to Jamrud and reported their 
failure to Chamberlain. 
(15) Many informants reported t ha t two or more methods had been used. 
(16) For example in the case of . . . ferrites it has been reported tha t the use 
of nitrates gives rise to bet ter microwave properties. 
All the instances of report in the three examples above can without doubt 
be called intertextual, but they differ in pragmatically important respects. 
5
 These observations are not meant as a criticism of the quoted text , bu t as an indication 
of t h e broad variety of intertextual phenomena in technical discourse. 
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In example (14), a simple historical event is narra ted which happens to 
include a linguistic act . Accordingly, a metapragmatic verb (report) is used. 
But this verb has no specific status in this particular discourse qua academic 
discourse. The linguistic act of reporting that is reported here is simply part 
of the tex t ' s subject ma t t e r . We might call this use of the verb report the 
narrative use. As far as the pragmatics of academic discourse is concerned, 
report in this use is in no way different from other verbs. 
Example (15) comes from a s tudy of birth control practices where in-
formants were questioned as part of the research done for the paper. The 
reporting that is reported here is thus occasioned by a professional activity, 
which in turn is reported in the paper. The linguistic acts described here thus 
have a more significant status in the discourse, as they are part of a scien-
tific practice. They do not just happen to be linguistic acts, they are elicited 
as such and used as evidence. A distinction should be made between trivial 
instances of reported speech acts (example (14)) and reports of speech acts 
which are da ta in a scientific inquiry. 
To discuss example (16), another item of theoretical background is to 
be introduced here: the notion of autonomous, planned discourse (Ochs 1979; 
Meyer 1983), i.e. discourse that is not bound to a specific immediate situa-
tion, tha t is addressed to people not in a private, bu t in a public role (Akin-
naso 1985). The overwhelming majori ty of technical discourse available for 
analysis obviously falls in this category. I cannot go into all the intricacies 
of the 'oral-literate' deba te here (see, among many others, Tannen 1980 and 
Bibe 1986). But I do want to argue t ha t despite all the necessary autonomy of 
technical discourse, technical communication creates its own specific 'context 
of situation': a fictitious 'situation' between an author , an anonymous reader, 
and other authors that are being discussed in the intertextual layer of the text 
and tha t form a background for it. This reference to other texts is all that 
planned, autonomous tex t s have for a context of si tuation. 
It is this context t h a t is, along with the text itself, the second major 
source and object of metapragmatic awareness. It means that each technical 
or academic text is pa r t of a larger discourse to which it relates and in which 
the academic community, so to speak, takes par t . This discourse basically 
consists of written texts , and it is not easily delimited. Potentially, it includes 
all texts tha t could be regarded as bearing on a certain topic. 
While the reporting referred to in example (15) was part of a discourse 
that was used as a research strategy, but not part of an academic communica-
tion si tuation, the sentence in example (16) relates to the academic discourse 
background just described. It seems obvious that examples of type (16) are 
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the most relevant for a pragmatics and metapragmatics of academic discourse. 
Only this type of intertextual reference is to be called metapragmatic in the full 
sense: the linguistic acts referred to are the ones tha t constitute academic dis-
course proper; they are the equivalent of turn-taking and responding to other 
participants in a face-to-face situation. Thus this use of intertextual expres-
sions serves to create a new communication situation which brings together 
different texts. 
2.4. 'Metatheoretical' use of verbs 
The metapragmatic uses of verbs are by no means exhausted by the functions 
described so far. In fact, it was not quite easy to find clear-cut sentences from 
the corpus tha t could be used as good examples of performative, metatextual , 
and intertextual uses. There are many ways to discuss academic speech acts, 
and use verbs in this discussion. Look at examples (17)—(19): 
(17) . . . the former are useful when discussing problems associated with a 
definite point in the crystal. 
(18) Three instances of well at tested phenomena which this theory is unable 
to explain will be quoted. 
(19) It is quite another mat ter to suppose that there ought to be one technique 
or one set of rules. 
These examples show that metapragmatic expressions are not only used 
to perform or discuss real linguistic acts, but also to discuss hypothetical 
ones, or to refuse specific acts, or to discuss certain properties of possible 
academic speech acts without being committed to them or to the claim tha t 
somebody else actually performed them. It is not so much real arguments t ha t 
are discussed in this way, but possible arguments in hypothetical discussions. 
This use of metapragmatic expressions is neither meta- nor intertextual, it 
may perhaps be labelled 'metatheoretical ' . 
2.5. 'Evidential' use of verbs 
There is yet another use of verbs in academic discourse, evincing considerable 
overlap with metapragmatic expressions, and playing a significant role in the 
process of technical communication. Look at examples (20)-(23): 
(20) The origin of pure modern abstract painting is fully exemplified in the 
work of Mondrian. 
(21) For example, the recent investigations by . . . have indicated that . . . 
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(22) The foregoing analysis indicates that restrictive amendments to the 
present act are not likely . . . 
(23) The causes of this change have aroused great controversy, controversy 
which illustrates how difficult it is to interpret . . . 
These examples are typical of a group of verbs which are used equally 
freely in a performative, metatextual , and in a third function. In my corpus, 
this group consists of suggest, exemplify, indicate, illustrate, and show. See is 
also related, but behaves differently in some respects. What is striking about 
these verbs is tha t they can either have an animate subject , in which case 
they usually signify speech acts, or their subject refers to facts which are 
usually called ' da ta ' in science, or to scientific activities (research etc.). In 
the two latter cases these verbs indicate that the data or research mentioned 
consti tute or have produced evidence of something. This is why I propose the 
term 'evidential' for this use of these verbs. 
The meanings of this group of verbs seem to const i tute a chain of 
métonymie substitutions from facts via scientific activities to linguistic action 
and in some of the examples it is not possible to determine the boundaries. 
It is not at all clear, however, in what direction these substi tutions have pro-
ceeded, and if there has been historical development at all. It seems that facts, 
research, and description can sometimes be viewed as one and the same thing, 
and it does not seem to matter which aspect is highlighted in an argument. 
It seems that in language usage, the distinction between non-verbal events 
and speech acts is not always clear-cut. Events may be represented as speaking 
subjects, texts as agents, speech acts as physical actions. And it is not always 
easy to tell which usage is literal and which is metaphorical. 
3. Domains of text coherence and metatextuality 
In previous research (Meyer 1983), I have identified five conceptual-functional 
domains from which the relevant coherence-creating text-internal relations 
may be motivated, at least in common-sense texts: Topic, Clarification, Time, 
Causality, and Persuasion. Seen from this angle technical texts are among the 
most interesting text types as they form a prototypical kind of coherent text 
and provide a fuller range of functional text-internal relations than most text 
types. 
The categories of Topic, Time, and Causality correspond to relations in 
the 'real', i.e. text-external world. Topic development in technical texts is 
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largely based on real connections between real objects. Temporal and causal 
relations between clauses reflect temporal and causal relations between real 
events. Clarification and Persuasion, on the other hand , are purely commu-
nicative categories. The relations that they define seem strictly text-internal. 
In the following it will be shown how the specific conditions of technical 
discourse lead to specific forms of metapragmatic awareness concerning the 
five different conceptual domains. 
3.1. The very complexity of the inter-objective relations that a text may de-
scribe calls for more explicitness and transparency on the topical text level. As 
a rule, technical texts do not just slide from one topic to another tacitly. They 
often mark their topic structure by subheadings and various other devices, 
and, what is more interesting in our present discussion, often comment on, 
give overviews of, and take stock of the topics covered and the way these have 
been dealt with. Take the following paragraph from the introduction section 
of a social science text as a typical example: 
(24) In the following, we will concentrate on those political debates and 
changes which primarily concern the past and future course of higher 
education in the Federal Republic, although occasional references will 
be made to the secondary sector. Before we can take a closer look at 
the most recent developments, we must, however, summarise the major 
structural features of the system of tertiary education as it evolved in 
the FRG over the past 25 years. Only in a larger time perspective, will it 
be possible to assess the significance of the issues involved in present-day 
debates on higher education. 
There is a large variety of terms used to refer t o sections of the current 
text or to mention speech acts. Most of the terms emphasized in the above 
section would not usually be regarded as metapragmatic (concentrate, look, 
assess.) But undoubtedly they are used in a metapragmatic, or, to be more 
specific, meta-topical function here in tha t their direct objects are topics and 
their semantic value boils down to a metaphorical description of a certain way 
of dealing with a topic. 
3.2. In the time layer of the text metapragmatic awareness seems to be re-
stricted to the occurrence of a few speech act verbs tha t make the narrative 
function of certain text chunks explicit. Sometimes, the linear character of a 
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text is referred to in terms of a text-internal temporal structure ( b e f o r e we 
can take a closer look), but spatial metaphors are more prevalent here (above, 
below, etc.). 
3.3. In view of the central role of causality in technical texts, text-internal 
pragmatic functions derived from causal relations abound. A causal relation 
between real-world states of affairs provides the basis for various kinds of 
speech acts or relations between speech acts. What counts for text s tructure, 
however, is not the objective real-world causal relations but their reflection in 
the hierarchy of text-internal speech acts, as well as purely text-internal causal 
relations between speech acts. Metapragmatic terms such as explain, justify, 
deduction, consequence are used to make these functions explicit. 
3.4. The speech act verbs (and nouns) t h a t exist to describe clarification and 
argumentation strategies occur as explicit markers of such functions in texts 
(e.g. summarize, exemplify, characterize, admit, hold, argue, emphasize etc.). 
A certain reluctance, however, seems to prevail, where t h e explicitness of some 
types of argument is concerned, criticize, e.g. is never used explicitly in the 
corpora studied by me, not even hedged, and not even when reporting other 
people's linguistic acts. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
To conclude, let me try to summarize the main results of this investigation in 
a few theses: 
4.1. As far as academic language is concerned, there is no such th ing as a 
class of metapragmatic terms. There is a whole lot of expressions that 
can be used in a metapragmatic or a similar way. Bu t there is hardly one 
expression that is exclusively used in one way or t he other. 
4.2. What is more, postulating a class of metapragmatic terms tends to blur 
distinctions that have to be made for an adequate pragmatic account of 
academic communication. 
4.3. It is potentially fallacious to draw conclusions for pragmatics f rom the 
terms people use to describe their own linguistic acts , or from the terms 
they use to at tr ibute linguistic acts to other people, i.e. one should be 
careful when inferring pragmatic categories on a metapragmatic basis. 
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4.4. It is not always possible t o separate metaphorical, métonymie, and ver-
batim uses of verbs describing verbal, mental, and scientific activities. 
It seems t h a t scientific activities and discourse have no t only made the 
world speak to people, b u t have also considerably widened the range of 
things t h a t people can do with words. 
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THE BASIC VERBA DICENDI 
AND THEIR COHESIVE ROLE 
IN SPOKEN CONVERSATIONAL LANGUAGE 
VESNA POLOVINA 
The aim of this study is to show some characteristics of the verba dicendi and 
their use in everyday conversational language, not only on the morphological 
and syntactic level, but also on the macro and micro level of preserving logico-
semantic textual cohesion in conversation. A conversation is taken here as a 
complete entity, i.e. as a unit of speech event. The cohesive function of the 
basic verba dicendi is also studied in the context of the interaction between 
interlocutors. Though most of the study deals with the verba dicendi in Ser-
bocroatian, the findings have been checked on examples in other languages, 
Russian, English and French, and based on the textual analysis of cohesion 
done on the material from these four languages. The corpus consisted of t ran-
scribed recordings of authentic, spontaneous, informal conversations between 
friends, relatives and colleagues conversing at parties, visits to one another 
and at informal situations at work, in offices. The duration of each recorded 
conversation was never less than half an hour.1 
Some features of the textual structure in conversational language 
The textual analysis of the conversations is based on the unit of paragraph, 
considered here as a thematic, content-coherent whole, and smaller units, cor-
responding to what in li terature is sometimes called "moves",2 but in our 
1
 Polovina, V. (1987): Razgovorni jezik (Tekstovi) [Conversational language (Texts)]. 
220 pp. unpublished transcribed conversations; Savic, S . -Polovina , V. (1989): Razgo-
vorni srpskohrvatski jezik [Conversational Serbocroatian language], 7 5 - 2 2 0 . Insti tut za 
juznoslovenske jezike, Novi Sad; Zemskaja, O. (1987): Russkaja razgovornaja rec' (Teksty) 
[Conversational Russian language]. 220 pp. Nauka, Moskva; Svartvik, J . - Q u i r k , R. (1980): 
A Corpus of English Conversations. Studies in English 56 (a part of 250 pp.). G l e e r u p -
Liber, Lund; La roche -Bouvy : Conversation, jeux et rituels. Unpublished doctoral thesis. 
Sorbonne, Paris; Kundakovic, M.: Prilog proucavanju dijaloga u savremenom francuskom 
jeziku (Contr ibut ion à l 'étude du dialogue en français contemporain) . A par t of unpublished 
transcribed au then t ic conversations. Beograd. 
о 
Langleben, M. (1983): On the s t ruc ture of dialogue. In: Petőfi, J . - S o z e r , E. (eds.): 
Micro and Macro Connexity of Texts, 220-86 . Helmut Buske, Hamburg. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
1 9 4 V E S N A P O L O VINA 
terminology "subtopical units" within the paragraph. This paragraph-based 
analysis provided a framework for fur ther description of the semantic and 
pragmatic characteristics of conversational coherence. The length of the para-
graph and the type of the cohesive ties between them, both in a continuant 
conversation and when a conversation gets occasionally interrupted by verbal 
digressions or some situational factor, depend on a number of exophoric and 
interpersonal factors. 
An important pragmatic finding based on this analysis concerns the av-
erage length of a. paragraph with a single topic, ranging from 7 conversational 
turns, plus or minus 2 turns , suggesting cognitive, psychological constraints on 
the paragraph length. More surprisingly, this average length applies not only 
to the paragraphs of the continuant conversation but also to the "digressive" 
paragraphs. 
The study of the cohesion between these basic communicative units— 
conversational paragraphs—shows an interesting phenomenon, namely, the 
cohesive ties are stronger between two to three paragraphs, either on logical, 
psychological or some other, situational grounds, so that dyadic and tryadic 
cohesive forms, as we called this phenomenon, turn out to be impor tan t char-
acteristics of the authentic spoken conversational language. 
No less important are the tendencies for the choice of topics in the con-
versations of our corpus. This has not been discussed much in l i terature, as 
it is felt tha t somehow such investigations would fall well beyond language 
study. But our corpus shows that, even though the flexibility in changing top-
ics is great , there is nevertheless a number of them tha t occur universally in 
conversations. Such common topics in the corpuses in all four languages are 
given here in the order reflecting their frequency of occurrence: a third person 
(usually not present in the situation of conversation), then work, then lea-
sure activities, and much less than these first three, yet characteristic enough: 
immediate physical situation, weather, language. These are, of course, tenden-
cies, but very strong tendencies, and explicable by their importance for the 
interlocutors. Apart f rom these, in a sense universal themes, many specific, 
culture-based topics appear relating speakers to their relevant speech commu-
nities and country situations. 
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Verba dicendi in Serbocroatian conversations 
The basic verba dicendi in Serbocroatian are given here according to the fre-
quency of their occurrence3 in our corpus: kazati - 'say, tell', reci - 'say, tell ' , 
pricati - 'tell ' , govoriti - ' speak' , zvati se - 'be called, name' , zvati - 'call ' , 
pitati - 'ask' . These are the basic forms, but it should be mentioned tha t 
Serbocroatian has a rich derivational system of affixation tha t either changes 
the meaning of the verb altogether, or its aspectual meaning. This can be 
shown on the example of the two most frequent verbs kazati and reci. Thus 
kazati by means of prefixation becomes dokazati - ' to prove', otkazati - ' to 
cancel', prokazati - 'tell on somebody', etc. By means of infixation these verbs, 
which are perfective, can become imperfective: kazivati, dokazivati, otkazivati, 
prokazivati, now denoting continuant, i terative actions. Beside these deriva-
tional possibilities, the verb kazati, even in its perfective form, can have im-
perfective meaning in the present tense form, in certain contexts. For example 
Ja vam kazem can be translated as "I am telling/speaking to you". On the 
other hand, the verb reci, while it can give other verbs, proreci - 'foretell', for 
example, cannot be imperfectivized. 
The categories of tense and aspect are linked in a complex manner in 
Serbocroatian, so that the present tense of the perfective verbs, for example, 
is normally used in restricted contexts (conditional and intentional sentences). 
This is certainly one of the reasons why the tenses of the two most frequent 
verbs of speaking are distributed in our corpus in a complementary way ( the 
numbers in brackets refer to the number of their occurrences): kazati occurred 
in the present tense form (248), in perfect tense (15), future (3), and imperative 
(7), whereas reci occurred mostly in perfect tense (55), aorist (24), imperative 
(9), and conditional (3). 
It is also interesting to see the use of the grammatical category of person. 
The dominant forms for both kazati and reci are the first and third person, 
which results from the high frequency of the "third person" topic in our con-
versations, since the common role of these verbs is to introduce the direct 
speech of a third person, less often as an introduction to the indirect speech 
and very rarely to introduce free indirect speech. 
The two verbs kazati and reci are in our corpus usually followed by direct 
and indirect object , declarative or intentional sentences. 
о 
For the purpose of our s tudy this is considered to be the most significant criterion, but 
the decision upon the overall s t a tu s of these verbs is according to Verschueren, J. (1989). 
Language on Language: Toward Metapragmat ic Universals. Papers in Pragmatics. Vol. 3., 
No. 2. 
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The high frequency of kazati and reci can, therefore, be explained by 
several factors: firstly, they serve to introduce other persons' speech, secondly, 
they are used not only in their primary meaning but also as synonyms of ' to 
confirm', ' to suggest', ' to assert ' , etc., thirdly they sometimes function as pause 
fillers or hesitations, and lastly they have a cohesive role in conversation. 
As to the other, less frequent verbs in the corpus, the situation is as 
follows: The verb pricati - 'tell', has not been used often, which is not unex-
pected, since it demands a "story-type" object ("story" in Serbocroatian is 
prica. The conversations of the type tha t we analysed do not stand long sto-
ries and monologues, and shorter conversational turns are preferable in such 
situations in which the general tendency toward solidarity in assigning equal 
conversational roles is dominant. 
The verb govoriti - ' to speak' which denotes the action of speech as the 
general human ablitity, is usually followed by a noun or adverbial phrase that 
'qualifies' t ha t ability: govoriti gluposti - 'speak nonsense', govoriti glasno -
'speak loudly' . 
The reflexive zvati se - 'be called, name ' occurred mostly to refer to the 
third person that is being talked about, whereas the non-reflexive zvati - 'call' 
was used in syntagms such as zvati telefonom - 'call by phone' or zvati glasno 
- 'call aloud' . The relatively high frequency of the reflexive zvati se (31) as 
compared to zvati (9) or the other less frequent verbs can be explained by the 
fact that people often discuss the names or nicknames of other persons and 
objects. 
The verb pitati in Serbocroation is seldom used in the sense of ' request ' 
and in fact , it does not occur as such in our corpus. It introduces direct and 
indirect questions. 
The cohesive role of verba dicendi 
It can be shown that the distribution of the basic verba dicendi in spoken 
conversational language, their linguistic and pragmatic context, and cohesive 
function is very similar in all the four languages that we examined. 
In order to preserve the continuity throughout a conversation, as a whole 
speech event, a wide variety of lexical expressions and syntactic devices can 
be used. The continuity may be maintained through the same topic, or several 
connected topics, but as the oft-mentioned features of this type of conversation, 
between friends and acquaintances, spontaneous, casual, are the discontinuity 
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and susceptability to all sorts of interruptions or the flexibility in topic intro-
ducing, the devices for the continuation of a whole conversation are varied, 
depending on the kind and length of the interruption. If verbally expressed, 
the interruptions are most of ten the length of a paragraph, whereas longer in-
terruptions are rare. More precisely, if an interruption occurs after a topic has 
been pursued for some t ime and consists of a shorter paragraph (two to four 
shorter turns) fewer linguistic devices will be needed to restore the original 
theme. As the length of the interruption increases more linguistic devices will 
be used. 
The most common linguistic devices used in such cases are: particles, 
proper names as appelatives, verba dicendi, and repetition of key lexical items 
tha t denote the main topic. For example: 
I dobro, kazes niste uspeli ... ("And O.K., you are saying you didn't 
manage . . . " ) . 
The interruption was relatively long due to the negotiation about how the 
coffee would be served, and it would be impossible without using such cohesive 
items as particle i plus affirmative adjective dobro (good, OK) to signal that 
the successful agreement about the coffee has been completed, and the verb 
kazati to give the explicit invitation to one of the interlocutors to continue 
what he was saying, to restore the previous theme. Mere repetition of the last 
or key words of the preceding topic would be odd because there is always a 
possibility tha t the interlocutors might t ry to interpret them in connection 
with the immediately preceding turns (e.g. in the example above "You did not 
manage to take coffee"). 
Or in this example f rom the English corpus, one of the four participants 
in conversation has not been actively participating in i t , but reading a letter 
by himself, and one of his friends invites him to get involved: 
Tell us, Gordon, will you come out of that letter / tell us ... 
Of course, verba dicendi are not the only linguistic expressions in such 
situations, and we find various other ways to realize cohesive ties in conversa-
tions. In the same English conversation with the four participants we find this 
example: 
Gordon where / a simple question / where ... 
in which the expression a simple question can be expanded into "I want to ask 
you something". In many such cases, it seems that an explicit metapragmatic 
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expression is the easiest and shortest way of restoring continuity after inter-
ruptions. In dyadic and tryadic cohesion, i.e. between two or three paragraphs, 
verba dicendi, or explicit metalinguistic and metapragmatic along with other 
cohesive expressions are often used to establish continuity, especially in those 
cases when the new topics are not so close to the preceding ones, or there is 
some other danger that the interlocutor will have difficulties in grasping tha t 
the speaker's intention is to change the topic. It should be noticed that such 
use of verba dicendi is not an idiolectal fea ture of some speakers, but one of 
the linguistic devices that mus t be used if the conversational flow is to be 
preserved in the same "solidarity" manner. 
The following examples show the situation in which verba dicendi are 
used to perform the cohesive role in a continuant conversation, without inter-
ruptions. In a conversation of four friends meeting after t he holiday tr ips to 
various places, which is the prevailing topic throughout the conversation, one 
begins with: 
Cekaj da ti pricam о starom drustvu . . . ("Wait that I tell you about old 
friends . . . " ) 
and as the conversation goes on new topics are connected to the preceding 
ones by: 
Kazi kako ste provodili dane... ("Tell us how you spent the days") 
the preceding theme being "how they spent the evenings", or 
A mogu ii reci, mi smo jeli . . . , ("And I can tell you, we a te . . . ") 
a f ter the other two participants have informed about their "food" experiences. 
In another conversation between two elderly friends who have not seen 
each other for a long time, the general topic of the whole conversation is "what 
has happened in their lives in the meantime", but one of them puts more 
questions than the other. In order to diminish the effect of an interviewer, 
when the more inquisitive of t he two friends wants to introduce a new topic, 
she often begins with: 
Kazi, Vera, jeste li zamenili stan? . . . , ("Tell me, Vera, have you changed your 
flat? . . . " ) 
A reci mi, kako ti je sestra? . . . , ("Tell me, how is your sister? . . . ") 
It would be very odd indeed, almost impolite if these appelatives and verbs of 
speaking were eliminated, and questions simply uttered wi thout such cohesive 
metapragmatic devices. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
T H E B A S I C VERBA DICENDI AND T H E I R C O H E S I V E R O L E 199 
The verba dicendi may also have an impor tan t role in preserving the 
cohesion within a paragraph. The most characteristic use is exemplified wi th 
the following words from the already quoted "holiday" conversation: 
Sve и svemu, kazem, lepo smo se proveli . . . , ("All in all, I say, we had a nice 
t ime") 
where the verb kazati is used to signalize a generalization, common when a 
speaker thinks tha t a topic has been exhausted. 
That this cohesive role of verba dicendi in conversational language is more 
textual and metapragmatic in nature than we can find in their other uses is 
supported by the fact that in many instances they can be substituted by 
other cohesive verbs such as verbs of perception (listen, hear, . . . ) or verbs of 
cognition (know, understand, . . . ). The following examples will illustrate this: 
AI da cujes ovaj finale ..., ( "But that you hear you the finale" in a ra ther 
literal translation, meaning "you should hear the end of the whole thing . . . " ) . 
In this utterance the verb cuti - "to hear" could be substi tuted by kazati or 
ispricati (followed by the obligatory pronoun as the indirect object) . Similarly 
in: 
Advokata jos nisam uzela [... ] ali sad gledaj, ja odlucim da .., ("The lawyer I 
haven't yet hired one [ . . . ] but now look, I decided to . . . ") 
Instead of the phatic verb of perception gledati we could subst i tu te it with yet 
another verb of perception such as slusati - "listen", or equally with the verb 
of speaking, kazati for example. The same applies to the next example: 
Ej, znas sta, idemo sutra . . . , ("Hey, you know what, tomorrow we are 
going. . ' .") 
in which the verb of cognition znati can be subst i tuted with a verb of speaking 
with the same effect. 
The verbs of perception and cognition in all these examples signalize t he 
continuation of a topic after a certain interruption, verbal or non-verbal, or 
tha t the speaker is continuing the same thread of conversation and at the same 
t ime warning the listener tha t a new topic or subtopic is being introduced. 
These verbs of cognition and perception have the same cohesive role as 
the verba dicendi, and they can be relatively easily substituted for one another 
in these contexts without any particular change in meaning. 
They all characteristically occur at the beginning of a turn that intro-
duces a new theme, and at the beginning of a turn of new interlocutor. B u t 
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in comparison with other cohesive devices verba dicendi show certain specific 
distribution. While appelatives occur a t distant par t s of conversations, and 
particles can function to connect two successive turns , the verba dicendi in 
their cohesive role clearly signalize the introduction of a generalization, expla-
nation, more precise description, i.e. to connect subtopical or paragraph units. 
Thus, they serve to bridge possible metaconversational misunderstandings be-
tween the interlocutors, signalizing explicitly the metapragmatic action in the 
conversation. 
This analysis of the way the basic verba dicendi are used in Serbocroatian 
and other languages clearly shows t h a t they have a major role in preserving 
cohesion in spoken conversational language by fulfilling their metapragmatic 
functions. 
Address of t h e author: Vesna Polovina 
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METAPRAGMATIC TERMS OR THE 
EXPRESSION OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE: 
THE CASE OF CAUSAL CONJUNCTIONS 
SONIA V A N D E P I T T E 
) 
In English some causal conjunctions introduce an adverbial clause in which 
the idea expressed (or prepositional content) is not causally linked to the idea 
expressed (or prepositional content) in the main clause. Examples of such 
non-propositional adverbial clauses are the following: 
(1) (a) "Percy is in Washington, for he phoned me from there." (Quirk et al. 
1985,1104). 
(2) (a) Considerable help will be provided to re ta in experienced teachers who 
are urgently needed because there will be a financial incentive for 
them to stay. (POA.4F. 1131) 
(3) (a) All we are saying in our report is t h a t as circumstances have now 
changed, as reprocessing is responsible for 75% or more of the volume 
of radioactive waste and we have no satisfactory means of disposing 
of radioactive waste in this country as yet, should we not reconsider 
our whole philosophy in this particular area? (VI. 7) 
(4) (a) Since some of the oil companies have threatened to get out of North 
Sea, will my right hon. Friend say whether they have indicated where 
else they could go on less tough terms than the Government are now 
suggesting? (POA.20J. 1007) 
(5) (a) Now that the Treasury has at last yielded the principle of indexation 
by indexing savings bonds—which I welcome—is it not high time to 
extend indexation to taxation? (POA.30J. 602) 
(6) (a) That is why in Brussels at the present moment, eh, we are discussing, 
eh, labelling of animal feed—on mixed feeds and compound feeds so 
that the farmer knows when he looks at a cattle feed bag exactly what's 
in it. (PI . 96) 
(7) (a) It was the very strong feeling of [ . . . ] tha t meeting tha t we should 
support the , eh, situation such that the ambulance service should be 
treated as a special case within the health service. (VI. 104) 
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In example ( l a ) , for instance, it is not the case tha t Percy's phonecall from 
Washington is the reason for him being there. At least , our judgement that it 
is not the case that Percy's phonecall f rom Washington is the reason for him 
being there is made and will be accepted on the basis of a set of assumptions 
an individual has gathered about the world which is individual, temporal and 
culture-specific and which I will call an individual's 'knowledge of the uni-
verse'. This knowledge of the universe does not allow us to relate somebody's 
phonecall from a place to him being there in a causal relation. Neither does 
this knowledge of the universe allow us to accept tha t it is because I checked 
my bank account this morning, that there 's no longer anything in i t , as in 
example ( l b ) below. 
Among these non-propositional adverbial clauses, two types can, in fact, 
be distinguished semantically. In one type (examples ( l a ) to (7a) above) the 
cause is a sufficient condition for the consequence, i.e. the cause entails the 
consequence. In examples ( la) - (5a) this cause is expressed by the subclause, 
whereas in examples (6a) and (7a), the cause is expressed by the main clause. 
In the other type the cause is not a sufficient nor a necessary condition 
for the consequence. This type is exemplified in utterances ( lb ) - (6b) below: 
(1) (b) I have nothing in my bank account for I checked this morning. 
(2) (b) "I have nothing in my bank account, because I checked this morning.'" 
(Quirk et al. 1985,1072) 
(3) (b) LLAs you're in charge, where are the files on the new project?" 
(ibid., 1104) 
(4) (b) "What does this word mean, since you're so clever ?" (ibid., 1072) 
(5) (b) Now that the White Paper on Public Expenditure has shown that 
the government no longer believe that that is possible, when will the 
right hon. Gentleman be meeting the T U C leaders to tell them? 
(POA. 4F. 1141) 
(6) (b) I very much share the view which has been expressed by the Director of 
Fair Trading. I think the grounds for reference for these takeover bids 
should be changed, so that instead of the Director of Fair Trading 
having to establish that a bid is against the public interest, it should 
be up to those proposing the merger to prove that it's in the public 
interest. (PI. 29) 
Syntactically and phonetically, however, all 'non-propositional' adverbial 
clauses ( l a ) - (7a ) and ( lb ) - (6b ) share the same specific features in contrast 
with the 'propositional' adverbial clauses (as in, for instance, He called from 
Washington cos he was worried), as has been pointed out in the li terature 
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by Rutherford (1970), Williams (1975), Haegeman (1985), Quirk et al. (1985, 
1070ÍT) and Haegeman (1987, 2-3) (intonation, cleft-sentence construction, 
etc.) . 
In order to explain this type of non-propositional clause, it has been 
claimed that , instead of linking the two propositional forms of the subclause 
and the main clause, these conjunctions link the adverbial subclause to an 
implicit clause like I claim this ... от I say this ... (see for example Quirk et 
al. (1985, 884) and also the—explicit or implicit—proponents of Ross's (1970) 
performative hypothesis: Rutherford (1970, 96 and 98ff), Sadock (1974,38), 
Henschelmann (1977,178) and Coppieters (1984-5, 55ff and 64)). In o ther 
words, these conjunctions and their clauses are also linked to what have been 
called performative verbs or illocutionary acts: 
"Les adverbiaux de relation causale [ . . . ] peuvent aussi se situer à un 
niveau plus abstrait et concerner l 'énonciation ou l ' ac te illocutoire." 
(Korzen 1985, ch. II) 
This means that these adverbial clauses refer to the speaker 's awareness 
of her communicative activities, just like the other explicit metapragmatic ex-
pressions do: performative verbs, speech act verbs, or adverbials like personally 
speaking in example (8): 
(8) Personally speaking, I d idn ' t really like the course. 
The labels assigned to them by Quirk et al. (1985, 618 and 1072)— 
'comment disjunct ' and 'style disjunct'—also suggest that they can be classi-
fied with the other types of indicators of metacommunicative awareness. 
However, causal adverbial clauses do not share the same characteristics 
with adverbials like personally speaking. T h e latter could be considered as 
'direct ' metapragmatic terms: there is some explicit reference to the act of 
speaking or communicating. T h e causal adverbial clauses, on the other hand , 
do not contain this explicit reference and could therefore be called ' indirect ' 
metapragmatic indicators: they do not explicitly express in any form whatso-
ever the activity of speaking. Tha t there is a difference between the 'd i rect ' 
and 'indirect' types of adverbials is further reflected in some distinct linguistic 
characteristics. Only the ' indirect ' causal adverbials can be linked to impera-
tives, the 'direct ' comment disjuncts cannot (Quirk et al. 1985, 828). Consider 
the examples below: 
(9) Give me the answer, since you're so clever. 
(10) ? Give me the answer, personally speaking. 
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The ' indirect ' adverbial can occur as the answer t o a WH-question con-
taining the activity of speaking, the 'd i rect ' one cannot, as examples (11) and 
(12) illustrate: 
(11) A. Why did you say you have nothing in your bank account? 
B. Because I checked this morning. 
(12) A. W h y / How did you say you d idn ' t like the course? 
B. ? Speaking personally. 
Apart f rom the performative explanation of causal adverbial clauses, other 
accounts have been presented. These, too, include reference to a link between 
the causal adverbial clause and an implicit clause. Th i s time, however, the 
clause does not contain a performative verb but ra ther a cognitive one like / 
think this, I believe this, I judge(d) or and I know, and I am sure of it, and 
and I am convinced of it. On this account, a sentence like (2b) is not related 
to sentence (13). 
(13) I tell you that I have nothing in my bank account because I checked this 
morning. 
but to sentence (14): 
(14) I know that I have nothing in my bank account because I checked this 
morning. 
In other words, the adverbial clause need not reflect a mefacommunicat ive 
awareness in the strict sense: it can also reflect a kind of metacognitive1 aware-
ness. Hence, adverbial causal clauses need not express a reason for ut tering 
a sentence: instead, they can contain an argument for jus t having a specific 
thought or belief, or to use a more precise term derived from philosophy 
which has already been used in pragmatics, for example, by Sperber-Wilson 
(1986, 73), the propositional att i tude t h a t the speaker has (consciously or not) 
when she expresses the ut terance. It denotes the way in which the speaker en-
tertains an idea, whether, for instance, she believes it t o be a true s ta te of 
affairs, or whether she wishes it to be a t rue state of affairs. 
Does this then mean that there are several types of metapragmatic 
awareness to be distinguished? The expression of these types could then be 
1
 The t e rm m e t a c o g n i t i v e is only valid as a notion in a theory in which cognitive 
representat ions of language are assumed, and in which one can therefore find the concept I 
think that I think. 
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summarized as follows. In sentence (15) no metapragmatic awareness is ex-
pressed, while sentences (16) and (17) are both examples in which metaprag-
matic awareness is communicated. Sentence (16) expresses metacommunica-
tive awareness and sentence (17) metacognitive awareness: 
(15) This is X. 
(16) I tell you this is X. 
(17) I believe this is X. 
But if it is the case that there are several types of metapragmatic awareness, 
how do we distinguish between them? This question reminds us, in fac t , of 
one of the main controversies surrounding the performative hypothesis: what 
is the exact wording of the implicit clause and on what should this formulation 
be based? 
One of the problems is, indeed, t ha t both types of metapragmatic 
causal adverbials—i.e. both metacommunicative and metacognitive causal 
adverbials—share the same characteristics. It is often not easy to identify 
even within a context whether a causal adverbial is intended as metacommu-
nicative or as metacognitive. Is a sentence like (2b) intended to express (13) 
or is it intended to express (14)? 
Consequently, as far as causal conjunctions are concerned, the language 
system does not seem to provide a distinction between a speaker referring to 
her cognitive activities (beliefs or prepositional attitudes) and a speaker refer-
ring to her communicative activities. Hence, linguistically, there does not seem 
to be a reason to make the distinction. Yet, epistemologically, it is possible 
to draw a distinction between a prepositional attitude (belief or wish) on the 
one hand and a communicative act on the other. Consider, for instance, the 
following sentences: 
(18) "X because Y" 
(expression of a prepositional form) 
(19) "I te l l /ask/command X because Y"2 
(expression of the act of expressing a prepositional form) 
2 
T h e causal clauses (because Y) link Y to the complete sequence preceding the clause: 
(I t e l l / ask /command X) because Y 
(I believe X) because Y. 
They cannot be used as metapragmat ic te rms to link Y to X only: 
I t e l l / a sk /command (X because Y) 
I believe (X because Y). 
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(20) "I believe X because Y " 
(expression of t he prepositional form and the at t i tude towards that 
prepositional fo rm) 
In sentence (18) a prepositional form (X because Y) is expressed, in sen-
tence (19) it is a communicative act containing the prepositional form X be-
cause Y, and in sentence (20) , finally, the speaker not only expresses a prepo-
sitional form (X because Y) but also her at t i tude towards that prepositional 
form. One solution to this difficulty is to assume that underlying each com-
municative act there is always a prepositional att i tude (whether the speaker 
is conscious of it or not) .3 Hence, each basic communicative act can be re-
traced to one specific type of propositional attitude. A statement could then 
be paraphrased as follows: 
(19) (a) When I tell you (X because Y), I also want you to believe tha t 4 I 
believe (X because Y). 
And the following paraphrases can be suggested for the ac ts of asking (sentence 
(19b)) and commanding (sentence (19c)) respectively: 
(19) (b) When I ask you X—i.e. when I want to get this piece of information— 
I want you to tell m e X. 
(19) (c) When I command you X—i.e. when I ask you to do X—I want you 
to do X. 
(cf. also Sperber-Wilson 1986). 
In other words, the basic speech acts all seem to go back to the prepositional 
at t i tude of wishing. In fact , this underlying propositional at t i tude is probably 
a pragmatic universal. Pu t differently, each utterance expresses or refers to 
the speaker's intentions. W h e n the speaker uses a metapragmatic te rm (and 
in particular a causal adverbial clause), what she does is either to refer to 
the propositional attitude of belief (telling, believing) or t o refer to the propo-
sitional a t t i tude of wish (asking, commanding). If the speaker construes a 
metapragmatic causal clause, she gives a reason for the propositional a t t i tude 
t ha t has remained implicit (19d-g): 
Note tha t the reverse need not be the case, i.e. each proposi t ional at t i tude need not 
be accompanied by a communicat ive act. 
4
 One might argue that a s t a t e m e n t could also be paraphrased eis follows: 
When I tell you (X because Y) I believe (X because Y). 
I have added the phrase I want you to believe that in order t o account for those cases 
in which the speaker is insincere. 
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(19) (d) When (I tell you X) because Y, I also want you to believe that [(I 
believe X) because Y]. 
(19) (e) When (I ask you X) because Y, I also want you (to tell me X) because 
Y. 
(19) ( f) When (I command you X) because Y, I also want you (to do X) 
because Y. 
(19) (g) When (I believe X) because Y, I may (tell you X) because Y, i.e. I 
may also want you to believe that [(I believe X) because Y]. 
If we assume tha t this is the case, i.e. that metapragmatic terms indirectly 
refer to att i tudes, and if we assume that , at least in Western culture and in 
formal language, one should not express personal things, and hence not one's 
a t t i tudes either, we might expect informal speech to contain more references to 
the speaker's propositional a t t i tudes (whether in the form of direct or indirect 
metapragmatic terms) than more formal speech. 
The results of an investigation into a corpus of causal adverbial clauses 
only (and not any of the other metapragmatic terms) contradict , however, 
these expectations. In this study I have tried to classify each example out of a 
total of 1500 cases in which two causally related states of affairs are expressed, 
either as propositional or as metapragmatic. For some utterances (about 5% 
of all utterances investigated), it was impossible to make a straightforward 
decision, in which case the example has not been classified. 
The following registers were included in the corpus: Radio 4 news inter-
views with politicians (PI), Radio 4 news interviews with other people (VI), 
parliamentary oral answers (POA), and conversations (S).5 From each register, 
a total of 375 instances of causal clauses was collected. 
Three of the four registers investigated seem to use about the same num-
ber of metapragmatic causal clauses: both types of interviews and the conver-
sations. In these registers the conjunctions initiating a consequence introduce 
1.5 to 2 times as many metapragmatic clauses as the conjunctions initiating a 
cause. Consider the figures in the table below: 
5
 T h e corpus consists of the following parts: 
S: S.1.10, S.1.12, S.2.6, S.2.7, S.2.8, S.2.9, S.2.12, S.2.13 and S.3.4 f rom A Corpus of 
English Conversation (Sva r tv ik -Qui rk 1980). 
VI: 130 interviews with various people recorded f rom BBC Radio 4 news interviews 
broadcast between 3rd December 1985 and 10th February 1990. 
PI: 150 interviews with politicians recorded from BBC Radio 4 news interviews broad-
cast between 3rd December 1985 and 10th February 1990. 
POA: 15 sections f rom T h e Par l iamentary Debates-Off ic ia l R e p o r t - H o u s e of C o m m o n s -
Oral answers to Questions between 13th January 1975 and 5th February 1975. 
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propositional metapragmatic 
causal consecutive causal consecutive 
PI 149 128 10 21 
VI 145 129 12 17 
POA 143 74 73 63 
S 126 171 12 21 
Total 563 502 107 122 
It is only the parliamentary oral answers (POA) t h a t show remarkable fig-
ures. These can, however, be easily explained: one of the rules governing that 
part of the Parliamentary Debates in Westminster is the requirement that 
Members are only allowed to ask questions, and t h a t they must not hold a 
monologue. Since Members do want to present arguments for their views, they 
integrate them within their questions and present them as reasons for asking 
their questions. 
Other results form the investigation are the following. It seems that one 
out of ten to fifteen clauses introduced by a causal or consecutive conjunction 
is metapragmatic. We must conclude from this t ha t expressing one's propo-
sitional a t t i tude is a fairly frequent phenomenon. As far as the frequency of 
each separate conjunction in a metapragmatic clause is concerned, the fol-
lowing order (going f rom the most frequent conjunction to the least frequent 
conjunction) can be set up: so that, because, as, and since. The conjunctions 
now that, that's why and such that occur only rarely in metapragmatic clauses. 
For a further analysis of the conjunctions introducing metapragmatic 
causal adverbials, however, it is insufficient to rely on propositional attitudes 
only: each metapragmatic causal adverbial itself carries with it the same propo-
sitional at t i tude of belief (or wish tha t the addressee believes tha t the speaker 
believes). Instead, the conjunctions differ from each other, for instance, in the 
degree of manifestness (Sperber-Wilson 1986) of the s ta te of affairs expressed 
by the clause. Since, for example, suggests that the speaker thinks that the 
causal relation expressed in the sentence is already regarded by the listener as 
a manifest state of affairs: 
(21) " S i n c e it was Saturday, he stayed in bed an ex t ra hour" (Collins 1987). 
This could be visualized by a gradient representing the degree of manifestness 
of a s ta te of affairs (cf. Vandepitte 1990-1991). It means that the same kind 
of difference between conjunctions used propositionally can also be found if 
these conjunctions occur in metapragmatic use. 
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Summarizing, this article presents some evidence for the existence of so-
called 'indirect ' metapragmatic terms. It illustrates this for one particular 
type, tha t of causal adverbial clauses. Further investigation is now needed 
into other ' indirect ' metapragmatic indicators, such as the causal adverbial 
conjuncts like thus and therefore, and the reformulatory conjuncts like rather 
(Quirk et al. 1985, 618). Secondly, the article introduces a cognitive basis—i.e. 
a propositional at t i tude—to which these indirect metapragmatic adverbials 
can be related. We need, of course, more research before we can conclude 
whether propositional atti tudes constitute the basis for other metapragmatic 
adverbials and for the metapragmatic terms in general, and whether more 
instruments are required for an investigation into their distinctive character-
istics. 
The cognitive basis suggested, however, broadens the field of investigation 
of metapragmatic terms. Not only speech act verbs or performative verbs 
should be included but also the so-called cognitive verbs, especially when used 
in the first person present tense indicative. 
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THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE ON LANGUAGE: 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS" 
J E F V E R S C H U E R E N 
1. Introduction: The research 
The definite article in the title of this paper should be interpreted with care. It 
is not intended to cover the entire category of investigations which could b e a r 
the label ' the study of language on language'. Nor does it refer to the exam-
ple par excellence. Thus we are not concerned with historical or philosophical 
approaches to language on language; nor do we touch upon indicators of lin-
guistic awareness other than verbs. Yet replacing the definite by an indefinite 
article would also have been problematic: Though the methodological prob-
lems to be discussed are characteristic of one particular s tudy of language on 
language, especially the theoretical implications are much wider, as we hope 
to demonstrate. 
1.1. Background 
The specific study under discussion is to be situated within an empirical-
conceptual approach to linguistic action (LA),1 interpretable as a form of 
ethnography of communication. The approach in question is an a t tempt to 
come to grips with the varying ways in which linguistic behavior is concep-
tualized by those engaged in it , by way of scrutinizing empirically observ-
able linguistic reflections of those conceptualizations (such as linguistic act ion 
verbials—LAVs for short—i.e. the verbs and verb-like expressions used, in 
* This paper was presented at the Symposium on Metapragmat ic Terms, held in Bu-
dapest f rom July 2 to 4, 1990. It is based on work suppor ted by a research grant f rom t h e 
Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research, and the final version was written under t h e 
auspices of the Belgian National Lottery and a Belgian government program ( I U A P - I I , 
contract number 27). 
1
 The approach was originally defined in those t e rms in Verschueren (1979, 1985) and 
fur ther exemplified in Verschueren (ed.) (1987). However, it is related to a much older and 
wider t radi t ion; references are to be found in the publicat ions mentioned. 
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natural language, to talk about the conceptualized behavior). This form of 
metapragmatics is motivated by the assumption that the meaning of social 
practices can only be fully understood by gaining insight into the worlds of 
ideas with which the participants associate them, and in terms of which they 
interpret t hem. Its ult imate goal, which can only be achieved af ter further 
scrutiny of t h e complex interactions between concepts and actual practices, 
is to shed light on cross-linguistic and cross-cultural communication problems 
which may result , in pa r t , from differences in the menta l frames in terms 
of which interacting members of different linguistic, cultural, or subcultural 
backgrounds, operate communicatively. 
Inseparable from the search for those differences, is a desire to locate 
similarities. Not only is there a logical connection between the two enterprises, 
but especially in an imponderable area such as the lexicalization of concepts 
of linguistic action, there is a strong temptat ion to regard the identification 
of similarities as a logically first step— though this step itself requires careful 
attention to mostly divergent data from a wide range of languages. In addition, 
an interest in the problem we have defined, detached f rom the potential quest 
for its solution, would be merely frivolous if not irresponsible. The belief that 
solutions to cross-cultural communication problems may exist, is tenable only 
on the assumption that people can learn foreign languages and can acquire the 
skills needed to function 'properly' in a foreign culture's communicative style. 
This assumption, for which human experience provides ample evidence, can 
presumably be explained only on the basis of a universal core inherent in all 
languages and cultures. T h e discovery of aspects of this universal core would 
be an invaluable step towards understanding the differences and, therefore, 
towards solving the problems resulting f rom them. 
Especially—but by no means only—in the domain of linguistic (in-
t e rac t ion or verbal behavior, the only safe starting point in this quest is an 
assumption of minimal universality: nothing should be considered a universal 
until conclusive evidence stemming f rom wide-ranging comparative research 
has been obtained. Given the large number of languages to be investigated 
in order to avoid genetic, areal, typological, and cultural biases, and given 
the large number of LAVs in most languages, the search for metapragmatic 
universale within a lexical version of the empirical-conceptual approach to lin-
guistic action (focusing on lexicalizations of linguistic action as reflections of 
underlying conceptual pa t te rns) may run into serious problems on account of 
this at t i tude. 
For this reason, an a t t emp t should be made to identify more restricted, 
conceptually basic, sets of LAVs which are small enough to make the topic 
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of investigation manageable across a wide range of languages. This search for 
basic linguistic action verbs (BLAVs) cannot be carried out successfully unless 
the LAV lexicons of na tura l languages show a hierarchical structure of some 
sort. As Wierzbicka (1988) points out in her comments on the project , the 
existence of such a hierarchy cannot be taken for granted: 
"The idea [ . . . ] is attractive, but I believe t ha t it is based on a 
dubious assumption. There is no reason to suppose, a priori, that the 
lexicon of speech act verbs will have a kind of hierarchical s tructure 
similar to the folk-taxonomies of animals or plants, or to the sets of 
color terms. The problem is empirical and has to be solved on the 
basis of a detailed semantic analysis of a large number of speech act 
verbs" (111-2).2 
The issue is indeed empirical. But since the aim is to identify those sets of 
LAVs which occupy a basic level in language-specific lexicalizations of linguis-
tic action concepts (in view of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural differences in 
conceptualization), the issue can only be approached in terms of the relation-
ships which speakers themselves can observe between the LAVs of their own 
individual languages, and not in terms of relationships which emerge f rom a 
uniform application of anything comparable to the 'semantic primitives' anal-
ysis proposed by Wierzbicka (1972,1980, 1985)—though the latter has already 
been applied with great skill and patience to speech act verbs (see Wierzbicka 
1987). A language-internal identification of a set of BLAVs can be carried out 
only on the basis of a number of operational criteria which can be reason-
ably assumed to reflect, with a sufficient degree of accuracy, language-specific 
conceptual basicness within the LAV lexicon. 
Our research goal in the work commented upon here (and reported exten-
sively in Verschueren 1989) was to discover sets of LAVs which are conceptu-
ally 'basic' in a representative sample of the world's languages, by applying a 
number of operational criteria to define sets of BLAVs in a uniform, and hence 
cross-linguistically and cross-culturally comparable way. Further, a compari-
son of the operationally defined sets of BLAVs (if the investigation shows that 
they can indeed be isolated) was intended to lead to the discovery and for-
mulation of universal tendencies in the lexicalization of linguistic action, or, 
Similarly, Herb Clark (personal communication) has remarked, quite correctly, tha t 
the existence of a strict parallelism between the hierarchical s t ruc ture of biological folk 
taxonomies and the conceptual relationships between verbs cannot be simply pos tu la ted . 
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in language on language. The original idea was to look for synchronic impli-
cational universals comparable to those found for color terms (see Berlin-Kay 
1969) and plant and animal names (see Brown 1977, 1979, 1984). 
1.2. Methodology 
Two categories of operational criteria were used to identify the sets of basic 
linguistic action verbs in each individual language investigated. A number of 
preliminary screening criteria were used to exclude certain types of LAVs from 
the set of BLAVs. They basically served to reduce the amount of da ta as much 
as possible, as efficiently as possible, as soon as possible, without betraying 
the research goal , i.e. without being obliged to take unwarranted shortcuts by 
simply ignoring LAVs which one would not intuitively ( tha t is, on the basis 
of the researcher's intuition) be inclined to regard as conceptually basic in 
t he domain of linguistic action. Passing all the preliminary screening criteria 
does not automatically qualify a LAV as a member of the set of BLAVs. A 
positive assessment of membership has to follow from da t a obtained through 
elicitation procedures based on the basic conceptual criterion. 
The following preliminary screening criteria are formulated in terms of 
questions a negative answer to which will normally exclude a verb from the 
set of BLAVs for the language concerned. Note the adverb 'normally,' which 
points at the necessity to apply the criteria in a flexible manner—not to be 
confused with arbitrariness. Flexibility is needed, first, because due at tention 
has to be paid to some typological characteristics or idiosyncracies of individual 
languages. Second, most of the criteria bear on gradable notions so tha t a 
mechanical form of decision-making is in principle out. Thi rd , not all of the 
criteria are equally important in view of the research goal; hence decisions 
in terms of one criterion may sometimes overrule decisions based on another 
criterion. For a complete explanation of the criteria, and the way in which 
they were applied, the reader is referred to Verschueren (1989). The criteria: 
PSC1: Is t he LAV monolexemic? 
PSC2: Is t he LAV monomorphemic? And if not, is its meaning se-
mantically non-transparent? 
PSC3: Is t he LAV formally unmarked? 
PSC4: Is t he LAV semantically unmarked? Can it be applied to a 
wide range of arguments? Is its degree of semantic specificity lower 
(or at least not higher) t h a n that of other available terms with related 
meanings? 
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PSC5: Is the LAV pragmatically unmarked? Can its meaning be ade-
quately accounted for in terms of characteristics of the act it describes 
(without reference to the describing act in which it is used)? 
PSC6:Is the only meaning of the LAV a linguistic action meaning? If 
not , is its linguistic action meaning the primary meaning? 
PSC7: Is the LAV psychologically salient for native speakers? 
Positive assessment of membership in the set of BLAVs for any given 
language is a judgment about the conceptual basicness of a LAV. Using def-
initional relationships as indicators for conceptual basicness (just as we used 
the parameters presented in the form of the preliminary screening criteria as 
indicators of conceptual non-basicness) enables us to formulate a semantic op-
erational criterion which is similar to one used by Berlin-Kay (1969,6) for 
basic color terms (viz. "Its signification is not included in that of any other 
color t e rm") , and which is also related to Dixon's (1971) notion of 'nuclear 
verbs'. The most elementary form of the basic conceptual criterion is as fol-
lows: 
BCC: A BLAV cannot be defined in terms of another LAV. 
This criterion, however, requires various modifications, for which, again, we 
have to refer the reader to the more complete report in Verschueren (1989). 
Verbs which are not excluded from further consideration by one or more 
of the preliminary screening criteria, and which pass the test of the basic con-
ceptual criterion (taking into account numerous caveats), belong to the set of 
BLAVs for the language under investigation. It should be clear that the BCC 
makes the verbs satisfying it by excluding each other in paraphrases concep-
tually basic because speakers of the language in question do not (habitually) 
regard the acts they refer to as subtypes of other types of linguistic action. 
An elaborate questionnaire (Verschueren 1984) was developed for the re-
search reflected on in this text . It did not only contain guidelines for applying 
the operational criteria, bu t also a standardized set of speech events. This set 
of speech events was intended to serve two purposes. First, it was meant to 
be used for eliciting LAVs for languages for which no reliable lexicographical 
sources were available. Only in a few cases was the questionnaire actually used 
for that purpose. Second, it was designed to allow us to study the distribution 
of the meaning of the BLAVs singled out on the basis of the operational cri-
teria, across the spectrum of speech events, in a sufficiently uniform manner 
to make decent cross-linguistic comparisons of such distribution possible. So 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
216 J E F V E R S C H U E R E N 
far , this task was performed for only about a dozen languages—not enough to 
draw serious conclusions at this time. 
Except for those languages for which the entire procedure outlined in the 
questionnaire was followed, some shortcuts were taken towards achieving the 
goal of identifying the sets of BLAVs. The first step was lexicographical consul-
tat ion. On the basis of the information found in the available lexicographical 
sources, language-specific ordered sets of questions were constructed, aimed at 
an efficient application of the operational criteria to all LAVs remaining af ter 
excluding those which could already be unambiguously rejected because of the 
lexicographical information. Those questions were used to elicit the missing 
information either by directly working with informants, or by presenting them 
to experts with access to informants. In most of the cases where mediating 
experts were involved, further follow-up questions were required. 
1.3. Research findings 
The structure of the sets of BLAVs 
The BLAVs discovered for the 81 languages of our sample on the basis of 
the operational criteria do not form undifferentiated sets.3 At least six clearly 
distinguishable types can be observed. 
(i) Base 
There are BLAVs such as to say and to speak which can be used to describe 
any type of linguistic action. In their most general sense they mean ' to use 
language', ' to express linguistically'. This does not preclude their having more 
specific senses as well, as is the case with to say in the sense of 'to s ta te ' . 
However, any other LAV can be defined in terms of at least one of them. 
Because of this property, and because of the semantic generality of which it is 
a consequence, we regard them as base items. 
All languages in our sample have at least one base i tem. Most languages 
(43 from our sample, or 53%) have two base items; there are 16 with one (Fore, 
Gbeya, Grebo, Hausa, Kalam, Kera, Kewa, Kiowa, Lingala, Ngizim, Nukuoro, 
Polish, Russian, Sranan Tongo, Warlpiri, Wolof), 13 with three (Blackfoot, 
Bobo Fing, Ch'ol , Hanunoo, Kamchadal, Khmer, Kwanyama, Maidu, Sotho, 
Remember t h a t also B e r l i n - K a y ' s (1969) sets of basic color t e r m s do not form fully 
continuous sets of contrasts. The only contrast lexicalized in all languages (black vs. white) 
is mainly a contras t in terms of brightness (dark vs. light), whereas most additional basic 
color terms (red, green, yellow, e tc . ) are differentiated along the p a r a m e t e r of hue. 
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Yimas, Yoruba, Yup'ik, Zulu), and 9 with four (Emai, Hawaiian, Kilivila, 
Maori, Nisenan, Nubian, Ojibwa, Xhosa, Yurok). 
(ii) Core 
The base items are not the only members of what could be called the concep-
tual core of the LAV lexicon. The label is motivated by the fact that these 
so-called 'core items' have a disproportionately wider range of linguistic action 
tokens within their scope than any of the other BLAVs. 
The distinction between base and non-base core items is a gradual one. 
Closest to the base, for English, is to talk. It differs from to speak in tha t , 
though it can sometimes be used in the general sense of 'using language', 
it is generally restricted to contexts in which there is a clear implication of 
reciprocity; its basic meaning seems to be something like ' to converse'. 
Similarly, to tell is very close to to say. It is further removed from the 
base, however, since it cannot be used in the general sense of 'using language' 
and always carries the more specific meanings of 'informing' (i.e. 's tat ing' with 
a clearly present addressee), 'narrat ing ' , or—derivatively—'ordering'. 
It is not always easy to decide whether equivalents of to talk and to tell 
should be treated as base items or as non-base core items. Especially in cases 
where more than two items were placed in the base (see the lists under (i)) 
it is quite possible tha t further research will show that one or more of them 
belong to the core outside of the base. Given the difference in distance from 
the base, this possibility is stronger for items which might have to take up 
the ' ta lk ' slot (which is filled in only 13 cases now); the risk of misjudgment 
in the case of 'tell ' BLAVs (49 cases listed now) is lower because of the larger 
distance from the core. 
A further core item is to ask. Of the 81 sample languages, only 8 do 
not have an 'asking' term with BLAV status. Of those who do, 24 have a 
BLAV equivalent to English to ask in that it incorporates both 'question' and 
'request ' senses (one of these, Dongolese Nubian, has two BLAVs with both 
meanings: tdd(i) and sikk(i)\ three of them, Tunica, Ngizim, and Shuswap, have 
an additional 'asking' term: Ngizim jàayu ' to ask [question]', Tunica wira ' to 
ask [question]', and Shuswap q°ex-m ' t o ask for [object]'). Kabyle Berber, Hopi, 
Nukuoro, Persian, Cuzco Quechua, and Wolof only have 'asking' terms with 
a 'question' meaning (Persian has two, as a result of some special properties 
of the Persian lexicon pointed out before; the others only one). Languages 
with only a 'requesting' BLAV do not occur in our sample at all. 41 languages 
have two terms distinguishing ' to ask (question)' (e.g. German fragen) from 
' to ask (request) ' (e.g. German bitten); but in many of these, the 'question' 
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BLAV seems to be extendable to the description of 'requesting' acts, whereas 
we have not been able to observe the reverse. Exceptionally, languages make 
a three-fold 'asking' distinction: 
1. asking a question; 
2. asking for some object; 
3. asking someone to do something. 
In our sample, only Kamchadal fully fits this paradigm: Unj (1), anst (2), 
nest (3). A few other languages, however, make use of the possibilities of this 
three-fold distinction. We have already noted Shuswap cfex-m (2), occurring 
in addition to a verb with both 'question' and ' request ' senses, 
(iii) Periphery 
There is a special category of BLAVs which we call peripheral because their 
acceptance as BLAVs seemingly violates PSC4: i ts English members are to 
name and to count. These verbs, indeed, refer to rather restricted kinds of 
activities. This fact is counterbalanced, however, by the following observations: 
- They occur very frequently. 
- The constraints are not of an institutional kind. 
The second observation does not count for to name in the sense of 'giving 
a name' , an activity which is usually surrounded by a more or less strong 
institutional context. Hence 'naming' verbs which exclusively mean ' to give 
a name' were eliminated. As soon as they allow additional modes of usage 
related to 'mentioning by name' or 'referring to ' (as in "Name the capital of 
the United States" or "Name something, and I'll get it for you"), 'enumerating' 
(as in "Name the fifty states"), or even 'calling by name', they are accepted 
as BLAVs unless one or more of the other criteria blocks this possibility. It 
should be clear from this that there are different shades of BLAV-ness among 
'naming' verbs; thus French nommer may be a more dubious case than English 
to name. The case for including 'naming ' verbs is strengthened, however, not 
only by their intuitive importance and their irreducibility to other LAVs, but 
also by their occasional identity with base items (interpretable as a specialized 
meaning of the 'unique beginner' on a lower level of the lexical hierarchy), as 
in Blackfoot, Maidu, Nisenan, and Dongolese Nubian. 
For the BLAV s ta tus of irreducible 'counting' verbs, there are even 
stronger indications, in spite of the fact that counting may arguably also be a 
mental activity (an assumption supported by the fact that the verbs in ques-
tion often also mean ' to reckon, est imate, etc.'; consider, for instance, also 
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Wintu X'a-mah to count, figure, reckon' which is related to A'am ' t o think') . 
First, their occurrence is nearly universal (67 cases f rom our sample, or 83%). 
Second, from a diachronic point of view, they are of ten the basis for other 
LAVs, some of which are even BLAVs. Thus a diversity of languages seems to 
testify to a conceptual link between 'counting' and ' te l l ing/narrat ing ' : Span-
ish contar realizes both meanings fully; English to tell itself used to have 
a 'counting' meaning which still surfaces in some contexts; English to count 
vs. to recount; French compter vs. raconter; Dutch teilen vs. vertellen; Ger-
man zählen vs. erzählen; Yana dau ' to count ' vs. daumai ' to recount, retell'. 
Similarly, the meaning of Limba kondi ' t o count' is extendable to ' t o relate, 
narrate; notify, say, tell; acknowledge'. Tunica wi'ra means both ' to coun t ' and 
' to ask (question)' . And Greek légó used to mean, in Homeric times, ' t o pick 
out, select; collect, enumerate, recount'; it then became the usual word for 'to 
speak' and ' to say', and it further specialized its meaning to the Modern Greek 
' to say'. A third observation underscores both its conceptual importance and 
its peripheral position: in a very wide range of languages, 'counting' verbs are 
the basis for or extend their meaning to 'reading' (e.g. Emai, Fore, Gbeya, 
German, Hungarian, Lenakel, Miwok, Nukuoro, Ojibwa, Venda, Yup' ik , and 
many more).4 
Both 'naming' and 'counting' BLAVs were found in 32 languages; a 'nam-
ing' verb only in 5 languages; a 'counting' verb only in 34 languages; and one 
language, Lingala, has one verb, -tánga, for both 'counting' and 'naming ' . 
(iv) Interaction 
Most types of linguistic action involve interaction. The BLAV types considered 
so far, however, do not explicitly focus on the interactive aspects of verbal 
behavior. These aspects remain implicit, except in the case of to talk and its 
equivalents, which tend to require reciprocity ('conversing') in most instances 
of use. About 50% of our sample languages (41 out of 81) also have a BLAV 
which focuses explicitly on interaction by describing a conversational move 
which necessarily follows speech by someone else: to answer and its equivalents. 
4
 In spite of the decision to keep counting verbs in the set of BLAVs, and in spite 
of all the arguments we can think of to jus t i fy tha t decision, t he case for to count as a 
BLAV is no doubt the weakest one. Independent evidence for th is comes from a tentat ive 
explanation of performativi ty (see Verschueren n.d.) according t o which passing P S C 5 would 
entail the possibility of explicit performative use for the verb in question. W h e r e a s this 
entai lment seems to match linguistic facts for all other BLAVs (except, of course, the non-
action BLAVs), it does not do so in the case of to count. 
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The reason why an 'answering' BLAV is to be found in only 50% of the 
sample, is that t h e concept lends itself to semantically t ransparent compound-
ing and derivation (forming i tems to be excluded on the basis of PSC2) and to 
semantic extensions of ' returning' verbs (to be excluded on the basis of PSC6) . 
'Answering' BLAVs never coincide with any other BLAVs, except for one 
case where (not surprisingly, since both involve interaction though one more 
explicitly than the other) it is the same verb as the ' ta lking (conversing)' 
BLAV: Osage u-ki'-e. The same relationship emerges from quite a number of 
non-basic LAVs in the investigated languages. Just two examples: 
Hanunóo magsaragtán ' t o talk, answer back and 
for th to each other , as of a 
group of people on the 
t rai l ' (cf. the noun sagút 
'answer') 
Hausa tanka/tamka ' t o converse, to talk much' 
bu t also ' to reply ' 
(v) Social routine 
A fifth category of BLAVs covers a domain of verbal behavior which can 
be labeled social routines. Its only members are to greet and to thank and 
their equivalents. Though the behavior in question usually manifests itself in 
formulaic expressions (which restricts the scope of applicability) and though 
a t least 'greeting' can usually b e non-verbal as well as verbal, there are good 
reasons to accept the BLAV s t a tu s of the corresponding LAVs. 
The potential counterarguments tentatively adduced in the foregoing sen-
tence are not based on properties which could give us something to go by in 
an at tempt to exclude the verbs on the basis of our operational criteria. The 
restricted scope (reminding us of PSC4) has nothing to do wi th a high degree 
of specialization or institutional constraints, only with the forms of expression. 
In this respect, to greet and to thank contrast sharply with the much more 
specialized to apologize and to congratulate (for which direct equivalents are to 
be found in only a small minority of the world's languages); acts of 'greeting' 
and ' thanking'—in that order—are extremely pervasive in human interaction. 
As to the non-verbal nature of many acts of 'greeting', this does not help us 
to apply PSC6 since in most cases native speakers cannot decide whether the 
verbal or the non-verbal action meaning is primary. There are, of course, some 
noteworthy exceptions, such as the following: 
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Ojibwa namkawaad ' to greet someone' 
anam + ik + aw + aa + d 
[greet] [use the body] [abstract final] [3-object] [3-subject] 
Similarly, one other quite common type of specificity rules out the BLAV-ness 
of a number of 'greeting' verbs. An example: 
Luiseno патока- ' to greet visitors, receive guests ' 
(Many 'greeting' verbs acceptable as BLAVs incorporate this 'welcoming' 
meaning.) 
Social routine BLAVs occur in 44 languages (i.e. 54% of our sample). Of 
these, 20 languages have two terms corresponding more or less to English to 
greet and to thank; 19 have only a 'greeting' term, 3 only a ' thanking' term, 
and 2 have a term covering both meanings. 
The conceptual unity of the social routine category (justifying its setting 
apart as a category) does not only appear from the polyvalent BLAVs in two 
languages from the sample: 
Hausa gaida: ' to greet, salute, bid farewell' and 
' to thank ' 
(Consider also the noun barka 
' thanking, blessing, congratulation') 
Hungarian köszön ' to g r e e t ' a n d ' t o thank' 
It also emerges from large numbers of LAVs in this domain which had to 
be excluded from the set of BLAVs for a variety of reasons. The unifying 
meaning seems to be the expression of positive feelings towards the addressee, 
the expression of goodwill, the acknowledgment of the existence of a social 
relationship worth maintaining. This is why 'greeting' verbs are more crucial 
members of the set than ' thanking' verbs, a fact supported by the figures 
(of the 22 languages with only one social routine BLAV, there are 19 with a 
'greeting' verb and only 3 with a ' thanking ' verb) and by the close relationship 
between 'greeting' and 'talking to, addressing'. Some examples from which 
the conceptual unity of social routines, as lexicalized in the world's languages 
(though not always in the form of verbs), and as defined above, may appear: 
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Kabyle Berber 
Blackfoot 
Gbeya 
Hanunoo 
Hawaiian 
ehmed 
ksimmatsim-
[happy] 
mba-á 
báti' 
aloha 
Krio eku 
Sebei ngerekyi 
' to praise, celebrate, thank ' 
' to greet ' (cf. 
ksimmatsitaki- ' to be happy ' 
and ksimmatsin- ' to be happy 
to see a person') 
' to greet ' but also ' to 
congratulate' 
(n.) 'greeting' or 'feeling, 
emotion' 
'to love, regard with 
affection; have pity, 
compassion upon; show mercy; 
salute at meeting or 
parting; give thanks (as an 
act of worship)' 
a greeting word, used 
especially by the Muslim 
Krios of Freetown 
< Yoruba кг ' to greet ' 
> екиаЬэ 'welcome home' 
eku fo 'I compliment you 
on' 
' to greet visitors, welcome' 
and ' to please' 
(vi) Non-action 
A relatively low number of languages (13 from our sample) have specialized 
verbs describing linguistic non-action. The majori ty of languages, however, 
fills this slot in the pattern by negating a base item. 
The pat tern resulting f rom the occurrence of these six types of BLAVs is 
'broken' only by a few lexical i tems which occur with more than one BLAV 
meaning: 
Kabyle Berber ini 
Blackfoot ani-
both ' to say' and ' to ask 
(question)' 
both ' to say, tell' and ' to 
name' 
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Maidu 
Nisenan 
Dongolese Nubian 
Osage 
Spanish 
Tunica 
Warlpiri 
Yurok 
a.. 
ha 
e-
we 
u-ki'-e 
contar 
wira 
ngam-rni 
both ' t o say ' and 'to 
name' 
both ' t o say ' and 'to name ' 
both ' t o say, tell' and ' t o 
name' 
both ' t o say, tell' and ' t o 
name' 
both ' t o talk (converse)' 
and ' to answer' 
both ' t o tell (story)' and 
'to count ' 
both ' t o ask (question)' and 
'to count ' 
both ' t o tell (story)' 
and ' to name ' 
Ugawam- both ' t o speak, talk to ' and 
'to greet ' 
Since the to ta l number of distinct BLAV forms presented for our sample 
languages is 572, the stability of the pattern cannot be doubted on the basis 
of 11 items which occupy slots in more than one BLAV category (i.e. a 1.5% 
exception rate). Some of them (as in the case of Yurok) are easy to explain. 
Others are surface expressions of more commonly observed relationships (as 
in the case of Spanish). And some recurrent ambiguities (as in the case of t he 
five forms meaning both 'saying' and 'naming') may point a t other common 
relationships; the recurrent identity with a base i tem may lend further support 
to the decision to t reat 'naming' verbs, if the criteria are satisfied, as BLAVs 
in spite of their seemingly restricted scope. 
The overall distribution of BLAVs across the six categories in our 81-
language sample is as follows 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Number: 81 77 72 41 43 13 
Percent: 100 95 89 50 53 16 
The (roughly) descending numbers from left t o right give fur ther support to the 
centrality of the core items. Furthermore, the relevance of all BLAV categories 
is underscored by their occurrence in at least 50% of the sample languages 
(except for the non-action category, the marginality of which is clear). 
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The number of BLAVs 
The number of BLAVs varies from 1 to 12, with languages having 4 to 11 
BLAVs representing 92.5% of the sample (75 cases). Overview: 
BLAVs Languages 
1 2 Kalam, Kewa 
2 None 
3 2 Kera, Kiowa 
4 6 Amharic, Fore, Wappo, Warlpiri, Yana, Yimas 
5 10 Cuicatec, Gbeya, Hanunóo, Hausa, Hindi, Luiseno, 
Lake Miwok, Nukuoro, Eastern Ojibwa, Sranan Tongo 
6 12 Blackfoot, Ch'ol, Diegueno, Grebo, Hopi, Krio, 
Ayacucho Quechua, Cuzco Quechua, T a r m a Quechua, 
Shuswap, Wintu, Wolof 
7 16 Achumawi, Mzab Berber, Guarani, Khmer , Kilivila, 
Lenakel, Limba, Lingala, Maidu, Bodega Miwok, 
Mon, Mong Njua, Ngizim, Tunica, Venda, Central 
Yup'ik 
8 8 Kabyle Berber, Hungarian, Indonesian, Kamchadal, 
Nisenan, Persian, Sebei, Zulu 
9 7 Abuan, Bobo Fing, Emai , Hawaiian, Maori, Tiruray, 
Yoruba 
10 10 English, French, North Frisian, Dongolese Nubian, 
Osage, Northern Sotho, Spanish, Swahili, Southern 
Tuvaluan, Welsh 
11 6 Dutch, Greek, Kwanyama, Polish, Russian, Yurok 
12 2 German, Xhosa 
The order of development 
The da ta make the formulation of synchronic implicational universale (poten-
tially revealing an order of development, as discovered for color t e rms and 
plant and animal taxonomies), completely impossible. The only BLAV cate-
gory which is always represented is the base. From there onwards, any direction 
of development seems possible, though statistically there is a higher likelihood 
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tha t the core and the periphery will be developed than the interaction and so-
cial routine components, and though the development of a non-action BLAV 
is exceptional. 
Universality 
The form of universality emerging from the da ta may be much stronger than 
if a neat developmental pa t te rn had been discovered. A highly stable core of 
lexicalized conceptualizations of linguistic action can be observed. 
First of all, there is never a correlation between the differences in the sets 
of BLAVs and geographical or cultural parameters. Thus higher numbers of 
BLAVs are not reserved for languages spoken in highly industrialized west-
ern societies: Xhosa shares the privilege of having 12 BLAVs with German; 
Kwanyama and Yurok both have 11, just like Dutch or Polish; Osage and 
Northern Sotho share the number 10 with English and French; on the other 
hand, the Hungarian BLAV set is restricted to 8 items. Similarly, none of 
the BLAV categories is restricted to areas or culture types; even the slightly 
marginal non-action BLAVs occur in Berber, Kwanyama, Mon, and Northern 
Sotho alongside Dutch, French, Greek, Russian, etc. 
Second, the mechanisms by which the BLAV status of verbials in certain 
categories (in particular non-action, but also interaction and social routine) are 
'blocked' are well-understood. It is predictable that such blocking will occur 
for a significant number of languages, which means t h a t the lexicalization 
processes are quite universal. 
Third, further differences between languages are usually to be explained 
on the basis of additional properties of those languages. T h u s the extreme cases 
of Kalam and Kewa (with only one BLAV) derive their s t a tu s unambiguously 
from the special characteristics of their restricted verb root sets.5 
The findings clearly lend support to the view that all human languages 
represent the same overall level of evolution. The lexicalized reflection of con-
ceptualizations of linguistic action points at a truly universal linguistic action 
core. Any assumptions about verbal behavior which go beyond what is directly 
derivable from the existence of this universal core should be subject to careful 
scrutiny, from an explicitly intercultural perspective, before generalizing them. 
On the basis of the foregoing observations, we can formulate a number of 
universal tendencies (UT) in relation to the LAV lexicon of natural languages. 
5
 Kalam, for instance, contains only about 95 verb stems, only 25 of which are 'generic 
verbs ' which speakers of the language rely on heavily. All action and s ta te meanings have 
to be expressible with those restricted means. Hence, a restricted set of BLAVs is vir tual ly 
predictable. 
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UT 1: For all human languages it is possible to identify a set of concep-
tually basic LAVs 
(Note t h a t the validity of this generalization implies t he hierarchical struc-
turing of at least a significant part of the LAV lexicon of human lan-
guages.) 
UT 2: The number of BLAVs varies f rom 1 to 12, bu t almost all languages 
have from 4 to 11 BLAVs 
UT 3: All BLAVs can be placed in a pat tern of six categories (base, core, 
periphery, interaction, social routine, non-action) which is highly stable 
across the languages of t he world. 
UT 4: If a language has only one BLAV, it is always a base item 
UT 5: Amost all languages have, in addition to a base item or base items, 
core and periphery BLAVs. 
UT 6: Almost all languages have one or more 'asking' verbs in their non-
base core; of the threefold distinction 'ask (question)', 'ask for (an objec t ) ' 
and 'ask to do something' , only the first one is always realized in languages 
with 'asking' BLAVs. 
UT 7: Almost all languages with periphery items have a 'counting' BLAV. 
UT 8: Almost all languages with social routine i tems have a 'greeting' 
BLAV. 
2. Methodological problems 
Before trying to spell out t he theoretical implications of those research results, 
a number of methodological caveats have to be formulated which put them in 
the proper perspective. 
It may be useful, as a starting point , to consider t o what extent crit-
icisms which have been levelled against anthropological linguistic studies of 
the Berlin-Kay type (which functioned at least partly as my source of inspi-
ration) are applicable to the BLAV research as well. Take Hickerson's (1971) 
critique. Her main points a re the following: 
(i) The study used an u rban sample of bilinguals as informants. 
(ii) The language sample was biased. 
(iii) Imperfect sources were used. 
(iv) The evolutionary claims are not tenable. 
(v) The observed cultural correlates are dubious. 
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As to (i), our research procedure was considerably different. Though some 
informants (especially for European languages) were definitely urban bilin-
guals directly accessible to us, many provided information through linguists 
in the field. To (ii) we must plead guilty: the sample overrepresents Euro-
pean languages, and completely underrepresents Asia. Hence, many more lan-
guages have to be investigated to support the generalizability of our research 
findings. Similarly, (iii) is applicable: of the lexicographical sources consulted, 
many are outdated and some contain quite biasing glosses. However, though 
lexicographical sources were usually the s tar t ing point, they were never relied 
upon as conclusive evidence. Points (iv) and (v) are not applicable: the BLAV 
findings themselves undermine any aspirations in the direction of evolutionary 
claims (except that all languages investigated seem to represent a very similar 
evolutionary stage) or the observation of cultural correlates. 
So far, the study may not score too badly. The situation gets worse, 
however, once it is approached from the point of view of theories of the lexicon.6 
For instance, more clarity is needed on how the project relates or does 
not relate to cognitive notions of and tests for basicness (or even to the idea 
of 'basic vocabulary' as handled in lexicostatistics). 
The BLAV study, as presented above, only addresses the question of differ-
ential total lexicalization in some controllable perceptual/conceptual domain. 
It is far from clear how total or maximal lexicalization can be operationalized. 
However sophisticated one makes the operational criteria, there is still the dan-
ger that the task one performs is essentially a recoding of dictionary entries to 
fit a template of intuitions characteristic of a speaker of one of the maximal-
izing languages. Though the existence of such danger cannot be denied, t he 
best defence against this crucial form of criticism is to point out that none of 
the research findings were predicted and tha t only one (the one reflected in 
UT 4) was at all predictable. Thus the six different types of BLAVs were not 
at all postulated in advance; actually the hypotheses we started out with were 
quite different. Moreover, as will be shown in the discussion of the theoretical 
implications, the results completely undermine expectations one might have 
on the basis of theories of verbal behavior (in particular speech act theory). 
This does not mean, though, that what 'emerged' from the da ta can be said 
to be unrelated to our own habits of thinking about verbal communication. 
Therefore, corroborating evidence deriving from further detailed analyses and 
especially from complementary types of investigation, is needed, 
g 
Many of the following remarks were made, qui te correctly, by an anonymous referee 
for the IPrA Papers in Pragmatics , in which the original research report appeared. 
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The main weakness of the BLAV-approach to lexical semantics remains 
the fact tha t it was essentially agrammatical and context-free. It ignores as-
pects of discursive styles and genres in the institutional contexts in which 
verbs of saying are characteristic in many languages (as in narratives, formal 
ritual occasions in which explicit performatives are used, etc.). It also ignores 
the grammatical structures in which verbs of speaking are used. Thus it may 
be necessary to investigate the possibility of language-specific bias in the fact 
that all the verbs considered seem to focus on the utterer as topical subject . 
Furthermore, the approach ignores the relationships between metapragmatic 
verbs and other indicators of metapragmatic awareness. 
Though there is a practical excuse for the agrammatical and context-
free approach (viz. the need to cover too many languages for the sake of the 
comparative validity of the research), there is no justification. Hence we must 
conclude t h a t to the extent that the results of the investigation can be deemed 
relevant, they can be regarded only as a stepping stone to more sophisticated 
metapragmatic studies more akin to the tradition established by Silverstein 
(see, e.g. Silverstein 1985; Gumperz n.d.) which concentrates on actual usage 
pat terns—rather than a survey of decontextualized lexical items—of a much 
wider range of indicators of metapragmatic awareness (including adverbs, dis-
course markers, and the like). 
3. Theoretical implications 
Taking these methodological caveats into account, the BLAV-investigation car-
ries numerous theoretical implications which deserve to be formulated tenta-
tively while awaiting more definitive research results based on (i) a wider lan-
guage sample, (ii) further detailed analyses, and (iii) complementary research 
providing corroborating evidence. The following remarks will be restricted to 
four domains: speech act theory, the s tudy of sentence types, the semantic 
analysis of LAVs, and the study of problems of crosscultural communication. 
3.1. Speech act theory 
The results of this investigation cast doubt on the universal validity of the 
'orthodox' theoretical classification of speech acts (cf. Searle 1976).7 We shall 
restrict our observations to commissives and directives, two of the five main 
classes proposed. 
Y 
For earlier criticisms, which are largely supported and fur ther subs tan t ia ted by the 
BLAV-invest igat ion, see Verschueren (1983a, 1983b) 
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The most striking fact is tha t commissives (one instance of which, the 
act of promising, was for a long time t reated as a prototypical example to 
illustrate the tenets of speech act theory) are not represented in the set of 
BLAVs of any language. 'Promising' verbs, if they occur at all, are definable 
in terms of 'saying that one will do something' in a clear s tatement sense. This 
relationship is underscored by 'promising' verbials and nouns which do occur 
in a variety of languages. Some examples: 
Amharic qal sättä ' t o promise' 
[word, s ta tement (in court)] [give, grant , provide] 
Maori kii taurangi ' to promise' (literally 'to say 
something that has not yet been 
fulfilled') 
[to say, tell, speak] [unsettled, changeable, incomplete, 
unsatisfied, unfulfilled] 
Lake Miwok lilaw- ' to say, tell' 
< lildwpo (semelfactive, reflexive, 
transitive) 1. ' to say something 
about oneself', 2. ' to claim to 
be ' , 3. ' to promise' 
The obligation involved in 'committing oneself to do something' seems to de-
rive exclusively from general (and culture-specific) norms of interaction and 
verbal behavior, operating in this case on statements about certain types of 
fu ture activities. 
Similarly, the obligation resulting from acts of 'ordering' derives com-
pletely from an institutional context of authority. There are no 'ordering' 
BLAVs in any language of the sample. If the meaning is present more or 
less prominently in the usage of any BLAV, such a BLAV will always have a 
basically assertive meaning, as in the case of English to tell. Some other basic 
and non-basic LAVs showing the same relationship: 
Limba cepi ' to acquaint, tell, affirm, allege, 
assert, bid, command, declare, fix 
(price), inform, invite, mention, 
narrate, notify, proclaim, profess, 
quote, relate, say, show, speak' 
Nubian ári 1. ' to say', 2. ' to say to, tell, bid', 
3. ' to let, allow' 
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Venda -laya ' to advise, admonish, impart wisdom, 
teach' but also ' to order, command' 
Another typical case is where 'ordering' verbs basically mean 'to rule, govern' 
(e.g. Diegueno uuchutt ' to rule, send, order ' , Mong Njua cat] ' to rule, govern, 
manage, order ' ) . The only 'directing' BLAVs are ' requesting' verbs. 
If such lexical findings can be correlated with ethnographic observations, 
as is the case for commissives if Rosaldo's (1982) observations concerning the 
negligible role of this category in Ilongot verbal interaction are valid, they 
should be considered seriously for evaluating theories of verbal behavior. 
3.2. The study of sentence types 
Not only are the only 'directing' BLAVs 'requesting' verbs, but (as appears 
from the observations concerning asking and requesting in 1.3), ' requesting' is 
strongly associated with 'asking questions'. In many languages both meanings 
are incorporated in the same verb (as in English to ask). Moreover, the asking 
of questions seems to take priority in the lexicalization of linguistic action 
concepts (cf. UT6). Adding to this t ha t the canonical form for expressing a 
request is an interrogative sentence (a direct question about a fu ture action, 
such as "Will you do this for me?", or an example of an indirect speech act or 
'pre-request ') and tha t—as observed above—other directives do not occupy a 
central position in the conceptualization of linguistic action as reflected in its 
lexicalization, it may be justified to call the supposed correspondence of the 
three basic sentence types (declarative, interrogative, imperative) with three 
basic illocutionary force types into question. 
In much of the linguistic l i terature, the following form-function correla-
tions are taken for granted: 
declarative - assertion 
interrogative - question 
imperative - order/request 
Though our data do not make it possible to make grammatical claims (since, 
for one thing, the approach was itself basically agrammatical) they do allow 
us to ask questions and to formulate hypotheses to be tested by completely 
different methods. With regard to typical correlations between sentence types 
and ut terance functions, at least the following hypothesis can be suggested: 
declarative - assertion 
interrogative - (i) question, (ii) request 
imperative - ? 
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Thus only the.declarative sentence type would have one clear functional cor-
relate; the interrogative would have two; and the imperative would be a vague 
or multifunctional category. 
3.3. The semantic analysis of LAVs 
As to implications concerning the semantic analysis of LAVs, there is at least 
one directly related to the foregoing observations concerning questions and 
requests. Rudzka-Ostyn (1989) argues, for instance, t h a t to ask covers two 
distinct meaning prototypes: one for asking questions, and one for making 
requests. Though she accepts interrelationships, her analysis emphasizes the 
distinctness. Some of her own observations, however, are not easily explained 
in this way: 
- the conceptual connection which emerges in examples such as "He asked 
whether I would join him"; 
- the direction of historical development in the meaning of to ask in English 
(which goes from question to request); 
- the frequency of occurrence in the investigated corpus (1276 instances of 
asking a question vs. 747 instances of requesting). 
Our da ta fully support the conceptual connection, and the conceptual prior-
ity of questioning over requesting. Such additional evidence should at least 
warrant an a t tempt to describe the meaning of to ask in terms of one basic 
prototype. 
Further, the data obviously challenge the conclusions Wierzbicka (1988) 
draws from her own investigation of speech act verbs: 
" [ . . . ] there is only one 'basic speech act verb' in English: say; and 
that as 'say' is probably a lexical universal, and a universal semantic 
primitive, the word for 'say' may well be the only basic speech act 
verb in any language. Above the level of say there are no hyponyms 
and hyperonyms. Detailed semantic analysis shows tha t apart f rom 
say, there are no speech act verbs in English which would be related 
to one another in the way sparrow is related to bird [ . . . ] ." 
Something must be wrong with a semantic analysis which shows t h a t only 
to say is hierarchically related to other English speech act verbs if 
- at least 8 English verbs (all base, core, interaction, and social routine 
BLAVs) are actually used by speakers of English to define other linguistic 
action concepts felt to be 'subtypes'; 
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- more than one English verb (to speak as well as to say) occupies a top 
position in the hierarchy. 
T h e data confirm tha t the occurrence of at least one base i tem (such as English 
to say) is universal. But accepting 'say' as a semantic primitive disregards the 
fact that 
- many languages (not just English) have more than one base item; 
- in many languages the 'saying' verb is not strictly separable from more 
general action meanings. 
Once a semantic primitive approach is adopted, however, it is hard to avoid this 
kind of problem. Since the approach may also tend to make wrong predictions 
and could thus prevent the discovery of the type of universality found in this 
study, it should always be seen as just one of a variety of collectively necessary 
approaches. 
3.4. Problems of intercultural communication 
T h e universal tendencies observed in this investigation provide us with a ten-
tative empirical basis to s tar t from in the search for intercultural differences 
in the conceptualization of linguistic action which may be part ly responsible 
for intercultural and international communication problems. 
Needless to say that all the work still has to be done. Though the search 
for the relevant differences can start as soon as a reliable research strategy 
has been developed, the empirically identified universal basis itself needs to 
be further investigated. One necessary way of doing this will be by mapping 
the comparative distribution of BLAVs across the spectrum of speech events. 
Also, as explained in section 2, grammatical considerations have to be rein-
troduced in the lexical semantic methodology, and data f rom other types of 
metapragmatic research have to be adduced.8 
g 
For a quite interest ing a t t e m p t on the part of a th i rd party to jus t i fy the metapragmat ic 
approach taken in our BLAV investigations, the reader is referred to Kertész (n.d.). 
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A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC APPROACH TO 
COMMENTARY PRAGMATIC MARKERS: 
THE CASE OF ACTUALLY, REALLY AND BASICALLY 
R I C H A R D J. WATTS 
1. Introduction 
My principal argument in this paper will be tha t a relevance-theoretic ap-
proach1 to what Fraser (1990) calls "commentary pragmatic markers" offers 
a possible way out of a terminological and analytic impasse into which both 
European particle research and Anglo-American discourse marker research 
appear to be moving. The almost total lack of cross-fertilization or even of 
any kind of healthy competition between these two research traditions is both 
alarming and lamentable. The study of particles/discourse markers does after 
all cover a large area of the field of metapragmatics, which I take to be analysis 
of the linguistic, paralinguistic and extralinguistic means by which interlocu-
tors a t tempt to guide the processes of interpretation and social involvement 
in verbal interaction. 
In section 2 I shall sketch out the work being done within these two 
research traditions. I shall suggest that the different theoretical orientations 
with respect to the way they approach the study of language are largely re-
sponsible for many of the terminological problems confronting this area of 
metapragmatics. I shall thus a t tempt to gain a l i t t le clarity here before mov-
ing on to section 3, in which, while agreeing in general with Fraser's (1990) 
analysis of discourse markers, I shall argue that we cannot and should not di-
vorce ourselves entirely from considering how metapragmatic elements might 
be accounted for in syntactic terms. The discussion in section 2 will show tha t 
at least for German and Dutch syntactic considerations are unavoidable. 
In section 4 I shall tackle questions of meaning. Here I shall agree in 
principle with the "minimalist" tradition (cf. e.g. Schourup 1985; Fraser 1987, 
and 1990; Schiffrin 1987; Wat ts 1987; Blakemore 1987; Foolen 1991; König and 
1
 The application of Spe rbe r -Wi l son ' s (1986) theory of relevance to the analysis of dis-
course markers is best illustrated in Blakemore (1987) and Blass (1988). 
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Requardt 1991), but I shall argue t h a t Fraser (1990) is wrong in assuming that 
the pragmat ic core meaning of the discourse markers he considers (well, so, 
now, etc.) need not be related to their content meaning. In order to show how 
a core meaning can be used either metapragmatically or semantically, I shall 
undertake a relevance-theoretic analysis of the three English lexemes actually, 
really and basically in section 5. The type of analysis I propose will also offer a 
way of coordinating syntactic and pragmatic approaches to particles/discourse 
markers and thereby bridging the gap between the continental European and 
Anglo-American research traditions. 
2. Particle or marker, discourse or other 
2.1. The status of particles 
In recent years there has been a veritable upsurge of interest within German 
linguistics in the status of lexemes t h a t are generally referred to as "particles", 
which almost leads one to feel that we are dealing here with a research tradi-
tion. Some of the s tandard works within this tradition are Weydt (1969, 1979, 
1983, 1989), Altmann (1976), Helbig (1977), Helbig-Kötz (1985), Weydt-
Harden-Hentschel-Rösler (1983) and Weydt-Ehlers (1987). In addition a 
number of doctoral and post-doctoral theses have been published, which ei-
ther deal directly with particles in German (e.g. Hentschel 1986; Jacobs 1986; 
Gornik-Gerhardt 1987; Thurmair 1989) or devote significant sections of the 
text to an analysis of particles (e.g. Franck 1980; Doherty 1985; Wegener 1985). 
Articles have appeared in numerous journals and collections, and conferences 
have been devoted to the subject of particles.2 In addition particle research 
has spread to the analysis of a wide variety of languages other than Ger-
man, notably Dutch (cf. e.g. Foolen 1984; van der Auwera-Vandenweghe 1984; 
Westheide 1985, 1986b, 1986c, 1991; De Vriendt-van der Craen-Vandeweghe 
1991), Norwegian (cf. e.g. Fretheim 1989 and 1991; Askedal 1989), Polish (cf. 
e.g. Tabakowska 1989; Katny 1980; Grochowski 1986). There is little point in 
continuing this list, bu t readers are referred to the particle index (Partikel-
register) in Weydt (1989) in which references to particles in no fewer than 36 
languages are listed. 
2 
E.g. t h e particle conference in West Berlin in 1988, the proceedings of which have been 
published in Weydt (1989) and the Groningen symposium on discourse part icles in 1989, 
the proceedings of which appeared in February 1991 as a special double issue of the journal 
Multil ingua under the guest editorship of Werner Abraham. 
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The fundamental problem with the majority of this research, however, is 
that it s ta r t s out from a consideration of particles within one or another theory 
of grammar . 3 Particles are taken to be a word class, hence a syntactic category, 
and as such require to be distinguished from other word classes. Once this has 
been achieved—and my main argument is that it has not been achieved, for 
reasons t ha t I will outline shortly—it should then be possible to subcategorize, 
a process which requires a stringent set of syntactic constraints on distribution. 
Given an adequate subcategorization of the syntactic category "particle", it is 
then impor tant to consider what its grammatical and semantic functions might 
be within the sentence, and finally to establish what it contributes towards 
pragmatic interpretation and discourse structure. 
The first and thorniest problem is the fundamental question of whether 
there are any grounds at all to positing a syntactic category "particle". The 
term has been used in the traditional grammars of several European languages, 
including English, to account for a veritable ragbag of elements that could not 
be fitted into any of the traditional par ts of speech.4 In fact, since in English 
prepositions, conjunctions and interjections were generally left over after the 
grammarian had accounted for the other parts of speech and since they were 
considered to function only as cohesive syntactic elements, they were often 
lumped together as particles. In reading English grammars of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, however, one quickly gains the impression tha t , true 
to the Western grammar tradition, such leftovers as these were not consid-
ered worthy of much attention and were easily disposed of with a few choice 
examples.5 
In the case of German, however, things were somewhat different. Tradi-
tional grammars of German tended to focus their attention on those parts 
of speech which could be inflected, i.e. on verbs, nouns, pronouns, adjec-
tives and articles. Those syntactic elements which could not be inflected 
tended to be lumped together as particles. The 1984 edition of the Du-
den, for example, classifies adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions as parti-
cles, and further sub categorizes the adverbs into "Adverbien", "Pronominal-
adverbien", "Modalwörter", "Abtönungspartikeln", "Gradpartikeln" and "In-
tensivpartikeln" (cf. Hentschel-Weydt 1989,4). Other grammars of German 
A number of particle studies do not presuppose a specific theory of g rammar , e.g. 
Blass (1988), Fretheim (1991), Tobin (1989, 1991), König (1991). 
4
 W a t t s (1990) indicates the kinds of word class commonly focussed on in t radi t ional 
grammars of the 17th and 18th centuries. 
5
 Cf. t he comments on particles in Bishop Lowth's g rammar of English (Lowth 1762). 
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either restrict particles to the scalar (or degree) particles ("Gradpart ikeln") 
or extend them to cover interjections as well. 
Hentschel-Weydt (1989) make an a t tempt to bring some order into the 
picture by positing three groups of word classes, those that are traditionally 
considered to be the "major" word classes on the basis of the fact that they 
have lexical meaning (i.e. verbs, nouns and adjectives), those with a deictic 
function (e.g. the deictics and all pro-forms), and those that have neither a lex-
ical meaning nor a deictic function but "ihre Semantik nur im Zusammenhang 
mit anderen Wortar ten entfal ten". This third group includes particles, prepo-
sitions and conjunctions. They then narrow down the category of particles to 
"Gradpartikeln" (scalar or degree particles), which they proceed to further 
subcategorize into "Intensivpartikeln" (intensifying particles) and "Fokuspar-
tikeln" (focus particles), "Modalwörter" (modal words), "Abtönungspartikeln" 
(downtoning particles) and "Antwort- und Negationspartikeln" (answer and 
negation particles). 
Despite their valiant effort to bring some order into a confused area of 
grammar , however, the reader is left with a distinctly uncomfortable feeling 
t h a t this kind of categorization just does not work. The principal reason con-
cerns Hentschel- Weydt 's theoretical approach and their terminology. Although 
it is quite correct to question the idea that all non-inflected words in German 
should be lumped together and called particles, no reason is given for wishing 
to hold on to the term "particle" at all. 
The question as to whether "particle" is a clearly definable syntactic cat-
egory in relation to other categories can, of course, only be answered within 
a theoretical model of grammar . We may first question Hentschel-Weydt's 
word class grouping. Within generative grammar a clear distinction is made 
between major categories, i.e. those which do or do not enter into syntac-
t ic configurations with the logical function of a predicate (symbolized by the 
feature [V]) or with the logical function of an argument (symbolized by the 
feature [N]), and minor categories, i.e. those which fulfil other grammatical 
functions such as modification and specification. Modern generative grammar 
recognizes four major categories, N [+N,-V], V [-N,+V], A [+N,+V] and P 
[-N,-V]. The category A also covers those lexemes whose scope of modifica-
t ion ranges over members of the V category as well as those of the N category. 
Hence, in German adjectives may also occur as adverbs without any inflection, 
i.e. they would still be counted as members of the major category A; some add 
the morpheme -weise (e.g. glücklich - glücklicherweise). 
A few of these lexemes, however, are listed by Hentschel-Weydt as being 
modal words, i.e. as being a type of particle (e.g. wahrscheinlich, eventuell, 
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sicherlich, möglicherweise). Prepositions (and by extension many conjunc-
tions) are put into the same category type as particles. In generative grammar , 
however, they are members of a major category P. Scalar particles are bet-
ter placed in a minor category ADV (adverb), whose grammatical function is 
that of specification. The type of specification can then be defined, like that of 
the category of determiners (DET) and numerals (NUM), in logico-semantic 
terms. This then leaves us with the downtoning particles and the answer and 
negation particles. Interestingly enough, two of this l a t t e r group, ja and doch, 
also occur as downtoners. The other members of the downtoning group also 
belong to the minor category ADV. 
We therefore return to the crucial question: Do we need a category "parti-
cle" at all if most if not all of the members of that category can be accounted 
for in terms of other categories? There are four main reasons why positing 
such a category is so compelling for German (and also for Dutch). Firs t , if one 
tries to order the categories of traditional grammar wi thout resorting to an 
entirely new theoretical framework, one needs, at least for German and Dutch, 
to find good reasons for retaining the te rm "particle". Since retaining the term 
appears to be a relatively straightforward move—much more so than it is for 
English—there seems to be no reason for shifting to another framework. Sec-
ond, the very fact that many elements classified as particles appear to lead a 
double life as some other pa r t of speech and as particles, has created the need 
to account syntactically for the "other" (particle) use. Thi rd , particles occur 
syntactically in what Abraham has called the middle field. That is, if we take 
German and Dutch to be SOV verb final languages (and t h a t is still very much 
an open question!), particles always occur somewhere between the subject and 
the verb. This is of course only apparent on the surface in subordinate clause 
structure and in main clauses containing an auxiliary verb in which the main 
verb occupies the final position. In other words, they occur within sentence 
structure in well defined positions and never sentence externally. Fourth, they 
can occur in clusters in a well-defined order (cf. Thurmair 1991 for German and 
De Vriendt-van der Craen-Vandenweghe 1991 for Dutch) , which has even led 
to the suggestion made by those of a generative bent t h a t there may be such a 
thing as a "particle phrase". Fifth, they appear to occur between the sentence 
theme and the sentence rheme (cf. Hentschel-Weydt 1989; Krivonosov 1989), 
although Thurmair (1991) has some very convincing counter arguments to this 
hypothesis. 
The main argument against continuing to accommodate a category "par-
ticle" for the grammatical description of German (and, by extension, Dutch) 
is that the Hentschel-Weydt division into three basic category types rests on 
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semantic rather than syntactic criteria. The third type, t o which particles 
are said to belong, rests on t h e criteria t ha t this type of element has nei-
ther a lexical nor a deictic meaning and that it is semantically definable only 
in relation to its combination with members from other word class types. In 
addition, Hentschel-Weydt derive their subcategorization in to particle types 
not from syntactic distributional constraints, but from semantic-pragmatic 
considerations. Focus particles are said to have "die semantische Funktion, 
Beziehungen zu anderen Propositionen als zu denen, in denen sie selbst stehen, 
herzustellen." Furthermore they imply "Alternativen zu ihrem Beziehungsele-
ment und schliessen sie als mögliche Werte in einem grösseren Zusammenhang 
ein oder aus" (Hentschel-Weydt 1989,12). Modal words are particles "die 
dazu dienen, den Wahrheitsgrad einer Äusserung zu bezeichnen" (ibid., 12), 
whereas downtoning particles do not function on the level of the sentence in 
which they occur, but "sie kommentieren ihn als Gesamtäusserung von einer 
Metaebene aus und verankern ihn so im Redekontext" (ibid: 14). 
In general I am not in disagreement with their interpretation of how such 
linguistic elements function within discourse, but this surely cannot form the 
basis upon which syntactic categories and subcategories are set up. The double 
life of particles is no different f rom that of similar elements in other languages, 
e.g. English well, now, then, e tc . , but that double life concerns the use to which 
the members of syntactic categories are put, not the distinction between differ-
ent syntactic categories. I would wish to say t ha t whatever category we might 
assign, for example, English well or German eben to, it remains a member of 
t ha t category even though it might be put to different uses in discourse. 
The third and fourth arguments for positing a syntactic category "par-
ticle" are equally unconvincing, but they do raise an interesting syntactic 
problem. Whether they are interpreted as contributing content meaning or 
metapragmatic meaning to t h e utterance in which they s tand, they do oc-
cupy a sentence internal position from the point of view of theoretical syntax , 
and thus demand a grammatical description on that level. This is less clearly 
the case for equivalent lexemes in English, which often s t and outside sentence 
structure in either a sentence prefacing, sentence coda or parenthentical po-
sition (cf. section 5). The f i f th argument assumes that we can unequivocally 
analyze sentence structure in to theme and rheme. The immediate criticism 
here is that the status of t he two terms theme and rheme is still under de-
bate, and tha t even if we were able to find adequate cri teria for making such 
a distinction, those criteria would rely crucially on discourse structure and 
mutually shared knowledge ra ther than model-theoretic syntactic constraints. 
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We can conclude from the foregoing discussion that there is little if any 
need to posit a minor syntactic category of "particle". It is perfectly possible t o 
account for particles categorially in other ways. What does remain unsolved, 
however, is the crucial link between their syntactic regularity of occurrence in 
sentences and the metapragmatic functions they fulfil when such sentences a re 
used as utterances in real discourse. As we shall see in the next subsection, it is 
their metapragmatic function in discourse which has interested Anglo-Saxon 
researchers more than their syntactic description. 
2.2. Discourse marker research 
American and British discourse marker research is firmly anchored in the s tudy 
of pragmatics and also sociolinguistics. Fraser (1990) suggests t h a t the study of 
discourse markers as a field of enquiry in pragmatics can be traced back to t he 
early 1980s. Concern with the pragmatic, as opposed to grammatical, functions 
of certain sentence connectives such as and, but, i f , etc. can be traced back 
at least as far as Robin Lakoff's seminal article "If 's, and's and but 's about 
conjunction" (1971). In Bernstein (1971) we find a useful suggestion on how 
you know might be understood as a sociolinguistic marker in discourse. Fraser 
quotes work by Schourup (1985), Schiffrin (1987) and Blakemore (1987) as be-
ing perhaps the most significant lengthier contributions to the pragmatic study 
of discourse markers, but several other contributions might also have been 
mentioned, e.g. Owen (1983), Lakoff (1973), Svartvik (1980), Ös tman (1981), 
Watts (1987), Stenström (1984a, 1986). 
In all of this work the central concern has been on the contributions to 
utterance meaning tha t certain elements which have come to be called "dis-
course markers" make in ongoing discourse. This has meant tha t a number of 
approaches to the study of those contributions have been made. On the one 
hand, they may be looked at as lying on the borderline between semantics and 
pragmatics, such that the study of discourse markers may be used to investi-
gate where content meaning ends and pragmatic meaning takes over. On the 
other hand, they may be approached from various models of discourse analy-
sis (cf. Schiffrin's 1987 model of discourse or the approach taken by Svartvik 
and Stenström from within the tradition of British systemic analysis), or from 
the point of view of conversation analysis (cf. Owen 1983; Wat t s 1987). They 
may also be considered from the point of view of contextualization cues in the 
Gumperz tradition of interactional sociolinguistics (cf. here W a t t s 1989), or, 
as I wish to do in this paper, as elements which help to evaluate the relevance 
of one or more utterances in a discourse with respect to others (cf. Blakemore 
1987; Blass 1988; Wat ts 1991). 
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The problem with the majority of this research is, however, t ha t there 
is no clear definition of what is understood by the t e rm "discourse marker". 
Fraser (1990) makes some very valuable suggestions, which I shall deal with in 
more detail in section 3. It should be clear, however, t h a t the model theoretical 
status of the term is radically different from that of "particle". Whereas par-
ticle research has a t t empted to show (or has more of ten simply assumed) that 
there is a syntactic category "particle" which needs to be fitted somehow into 
models of syntax, discourse marker research has m a d e no such assumptions. 
Discourse markers are in any case a very heterogeneous set of expressions 
ranging f rom non-lexical segments like oh and mm through lexical elements 
like well and now to phrases like all right, of course, sentence fragments like 
you know, I mean, you see, and whole clauses like what I wanted to say was, 
while I have you (cf. Fraser 1990), to get back to what I was saying, etc. It 
would make very little sense indeed t o pretend t h a t discourse markers were 
members of a syntactic category. However, in a later section I shall argue that 
it may be possible to ascribe the same grammatical function to them and thus 
to account for them in an extended model of syntax. 
How, then, should we understand the term "discourse marker" if not 
syntactically? Since the analytic approach to these expressions is so different 
from t h a t which is usual in the particle research tradition, it is clear that 
terminologically "particle" and "discourse marker" must be understood in 
two fundamentally dist inct ways. Taken literally, "discourse marker" refers 
to any expression which marks off one segment of the overall discourse with 
reference to some other segment(s). As we shall see, Fraser (1990), with very 
good reason, narrows this down considerably. The term cannot therefore be 
understood as one pertaining to a grammatical model; it derives i ts value from 
a theory of discourse structure and function, and is thus metapragmatic. 
Given that this is so, however, we need to consider whether it would not 
also be a more appropriate way of analyzing German and Dutch particles. As 
we saw, continual recourse is made in the particle li terature to the terminology 
of language usage and pragmatics in order to subcategorize what is erroneously 
taken to be a syntactic category. There are even examples in which the cor-
relative German pronoun es (Richter 1989) and the German ethical dative 
(Wegener 1989) are analyzed as particles on the basis of the similar metaprag-
matic functions which they can be shown to fulfil. König-Requardt (1991) 
show quite convincingly that it is indeed possible to analyze such expressions 
as doch and mal as discourse markers whose metapragmatic function is to 
help the addressee assess the degree of relevance of the ut terance in which 
they occur with tha t of preceding utterances or potential fu ture utterances. 
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My argument in this paper is that this iç the type of bridge we should now 
be concerned to build between the two research traditions outlined in this 
section. In the following section, however, I shall discuss Fraser's suggestions 
concerning the analysis of discourse markers and suggest some ways in which 
syntactic considerations may be dovetailed into a pragmatic analysis. 
3. The syntax of discourse markers 
Fraser (1990) makes a clear distinction between linguistic expressions that 
encode content meaning and those that encode pragmatic meaning. Those 
that encode content meaning form part of the propositional s tructure of the 
speaker's utterances, whereas those tha t encode pragmatic meaning are "sig-
nals of the speaker's communicative intentions" (1990,386). 
The pragmatic meaning of an ut terance can, he maintains, be subdivided 
into "basic pragmatic markers", which indicate what illocutionary force the 
utterance is intended to have (e.g. please, performative expressions such as 
I suggest, I acknowledge, etc., or even sentence mood indicators such as the in-
terrogative or the imperative), "commentary pragmatic markers", with which 
the speaker indicates how s/he stands with reference to what is said and /or 
how the addressee is intended to take the utterance, and "parallel pragmatic 
markers", which encode a message in addition to tha t which is encoded in the 
utterance itself. This la t ter class includes forms of address, but also modifying 
adjectives which indicate what the speaker feels about what s /he is referring to 
rather than modifying some expression in the proposition. The example that 
Fraser gives is "Take your damn shoes off the table" , in which the adjective 
damn does not really modify the noun shoes but rather expresses what the 
speaker feels about the state of affairs encoded by the proposition. 
It is within the group of commentary pragmatic markers that Fraser lo-
cates discourse markers. He defines these as being "a class of expressions, each 
of which signals how the speaker intends the basic message that follows to 
relate to the prior discourse" (1990, 387). In general one can agree with this 
basic taxonomy, but there are a number of reservations that have to be made. 
At one point he maintains that discourse markers are not simply adverbs mas-
querading as discourse markers, but that they are a very heterogeneous set 
of expressions (cf. the point made in section 2). Discourse markers are "not 
susceptible to analysis as a single traditional grammatical category such as 
Sentence, Noun or Preposition", but he contradicts himself by stat ing at an 
earlier point in the paper that commentary markers, which include discourse 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
244 R I C H A R D J. W A T T S 
markers as a subset , "are not just a random group of expressions but are 
members of a separate syntactic category with several sub-categories, albeit 
a category whose members carry pragmatic rather than content meaning" 
(1990, 388). How are we to understand these two statements? 
He also maintains that discourse markers indicate how the utterance to 
follow is to be interpreted in terms of previous utterances. As I have shown 
elsewhere, however, some of the expressions which Fraser lists as discourse 
markers can only occur in an utterance prefacing position as what I have 
called, following Schiffrin (1987), lefthand discourse brackets (e.g. now, look, 
listen, etc.), o thers only occur as righthand discourse brackets in an utterance 
coda position (e.g. though), while others may occur either in the prefacing 
position and the coda position and still others may occur parenthetically. My 
own research has shown quite clearly that native speakers have a tendency not 
t o perceive those tha t occur as lefthand discourse brackets, but are sensitive to 
those that occur as righthand discourse brackets, so much so tha t they can use 
discourse markers occurring in these positions as socially stigmatizing features 
of an individual's speech style. 
We may resolve the apparent contradiction as to whether or not discourse 
markers consti tute an independent category with a number of subcategories 
encoding pragmat ic rather than content meaning by interpreting Fraser's term 
"separate syntactic category" to mean a syntactic category not forming part 
of the prepositional structure of the utterance, and indeed Fraser also suggests 
t h a t while there is a central pragmatic core meaning to the discourse markers, 
th is meaning is not necessarily cognate with the semantic contributions they 
would make to propositional meaning if they were within the scope of the 
sentential syntactic structure. It is on this point that I disagree with Fraser, 
and I shall e laborate on questions of meaning in the following section. 
One argument against viewing discourse and other commentary markers 
as constituting "separate" syntactic categories can be derived from the particle 
research discussed in section 2.1. As we saw, in their efforts to set up particles 
as a syntactic category, particle researchers almost invariably have recourse to 
pragmatic ra ther than semantico-syntactic arguments in subcategorizing what 
they take to be particles. At the same time I argued that not only do many 
"particles" in German not merely masquerade as adverbs, but are obviously 
most logically defined as adverbs, but also tha t they are usually to be found 
within the scope of sentence structure, in the so-called middlefield. As König-
Requardt (1991) convincingly show for doch, however, they fulfil the same 
kind of pragmatic discourse function in German as the discourse markers in 
English. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that discourse markers are 
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also members of well-defined syntactic categories, but t h a t in English there is 
a tendency for them to occur outside the syntactic sentential structure of the 
proposition, either as righthand discourse brackets, lefthand discourse brackets 
or parenthetical insertions. As we shall see in our discussion of really, actually 
and basically, however, non-parenthetical sentence-internal positions are also 
possible. 
Sentence initial, sentence final and parenthetical occurrences of discourse 
and other commentary markers can be shown to lie outside the CP ( the com-
plementizer phrase, which in current government-binding models is the high-
est level of sentence structure) (cf. Wat t s 1991 for lexemes such as well, so 
and cos). The argument is derived from a paper by Haegeman (1990), who 
at tempts to account for subjectless sentences in English for two types of dis-
course, diaries and recipes, within the framework of a government-binding 
model. The parametric set t ing in the core grammar of English with respect to 
root sentence subjects can be relaxed under certain conditions by positing tha t 
an empty category in the subject NP position can be bound to a non-overt 
topic NP in the sentence specifier position, which is also t he position to which 
w/i-elements and other topicalized elements can be moved just as long as they 
are maximal projections. 
What is interesting about Haegeman's analysis for our present purposes 
is that with respect to one of her examples she suggests t h a t certain linguistic 
elements may occur to the left of a non-overt topic in t he specifier position. 
These are typically connectives such as and, but, so and because (cos), and 
adverbs like well, anyway, now, etc., all of which Schiffrin and Fraser analyze 
as discourse markers. In Wat t s (1991) I have carried th is argument fur ther 
to show tha t the specifier position could not possibly be occupied by these 
elements, since they may also occur in subjectless sentences. It follows from 
this argument that there must be a syntactic position lying to the left of the 
C P available for metapragmatic terms like commentary markers. In this ini-
tial position, all commentary markers identified by Fraser, whether a t t i tudinal 
like frankly, modal like certainly, those which signal the source of information 
(e.g. according to her, cf. Fraser 1990, 390f.), those which mitigate unpleas-
ant responses or minimize upcoming impositions, or the more narrow set that 
Fraser has termed discourse markers (i.e. those that signal a discourse rela-
tionship), modify the discourse in one way or another. They serve to guide the 
addressee's reaction to what is about to be said. 
By the same token, it follows that there must also be a syntactic posi-
tion available for such elements to the right of the CP. The metapragmatic 
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terms occupying this position instruct the hearer to focus on the last assump-
tion made and to process it in specific ways with old assumptions. In W a t t s 
(1989c) I have suggested, following Schiffrin's analysis (1987), that metaprag-
matic terms occurring as lef thand brackets are processed automatically, bu t 
that speakers are very aware of the occurrence of righthand brackets. T h e evi-
dence suggests tha t the sentence final position is perceptually far more salient 
than the sentence initial position. The parenthetical position is available for 
a speaker to interrupt the structure s/he is currently developing and to focus 
specifically on the part of the overall s t ructure to follow. Discourse markers in 
this position, in other words, function ra ther like lefthand discourse brackets 
instructing the hearer to focus specifically on the upcoming part of the overall 
structure. 
But why is it necessary to provide a syntactic explanation for commen-
tary markers? Is it not sufficient simply to recognize the fact that in English at 
least they lie outside the scope of current syntactic theories and to concentrate 
one's efforts on defining their metapragmatic functions? There are five reasons 
why I consider it necessary to give a syntactic account of commentary mark-
ers. First, it is clear that they differ from the set of interjections, which Fraser 
takes to be "not part of a sentence, but [ . . . ] an entirely separate 'sentence' , 
an expression (usually but not always a single word) which encodes an entire 
basic message typically involving the speaker 's emotional state" (1990,391). 
Thus commentary markers do not encode a message independent of other ut-
terances prior to them or following them in the discourse, and an adequa te 
linguistic account of them must take into consideration the ways in which 
they are linked to propositional structure. Second, they display regularities 
of occurrence in relation to utterances wi th a propositional structure which 
indicate that they form par t of the speaker's linguistic competence, regardless 
of the fact t ha t they encode pragmatic ra ther than content meaning. Th i rd , 
equivalent expressions in languages like German and Dutch generally occur 
sentence-internally.6 Fourth, and as a corollary to the thi rd point, a refusal to 
consider how they might be integrated into some form of syntactic description 
of the language concerned is not only t an tamount to a rejection of the need 
to account somehow for the native speaker's linguistic competence, but it also 
merely exacerbates the widening gap between particle research and discourse 
marker research which it is the major purpose of this paper to stress and to 
narrow. Fif th, insistence on a purely pragmat ic consideration of commentary 
6
 This is of course not always t h e case. They can sometimes occur in utterance prefac ing 
positions or be generated as tone uni t s in their own right—as in English. 
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markers is likely to lead to an insistence that whatever is posited as the core 
meaning of a commentary marker does not necessarily have anything in com-
mon with that expression's content meaning when it appears in propositional 
structure. 
I shall deal with questions of meaning in the following section. One further 
comment is in order here, however. An a t t empt to account for pragmatic 
markers syntactically does not necessarily imply tha t this is done within one 
theoretical framework only. I have chosen to consider them f rom the point of 
view of a government-binding model of syntax, bu t I am equally convinced tha t 
more intensive work along these lines, at least for English, will eventually lead 
to a radically different approach to syntax from tha t common to this model. 
Tha t particular discussion, however, lies outside t he scope of the present paper. 
4. Content meaning and pragmatic meaning 
Fraser (1990) makes a clear distinction between content meaning, i.e. "a more 
or less explicit representation of some state of t he world that the speaker in-
tends to bring to the hearer's at tention by way of the literal interpretation of 
the sentence" (1990,385), and pragmatic meaning, i.e. what the speaker in-
tends to communicate beyond t h a t which is interpretable from content mean-
ing. Pragmatic meaning, however, is always inferable within the context of 
language usage. Sentences only have pragmatic meaning as utterances, or at 
least as potential utterances. 
In a sentence like John shut the door the meaning of every individual 
lexeme and phrase is underdetermined. The proper name John indexes a po-
tential individual, but whether t h a t individual is human or animal (it is after 
all possible to train chimpanzees and other animals to shut doors) or whether 
tha t individual is male or female (I remind readers of a Johnny Cash song 
entitled "A boy named Sue") does not belong to the content meaning of John. 
The past tense verb form shut indexes a particular kind of activity which has 
been completed, i.e. is temporally distant from discourse time, but the fact of 
its being temporally distant is not immediately indexed by the "past tense" 
form itself despite our use of the term "past", nor is the activity indexed to a 
specific point in past time. In the NP the door t he determiner the specifies the 
referent indexed by the noun door to be in some sense within the mutually 
shared knowledge of the speaker and the hearer. In this sense it only really 
has meaning by vir tue of being used in an ut terance context. It would be very 
difficult indeed to argue that it has any real content meaning. 
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The underdeterminedness of content meaning is a characteristic of human 
language, such that in the process of verbal communication the addressee 
is continually involved in deriving f rom the propositional s t ruc ture of lan-
guage input possible inferences which will allow he r /h im to derive a maximally 
relevant interpretation of the speaker's communicative intentions. As Blake-
more (1987) suggests, language input is structured in such a way as to allow 
the addressee to derive from it, as well as from other systems of perceptual 
input, a logical proposition which can be enriched into a full cognitive rep-
resentation by applying logical processes of inference to it in the context of 
already present cognitive representations. The less the effort needed to derive 
cognitive representations which significantly enrich the addressee's knowledge 
within the context of the ongoing discourse, the more relevant the utterance 
may be said to be (cf. Sperber-Wilson 1986). 
Looked at from the perspective of cognition and communication, there-
fore, it is not at all sure that a real distinction can be made between content 
meaning and pragmatic meaning. It follows that the claim that discourse mark-
ers have a core pragmatic meaning which does not necessarily have anything in 
common with their content meaning when used as members of syntactic cat-
egories within sentence structure becomes rather tenuous. But it also follows 
that if expressions are used as a preface to or a coda of propositions (i.e. as 
lefthand and righthand discourse brackets) as they most frequently are in En-
glish, they are automatically interpreted pragmatically. Through their use the 
addressee is given explicit clues as to how s/he should interpret t he language 
input in order to form cognitive representations. There is, however, no rea-
son why such expressions should not come as an integral part of propositional 
structure, as they most frequently do in German and Dutch. 
To illustrate that the principle of underdeterminedness of meaning may 
allow us to discover a minimal content core meaning which can serve to guide 
the process of pragmatic interpretation, let us briefly consider the case of well, 
which has been the object of several researchers' a t tent ion. Well can occur as 
an adjective, as in (1), an adverb, as in (2) and (3), and a discourse marker 
(although, I maintain, still as a member of the syntactic category "adverb"), 
as in (4): 
(1) You're looking well. 
(2) John drives well. 
(3) I can well understand why you don't want to come. 
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(4) (a) Well, I understand why you don' t want to come, 
(b) I understand, well, why you don' t want to come. 
In each case I shall maintain that well is a member of the major category 
A[+N,+V], although it can never be used to modify the head of a noun phrase. 
Thus a sentence like (5) is not possible: 
(5) *John is a well man. 
The interpretation of well in (1) as meaning "healthy" is a clear case of under-
determined meaning. Since the only place where well may occur adjectivally 
is as the predicate of a copula verb, it is evident that some core content mean-
ing has been conventionally extended to index the same state of affairs as 
"healthy" or "fit". It is after all also possible to have a sentence like (6): 
(6) You're looking good. 
in which the meaning of the adjective good is similarly underdetermined. Since 
good cannot function to modify predicates, its place is conveniently taken by 
well. Hence the minimal content meaning of both lexemes must be very similar 
(cf. example (2)). 
In (3) well modifies either the whole VP understand why you don't want 
to come or merely the verb understand. With verbs of cognition like under-
stand, know, believe, appreciate, etc. well is conventionally interpreted to mean 
something like "easily", from which the addressee can infer the speaker 's em-
pathy or solidarity. Once again, this meaning is inferable from a minimal core 
meaning of well/good. 
Fraser suggests tha t well in (4a) is used as a discourse marker to signal 
upcoming dissonance, whereas it is simply a pause marker in (4b). Several 
other suggestions have been made with respect to the function of well as a 
discourse marker. ' Since well never occurs as a r ighthand discourse bracket, it 
seems more reasonable to suggest that when it occurs outside the propositional 
structure, either in the initial position as in (4a) or in a parenthetical position 
as in (4b), it has as its pragmatic scope the upcoming proposition or pa r t of the 
upcoming proposition. The interpretation of well as a pause marker does not 
make much sense if we consider either tha t a parenthetical insertion invariably 
causes an intonational break which often cooccurs with a pause or tha t the 
j 
Wat t s (1987) discusses three approaches and suggests an alternative analysis which 
may also be understood as a relevance-theoretic approach. 
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pause is made deliberately in order to insert the lexeme well. Interpreting well 
as a pause marker reduces it to t he level of a non-lexical phonetic segment like 
er , i.e. empties it entirely of meaning. 
I shall argue t h a t the minimal core meaning of both well and good can 
be glossed as something like " the speaker expresses a positive assessment of 
x" . The degree to which and the way in which x is positively assessed will 
rely entirely on how the addressee can enrich the proposition by means of 
inferential processes to derive a maximally relevant cognitive representation. 
In the case of the discourse marker use of well I suggest t h a t the proposi-
tion within its scope is interpretable as being positively assessed, but that the 
na ture of that assessment relies on the ability of the addressee to enrich the 
proposition inferentially to reach a maximally relevant cognitive representa-
tion. The implication here is tha t the speaker is certainly making an utterance 
to which s/he can adopt a positive stance but t ha t the full relevance of tha t 
ut terance will not be derivable f rom the content meaning of the utterance 
alone. I shall therefore suggest t h a t the minimal core meaning of a lexeme 
such as well on the level of content meaning is still present, in however opaque 
a form, on the level of pragmatic meaning. In the following section I shall 
i l lustrate this with an analysis of the lexemes actually, basically and really, 
which in accordance with Fraser's taxonomy of commentary markers can be 
considered as pragmatic markers indicating the degree to which both speaker 
and addressee can have "confidence in the accuracy of the following content 
message", i.e. as modal markers. 
5. An analysis of actually, really and basically 
In this section I shall focus on the three English lexemes actually, really and 
basically. The da t a on which my analysis is based are taken f rom approximately 
ten hours of verbal interaction recorded during social activities which I have 
described elsewhere (Watts 1989c) as family gatherings. The participants are 
all members of my extended family and, apar t from ninety minutes of the 
overall total, I was a participant observer. All the recordings were made using 
a Sony walkman with a built-in microphone with a recording range of roughly 
three metres. The instances of actually, really and basically to be discussed 
were taken from a forty-five minu te stretch of interaction, which I consider 
typical of the family discourse t h a t I have collected from the British side of 
my family. 
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Actually, really and basically appear to be fairly similar in meaning and 
by vir tue of their morphological derivation from the adjectives actual, real and 
basic may be assigned to the major category A[+N,+V]. They may occupy 
four different syntactic positions in an ongoing utterance, sentence internal 
(generally as a modifier in the auxiliary complex, which in the government-
binding model of generative syntax is taken to be part of the INFL component 
and considered to be the head of the sentence), sentence initial as lefthand dis-
course brackets (to the left of the sentence specifier position, so tha t utterances 
such as Really can't say and Actually don't remember what he said are possi-
ble, although rare in the present da ta) , sentence final as righthand discourse 
brackets (to the right of the core sentence in what might also be called an 
adjunct position, e.g. It's too late now basically or I can't understand them re-
ally) and parenthetically (in certain sentence positions, but separated in oral 
discourse from the syntactic constituents to the left and right by clear into-
national breaks, e.g. And they did, basically, a circle). In addition they may 
also occur as tone units in their own right, i.e. as isolated elements with rather 
specific intonation contours (e.g. Really? or Basically, yes.). 
In sentence initial or sentence final position they may also occur as tone 
units, i.e. there may be a distinct intonational break between them and the rest 
of the sentence (e.g. Actually, I find it difficult to see how the British could/ 
I/ the tourists can get into Gibraltar or He'd go in as an ordinary seaman, 
basically). I shall argue that from a syntactic point of there is no difference 
between their occurrence as sentence initial and sentence final elements with 
no clear prosodie break from the rest of the sentence and their occurrence 
as preceding or following tone units (i.e. as lefthand and righthand discourse 
brackets) or as parenthetical elements. 
However, despite the fact tha t from the point of view of content meaning 
their lexical contribution to the utterance is probably greater in the sentence 
internal position, I shall argue tha t in all positions their pragmatic meaning as 
commentary markers is derivable from and more important than their semantic 
core meaning. 
All three lexemes relate what the speaker is contributing to the topic, the 
assumptions s /he is making, to previous or already held assumptions and thus 
help to guide the fur ther development of the topic. Topic development displays 
the degree to which an individual group member is able to maintain, enhance 
or perhaps even damage her/his standing (or s ta tus) in the emergent network 
of interpersonal relationships tha t is being enacted through the ongoing dis-
course. They are thus key elements not only in creating topical cohesion in the 
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discourse, but also in allowing the participants in the discourse to structure 
the interaction socially. 
Consider first the following short extract from the data. Immediately prior 
to the speaker's turn , the participants in the verbal interaction have been 
discussing why fish and chip shops are not usually found in Europe outside 
the British Isles. The speaker then says that when he was serving in the navy 
in Gibraltar, he noted that there were no fish and chip shops there, which 
evinces general surprise and leads him to continue as follows: 
(7) Well, that- tha t ' s what all the troops were complaining about , you 
see. Which made it /(0.8) somebody over here have the idea (0.6) 
that- t h a t / you know, they were looking/ you know, a gold 
mine (0.7) basically. 
Extract (7) contains five examples of what Schiffrin (1987) and Fraser 
(1990) would call discourse (or pragmatic) markers, one occurrence each of 
well, you see and basically and two of you know. In addition there are three 
unfilled pauses of 0.8 sees., 0.7 sees, and 0.6. sees, duration. The speaker self 
corrects once, changing the pronoun it to the NP somebody over here, breaks 
off a syntactic s t ructure twice ( which made somebody over here have the idea 
that/ and they were looking/), repeats himself twice on the demonstrative that 
and finally gives the NP a gold mine in place of a full sentence. 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent dysfluency of the turn, communication 
is achieved, and I shall argue tha t it is achieved largely through the discourse 
markers. The da ta of oral performance contain metapragmatic terms which 
permit the hearer(s) to process information in specific ways and to infer as-
sumptions which add significantly to those already held and/or to strengthen 
the value of one or several of those assumptions. Oral interaction involves 
instantaneous cognitive processing, and most of this is below the level of con-
sciousness. Thus, it is crucially important as an addressee to receive instruc-
tions about what to focus on, what to ignore, what to hold in and what to 
erase from short-term memory. The discourse markers in (7) function in this 
way, although the instructions they encode are different and apart from those 
encoded by actually, really and basically will not concern us fur ther here. 
Let us begin the discussion of actually, really and basically by consider-
ing their syntactic s tatus. Apart from standing alone, they may occupy four 
different syntactic positions, sentence initial, sentence final, sentence internal 
and parenthetical. A range of examples is given below: 
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Sentence initial (with or without a prosodie break) 
(8) And they said, "Well, really, you- you- you- you really ought not 
t o go in." 
(9) Actually, I find it difficult to see how the (0.7) British could/(0.8) 
I / the tourists can get into Gibraltar . 
(10) I mean they had one episode there where/ with the 
:er(.): basically all about the doings of the vicar, on board a ship. 
In (8) the marker well functions to signal tha t the upcoming assumption 
should be processed by the hearer as a direct quote of what the person said but 
that its full relevance is to be gained by enriching the proposition by processes 
of inference into a full cognitive representation (cf. section 4). Thus really is in 
effect the first element to the left of the following sentence structure. In (10) 
the speaker tries twice to complete a syntactic s t ructure but without success, 
so tha t basically prefaces the phrasal structure to its right. 
Sentence final (wi th or without a prosodie break) 
(11) I t ' s too late now basically. 
(12) I can ' t understand them really. 
(13) The chips were quite nice actually. 
Sentence internal 
(14) I said, "You say it again, what you actually said." 
(15) Because I think P will basically turn round and say, "Well (0.9) 
if you don't move (0.6) I'm not taking you." 
(16) I don' t see/(0.9) really see any difference in the "Nationwide". 
Parenthetical ( the forty-five minute corpus does not contain any examples 
of really or actually in this position, although there are occurrences in the 
overall ten-hour corpus) 
(17) And if, basically, they didn't send you to sea, they (0.7) did jobs / 
they did/ you- you did jobs a t :er(.): barracks. 
Consider the following examples from the da ta : 
(18) Eighty pound the cot was. Yeah. And they actually got one 
for forty-ni ne. 
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(19) Course all the- all the- the really good British comedies are all 
finished really, aren't they? 
(20 = 15) Because I think P will basically turn round and say, "Well (0.9) 
(0.9) if you don't move (0.6) I'm not taking you." 
It seems reasonable to suggest that in (18), (19) and (20) actually, really 
and basically are generated within the VP (in the case of actually and basically 
in (18) and (20)) or in the adjective phrase (in the case of really in (19)) and 
that they function as modifiers. Thus the scope of modification for actually in 
(18) must be got one for forty-nine, for really in (19) good, and for basically 
in (20) turn round and say... 
Two questions may be asked at this point. What is the semantic con-
tribution of each of these elements in the modifying functions they perform 
sentence internally, i.e. what is their core content meaning, and is there any 
difference between these contributions and those tha t they make as metaprag-
matic terms sentence externally? The meanings of all three lexemes are fairly 
close, denoting something like genuineness, honesty, fundamenta l ly or even 
t ru th . However, it is in the sentence internal position that subtle differences 
can be discerned. If we insert really in place of actually in (18), we convey 
the impression tha t some other price was given for the cot that was purchased 
than forty-nine pounds. If we insert basically, we convey the impression tha t 
the price may in fact have been a little more or less than forty-nine pounds. 
Actually, on the other hand, guarantees that the genuine price t h a t they paid 
on the occasion of buying the cot was forty-nine pounds rather t han the price 
of eighty pounds that the purchasers had seen for another cot. 
Thus, although the fundamental meaning of all three lexemes appears 
to be something like "genuine, real, basic", the logical information found at 
each lexical address is that further assumptions should be inferred, and tha t 
these will be different for each lexeme. For actually we may posit that the 
assumption within its scope, e.g. in (18) the fact that the cot was bought 
for forty-nine pounds, was true at one particular point in past t ime (which 
the speaker does not further specify) but not necessarily at any other point in 
time. For really we may posit tha t the assumption within its scope, e.g. in (19) 
that the assessment good may be made of British comedies, does not always 
hold. The inference in (19) is that some British comedies are classified as good 
that do not deserve that assessment. In the case of really there is thus always 
an alternative assumption, which accounts for its occurrence as a tone unit in 
its own right used to query the validity of a prior assumption, as in (21): 
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(21) S These were taken through the windows of the coach. 
В Really? 
Neither actually nor basically could substitute for really in (21). 
For basically we may posit that the assumption within its scope is more or 
less valid, but that the hearer should allow for a certain amount of variability. 
Hence in (20) actually and really could substitute for basically. If we were 
to insert actually in place of basically, the speaker would then guarantee the 
t ruth of the assumption at some point in the fu tu re and not leave room for 
any other assumption. If we inserted really, the speaker would then indicate 
to the addressee that there is another alternative, which is being excluded by 
the use of basically. 
The subtle differences just suggested between the three lexemes actually, 
really and basically are not part of the core content meaning, but they concern 
rather the types of inference permissible on the basis of that core meaning by 
the addressee on the assumption(s) within the scope of the lexemes. They 
indicate tha t certain types of assumption may be derived from par t s of tfye 
linguistic input and they thus guide the hearer in assessing the way in which 
s /he should process the new information. In this sense they are metapragmatic 
markers guiding the search for relevance. Whether they occur sentence inter-
nally or as lefthand or righthand discourse brackets, the propositional structure 
immediately following them or immediately prior t o them will contain the as-
sumption tha t should be processed not only in accordance wita a core content 
meaning, but also and more importantly in terms of pragmatic meaning, i.e. in 
terms of the logical operations to which that assumption should be submitted. 
I therefore maintain that the function of this type of commentary marker 
will always be to modify some propositional s t ructure or part of i t . The struc-
ture itself may be internal to a CP, a whole C P or some other phrasal or 
clausal structure s tanding not in a C P but on its own. The purpose of the 
modification, however, is to indicate to the addressee(s) how the process of 
pragmatic interpretation should proceed. A grammar of English—and by ex-
tension the argument must carry over to the grammars of languages like Ger-
man and Dutch with respect to the so-called particles—need only allow for 
syntactic positions beyond the s t ructure of the C P and with respect to those 
elements which may occur in those positions for well defined positions inside 
the CP, either parenthetically or not . The syntactic description of German 
and Dutch positively requires that most of these elements be accounted for 
within a theoretical syntactic framework. The fact t ha t both languages, being 
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essentially verb-final, contain a so-called "middle field" which will allow for 
the generation of metapragmatic elements sentence internally merely stresses 
the need to extend the syntax of English beyond its present limitations, and 
no amount of pretending that the "welP's, "you know"s, "anyway"s, "really"s 
etc. of oral performance data are not within the scope of a sentence grammar 
will do. The three elements presented here may occur sentence internally and 
will therefore require the syntactician to provide an adequate explanation for 
their occurrence anyway. 
6. Conclusion 
I have suggested tha t some form of sensible fusion between syn tax and prag-
matics can be achieved if we resort t o a theory of relevance, as I have implicitly 
done throughout this paper. If we consider ut terances to const i tute linguistic 
input to the central processing component of the brain, tha t input must be 
structured in accordance with the grammar of the language concerned even 
though it may be incomplete and contain a number of false s t a r t s . In general 
we are very good at filtering the "noise" out of the data, precisely because, as 
Sperber-Wilson (1987) and Blakemore (1987) suggest, we need to convert tha t 
input , like all other perceptually structured input , into propositional structure 
to make it available for processes of inferencing on the basis of old information. 
To make the conversion into propositional s t ructure possible we need to access 
all the encyclopaedic and logical information derivable from the input. Par t 
of tha t information will be metapragmatic, i.e. instructions on how to process 
the assumptions derived from the input . In this paper I have deal t with three 
adverbs in English—and I see no reason why we should not continue to classify 
them as such from the point of view of syntactic categories—and have shown 
how they may function both inside and outside canonical sentence structure 
in English to focus attention on syntactic structures from which assumptions 
may be derived. I have argued t h a t in focussing the hearer's attention on 
those structures, they also guide the ways in which the hearer may assess de-
grees of relevance. I have given an informal account of their syntax and of 
the metapragmatic functions they fulfil. A more detailed formal account is 
of course necessary, but cannot be given within the framework of one short 
paper. There remains no doubt in my mind, however, that it can be given. 
I should nevertheless prefer to end this paper on a note of warning. It 
would be a mistake to conceptualize metapragmatics as a level of linguistic 
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description beyond pragmatics. There are two reasons for making this claim. 
First, it is not possible to conceive of an u t terance in real t ime and in a real 
discourse context as totally neutral, i.e. as not in some way containing an 
indication of the utterer 's involvement with what s/he says and as not be ing 
directed at some interlocutor within some form of social interaction. The only 
linguistic objects that are purportedly neutral in this way are not ut terances 
but sentences or sentence fragments, and these exist, if at all, only in t he 
clinically sterile abstraction of linguistic theory. All language, if we conceive of 
it as something learnt and used by human beings, is dialogic. Every ut terance, 
as Sperber-Wilson (1986) argue, comes with its own guarantee of relevance 
and requires interpretation of some kind. If this is so, it must have some 
metapragmatic import. 
Second, even if we were to try to locate metapragmatics in some form 
of extended linguistic model, the very fact tha t those elements may occur , 
for example, as the choice of one grammatical structure or linguistic expres-
sion over another, as grammaticalized honorific forms, as sentence internal 
adverbs, as sentence connectives, parenthetical phrases, indirect speech acts , 
as pragmatic markers of various kinds, as pre-sentential verbal structures or 
tag questions, as intonation and rhythmic patterning, tempo, volume and si-
lence, as co-occurrent kinesic signals, to name but a number of subsets of 
possible elements, would simply make a mockery of the a t t empt . 
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LEXICAL HEDGES AND NON-COMMITTAL TERMS 
YAEL ZIV 
1. Introduction 
Languages provide a variety of means of expressing non-commitment with re-
spect to the content of a given message. In this paper I will investigate a lexical 
hedge in Colloquial Israeli Hebrew (CIH) which is functional in expressing lack 
of commitment and in modifying speech acts and manifests metacommunica-
tive awareness. The account proposed utilizes some non-ad-hoc version of the 
Gricean maxims and constitutes an a t t empt at a principled explanation of the 
relevant linguistic phenomena.1 
CIH has recently witnessed the introduction in the speech of many young-
sters of certain lexical hedges sharing a common non-committal force. Lexical 
items which otherwise function as a subordinating conjunction "as if1 (ke ' i lu) , 
an adjective or an intensifier "like this" (kaze) and an adverbial "in this man-
ner" (kaxa) , as in the following sentences, respectively, 
(1) hu hitnaheg ke'ilu hu lo makir oti 
he behaved as if he (does) not know me 
(2) (a) hu gar bebayit kaze 
he lives in a house like this 
(2 ) (b ) hu kaze xaxam 
he so/such/like this smart 
(3) kaxa ani oved 
this way I work 
display different distributional constraints and significantly distinct semantic 
and pragmatic characteristics in their recent "hedgy" usages. In these latter 
uses, the items under consideration function as adverbials and show proper-
ties which, presumably, have evolved f rom their more conventional uses. The 
following sentences may constitute examples of their special adverbial use. 
1
 I should like to thank my student Ayelet Sackstein, whose seminar paper on the mini-
mizing kaze helped crystalize my conception of the topic, and my colleague Joe Tagl icht for 
his helpful comments on some of the issues raised here. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
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(4) ani yaxol ke'ilu lalexet matay sheani roce 
I can as if/sort of t o go whenever I want 
(5) hitragashti kaze velo yaxolti lazuz ' 
I got excited like this/kind of and not I could move 
( = a n d I could not move) 
(6) az ani roce kaxa lalexet vehu matxil ledaber 
so I want this way/sort of to go and he starts to talk 
As might be expected, the distributions of the different adverbials are not iden-
tical; still, they all indicate lack of commitment. The commitment in question 
may be pert inent to the t ru th , accuracy or appropriateness of the ut terance 
or a relevant pa r t of it. In sentences such as those in (4)- (6) their use has 
the effect of signalling to the addressee t ha t the propositional content of the 
sentence need not be taken literally, and the most insightful approximation of 
their meaning would be akin to "sort o f ' . 
In this paper I will restrict my attention to one of these i tems kaze ( ' such ' , 
'kind of'), in an attempt to shed light on its special meta-communicative 
characteristics and on the over-all t reatment within our pragmat ic theory of 
such lexical hedges.2 
2. kaze - syntactic and semantic properties 
2.1. Syntactic characterization 
As an adjective kaze displays the characteristic agreement with the noun which 
it modifies and may either precede or follow it as in the examples below: 
(7) (a) bayit kaze 
house(M) like this (M) 
(7) (a') kaze bayit 
such (M.SG) house 
2 
The American English colloquial use of like, t he Norwegian use of lisom and the use 
of kao in Serbo-Croat ian appear to display some of the pragmatic characterist ics which our 
instances of kaze exhibit . 
The semant ic similarity between the various i t ems and the a p p a r e n t pragmatic cor-
respondence in the i r extensions is indicative of a na tu ra l tendency for such developments, 
unde r the reasonable assumption t h a t these are independent linguistic phenomena. (I am 
indebted to Th . Fre theim and to V. Polovina for the d a t a on Norwegian and Serbo-Croat ian, 
respectively.) In Japanese , a related extension is evident with the use of tyotto 'a l i t t le ' as 
a similar lexical h e d g e (cf. Matsumoto 1990). 
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( 7 ) ( b ) agada kazot 
legend(F) like this (F) 
(7) (c) batim kaele / kaelu 
houses(M.PL) like these(PL) 
(7) (d) agadot kaele / kaelu 
legends(F.PL) like these 
In its newly acquired use as an adverbial kaze naturally ceases to manifest 
the various morphological realizations in t he feminine and in the plural and 
occurs invariably as kaze. 
The two instances of kaze differ also in their potential for accentuation. 
Only the adjectival, the so-called "original", kaze can be accented, the new 
adverbial item cannot be accented. 
Syntactically, the adverbial in question shows distributional properties 
tha t place it under what Quirk et al. (1985) refer to as ' subjunct ' , namely, an 
adverbial which, like a disjunct, cannot be the focus of a cleft construction, 
an alternative interrogative, or a restricting subjunct like 'only' .3 
It pre or post modifies whole VP ' s as in: 
] indicates material in the scope of kaze 
(8) bahatxa la ze [hevix oti] kaze ( taatuon p. 15) 
at the beginning it [embarrassed me] sort of/like this 
(9) (a) ani t amid kaze [carix sheyidxafu oti kcat] ( taatuon p. 36) 
I always sort of [need that will push (PL) me a little] 
(9) (b) im mishehu holex kaze [liftoax xanut mircono] (taatuon p. 13) 
if anybody goes sort of [to open a store out of will] 
It may occur between the main verb and its non-pronominal direct object 
post-modifying the main verb as in: 
(10) sheanaxnu yexolim [lehafxid] kaze et habecim shelahem 
that we can [to frighten] like ACC the balls their 
(taatuon p.12) 
When the direct object is a pronoun kaze follows it, as in: 
(11) [lakxu oto] kaze al alunka mi shama (taatuon p. 62) 
took(PL) him like on a stretcher f rom there 
о 
The impossibil i ty of the occurrence of ifcaze in these positions is clearly predicted by 
i ts non-accentuat ion. 
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Where the main verb occurs with some other complements or adjuncts kaze 
precedes the complements or adjuncts as in: 
(12) (a) ma , caak ecyon, mitparec kaze [baalicut] ladvarim shelo 
what shouted Ezion bursting like [gayly] to the words his 
(taatuon p. 56) 
(12) (b) mipney [sheze lo histader] kaze im hadmut shelo (taatuon p. 56) 
because [it not work out] like wi th his image 
It may modify certain descriptive adverbials or adjectives functioning 
predicatively as in: 
(13) haknisa elav[mugefet] kaze besorgey barzel ( taatuon p. 43) 
the entrance to it [closed] like with iron bars4 
These distributional properties of kaze, thus, strongly suggest t h a t it is 
functional in modifying the predicative entities. The fact that it cannot occur 
sentence initially seems to corroborate this hypothesis, under the assumption 
that it must be an immediate neighbour of the entities within its scope.5 
2.2. Semantic properties 
Semantically, the adjectival kaze means 'like this', 'such' , while its adverbial 
use acquired the meaning 'kind of', ' roughly speaking', 'approximately' . As 
such, it serves to modify the meaning of the items within its scope: t h e im-
mediately preceding or immediately following entity. T h e conceptual content 
added by kaze to the sentence is, clearly, t r u t h conditionally relevant, for the 
4
 An interest ing dis t r ibut ional characteristics is its potential double occurrence, once 
preceding and the other t ime following a given ent i ty , as in: 
(i) and Ezion turned to h im kaze muxan lehakot kaze ( t aa tuon p. 34) 
sort of ready to h i t kind of 
T h e two instances of kaze differ in scope, such t h a t one of them is properly included in the 
scope of the o ther . 
5
 The only apparent except ions occur in sentences or clauses with elliptical sub jec t s , 
thereby, again, modifying the predicative part of t h e sentence. Consider: 
(i) ima h a y t a kazoti t m i m a . kaze heemina, ana aref, 
mother was such naive, like believed, I know, 
bacad hatov shel haarvim 
in the side the good of the Arabs 
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propositional content of the sentence in question is affected by the hedging 
effect of the adverbial under consideration.6 
Consider its uses in the following examples: 
(14) and the American. . . can feel great., shehu megane kaze 
tha t he reproaches sort of 
et hamakim vetomex bamukim (taatuon p. 39) 
ACC the beaters and supports the bea ten 
(15) and I see the face of the stabber . . . . merutashot kaze 
smashed sort of (taatuon p. 36) 
(16) ..shoxev al haarec uvoxe kaze (taatuon p. 38) 
lying on the ground and crying like 
In these instances the speaker provides a description of an activity or an 
at tr ibute of some object and chooses to present his characterizations using 
hedged terminology. The natural expectation in such cases would, presum-
ably, be that terms of a scalar nature would be thus characterizable, so that 
the item in question would be modified in terms of the relative position which 
it occupies on the relevant scale. 
Instances like: 
(17) we are talking bekol ram kaze (taatuon p. 11) 
in a voice loud sort of 
(18) hu yafe kaze 
he handsome sort of 
where kaze seems to function as a diminisher of a nonexact type, indeed, 
occur, but the use of kaze does not require that the entit ies which it modifies 
be scalar, ra ther , it seems to impose a hedged sense on the items in question. 
Thus, examples like (14) and (16) above and (19) following 
(19) (a) loxacim yadayim kaze (taatuon p. 39) 
pressing hands like 
(19) (b) vekonfino nisa lenaer o to kaze (taatuon p. 41) 
and Konfino tried to shake him sort of 
abound. Presumably, the type of hedged description evident in such non-
scalar cases serves an important communicative need—the speaker's option 
g 
I will not elaborate here on the semantic propert ies and s t a t u s of hedges, b u t , pre-
sumably, some version of fuzzy logic of the type proposed in Lakoff (1972) will h a v e to be 
adopted to account for the meaning of such lexical items. 
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not to have to commit himself to any definite, precise characterization, if he 
so wishes.7 
The Gricean maxim of Quality dictates that the speaker should not say 
tha t which he believes to be false and t h a t for which he lacks adequate ev-
idence. Making imprecise, and under substantiated s tatements , thus, consti-
tu tes a blatant violation of the Cooperative Principle. Using an explicit hedge 
is, therefore a very useful conversational tool to avoid violating the CP. It is 
not the case, then , that the speaker cannot a t tempt to venture an opinion on 
or to provide an assessment of a given topic tentatively, it is only the case t h a t 
such tentativeness in expressing his opinion ought to be explicitly indicated. 
Diminishers such as kaze funct ion in expressing this tentativeness.8 '9 
This semant ic characterization predicts the ill-formedness of such sentences as: 
(i) exad veod exad hem shnayim * kaze 
one plus one are two sort of 
T h e hedgy kaze canno t co-occur with such well-known, non-controvertial truths. I t seems 
t h a t there is no relevant sense in which the speaker could be hedging in such cases, un-
der normal assumpt ions . Not surprisingly, M a t s u m o t o (1990) notes independently t h a t the 
Japanese coun te rpa r t of (i) with tyotto 'little' eis the lexical hedge is j u s t as infelicitous. How-
ever, she points ou t an interesting context where such sentences may become felicitous. T h i s 
is the case where t h e speaker is correcting the addresse ' s mistake in t h e addition opera t ion 
and is a t tempt ing to mitigate the effect of his u t t e r a n c e by presenting it in a " so f t ened" 
apologetic manner , akin to "if I may say so". No te tha t here it is no t the proposi t ional 
content that is be ing modified bu t , rather, the speech act itself. 
о 
At this po in t it may be interest ing to speculate about the na tu re of the semantic al ter-
nat ives designating tentativeness. Expressions such as "I 'm not sure" , "maybe", "p robab ly" 
and the like are no t as versatile in t e rms of dis t r ibut ion and wear the tentativeness on the i r 
sleeves. Kaze is a lot looser and i t s distributional properties make it considerably more 
functional in CIH. 
9
 The lack of commitment evident in the use of kaze is, sometimes, utilized to avoid 
specification in a part icular context , for reasons of ignorance, irrelevance or even in order to 
conceal some informat ion. The following example shows this use: 
(i) halaxti ba rxov kaze 
I walked in t h e street sort of (=wi th no pa r t i cu la r 
specification of the ac t iv i ty ) 
T h e sentence in (i) seems to convey a meaning s imi lar to that of 
(ii) stam halaxt i barxov 
just I walked in the street (with no par t icular reason 
or purpose) 
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3. Pragmatic characterization 
The semantic-pragmatic characterization adopted here presupposes a well-
defined function which is non-arbitrarily assigned to kaze. The straw-man pro-
posal t ha t kaze is a discourse entity whose sole function is "gaining t ime" as a 
kind of hesitation marker, is easily counterevidenced by its disributional con-
straints, on the one hand, and its non substitutability, on the other. Thus, the 
idea tha t kaze is a mere hesitation marker that is utilized as a filler in instances 
where the speaker is still undecided as to what it is tha t he wants to say would 
make the wrong predictions that it ought to be possible to insert it in any po-
sition tha t would be available for hesitation phenomena markers. Such is not 
the case. (Cf. Maclay-Osgood (1959) where the distributions of a variety of 
hesitation phenomena markers e.g. pauses—filled and unfilled—repeats and 
false s tar t s are discussed.) The fact tha t kaze can occur as a post-modifier 
in sentence final position indicates tha t it is not a "filler" in these cases. If 
we assume that some other instances of kaze could fulfil the filler role, then 
we would have to explain their non-substitutability with other hesitation phe-
nomena markers. Thus, there must be something unique about the occurrence 
of kaze and the only sound assumption consistent with these facts is that it 
contributes semantic content to the sentence.10 
In what follows I will show that in addition to its semantic "hedginess" 
kaze is functional in the modification of speech acts as well. It is used as 
a mitigating device. This pragmatic function will be examined in some detail 
and an a t tempt will be made to show tha t the meta-communicative properties 
associated with kaze follow from its semantic characteristics. The claim about 
such extensions of meanings will be corroborated by parallel developments 
both in the case of related lexical i tems in Hebrew and in instances of the 
counterpart or related lexical entities in other languages (cf. fn. 2). 
The occurrence of kaze-like lexical items in sentences such as : 
(20) at muxana kaze / ke'ilu laazor li? 
you ready sort of / as if to help me 
1 0
 I t is interesting to note in this context t ha t even the lexical i tem well which shows up 
in a variety of positions in the discourse in the guise of a filler, is not , in fact, a mere filler. 
It t u rns out tha t there are two distinct i tems well and that they differ in their discourse 
funct ion. One of them displays properties t ha t are associated wi th a predictable semantic 
content which is not in free variation with other hesitation phenomena markers (cf. Schiffrin 
(1985) and Gluckman (n.d.)). 
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is t o be accounted for in te rms other than the speaker's commitment to the 
t r u t h or lack thereof of the propositional content of the sentence. Such sen-
tences function as requests11 and any account based on their t ruth would of 
course be inapplicable, in principle. Rather, the occurrence of kaze in such 
sentences is to be explained in terms of their illocutionary force. Thus, kaze 
can occur in sentences expressing requests as an indicator of the speaker's lack 
of commitment to the appropriateness of the request. The request could be 
judged inappropriate in terms of politeness, for example. The speaker could 
be assumed to have taken the liberty of requesting something he should nor-
mally not have asked for, potentially from someone who it is presumptuous of 
h im to assume would comply wi th his request. The same is true in the case 
of questions, where the appropriateness s ta tus of the question at hand may 
call for a softener. Thus, if the question under consideration is in some sense 
in violation of normal assumptions about appropriateness in a given context, 
t hen the subjunct kaze would indicate tentativeness, which would function as 
a mitigating device.12 The prediction that we would make concerning the co-
occurrence of kaze with questions is the following: only questions which could 
count as impositions would seem to allow the occurrence of kaze; sincere ques-
t ions which do not seem to cause any embarrassment would disallow kaze in 
the i r domain. T h u s compare: 
(21) * matay hu magia kaze 
when he arrives (=When does he arrive kaze!) 
(22) at yexola kaze lehagid li lama lo bat? 
you can to tell me why not came (2FM) 
(Can you tell me kaze why you did not come?) 
In (22) the speaker is making explicit his awareness of the potential embarass-
men t in his question, no such embarrassment or inappropriateness is evident 
in (21), which constitutes a genuine request for information of a non-emotive 
type . 
1 1
 I will make no claim here abou t t h e syntactic s t a t u s of such sentences in CIH, whether 
t hey are to be analyzed as interrogat ives differing f rom their counte rpar t declaratives solely 
by rising intonation or whether t hey are to be regarded as declarat ives. Crucial in the 
p resen t context is t h e range of po t en t i a l illocutionary functions t h a t they display, which, 
no t surprisingly, is co-extensive wi th t h a t shown by interrogative sentences in English, for 
example . 
Incidentally, t h e literary Hebrew version of interrogatives with the particle haim is 
incompat ib le with t h e colloquial use of kaze 
12 
In this context cf. Mittwoch (1979), where final parenthet icals with questions are shown 
t o have a modifying or correcting func t i on with respect to the speech ac t performed. 
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The characterization of the pragmatic function of kaze as a mitigating 
device allows us to make the following prediction with respect to its distribu-
tion: kaze will not co-occur with orders. This prediction is indeed borne out, 
as is evident from the ill-formedness of sentences like 
(23) * shev besheket kaze (* indicates infelicity) 
sit still 
The decisive and authori tarian nature of orders is incompatible with the at-
tempt to mitigate them via some indications of inappropriatenss. Sentences 
with the explicit performative mecave 'order ' such as 
(24) ani mecave alexa lashevet besheket *kaze 
I order (on) you to sit still 
indicate this incompatibility even bet ter . 1 3 
In trying to account for the various uses of kaze it becomes patently obvi-
ous that in addition to i ts semantic content, kaze exhibits pragmatic extensions 
of its originally conceptual content. The common denominator is an overt in-
dication of the speaker's lack of commitment to the accuracy of the relevant 
description in or whole propositional content of the sentence in question or to 
the appropriateness of some aspect of the illocutionary force of the ut terance 
under consideration. The over-all effect is, then, one of absolving the speaker 
of the responsibility for the absolute t ru th or appropriateness of his s ta tement 
and as such it can function as a mitigation device. 
A satisfactory account of the natural extension of the meaning of kaze, 
would consider its original sense. Thus kaze 'like this' expresses similarity. Sim-
ilarity, as is well-known, is not an exact concept. It is clearly relativistic; similar 
in some respect (cf. Tversky-Gati 1978). Hence, it is close to the adjunct 'ap-
proximately'. The pragmatics of its non-committal use follows automatically 
from this semantic characterization. It is thus not surprising to find parallel 
developments in several unrelated languages (cf. fn. 2). In concluding, I would 
like to point out that the semantic minimization characteristic of kaze consti-
tutes evidence for its meta-communicative nature. Any a t tempt by the speaker 
to qualify his description in terms of the appropriate linguistic expression is 
by definition evidence for meta-communicative awareness. 
13 X 
Note t h a t if the per format ive verb is modified e.g. 'I sort of order you to X ' we may 
have a felicitous utterance, b u t we are certainly not dealing wi th a performative, bu t rather 
with a hedged performative. 
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4. Theoretical implications 
The account I propose of such lexical hedges within our pragmatic theory 
utilizes a version of the Gricean maxims. Any such a t t emp t at an over-all 
treatment will have to provide a non-ad-hoc explanation of the particular uti-
lization of the pertinent super-maxim ( Be Cooperative) with its corollary 
sub-maxims. A case can easily be made tha t the maxims of Quantity, Quality 
or Manner properly defined and extended can be adduced to account for the 
interpretation of the lexical hedge kaze in the case at hand. Thus , the maxim 
of Quantity with its subspecification whereby the speaker has to make his con-
tribution as informative as but not more informative than is required could 
easily be shown to account for the relevant use of kaze. Kaze makes sure t ha t 
the lack of specification evident in the context where it is used be acknowl-
edged and as such would not constitute an instance of violation of the relevant 
maxim of informativeness of the Cooperative Principle ( C P ) . In considering 
the Gricean maxim of Quality which dictates that the speaker 's contribution 
ought to be t rue and be supported by adequate evidence it is clear that kaze 
is utilized in an attempt not to violate tha t maxim: using kaze the speaker 
explicitly indicates that he indeed lacks the appropriate type of evidence and 
tha t his contribution may not necessarily be accurate. The explicit indication 
is supposed to absolve him from the responsibility to abide by these criteria. 
The use of kaze is thus accounted for also by the maxim of quality. 
As for the maxim of manner , here we seem to need a more liberal interpre-
tation for the account to follow through. To star t with, it is evident that this 
maxim is considerably vaguer than the others. So it is not surprising that we 
need to work harder to find a way to put it to use in explaining the properties 
of kaze. As a mat te r of fact, it is easier to show that the use of kaze stands in 
a blatant violation of this maxim. Thus, kaze introduces "obscurity of expres-
sion" due to i ts nonexact na ture , which is missing from the sentence once it 
is not used. On the other hand , two other sub-maxims making up this maxim 
'be brief' and 'be orderly' may be appealed to in our a t t emp t to explain the 
pragmatics of kaze. Both sub-maxims could be shown to be operative when in 
place of suggesting at relative length that the speaker is providing his descrip-
tion tentatively, we simply use the lexical marker kaze (cf. fn . 8). Needless to 
say that a more sophisticated argument could be constructed with sufficient 
ingenuity, t ha t would derive the properties of kaze from the maxim of manner. 
I do not wish to attempt such an account at this point, but I believe that my 
little excercise in this direction proved the ad-hoc nature of any such a t t empt 
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to account for the pragmatics of kaze on the basis of the various Gricean max-
ims. I thus hope to have established the need for a much tighter pragmatic 
framework within which such linguistic phenomena could be handled, in a 
principled manner. 
Various theoretical alternatives to the Gricean maxims exist. The seri-
ous contenders in the context under examination are the Hornian (Horn 1972, 
1985) and the Levensonian (Levenson 1987) versions which a t tempt to come 
up with an accurate and all-encompassing system of inferences. Thus, several 
specific hearer / speaker inferential principles are assumed to be operative in 
interpreting utterances. Still, adopting any of their proposed alternative appa-
ratuses leaves us with the challenge of a non-ad-hoc assignment of the relevant 
principles. Such an assignment is not a trivial procedure and it requires in-
dependent motivation which is, apparently, still unavailable. This alternative 
therefore does not fair bet ter as an explanation in the case at hand than the 
Gricean maxims. 
Sperber-Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory consti tutes an alternative to 
the Gricean CP with i ts sub-maxims. The Relevance Principle, from which all 
the other Gricean Maxims are supposed to follow, measures informativity in 
terms of cognitive effort . Despite its attractiveness, it seems to be insufficient 
in cases where social considerations such as politeness are concerned. Since 
it only allows for cognitive factors to be involved in the determination of 
informativity, this theory will necessarily at tr ibute an improbable cognitive 
content to otherwise purely social, interactional factors . The use of kaze as a 
mitigating device is j u s t such an example. This lexical hedge expresses lack of 
commitment with respect to the appropriateness of the utterance in question 
in terms of politeness, inter alia. Such properties cannot be accounted for by 
any exclusively cognitively oriented approach, such as the Relevance Principle 
(cf. Ziv (1988) for an extensive discussion of this issue). 
Kasher 's (1976, 1982, 1987a, 1987b) Rationality Principle is another at-
tempt to reduce the Gricean maxims to a single principle from which all the 
other maxims would follow. The principle of Rationality reads as follows: 
"Where there is no reason to assume the contrary, take the speaker to be 
a rational agent. His end and beliefs, in a context of utterance, should be 
assumed to supply a complete justification of his behaviour, unless there is 
evidence to the contrary." (1982,33) This principle, which clearly takes so-
cial factors into account, can be shown to make the right kind of predictions 
with respect to the properties of kaze as evident in the current paper. Un-
der the reasonable assumption (which underlies Kasher 's proposal) that the 
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various Gricean Maxims follow from the Rationality principle,14 it is easy to 
predict the characteristics of kaze. Just as we could predict i ts properties on 
the basis of the Gricean maxims of Quality and Quantity (see above) so it 
is possible to come up with an account in terms of the Rationality Principle. 
Here, though, we would not have a duplication in terms of explanatory prin-
ciples, since the overriding principle of Rationality will be invoked. The only 
problem worth clarifying at this point is the apparent contradiction between 
the non-commitment evident in the use of kaze and the informativity require-
ment which is at the heart of any theory of inference, Kasher 's Rationality 
theory constituting no exception.15 Thus, the use of the hedgy, non-committal 
kaze would appear to counter the basic communicative need to convey a high 
degree of informativity. This conflict can be resolved if we assume that vio-
lations of the informativity requirement are less costly in social terms than 
are corresponding violations of t ru th and accountability, in the relevant social 
environment. And indeed, the extensive use of lexical hedges like kaze seems to 
corroborate the suggestion tha t we do in fact consider violations of truth and 
unsubstantiated statements worse socially than corresponding violations of 
fullfledged informativity. Given this state of affairs, there seems to be no con-
tradiction between the rationality principle underlying human interaction and 
the general communicative principle of informativity. Accordingly, one need 
only be as informative as is possible under reasonable assumptions, without 
making any "irrational" social move, where by "irrational" is meant violating 
the Rationality Principle.16 In other words, the socially oriented Rationality 
principle would seem to make the correct predictions even with respect to 
apparent violations of the basic informativity requirement. 
We have thus shown that lexical hedges such as CIH kaze the function of 
which is to mitigate the speech act or to consti tute markers of tentativeness 
can be accounted for insightfully by invoking a version of the Gricean maxims 
which makes use of an overall Rationality Principle. 
1 4
 In Ziv (1988) I argue tha t Relevance cannot follow f rom Kasher's Rat ional i ty Principle. 
1 5
 Note tha t whether Relevance is derived from Rationali ty a' la Kasher , or whether 
it has to be established as an independent principle alongside Rat ional i ty (as I claim in 
Ziv (1988)), is immater ia l with respect to the issue at hand . In both cases it is clear t h a t 
informativi ty (which underlies Relevance) is a primary requirement in any theory of human 
inference. 
1 6
 In this context cf. Kasher (1988) where apparen t violations of t he requirement on 
informativi ty quoted by Keenan (1976) are resolved in a similar fashion. 
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ASPECT ET PERFORMATIVITÉ 
EN SLOVÈNE. PLAIDOYER 
POUR UNE HYPOTHÈSE DELOCUTIVE 
IGOR Z. ZAGAR 
Presque tous les verbes en slovène connaissent deux formes aspectuellement 
distinctes1 dont la distinction est même morphologiquement marquée: une 
forme perfective et une forme imperfective. Par conséquent, on peut dire, par 
exemple, Je promets, de deux façons différentes: 
Obljubljam (forme imperfective que je désignerai par;?/) 
et 
Obljubim (forme perfective que je désignerai раг/тр), 
mais seulement la première, la forme imperfective, est utilisée par les Slovènes 
dans le sens performatif, tandis que la forme perfective, fai t curieux, ne peut 
signifier que je suis prêt à promettre, je vais promettre — la simultanéité d 'une 
promesse, accomplie par le fait-même de l'énonciation, é tan t absente. 
Mais, en fait, qu'est-ce qu'on a dit si on a employé la forme «authentique», 
c'est-à-dire la forme imperfective? Avant tou t , qu'on n 'a toujours pas promis 
(ou juré, etc.), qu'on est, peut-être, en train de promettre, mais que, justement 
à cause du choix de la forme imperfective, la promesse n ' a toujours pas été et 
n 'a pas pû être donnée. Aussi longtemps que je promets/г/, je n'ai rien promis, 
et si je ne fais que promet t re^ / , je ne peux pas présenter quelque chose comme 
promis. 
Cependant , le fait reste que les Slovènes, quand ils veulent vraiment 
promettre, c'est-à-dire quand ils ne veulent pas seulement exprimer leur 
volonté de promettre, choisissent toujours la forme imperfective. La ques-
tion qui s'impose — peut-être pas pour un linguiste, mais sûrement pour un 
philosophe — est bien sûr: comment promettre ou, plus précisément, com-
ment donner une promesse? Même plus: peut-on jamais promett re en slovène, 
peut-on jamais présenter quelque chose comme promis? Cet te antinomie était 
1
 «Presque», dans ce cas, n 'est pas restrictif. Il veut dire seulement que certains verbes ne 
connaissent qu 'une seule forme, mais qui, elle aussi, connaît deux emplois aspectuellement 
distincts, par exemple: roditi 'donner naissance', krstiti 'baptiser ' , ubogati 'obéir', darovati 
'faire cadeau ' , zrtvovati 'sacrifier' , etc. 
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déjà présente et actuelle à la fin du XIX. siècle; à vrai dire, c'était jus tement 
cette antinomie qui a — un peu par mégarde — engendré les fondements de la 
théorie de la performativité en slovène, et cela, un demi-siècle avant Austin. 
Dans le présent article, j'essaierai de dépoussiérer une partie de la con-
troverse qui a opposée pendant trente ans les différents savants slovènes.2 
En 1892, à la couverture3 d'un journal , d'ailleurs consacré entièrement 
aux problèmes religieux, Cvetje z vertov sv. Franciska [Les Fleurs du Jardin 
de Saint-François], un frère franciscain, Stanislav Skrabec (1844-1918), a com-
mencé une polémique sur la différence d'emploi entre le présent perfectif et le 
présent imperfectif en slovène. L'enjeu de la controverse é ta i t le suivant: est-il 
légitime d'employer le présent perfectif (par exemple obljubim 'je promets ' ) 
à la place du fu tu r perfectif ou pas, vu que dans certaines régions limitro-
phes, surtout près des frontières italienne et hongroise, la population utilisait 
le présent perfectif à la place du futur perfectif? 
La première chose, un peu inhabituelle pour l'époque, que Skrabec a faite, 
é ta i t sa répartit ion des verbes slovènes: il ne les a pas répartis d'après les temps, 
comme c'était d'usage, mais d'après les deux aspects. En slovène on a donc, 
avant tout: 
a) des verbes perfectifs (obljubiti 'promettre ' ) 
b) des verbes imperfectifs (obljubljati 'promettre ' ) , 
et c'est les aspects qui gouvernent l'emploi des temps, nullement le contraire. 
Les verbes imperfectifs connaissent ainsi trois temps: 
- praesens (obljubl jam 'je p romets^ / ' ) , 
- imperfectum (obljubljal sem 'je promettais ') , 
- futurum (obljubljal bom ' je p romet t ra i^ / ' ) 
et les verbes perfectifs quatre temps: 
- perfectum (obljubil sem ' j ' a i promis'), 
- plusquamperfectum (obljubil sem bil ' j 'avais promis'), 
- futurum exactum (obljubil bom 'je promet t ra ipp ' ) , 
- aorist (obljubim 'je p rometspp ' ) . 
2 
Je serai, bien sûr, obligé d ' abréger , mais je d i scu te ce débat en détail dans mon livre 
Zagatnost performativnost i ali kako obljubiti [Les impasses de la performat iv i té ou comment 
promettre] . DZS, Ljubl jana 1989. 
«A la couverture» veut di re l i t téralement à la couverture, parce que c 'était le seul 
espace dont il pouvai t profiter p o u r publier ses écri ts linguistiques. 
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Une chose est claire pour Skrabec (1887: VII /2) , c'est que d'après cette 
classification, la forme aoristique obljubim (utilisée dans certaines régions à 
la place du futur perfectif) ne peut pas dénoter un acte au présent parce 
qu'elle n 'est «praesens» que de par sa forme, et non de par son contenu. Le 
vrai «praesens» ne peut dénoter que ce qui se déroule, ce qui est en train 
de se dérouler au moment de la parole, bien que l 'aoriste annonce seulement 
l'accomplissement de l 'acte mentionné, quelque soit le temps, il est donc aoriste 
dans le vrai sens du terme qui veut dire «illimité», c'est-à-dire n ' indiquant pas 
une data t ion précise. Et puisque qu'il s'agit d'un temps illimité, l 'aoriste peut 
être employé soit pour un acte qui e s t / a été déjà accompli, soit pour un acte 
qui ne sera accompli qu'à l'avenir — si le sens de l'énoncé est suffisamment 
expliqué par le contexte. Si ce n'est pas le cas, il faut employer les formes plus 
définies dont dispose la langue slovène, c'est-à-dire soit le perfectum (obljubil 
sem) pour le passé, soit le futurum exactum (obljubil bom) pour le fu tur . 
Son collègue Luka Pintar (1857-1915), linguiste et historien de la 
l i t térature, a été beaucoup plus précis et restrictif dans ses définitions. Avec des 
verbes perfectifs, dit-il, on ne dénote qu 'un fait, c'est-à-dire l'accomplissement 
d'un fai t , tandis qu'avec des verbes imperfectifs, on dénote sa durée. C'est 
pourquoi il pense injustifié la division entre un vrai présent, qui dénotera le 
déroulement d'un fait dans le présent, et un présent illimité, un aoriste, qui 
ne dénotera que l'accomplissement d 'un acte. 
Le vrai présent, dit-il, est celui qui dénote ce qui est réellement présent, 
et non pas ce qui a été — en raison d 'une narration plus vive — seulement 
transposé au présent. Et ce qui est réellement présent, ce n'est pas seulement 
ce qui se déroule au présent ou ce qui est en train de se passer, mais aussi ce 
qui — au moment où je le constate — s'accomplit. Je donnepi, je prêtepi, je 
remetsjri, sont des vrais présents (ils dénotent que je suis en train de donner, 
prêter ou remettre), mais je donnepp, je prêtepp, je remetspp, sont des vrais 
présents aussi si — en les énonçant — j 'accompagne l'accomplissement d 'un 
acte, c'est-à-dire si je constate l'accomplissement aussi verbalement (Pintar 
1890,686). 
D'après Pintar donc — et contrairement à Skrabec —, «le vrai présent» se 
divise en présent au sens duratif, pour lequel on emploie des verbes imperfec-
tifs, et en présent au sens factuel, pour lequel on emploie des verbes perfectifs. 
Mais qu'est-ce-que le sens «factuel»? 
D'après Pintar, on a affaire au sens factuel d 'un verbe quand on conçoit 
une action en soi-même, indivisée en commencement, déroulement et accom-
plissement, quand on la conçoit dans «une seule pensée indivisible», sans tenir 
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compte de la durée et du résultat de cette action, bref, quand on constate un 
fai t . 
Ce qui est tellement important dans cette délimitation entre le présent 
duratif et le présent factuel, c'est le changement de niveau que commet Pintar 
quand il donne des exemples pour son «présent factuel». Le présent factuel, 
dit-il, c'est le présent avec lequel je constate un fait , quand j 'accompagne 
l'accomplissement d'un fait (par exemple, quand je donne quelque chose à 
quelqu'un) aussi verbalement. L'exemple qu'il présente en détail est l 'emploi 
du verbe se recommander. 
Je me recommande p i , dit-il, quand je cite à la personne à laquelle je 
me recommande mes références, mes avantages et mes capacités (facultés), 
mais, par contre, quand je fais mes adieux, quand je prends congé, et quand 
je constate mon désir que la personne en question se souvienne de moi, alors 
je me recommande pp. 
Ce qui a échappé à Pin tar , c'est un fait extraordinaire, à savoir que 
le verbe se recommander (ou avouer, qu'il évoque également) se comporte 
différemment que les verbes donner, prêter ou remettre, verbes qu'il avait 
cités à l 'appui de son présent factuel. C'est-à-dire que, avec le verbe se recom-
mander, on ne peut pas accompagner ou constater un fait qui soit accompli 
indépendemment de la profération de ce verbe, comme par exemple dans le cas 
de donner (ou prêter ou remettre). Le verbe se recommander ne peut constater 
que soi-même, son propre emploi et énonciation, il est donc son propre fai t , 
son propre acte: on ne peut se recommander qu'en disant je me recommande! 
C'était en 1890. Il lui faudra 20 ans de polémique pour s'apercevoir de 
cette distinction. Mais suivons d'abord les échos polémiques qu 'a déclenchés 
sa définition du présent factuel. 
Son plus sévère critique était Viktor Bezek (1860-1920), pédagogue et 
linguiste. Pour lui, le présent n'est rien d 'aut re qu'une limite qui se déplace 
toujours entre le passé et le présent, sans dimension, comme un point 
mathématique qui fuit incessamment. Essayer de arrêter ou fixer cette limite 
est impossible, parce que dans l'instant même où on ouvre la bouche pour la 
constater, elle est déjà passée. Constater le présent, dit-il, ce serait la même 
chose que'arrêter le temps (Bezek 1891, 632). 
En 1892, Skrabec est toujours d'accord avec Bezek sur le concept du 
présent et l'impossibilité de l'emploi du présent perfectif au présent, bien que 
ce qui l'interesse, c'est l'impossibilité de l'emploi du présent perfectif au fu tur : 
Le présent perfectif annonce, sans que le temps concret soit pris en con-
sidération, le commencement d 'une action. Mais nous ne pouvons pas concevoir 
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de commencement ni dans le passé ni dans quelque aut re temps, à moins que 
ce ne soit évident à pa r t i r des autres expressions de l 'énoncé. Nous ne pouvons 
pas concevoir de commencement comme comprenant tout le t emps du discours 
non plus, parce que un discours, si bref soit-il, est quand même quelque chose 
de durable; un commencement , par contre, n'est q u ' u n instant qui est soit dé jà 
passé avant même q u ' o n l 'annonce, soit qu'on n ' a t t e n d que pendant le discours, 
et qui se situe donc d a n s le futur , si proche soit-il (Skrabec 1892: XI /2 ) . 
C 'es t vrai que le présent perfectif en slovène fait penser au fu tur , dit 
Skrabec, mais ce n ' es t pas la même chose quand on dit : 
To kravo prodam ( J e vends^p ce t te vache), 
ou 
To kravo bom prodal (Je vendrai/гр cette vache). 
Avec la première phrase je n ' annonce que la volonté de vendre, s'il y aura 
des acheteurs, avec la deuxième, la certi tude que le marché a u r a lieu. 
Néanmoins, il ressent déjà l ' impasse d'une tel le définition de l 'emploi du 
présent perfectif, et cela justement au sujet des performatifs: 
Faire un éloge en disant «Je te louepp», ce n'est pas slovène; chez 
nous, on loue en disant «bien, tu as bien fait, tu es sage», etc. Dire 
«Je me recommandepp, je m'inclinepp», c'est un barbarisme. E t «Je me 
recommandepi, je m'inclinepi», pas beaucoup moins . Si quelqu'un s'incline, le 
Slovène le voit, s'il n ' e s t pas aveugle, pourquoi le raconter donc? S'il dit qu'il se 
recommande, mais ne dit rien qui pourra i t servir comme recommandat ion, je 
crois que c'est comme si quelqu'un disait «Je travaille», mais en même temps, 
il demeurai t les ma ins croisées à l 'ombre et sommeillait . — D a n s ce groupe 
se s i tuent aussi les expressions: je prometsFP, je remerciepp, je garantisFp, 
je commande F p, je déments pp, j'ordonne pp, je conclus pp, je m'engagepp, 
je conjure pp, je renonce FP, je confesseFP, etc. P a r rapport au vrai présent, 
ce sont des germanismes et des latinismes. Mais on ne peut pas employer des 
verbes imperfectifs à leur place non plus, parce que l'accomplissement d'une 
action doit être exprimé (Skrabec 1892: XI/3) . 
E t c'est là tou t le problème qui , comme dans un cercle vicieux, continuera 
à se reposer pendant dix ans: comment accomplir une action qui ne peut ê t re 
accomplie que par Dénonciation du verbe ment ionnant cette ac t ion , vu que: 
1) le présent perfectif ne peut pas dénoter des act ions qui s 'accomplissent au 
présent; 
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2) le présent imperfectif ne peut dénoter que des actions qui se déroulent et 
pas celles qui s'accomplissent au présent? 
Ce n'est qu'en 1910 que Luka Pintar trouvera une réponse «logique» à ces 
questions: 
Est-ce qu'on peut toujours appeler illimité ce qui est exclu du présent? 
Parce que l'exclusion du présent est aussi une limitation. Et si quelque chose 
est vraiment illimité — comme était supposé l'être le présent perfectif ou 
aoristique —, il doit être réalisable non seulement au passe ou au futur , mais 
aussi au présent (Pintar 1910, 500). 
A partir de cette définition, Pintar revient à son exemple d'il y a vingt 
ans, quand il a at t r ibué aux verbes comme je donne, je prête, je remets, la pos-
sibilité d'accomplir l 'action qu'ils mentionnaient, et introduit une distinction 
entre ce qu'il appelle le praesens effectivum et le praesens instans: 
Je donne est de par la modalité (un) potentiel, de par le temps (un) 
présent, mais si ce n'est pas un présent factuel ou praesens effectivum, on pour-
rait l 'appeler praesens instans (présent imminent ) . . . On appelle un présent 
imminent ce qui peut s'accomplir à chaque instant, ce qui va s'accomplir dans 
un futur très proche, ce qui est en t ra in de s'accomplir, même ce qui vient de 
s'accomplir (Pintar 1910, 502). 
Avec cette distinction entre praesens effectivum et praesens instans, Pin-
tar a produit une distinction très importante à l'intérieur de la catégorie du 
présent perfectif, corroborée par deux distinctions extérieures (extérieures en 
tant qu'elles délimitent le présent perfectif par rappor t au présent imperfectif): 
1) modale (le présent perfectif étant «problématique» et «potentiel», le présent 
imperfectif (par contre) «assertoire» et «indicatif»); 
2) généalogico-taxonomique (le présent perfectif é tan t «particulier», le présent 
imperfectif (par contre) «général»). 
On emploie des verbes perfectifs pour exprimer des jugements problé-
matiques, c'est-à-dire de par leur modalité potentiels et subjectifs, et des 
verbes imperfectifs pour exprimer des jugements assertoires, immédiatement 
valables, de par leur modalité donc indicatifs. 
La différence entre le présent perfectif et le présent imperfectif est donc — 
d'après Pintar — dans la possibilité de montrer l ' a t t i tude de celui qui pense, 
juge ou énonce quoi que ce soit, à l'égard de la pensée ou jugement énoncé. Le 
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présent perfectif serait ainsi une instantiation du présent imperfectif, une par-
ticularisation de la forme générale, en tant que tel subordonné à la généralité, 
mais, justement à cause de sa particularité, parce qu'un énonciateur particulier 
exprime de par cette forme particulière (et particularisée) son attitude (par-
ticulière) par rapport au contenu propositionel général, impossible à ramener 
à la forme générale. 
C'est justement par cette particularité énonciative que Pintar motive la 
nécessité d'emploi de la 1. personne du présent pour l 'accomplissement d'une 
action qui ne peut s'accomplir que par la seule profération du verbe qui la 
mentionne: 
On peut facilement trouver une raison pour cet te limitation à la 1. per-
sonne du singulier. C'est que pour moi-même, je suis en position de savoir ce 
que je viens de conclure, déterminer etc. Quant aux autres, je ne possède pas 
un tel savoir, et si je ne le possède pas, je ne peux pas l 'exprimer non plus 
(Pintar 1910, 567). 
Skrabec, lui, a essayé de réconcilier la théorie et l'empirie par une autre 
voie, par la délimitation entre l'emploi du présent perfectif et l 'emploi du futur 
perfectif. 
On pourrait résumer ses points de vue d'alors en deux thèses: 
1. Dans le présent perfectif, les Slaves du Sud — et surtout les Slovènes — ne 
voient pas et n'ont jamais vu un futur ; 
2. On emploie le présent perfectif pour dénoter l 'accomplissement d'un acte 
dans un temps indéfini, c'est-à-dire comme présent historique ou aoriste 
gnomique. 
Mais jusqu'à la polémique entre Bezek et Pintar dans les années 1890-91, 
Skrabec n 'a défini le présent perfectif que par rappor t au futur , négligeant 
ainsi le deuxième chaînon du dispositif perfectif/imperfectif. Cet te polémique 
lui offre la possibilité de le délimiter aussi par rapport au présent imperfectif. 
Pour une action inaccomplie, en 1897, il s 'accorde avec Bezek: on ne 
peut pas employer un verbe perfectif, mais, ce qui est évident, seulement 
un verbe imperfectif. Le présent d 'un verbe imperfectif indique seulement la 
durée, qui peut comprendre aussi le moment d'un véritable présent, mais pas 
nécessairement (ce «pas nécessairement» sera épistémologiquement très trou-
blant dans les discussions ultérieures de la performativité en slovène). Qu'est-
ce que cela veut dire, «pas nécessairement»? 
Le présent, argumente Skrabec (1897: XVI/8), n 'est au fond qu 'un instant 
entre le passé et le fu tur . L'accomplissement d 'un acte, lui aussi, n 'est qu'un 
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ins tant . Et si l 'acte s'accomplit par l'énonciation même du verbe qui dénote 
cet acte, alors on doit s'accorder que les deux tombent dans un seul instant, 
puisque l'accomplissement et l 'annonce de l 'acte font un. 
Bref, s'il y a des actions qui s'accomplissent par l 'énonciation même des 
verbes qui les dénotent — une opt ion qu'il refusait à l'époque — les verbes en 
question doivent ê t re énoncés en forme perfective, parce que l'aspect imperfec-
tif donne une trop vive impression que l'action dénotée n'a pas été accomplie. 
Cet te théorisation de Skrabec a subi de sévères critiques. Même l'action 
accomplie par un seul mot, affirme le professeur Ra jko Perusek (1854-1917), le 
plus virulant critique de Skrabec, dure au moins autant de temps qu'il en faut 
pour que ce mot soit énoncé; cet te action commence par le commencement et 
s 'accomplit par la fin du mot, et même le mot le plus bref dure un certain 
temps. 
En fait, au cours de son argumentation, il s 'avère que la controverse per-
formative (en tant que déjà formée comme telle) ne porte pas sur le concept du 
langage, mais sur le concept de la réalité. Perusek écrit que dans la vie quotidi-
enne, on ne peut pas concevoir le présent comme un point sans dimension qui 
séparerait le passé et le futur, mais comme une série, tantôt plus longue tantôt 
plus courte, des moments temporels qui se succèdent. Le présent ne peut donc 
pas ê t re représenté par un point dans lequel coïncideraient le commencement 
et la fin, c'est même logiquement impossible: 
Chaque discours dure au moins quelques instants et un tel discours 
dépasserait aussitôt ce point sans dimension; ce point serait ainsi pour le lo-
cuteur passé. Ou bien il devrait se dépecher en parlant, jusqu ' à ce que ce 
moment n'arrive; ce point serait ainsi pour le locuteur dans le fu tu r (Perusek 
1910, 15-16). 
La conclusion qu'il en tire: puisque le présent s'étend aussi un peu au passé 
et un peu au fu tu r , même les act ions qui s'accomplissent par l'énonciation 
même des verbes qui les dénotent, doivent emprunter le présent imperfectif. 
Malheureusement pour lui et heureusement pour la théorie performative, 
Perusek avait mal choisi son exemple, se confesser, et son commentaire a 
été encore moins pertinent: le salut de l'âme, se demande-t-il, dépend-il des 
quelques caractères de plus qu'a la forme imperfective izpovedujem se 'je me 
confessep/ ' par rappor t à la forme perfective izpovem se 'je me confessepp'? 
Skrabec, qui é ta i t un saint homme, a violemment — mais théoriquement 
très productivement — répondu à ce «blasphème»: 
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L'accomplissement d'un acte de confession, écrit-il, ne dépend pas seule-
ment de la juste forme du verbe, mais de l'intention du confesseur autorisé 
(Skrabec 1911: XXVIII /5) . 
En 1911, l 'accomplissement d 'une action ne dépend plus — ou pas seule-
ment — de la jus te forme du verbe, c'est-à-dire de la forme qui exprime 
l 'accomplissement d 'une action, comme il a exigé à l 'époque. Au contraire, 
Skrabec y ajoute deux conditions supplémentaires: 
1. une intention (déterminée) 
et 
2. une personne autorisée. 
П connaît déjà la sui-référentialité (qui, à vrai dire, n 'a été postulée ex-
plicitement que par Benveniste), maintenant il pose encore deux conditions de 
la performativité réussie: 
1. condition qui exige que l 'énonciateur du verbe performatif donné ait vrai-
ment l'intention d'accomplir l 'action dénotée par le verbe); 
2. condition qui exige que l 'action dénotée par le verbe (performatif) ne 
peut être accomplie que par une personne autorisée, dans les circonstances 
déterminées. * 
Ce qui lui manque encore, c'est la condition qui exige que le verbe perfor-
matif soit proféré à la 1. personne du présent, condition qui a été théoriquement 
déjà postulée par Pintar . Deux mois plus tard il écrit: 
Et parce que l 'acte est accompli par celui qui profère le mot , le verbe doit 
se trouver à la première personne du présent, d 'habi tude au singulier, seule-
ment dans les chansons, quand il y a plusieurs personnes qui chantent à l'ésprit 
unique, au pluriel. La troisième personne peut seulement exceptionnellement 
remplacer la première (Skrabec 1911: XXVIII/7) . 
Skrabec a donc formulé presque toutes les conditions de la performativité 
réussie,4 exigées par Austin presque un demi siècle plus tard. Mais si Austin 
a formulé sa théorie dans le passage du champ philosophique au champ lin-
guistique, Skrabec, lui, est resté et a bricolé dans le champ linguistique même. 
Cependant , sa théorie performative est un produit accessoire et fortuit , issu 
d 'une controverse purement grammaticale, mais dès que le concept de la per-
formativité a commencé à prendre forme — si imparfaite fût-elle à l 'époque 
4
 A l'exception de la condition exigant l 'accomplissement correct et complet d 'un acte 
performatif par tous les part icipants. 
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—, c'est lui, le concept de la performativité encore naissant, qui maîtrise le 
débat, même au niveau grammatical dont il est issu!5 C'est-à-dire, que les 
concepts de la théorie de départ, de la théorie des aspects, sont construits et 
reconstruits, définis et redéfinis, dans le but de la complétude et du meilleur 
fonctionnement de la (méta)théorie performative, et pas dans le but de leur 
propre meilleur fonctionnement. On est donc confronté à une situation para-
doxale: on a affaire à deux théories, une théorie de base (théorie des aspects) 
et une métathéorie (théorie de la performativité), cette dernière engendrée, un 
peu par hasard, par la discussion concernant les problèmes de la théorie de 
base (emploi des différents aspects). 
Mais une fois tracée, la métathéorie accessoire devient tellement puissante 
que c'est elle qui oriente le débat concernant les problèmes de la théorie de 
base. En revanche, c'est justement leur solution (la solution des problèmes de 
la théorie de base) qui la rend (la théorie de la performativité) inopérante. A 
savoir, on a d'un côté la théorie, exigeant que les verbes, dont l'énonciation 
même accomplit les actes qu'ils dénotent , doivent être énoncés en forme per-
fective, parce que des verbes imperfectifs — malgré l 'intention du locuteur — 
donnent une trop vive impression que l 'acte dénoté n 'a pas été accompli, et de 
l 'autre la réalité qui la contredit, n'utilisant pour l'accomplissement des actes 
performatifs que des formes imperfectives. « 
Si on prend en considération tous ces faits — et contra factum non datur 
logica, affirme Skrabec — on serait obligé de conclure qu'en slovène on ne peut 
promett re ou jurer ou accomplir un quelconque acte performat i f . . . que par 
mégarde. Peut-on évitei une telle conclusion? 
On trouve une ébauche de solution de ce problème, malheureusement non 
développée, dans une dérive de la pensé de Skrabec. En 1897, une des raisons 
par lesquelles il justifie l'emploi, en slovène, des verbes dont l 'énonciation même 
accomplit des actes qu'ils dénotent, a été le fait historique que les Slovènes 
n'accomplissaient pas depuis toujours les dits actes par l 'énonciation des verbes 
qui les dénotaient. Il situe la coupure après l 'acceptation du christianisme, plus 
précisément, après la traduction de la bible et des écrits liturgiques en slovène, 
parce que ce n'était que des écrits liturgiques qui avaient présenté des formules 
— pour l'accomplissement des actes qui ne peuvent être accomplis que par 
l'énonciation des verbes qui les dénotent — que l'usage séculier a pu prendre 
pour modèle. 
5
 J 'essaie de montrer dans le chapitre I I / A de mon livre (voir note 2) et dans un article 
inédit «The Obligation to Keep a Promise» (1987), que même la «découverte» de la perfor-
mat ivi té par Austin a été en quelque sorte accessoire et fortuite, issue d 'un changement de 
champ conceptuel. 
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A un certain moment donc, une formule conversationnelle obljubljampi 
apparaît, qui est employée pour que le locuteur, de par le fait de dire obljubl-
j a m p i , p romet te quelque chose à son allocutaire. D est probable, dit Skrabec, 
que pendant un certain temps, deux formes concurrentes coexistaient, oblju-
bim Fp et obljubljampi. Mais puisque certains dialectes slovènes ont déjà 
adopté la forme perfective pour exprimer le futur (perfective), la forme im-
perfective a commencé de servir pour exprimer le praesens effectivum! 
Ce qu'il propose, implicitement, est donc une hypothèse délocutive de la 
performativité en slovène. Quand je parle d'une hypothèse délocutive de la 
performativité, je ne me réfère pas à la délocutivité benvenistienne, mais à 
la délocutivité généralisée, développée par J . C. Anscombre.6 De ses propres 
mots: 
Il s 'agit d 'un processus destiné à rendre compte de cas où une formule 
Fi de valeur sémantique Si peut donner naissance à un morphème F2 dont la 
valeur sémantique S2 fait intervenir la valeur en énonciation de Fi (Anscombre 
1980,115). 
Anscombre propose un schéma à cinq étapes que je vais, pour conclure, 
essayer d 'appliquer au cas de je promets FI slovène, pour corroborer ainsi l'idée 
de Skrabec. Il s'agit, bien sûr, d'un essai schématique. 
1. A une certaine époque, le slovène possède le morphème obljuba 
'promesse', avec le sens «engagement de (faire) quelque chose». Dans le pre-
mier dictionnaire de la langue littéraire slovène (Glonar 1936, 247), on trouve 
effectivement sous obljuba, «obljubo d a t i + : obljubiti» 'donner une promesse"1": 
promettre ' , la petite croix marquant que l'expression à gauche des deux points 
est hors d 'usage, l'expression à droite é t an t celle qui l ' a remplacée. Ce qui 
montre qu 'à une certaine époque, pour accomplir un acte de promesse, par 
exemple, les Slovènes n'employaient pas encore de verbe qui, de par sa pro-
pre énonciation, accomplissait l'acte qu'il mentionnait, mais plutôt une forme 
périphrastique. 
2. Apparit ion d'une formule F l = obljubljam\ (je promets^ / ) , par la-
quelle le locuteur s'engage à (faire) quelque chose à travers une loi de discours 
comme: «Si X dit à Y qu'il lui promet FI de faire quelque chose, c'est qu'il 
s'engage à faire quelque chose». D'après Skrabec, une telle formule apparaî t 
après l 'acceptation du christianisme. 
3. Pendant un certain temps, deux formes concurrentes coexistent, oblju-
bim f p et obljubljamFI• Mais puisque la forme perfective a déjà été adoptée 
6
 Voir su r tou t Anscombre 1979a, 1979b et 1980. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 38, 1988 
286 IGOR 2. 2 AG A R 
pour exprimer le futur (perfective), un nouveau morphème F2 = obljubljarri2, 
est fabriqué, dont la valeur sémantique S2 = «faire l 'acte qu 'on fait en disant 
obljubljami», contient une allusion à l'emploi de Fi du s tade 2. 
4. Puisque F i et F2 sont formellement identiques, les emplois de F i du 
stade 2 sont (à une certaine époque) relus en donnant à Fi la valeur sémantique 
S2. Obljubljami est donc relu comme obljubljami, ce qui veut dire que je fais 
quelque chose parce que je dis le faire. 
5. S'il y a identité formelle entre Fi et F2, les emplois de Fi du s tade 
3 peuvent (à une certaine époque) également être relus en donnant à F i la 
valeur sémantique S2, ce qui donne: obljubljami = «faire l 'acte que l 'on fait 
en disant obljubljami». 
Cette dérivation montre que l'accomplissement de l ' ac te de promesse (et , 
en principe, de tous les actes performatifs en slovène; le cas de promettre n ' a 
été pris que comme modèle pour des verbes de dire en général) ne dépend 
ni de l'intention du locuteur, ni de la jus te forme du verbe (prétendument 
performatif), mais simplement d'un fait banal qu'en slovène, il est (devenu) 
d'usage de promet t re (et, de par ce fait, accomplir un acte de promesse) en 
disant obljubljam jrI, et pas obljubimpp. 
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